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The sixteenth edition of the Employment in Europe appears just after the European Union's enlarge-
ment to twenty-five Member States in May 2004. This unprecedented enlargement is a milestone in
the history of European integration and has led to a united European continent sharing common val-
ues, fostering economic growth and social cohesion and strengthening Europe's role in a globalised
world.
The most fundamental objective of the European Union, however, remains unchanged: to help raise
the living standards and the quality of life of its citizens. This implies improving the growth perform-
ance of the EU economy on a sustainable basis; pursuing the way back to full employment in Europe;
enhancing productivity and quality in work ("better jobs"); and fostering social cohesion and inclu-
sion.
Achieving full employment and reinforcing social cohesion will largely depend on an appropriate
macroeconomic policy-mix and on effective employment and social policies. First, an appropriate pol-
icy setting would ensure high levels of business and consumer confidence and thus help maintain
buoyant demand levels throughout the economic cycle. Second, effective employment and social
policies are key to reducing poverty, social exclusion and regional imbalances, in turn helping to man-
age properly the social consequences of economic change.
The parallel development of economic and social prosperity is central to the European Social Model.
In its diverse forms in the Union, the model has played a crucial role in helping to lift productivity and
living standards across Europe. It has also helped to ensure that the benefits are widely shared, recog-
nising that we cannot make our economies stronger by making sections of society poorer.
Against this background, the current report shows that the EU25 is potentially well placed to take
advantage of the opportunities provided by enlargement. Following the economic slowdown of
recent years, the report also documents some encouraging signs of a global economic recovery which
may eventually help put Europe back on track towards the ambitious Lisbon objective for the EU “to
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sus-
tainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. 
The report shows that success will depend crucially on continuing reforms of our financial, labour and
product markets; the integration of markets for services; and the strengthening of investments in life-
long learning, education, and research and development, thus helping all Member States to emulate
the positive employment dynamics we observe in the best performing countries in the EU. Unless we
further change our policies and improve the implementation and coordination of policies at EU-level,
however, we are unlikely to achieve the Lisbon targets for higher employment rates.
In particular, the encouraging signs of an upturn in economic growth have not yet been translated
into more jobs. Average employment growth in Europe virtually stagnated in 2003 and was negative
in nearly half of the Member States. Although there is evidence of continuous improvements in
labour market participation of older people across most of Europe, labour market prospects have
clearly deteriorated over recent years in other groups, notably young people and people with low
skills.
It is clear from the report that Europe must now effect a step change in meeting the challenge of eco-
nomic growth, competitiveness, full employment and social cohesion. And it is equally clear that part-
nership and social dialogue are key to ensuring effective implementation of the necessary reform
measures on the ground. According to the report, the most important reforms are :
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Foreword by the Commissioner
• making labour market institutions such as employment services, benefit systems and education
and training more responsive to the needs of individual workers and to changing economic con-
ditions;
• tailoring tax-benefit systems and active labour market policies to the needs of the most vulnera-
ble groups in the labour market, with a view to increasing their employability, employment stabil-
ity and adaptability to change;
• combining flexibility and security on the job market in a way which helps increase both produc-
tivity and the quality of jobs, by guaranteeing security for individual workers whilst at the same
time allowing firms the flexibility needed to continue creating jobs;
• exploiting better the job creation potential in the services sector - and in high-skill, high-wage
services in particular - by raising investment in research and development, increasing labour mar-
ket participation of women and older people, and supporting both public and private demand for
services;
• encouraging all economic actors to seize the opportunities offered by globalisation, while devel-
oping accompanying measures to anticipate short-term shocks and to cope with temporary and
local hardships.
I expect the findings of this report to be a useful input into the Commission's thinking on the mid-
term review of the Lisbon strategy. But I trust that the report is also helpful in explaining to EU citi-
zens the employment challenges which face the enlarged EU and how the EU can add value in meet-
ing those challenges.
Stavros Dimas
4
Foreword by the Commissioner.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3
Executive summary .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .9
Chapter 1 - Panorama of the European labour markets .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .19
1. Introduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .19
2. Recent labour market performance .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .19
2.1. Overall EU labour market performance in 2003 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .19
2.2. General employment and unemployment developments over 2003 
and short-term prospects.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .20
2.2.1. Employment growth across Member States.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .20
2.2.2. Overall developments in unemployment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .21
2.2.3. Short-term prospects.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .21
3. Labour market situation in 2003 in the enlarged EU.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .23
3.1. Unemployment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .23
3.2. Activity rates.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .25
3.3. Employment rates and the Lisbon and Stockholm targets.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .26
3.3.1. Overall employment rate developments and progress in relation to 
the Lisbon and Stockholm targets.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .26
3.3.2. Employment rate developments at Member State level in 2003.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .29
3.4. Recent employment trends according to type of employment. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .29
3.4.1. Part-time employment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .29
3.4.2. Fixed-term employment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .30
3.5. Skills and employment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .31
3.6. Developments in the labour market situation for young people.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .33
4. Focus on specific developments in the EU15 and the new Member States.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .36
4.1. Continued overall resilience of the EU15 labour market to the recent slowdown, 
but concerns in specific areas.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .36
4.1.1. Overall developments and comparison with developments in the US.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .36
4.1.2. Sectoral employment developments.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .37
4.1.3. Employment developments by age-group, gender and type of employment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .38
4.2. Labour market developments in the new Member States 1998-2003.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .39
4.2.1. Developments in 2003.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .39
4.2.2. Longer term developments in the labour market.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .39
5. Sectoral employment structure and trends.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .42
5.1. Sectoral employment structure in the EU25 in 2003.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .42
5.1.1. Comparison of employment structure in the EU25, EU15 and new Member States.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .42
5.1.2. Sectoral developments in the EU25 in 2003.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .43
5.2. Changes in sectoral employment in the new Member States in recent years.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .44
6. Demographic trends.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .52
7. Update on immigration and labour market integration.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .53
8. Medium-term employment rate projections.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .55
The Lisbon/Stockholm employment targets.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .55
The employment rate targets.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .55
5
Table of contents
 
How are employment rates trends assessed?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .55
How to interpret the scenarios' results?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .56
Main results.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .57
Attainment of employment rate targets by country.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .58
Conclusion.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .59
Chapter 2 - Key Determinants of Labour Market Performance.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .61
1. Introduction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . .61
2. A broad framework to analyse the determinants of labour market performance.  .  .  .  .  .  .62
2.1. Taxes.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .62
2.2. Active Labour Market Policies.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .66
2.3. Other factors influencing labour market performance.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .77
2.3.1. Unemployment benefits system.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .77
2.3.2. Temporary and part-time jobs.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .77
2.3.3. TFP and skills.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .77
2.3.4. Openness.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .77
3. Econometric estimates of the determinants of the employment rate.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .78
3.1. The role of the macroeconomic variables.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .80
3.2. The role of labour taxes, social security contributions and active labour market policies.  .  .  . .81
3.3. The role of centralisation and co-ordination of wage bargaining.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .82
3.4. The role of part-time and fixed term contract.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .85
3.5. What explains the improvements in the employment rates 
of the second half of the 1990s?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .86
4. Explaining the evolution of real wages.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .89
5. Conclusion.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .92
6. Technical annex to chapter 2- GMM estimation of the employment rate 
and definition of variables.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .95
Chapter 3 - Employment structures in Europe and the US:
the role of skills, wages and final demand.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .97
1. Introduction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .97
2. EU-US Employment structures and performance.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .98
2.1. The EU-US employment gap: long-term evolution and recent trends.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .98
2.2. Further breakdown of the EU-US employment gap.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .102
2.2.1. by gender and age group.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .102
2.2.2. by sector of employment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .104
2.2.3. by occupation and skill level.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .105
2.3. Concluding remarks.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .107
3. Employment structures in the enlarged European Union.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .107
3.1. Sectoral employment structures.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .108
3.2. Employment structures by occupation and skill level.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .110
4. Explaining differences in employment structures.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .117
4.1. Theoretical explanations and major hypotheses.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .118
4.2. Previous studies and further evidence.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .120
4.2.1. Skill composition of the workforce.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .122
6
4.2.2. Relative wage structures.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .129
4.2.3. Marketisation of services, household consumption and final demand structures.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .133
5. Conclusions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .137
6. Annexes to Chapter 3.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .139
Annex 6.1. Employment, skills and wage data for the EU and the US.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .139
Annex 6.2. Sectoral classifications (NACE, SIC and NAICS).  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .140
Annex 6.3. Occupational classifications (ISCO and SOC).  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .143
Annex 6.4. Classifications of educational attainment levels (ISCED).  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .144
Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003.  .  .  .145
Chapter 4 - Labour market transitions and advancement: 
temporary employment and low-pay in Europe. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .159
1. Introduction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .159
2. The policy context.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .159
3. Key issues.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .160
4. Employment retention and diversity of contractual arrangements.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .161
4.1. Labour market dynamics: employment transitions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .163
5. The incidence of low pay and career advancement.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .167
5.1. Labour market dynamics: pay transitions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .169
6. Determinants of labour market transitions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .173
7. Summary and conclusions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .181
8. Annexes to chapter 4: Are temporary contracts stepping-stones? 
Some findings.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .183
8.1. A "programme evaluation" approach.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .183
8.2. A duration analysis approach.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .185
Chapter 5 - Globalisation and Labour Markets: 
a European perspective.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .187
1. Introduction.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .187
2. Defining the issue.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .189
2.1. What is globalisation ?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .189
2.2. Global labour flows ?  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .189
2.3. Causes for concern.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .189
2.4. Perceptions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .190
3. The changing nature of international trade.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .191
3.1. The enlarged EU in the world economy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .192
3.1.1. Characteristics of EU trade.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .192
3.2. Manufacturing.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .195
3.3. Services.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .196
3.4. Foreign Direct Investment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .198
3.5. Internationalisation of production.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .198
3.6. A short run vs. long run story?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .199
7
4. Regional integration and labour markets.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .200
4.1. Regional integration, a 'mini-globalisation'.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .201
4.2. Changing specialisation patterns.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .202
4.3. The role of Foreign Direct Investment.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .206
4.4. Too small to matter?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .209
5. Delocalisation, relocation and outsourcing.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .211
5.1. 'Offshoring, the global cousin of outsourcing'.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .211
5.2. Outsourcing and vertical integration.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .213
5.2.1. Outcome for employment and wages.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .215
5.3. Empirical evidence.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .216
5.3.1. Comparison between the EU and the US.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .219
5.4. Upper and lower bounds.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .219
5.4.1. The policy issue.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .220
6. Reconciling economic insecurity with the globalisation of production.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .221
6.1. Importance of job reallocation.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .221
6.2. Overall job creation in the EU25.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .223
7. Concluding remarks.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .224
7.1. Main findings.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .224
7.2. Policy perspective.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .225
Statistical annex.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .227
Macroeconomic indicators.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .228
Key employment indicators.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .235
Data sources and definitions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .267
List of tables, charts and boxes.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .271
8
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9
The global economic recovery continued to gain momentum during 2003,
with relatively strong growth in the US and Japan. Indeed, the upturn in
the US economy accelerated in the third and fourth quarters of 2003 result-
ing in 3.1% growth for the year as a whole, compared to 2.2% the year
before. Similarly, there has been a sharp turnaround in Japan, resulting in
2.5% GDP growth in 2003 compared to negative growth of 0.3% in 2002.
In contrast, economic growth for the enlarged European Union (EU25)
declined to 0.8% in 2003, down from 1.1% the year before.
Employment growth for the EU25 was limited in 2003. The slowdown in
employment growth which began in the first half of 2001 and saw growth
reach a standstill by the last quarter of 2002, was followed by only a very
moderate recovery over the course of 2003. For the year as a whole
employment growth was almost static, at 0.2%, while the unemployment
rate rose to 9.1% (EU15: 8.1%), up from 8.8% in 2002. 
In the US, the labour market showed clearer signs of improvement during
2003 in line with the upturn in its economy. Employment grew by 0.9% in
contrast to the declines of the previous two years. However, unemploy-
ment continued to rise, averaging 6.0% for the year as a whole compared
to 5.8% for 2002. Meanwhile, in Japan the continuing reduction in the
working-age population has led to further declines in employment,
although at a lower rate than in recent years.
Although, contrary to the US and Japan, overall employment levels in the
EU have essentially not shown any decline over the period 2000-2003, the
EU labour markets have shown signs of deterioration in certain areas, in
particular in industry, for young people, and for the low-skilled. In addi-
tion, long-term unemployment in the EU appears to be on the rise again,
increasing to 4.0% in 2003 (EU15: 3.3%), a change from the trend of pro-
gressive decline observed especially over the period 1998-2001. 
Within the EU25, employment performance in 2003 has been mixed across
Member States. Almost half of the Member States saw negative annual
employment growth. The employment situation deteriorated in 2003 in
the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, with all seeing
employment growth turn negative over the course of the year.
Furthermore, in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Portugal and
Slovenia the negative employment growth experienced in 2002 continued
into 2003, while employment growth in France had ground to a standstill
by the last quarter of 2003.
On the other hand, ten Member States experienced positive employment
growth in excess of 1%. In particular employment growth in Spain
remained relatively strong at around the 2% level and showed signs of a
Reflecting the slow economic
growth in the EU during 2003 …
… employment growth in the EU
was limited …
… with employment growth lower
than in the US.
The employment situation has
deteriorated for young and low-
skilled people, those employed in
industry, and the long-term unem-
ployed.
In the Member States, labour mar-
ket performance in 2003 was
mixed: negative growth rates in
several Member States …
… contrast with positive employ-
ment growth above 1% in others.
Executive summary
1. Slow overall economic growth and mixed
employment performance in Europe in 2003
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moderate pick-up. Employment growth in Italy remained positive at
around the 1% level although it had declined from previously higher lev-
els. Employment growth was also above 1% in Estonia, Greece, Ireland,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic.
Despite the foreseen improvement in overall economic activity, the pro-
tracted economic slowdown experienced in Europe in the early 2000s is
expected to continue to weigh on the performance of the labour market,
implying only limited employment growth prospects for 2004 and 2005.
This has to be taken into account when assessing the EU’s employment
prospects against the objectives and employment rate targets formulated
in the Lisbon and European Employment Strategies.
Employment performances are a key component of the Lisbon Strategy
which aims to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. The Employment
Guidelines have fixed three overarching and complementary objectives:
full employment; quality and productivity at work; and social cohesion and
inclusion. They have also integrated the employment rate targets for 2010
formulated by the Lisbon and Stockholm Councils in 2000/2001: 70% over-
all, more than 60% among women, and 50% for older people.
Against these targets, the overall employment rate in the EU25 stagnated
at slightly below 63% in 2003 (EU15: 64.3%). The marginal increase in the
employment rate, only 0.1 percentage points in 2003, was much lower
than the annual increases observed from the late 1990s until 2001, and was
due mainly to continued rises in the employment rates for women, up 0.3
percentage points on average to 55.0% (EU15: 56.0%), while the rate
declined slightly to 70.8% for men (EU15: 72.6%). As in 2002, the employ-
ment rate for older people aged 55-64 rose more noticeably, up some 1.5
percentage points to 40.2% in 2003 (EU15: 41.7%).  On the downside, the
labour market situation for young people (i.e. persons aged 15-24) in the
EU has generally deteriorated over the last three years.
Notwithstanding the increases in the employment rates over the period
1997-2002 and the structural improvements in labour market performance
of the late 1990s - as suggested by the reduction in the NAIRU (non-accel-
erating-inflation rate of unemployment), the relatively strong increases in
labour supply and the continued resilience of employment to the economic
slowdown – Member States exhibit structural labour market problems.
These include low employment rates, in particular for women, older work-
ers and the low-skilled, as well as persistent regional disparities in employ-
ment and unemployment rates.
Taken together, it seems that the EU is still far short of the Lisbon objec-
tives and targets. Relative to the 2010 employment targets, the 2003
employment rates overall, of women and of older people fall short by 7, 5
and 10 percentage points respectively. Closing these gaps will rely heavily
Employment growth prospects for
2004 and 2005 remain subdued.
Against the objectives for 2010 laid
down in the Lisbon and European
Employment Strategies …
… in 2003, the average EU  employ-
ment rate stagnated at around
63% overall and at 55% for
women, while increasing to above
40% for older people.
Low employment rates of women,
older people and the low-skilled
remain symptoms of structural
problems in the European labour
markets.
Further progress towards achieving
the 2010 employment rate targets will
rely heavily on the implementation of
further labour market reforms …
2. The enlarged European Union – (back) 
on track for Lisbon?
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… which are also supportive of
improving productivity and quality
in work and fostering social inclu-
sion and cohesion.
Key policy priorities in this regard
have been identified by the
European Employment Task Force
and the Employment Guidelines for
2003-2006.
Thematic chapters of this year’s
report provide in-depth analyses of
central interest to these policy pri-
orities:
• key determinants of employ-
ment rates;
• cross-country differences in serv-
ices employment;
• transitions out of low pay and
precarious employment;
• employment effects of outsourc-
ing, delocalisation and globali-
sation.
on the implementation of further labour market reforms to improve the
employment prospects notably of women, older people and the low-
skilled, and to foster employment creation in the services sector. It is also
necessary to combat the recent increases in youth unemployment and in
long-term unemployment.
Slow progress towards full employment is matched by disappointing pro-
ductivity trends and ample scope to reinforce social inclusion and regional
cohesion, and to improve quality in work further, as identified in the recent
Commission Communication “Improving quality in work”. Progress in real-
ising the Lisbon Strategy - and in furthering the knowledge society by
increasing R&D expenditures to 3% of GDP in particular - therefore also
requires that these reforms support improvements in quality and produc-
tivity at work and foster social inclusion and cohesion.
This year's report confirms that globalisation, technological change and
economic integration, on the one hand, and the rapid ageing of the pop-
ulation, on the other, are increasingly affecting the way people live and
work in Europe, as well as the way goods and services are produced. The
analysis of the report supports the call of the Spring 2004 European Council
to Member States to take decisive action in four specific areas highlighted
by the European Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok: improving
adaptability of workers and enterprises; attracting more people in employ-
ment and making work a real option for all; investing more and more
effectively in human capital; and improving the implementation for
reforms through better governance. Member States must therefore contin-
ue to enact policies in line with the Employment Guidelines for 2003-2006
and to implement the related country-specific recommendations. 
The thematic chapters of this year's report address most of these areas by
providing in-depth analyses of: first, the determinants of employment
rates and the role of labour market institutions and active labour market
policies in particular in determining the evolution of the overall employ-
ment rate over time (chapter 2); second, the evolution and nature of the
EU-US employment gap in the services sector and the determinants of dif-
ferences in employment structures across countries (chapter 3); third, the
determinants of employment and labour market dynamics and of transi-
tions out of low pay and precarious employment, in particular the role of
various forms of human capital investments (chapter 4); and, finally, a dis-
cussion of the employment effects of outsourcing, delocalisation and glob-
alisation (chapter 5).    
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Among the potential key determinants of labour market performance are:
the level of labour taxation; the characteristics of the collective bargaining
agreements and the wage-setting mechanism; the unemployment benefit
systems; and the level and composition of active labour market policies
(ALMPs). An evaluation of such policies calls for a better understanding of
the likely interactions between the different sets of institutions and poli-
cies – interactions which could either support or offset each other. The
results of such an evaluation based on econometric analyses, however, are
subject to methodological choice and thus have to be interpreted with cau-
tion.
While this chapter clearly confirms that openness to trade is a key determi-
nant of employment growth probably through the growth channel,
employment policies also matter. Increases in the share of part-time con-
tracts and the intensity of spending on ALMPs (% GDP spent on ALMPs rel-
ative to the number of unemployed) are two of the strongest contributors
to employment rate increases. Among the different categories of ALMP
expenditure, the intensity of spending on youth measures and on public
employment services are found to have the strongest positive impact on
the employment rate.
However, when one accounts for the interaction between the different
categories of ALMPs all appear to have a positive effect on the employ-
ment rate, although the impact of spending on public employment services
and youth measures is stronger than that of spending on direct job cre-
ation and training. If one considers the interaction between ALMP expen-
ditures and the gross replacement rate (a measure of unemployment and
welfare-related benefits as a proportion of income from work), the effect
of the intensity of spending on youth measures is stronger in countries
where the replacement rate is relatively high. In contrast, the positive
effect of training is slightly reduced in countries where the replacement
rate is high.
Between 1997 and 2000 the EU15 (un-weighted) average tax wedge
declined by about one percentage point. However, while it is likely that for
microeconomic reasons the tax wedge on the low-skilled is particularly
harmful, changes in the tax wedge overall are not found to have any sig-
nificant long-term effect on employment performance, possibly because
they may hide offsetting changes in the components of the tax wedge,
notably the employers’ social security contributions, employees’ contribu-
tions and income tax. Of the individual components of the tax wedge, the
employers’ social security contributions are found to have an impact on the
employment rate.
Moreover, the employment response to ALMPs and to changes in policy
variables is influenced by the level of co-ordination of bargaining. Where
bargaining is either decentralised or centralised, the employment perform-
ance tends to be less influenced by changes either in the tax wedge or in
the replacement rate, compared to systems where bargaining occurs at the
Explaining the total change in
employment rates over the period
1997-2002:
Increases in part-time employment
and the intensity of spending on
active labour market policies con-
tributed to increasing the employ-
ment rate.
While taking into account potential
interactions with other policies and
institutions, all categories of ALMP
expenditures have a positive impact
on the employment rate.
Changes in the tax wedge, on the
other hand, do not seem to have
any long-term effects on employ-
ment.
The employment effects of ALMPs
and changes in the tax wedge or the
replacement rate also depend on
the level of bargaining coordination.
3. Institutions and active labour market
policies do matter: a closer look at 
the determinants of employment rates
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industry level. For ALMPs, significant effects on the employment rate are
found in systems where bargaining is at the industry or centralised level,
but not in systems of decentralised bargaining.
To help retain producer and consumer confidence and provide an efficient
protection of workers, insurance against unemployment and income risks
is needed. Such measures are an important part of the response to today’s
economic situation but they must reflect the need for more rapid labour
market adjustments than in the past. 
Another widely quoted symptom of the continued structural weakness of
the European labour markets is the employment gap in the services sector
compared to the US. While stronger employment performance of services
and a less unfavourable employment evolution in industry in the EU has
narrowed the EU-US employment gap considerably over the period 1998-
2003, the US still shows the highest employment rate in services (55.4%)
and the lowest in industry (12.6%), compared with the EU Member States.
The EU-US gap in services sector employment which is most acute for
women and older workers suggests that there remains significant
untapped job creation potential in the European services sector.
In terms of sectors, the EU-US employment gap is greatest in both the com-
paratively low-skilled and high-skilled sectors, for example, in low-paying
sectors such as wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants, and
in high-skilled, high-paying sectors, such as real estate and business services,
education, and health and social services. The same observation holds for
the EU-US employment gap by occupation: it is highest among services
workers and shop assistants, on the one hand, and among clerks, legisla-
tors and managers, on the other.
Comparing EU labour market performance to the US can help identify the
remaining job creation potential in Europe as a whole, however, there are
equally positive experiences in several of the EU Member States which can
serve as benchmarks. For example, by 2003, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK had overtaken the US in terms of the employment
rate. Sweden in particular, but also the UK, have shown – similar to the US
- strong employment creation rates for both the high-skilled and the low-
skilled, most notably in the high-skilled, high-paying service sectors such as
business services, education, and health and social services.
The EU-US differences in employment structures are to a large extent
structural in that they reflect substantial differences in household con-
sumption patterns and final demand structures. They are explained, most
notably, by lower increases in the final demand levels in the EU compared
to in the US. The strong increases in demand for services in the US are to
a large extent due to the stronger labour market participation of women
and older people.
4. Final demand is crucial … 
and the main explanation for 
the EU-US employment gap in services
ALMPs and social insurance must
support workers' adaptability.
The employment gap in services
with respect to the US has nar-
rowed, but still suggests the exis-
tence of a substantial untapped job
creation potential in the EU.
The employment gap occurs both in
comparatively high-skill, high-pay-
ing sectors or occupations and in
low-productive, low- paying sectors
or occupations.
While helping to identify further
job creation potential in the EU, the
US experience is not necessarily a
benchmark for Europe. 
The EU-US differences in employ-
ment structures are mostly the
result of differences in household
consumption patterns and final
demand structures …
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Furthermore, there is no clear and binding evidence in support of the con-
ventional perception that differences in employment structures between
the EU and the US are predominantly due to either too rigid relative wage
structures or more favourable productivity patterns in the EU, which would
prevent the low-skilled from accessing the labour market. Information on
both formal education credentials and internationally comparable literacy
tests indicates that the employment situation of the low-skilled is actually
less favourable in the US than in the EU as a whole.
Relative wage structures are also found to be similar across countries and
not a significant determinant of employment structures. For the US in par-
ticular, while there is evidence that the increases in services employment
were matched by strong increases in relative wages there is no evidence of
firms lowering employment levels as a response to high-wage levels in a
sector. On the contrary, firms tend to respond through other long-term
adjustments, resulting in high-wage sectors becoming increasingly more
productive. It remains questionable, however, as to what extent the cur-
rent wage structures act as an adequate incentive for labour supply and
support job creation in the services sector, and in high technology and
knowledge-intensive services sectors in particular.
Finally, demand in industry and services in the EU are found to have a sim-
ilar effect on employment in services. In some cases, the evidence suggests
that industry demand has a stronger spill-over effect on employment in
services than services demand.
Deepening the internal market for services and breaking down remaining
barriers to the further integration of the EU services markets will help cre-
ate the framework conditions necessary to further develop the services sec-
tor in the EU. As a specific reply to the further restructuring of the
European economies, the key to increasing employment in services is in the
creation of jobs in the comparatively high-paying, high-productive services
such as business services, education and health and social services. To this
aim, existing spill-over effects from product demand in industry on employ-
ment in services need to be exploited, and increases in final demand for
services are necessary. In this context, reorienting public spending towards
areas such as education and health and social services is crucial. This will
contribute to accelerate further increases in the labour market participa-
tion of women and older workers.
Diversity in terms of contractual arrangements is an increasing feature of
European labour markets as it facilitates access to the labour market. Firms
increasingly use temporary employment, either to meet uncertainty and
cyclical fluctuations in demand, or to screen employees.
However, as highlighted by the European Employment Taskforce, strong
variations in access to the labour market or to career prospects may lead to
a two-tier labour market, with "insiders" benefiting from a high level of
… while there is no evidence in sup-
port of the conventional perception
that EU-US differences are due to
either better employment
prospects of the low-skilled in the
US …
… or to too rigid wage structures in
the EU which would restrict the
incidence of low-paying jobs in the
services sector. 
Furthermore, there are in general
strong spill-over effects of industry
demand on employment in services.
A genuine internal market for serv-
ices, a stronger labour force partici-
pation of women and older people
and the support of public spending
in areas such as education and
health and social services will help
to better exploit the employment
potential in services.
It is crucial that the greater flexibil-
ity offered by increasing diversity of
contractual arrangements …
… is also matched by an adequate
degree of security supportive of
both improved productivity and
5. Education and training help: 
ways out of low pay and 
precarious employment
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employment protection and career opportunities, and "outsiders" recruit-
ed under competing forms of contract. With a view to both improving pro-
ductivity and quality in work, and fostering social inclusion, it is therefore
crucial that flexibility is matched by an adequate degree of security, in par-
ticular in terms of people's ability to remain and progress in the labour
market.
An analysis of the dynamics of low-paying and precarious employment
reveals a high degree of transitions in European labour markets. Roughly
one third of those in temporary employment find a more stable job after
only one year. However, it is also true that even after six years - the longest
time horizon allowed by the data available - around 16% of those who
were initially in precarious contractual arrangements are still in the same
situation and, more worryingly, 20% of them have moved out of employ-
ment, more than for any other category of workers.
Although the incidence of low pay does not seem to have increased in the
EU in the second half of the nineties, it still remains at roughly 15% and it
has noticeably increased in Germany and in the Netherlands. The dynam-
ics into and out of low pay are similar to those out of temporary employ-
ment, with a higher persistence in low pay than in temporary employment.
44% of the low-paid manage to increase their pay above the low-pay
threshold, but only after an average of seven years. In contrast,  30% of the
low-paid are no longer working after seven years, a probability of moving
out of employment almost 13 percentage points higher than for those that
were initially highly paid.    
There are important variations in 1-year labour market transitions between
the Member States. The probability of moving from unemployment or
inactivity into employment is particularly low in Belgium, Greece, Italy and
Luxembourg while that of leaving employment is relatively high in
Germany and Spain. Together with France, Greece and Finland, Spain is
also characterised by one of the lowest transition rates from temporary to
permanent employment. Moreover, Germany and the UK present the
fewest opportunities for those in low pay to move above the low pay
threshold.  Transitions into employment are relatively easy in Denmark,
Finland and the UK, while moves from temporary to permanent employ-
ment are more frequent in Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the
UK. It is easier to move out of low pay and into higher paid employment
in Belgium, Finland and Portugal.
Women, the low-skilled, older people – and to a certain extent young peo-
ple – are at risk of having a weaker position in the labour market both in
terms of precarious contractual arrangements and low pay, but also have
fewer chances to improve their position in the labour market relative to
the other groups. While older workers have in general a better position in
terms of pay and contractual arrangements than younger workers, when
they are in low pay or temporary employment they have the greatest dif-
ficulty to remain or progress in the labour market. 
Educational qualifications and training courses are particularly effective to
help people move into employment. Concerning in-work transitions, how-
ever, on-the-job training is strongly correlated with the likelihood of mov-
quality in work and social inclusion.
European labour markets are char-
acterised by a high degree of tran-
sitions, notably out of temporary
employment …
… and out of low pay, although the
risk of leaving employment also
remains considerably higher in both
cases.
There are strong variations in tran-
sition patterns across Member
States.
Women, the low-skilled and older
workers, not only have a weaker
position in the labour market at any
one point in time, but they also
have fewer chances to improve it.
Educational qualifications and
training are particularly effective to
help the unemployed move back
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ing from temporary to permanent employment. In relation to moving out
of low pay, on-the-job training has a stronger effect on one-year transi-
tions than training courses, while training courses have a more important
role for longer term transitions, hinting at a better signalling function of
training courses that lead to a recognised qualification.
The analysis of this chapter confirms that promoting flexibility in the
labour market can only succeed if combined with adequate security for
workers in terms of their capacity to remain and progress in employment.
Temporary workers and those on low-pay, who are often low-skilled, are
more exposed to unemployment, inactivity and the low-pay trap, pointing
to a risk of segmentation of the labour market. This chapter also highlights
the key contribution that active labour market policies make to facilitate
entry and progression in the labour market, in particular public employ-
ment services and continuous training. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the European economies have become
increasingly integrated - not least due to this year's enlargement of the EU
- and globalisation has accelerated. Globalisation has positive and negative
effects, but altogether this process brings about overall gains to workers
and consumers, notably in terms of integrated markets, enhanced trade
links, increased efficiency, and upgrading of products and skills, all eventu-
ally translating into long-term growth prospects. 
Previous enlargements of the EU did not in general affect wages or
employment neither did they create substantial inflows of migrants. In the
case of the recent enlargement of the EU, trade and factor movements
might have an effect on regions immediately bordering the Central and
Eastern European countries and on specific sectors that are more exposed
to import penetration from those countries. These effects could be further
magnified by the lack of labour mobility across sectors, regions and coun-
tries. However, the effect on employment and wages is likely to be negli-
gible overall.
Restructuring of the manufacturing sector due to increased productivity or
technological change is an ongoing and gradual process. It is likely that, in
the near future, more sudden and abrupt changes will occur due to ICT and
related services, which will somewhat accelerate the pace of restructuring
in general and that of offshoring in particular. 
If globalisation is to bring benefits to all, it must be accompanied by adjust-
ment policies that help displaced workers in the short term, as well as
strong and continuous investment in human capital and efficient skill-
matching mechanisms. Such policies can help to turn the overall feeling of
insecurity into a perception of opportunities for developing more diverse
career paths at the individual level. Social protection systems also need to
be better tailored to the changing economic environment brought about
by accelerated globalisation.
into employment and those in pre-
carious and low paying jobs to
avoid unemployment and move up
the quality ladder.
Further improvements in the bal-
ance between flexibility and security
will contribute to enhance produc-
tivity and quality in work as well as
social inclusion. 
Increased integration and acceler-
ating globalisation bring about
overall gains.
European integration can be
viewed as a 'mini-globalisation' and
has had no major impact on
employment and wages so far.
However, the increasing impor-
tance for employment of ICT and
related services might further accel-
erate restructuring activities and
the potential of offshoring.
The uneven distributional effects of
such changes can be mitigated by
adequate adjustment policies.
6. Does globalisation hurt? 
Costs and benefits of economic integration 
in a dynamic perspective
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The design of such adjustment policies must take account of firms’ strate-
gies at the time they opt for offshoring. In particular vertical or horizontal
strategies of firm development have different consequences and this
should be considered when designing policies targeted at managing
change. The focus should be on mitigating the local or regional effects of
mass layoffs, while business risks related to the offshoring decision - such
as increased costs of coordination and potential repatriation costs - are
internalised by the firm in their decision to offshore.
While wage differentiation is one of the reasons behind offshoring, inter-
national differences in wages are not the main concern, the more so as
they also reflect underlying strong differences in productivity. Increasing
productivity and research and development, the continuous upgrading of
products and the increased quality of labour are the way forward to
improve firms' and workers' adaptability, overall employment perform-
ance and competitiveness. 
The EU is a global player and is very well placed to reap the benefits from
globalisation, and to harness globalisation to serve social as well as eco-
nomic goals. Given the nature of globalisation, supporting those most
affected has to be dealt with also at European level in a co-ordinated way,
including through employment and social inclusion strategies. The
European social model has helped the Union to sustain the speed of
change and its ongoing modernisation will further improve the EU's capac-
ity to promote change. 
Overall, despite progress achieved in reforming labour markets, the EU must
step up its efforts to tap its human potential and achieve the Lisbon objectives
set for 2010. Efficient labour markets delivering equitable outcomes are essen-
tial if the remaining challenges are to be identified. The findings of this report
emphasise in particular the need to increase participation of women and older
workers in employment. This should partly result from, and directly contribute
to, creating more employment in services in Europe.
The report also underlines the need to pro-actively anticipate, trigger and
manage change resulting from economic integration and technological
change on a world scale. To promote higher flexibility in the labour market,
to enhance employability and mobility, and to increase participation in
employment, it is necessary to foster new forms of security and to prevent the
emergence of a two-tier labour market. Lifelong learning and active labour
market policies, including effective support from public employment services,
can play a particularly important role in facilitating transitions and improving
overall employment performance.
By confronting Member States with their specific strengths and weaknesses,
issuing recommendations and linking its financial support more closely to the
implementation of the European Employment Strategy as foreseen in the
Commission's proposal for the new ESF regulation, the EU can be an effective
lever to support progress at national level, and to harness globalisation to
serve its economic, social and environmental objectives.
7. Conclusions: a vital role for the European
Employment Strategy
Designing such adjustment policies
requires that corporate strategies
at the time of the offshoring deci-
sion need be taken into account, …
… and to understand that interna-
tional differences in wages are of
less concern in the presence of well-
designed policies to facilitate firms'
and workers' adaptability.
Altogether, this will allow Europe
to reap the benefits of globalisa-
tion, while redistributing these
benefits more evenly across society
and territory.
The EU and its Member States must
step up their efforts to develop
their human potential, and to
increase employment ….
… through a better balance
between flexibility and security in
particular, ...
… using the European Employment
Strategy as an effective lever.
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1. Introduction
This chapter provides a detailed
overview of recent developments in
the European labour market and
compares them with developments
elsewhere in the world, in particu-
lar in the US and Japan. The chapter
starts with an examination of the
current labour market situation and
recent trends in the enlarged EU,
with a focus on the latest develop-
ments in activity, employment and
unemployment rates. This is fol-
lowed by an overview of recent
employment trends according to
type of employment, a review of
the labour market situation with
regard to skill levels, and a special
focus on recent developments in
the labour market situation for
young people. Following up the
analysis in previous versions of
Employment in Europe a review is
then presented of the recent
employment developments for the
EU15 and the new Member States
separately. This includes an assess-
ment for the EU15 of whether the
resilience of employment to the
prolonged economic slowdown
continued into 2003, and a close
look at labour market develop-
ments in the new Member States in
the last five years prior to their join-
ing the EU. Further issues reviewed
include recent sectoral employment
trends especially in the new
Member States, as well as a brief
overview of the latest demographic
developments. The developments
reported on in the chapter are
based on data available up to mid-
June 20041, while many tables and
charts include data for the EU15
aggregate in order to provide a his-
torical reference.
2. Recent labour
market performance
2.1. Overall EU labour market
performance in 2003
The global economic recovery con-
tinued to gain momentum over
2003, with particularly strong
growth in the US and Japan.
Indeed, the upturn in the US econ-
omy accelerated in the third and
fourth quarters of 2003 resulting in
3.1% growth for the year as a
whole, compared to 2.2% the year
before (table 1). Similarly, there has
been a sharp turnaround in Japan,
which clearly benefited from the
dynamism in the rest of Asia and an
acceleration in export growth,
resulting in 2.5% GDP growth in
2003 compared to negative growth
of 0.3% in 2002.
In contrast, economic growth for
the EU25 as a whole is estimated to
have been a much more limited
0.8% in 2003, down from 1.1% the
year before. Reflecting the very
modest pace of overall economic
recovery in the EU, employment
growth in 2003 was almost static, at
0.2%, while the unemployment
rate rose to 9.1%, up from 8.8% in
2002. 
Chapter 1 Panorama of the European
labour markets
1 The figures used in this chapter refer to data available up to mid-June 2004. For most Member States this means the most recent
data available is that for 2003, but the following exceptions apply:
-  LFS and much QLFD data for 2003 was not yet available for Luxembourg;
-  QLFD data for 2003 was not yet available for Malta;
-  QLFD data for 2003 for Austria are based on national estimates;
-  LFS and QLFD data for France are provisional data for 2003;
-  2003 data referring to ISCED, ISCO and NACE data for the Netherlands were not yet available (data used refer to the year 2002).
Table 1 - International Comparison of Key Indicators (2003)
Source: GDP and employment growth from latest updates to Commission's Spring 2004
Economic Forecasts and QLFD, Eurostat. GDP in PPS from AMECO database, Commission
Services. Employment rate from QLFD, Eurostat and OECD data for US and Japan.
Unemployment rate from the harmonised unemployment series, Eurostat. Population
from demographic statistics, Eurostat.
Note: Employment rates for the EU and Japan refer to persons aged 15-64; US employ-
ment rate refers to persons aged 16-64.
EU-25 EU-15 USA Japan
Population (millions) 455 381 284 128
GDP (in 1000 million PPS,
10180 9302 9980 3227current prices)
GDP Growth, at constant
0.8 0.7 3.1 2.5prices (annual % change)
Employment Rate
(as % of working age 62.9 64.3 71.2 68.4
population)
Employment Growth
0.2 0.2 0.9 -0.2(annual % change)
Unemployment Rate
(as % of civilian 9.1 8.1 6.0 5.3
labour force)
In line with the strong upturn in its
economy, the US labour market
showed clearer signs of improve-
ment over 2003, with employment
growing by 0.9% in contrast to the
declines of the previous two years,
although unemployment continued
to rise, averaging 6.0% for the year
as a whole compared to 5.8% for
2002. Meanwhile, in Japan employ-
ment continued to decline further
despite the sustained economic
recovery which has taken hold
there, although at a reduced rate
compared to recent years (charts 1
and 2).
2.2. General employment and
unemployment developments over
2003 and short-term prospects
2.2.1. Employment growth across
Member States
The slowdown in employment
growth in the EU, which began in
the first half of 2001 and saw
growth reach a standstill by the last
quarter of 2002, was followed by
only a very moderate recovery over
the course of 2003. Against this evo-
lution for the EU as a whole, devel-
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Chart 1 - Employment growth rates in the EU, US and Japan, 1996-2003
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Chart 2: Employment rates in the EU, US and Japan 1975-2003
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Table 2 - Annual change in employment growth, by quarter, over 2001 to 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
Note: No quarterly QLFD employment growth data for CY, LV, MT and PL; LT 2002Q1: break in the time series
2001Q01 2001Q02 2001Q03 2001Q04 2002Q01 2002Q02 2002Q03 2002Q04 2003Q01 2003Q02 2003Q03 2003Q04
BE 1.9 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 : :
CZ 0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.5 -0.5 -1.1 -1.4
DK -0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 -0.7
DE 1.0 0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -1.1 -1.5 -1.3 -1.0 -0.6
EE -0.5 0.9 0.7 2.3 1.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.2 1.2 2.0 2.4
EL 0.7 0.3 -0.5 -1.9 -1.6 -0.5 0.0 1.3 : : : :
ES 3.4 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1
FR 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0
IE 3.5 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.1 1.9 0.4 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.6
IT 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.6 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.7
CY : : : : : : : : : : : :
LV : : : : : : : : : : : :
LT -5.5 -5.3 -3.8 -1.3 -10.2 -5.9 -5.5 -7.5 2.4 3.6 0.8 1.9
LU 6.2 6.0 5.7 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.1
HU 1.6 0.7 0.5 -1.1 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 1.4 2.4 3.3 3.3 2.9
MT : : : : : : : : : : : :
NL 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9
AT 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.4
PL : : : : : : : : : : : :
PT 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 -1.2 -0.9 -1.3 -1.1 0.0
Sl 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
SK 1.6 2.0 0.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -0.9 0.0 2.4 2.9 2.3 1.5
FI 1.9 1.4 0.9 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -1.0
SE 3.0 1.7 2.0 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.5
UK 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.2
EU15 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
EU25 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Chart 1 - Employment growth rates in the EU,US and Japan, 1996-2003
Chart 2 - Employment rates in the EU,US and Japan, 1975-2003
Source: EU data from QLFD, Eurostat; US and Japan data from AMECO database,
Commission Services
Source: DG EMPL calculation  based on long-term trends in employment and popula-
tion, Commission Services
opments at Member State level
continued to be somewhat mixed.
In Germany, employment contrac-
tion continued in 2003, although it
appears that the negative growth
rate may have finally bottomed out
at the start of 2003, with the rate of
job losses slowing subsequently.
Among the other large Member
States employment growth in
France ground to a standstill by the
last quarter of 2003, while growth
in Italy also declined although
remaining positive at around the
1% level. On the other hand, the
UK experienced a recovery in
employment growth during 2003,
and growth in Spain remained rela-
tively strong at around the 2% level
and also showed signs of a moder-
ate pick-up. Among the remaining
Member States, the situation dete-
riorated in 2003 in the Czech
Republic, Finland, the Netherlands
and Sweden, with all seeing
employment growth turning nega-
tive over the course of the year.
Furthermore, available figures for
Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and
Slovenia show that the negative
employment growth experienced
in 2002 continued into 2003. In con-
trast, employment growth impro-
ved strongly in Estonia, Ireland,
Hungary, Lithuania and the Slovak
Republic compared to 2002 (table
2).
As a consequence of these develop-
ments, the employment growth for
the year as a whole has again been
somewhat mixed across Member
States in 2003 (chart 3). Less than
half of the Member States saw neg-
ative annual employment growth,
while some 10 Member States expe-
rienced positive employment
growth in excess of 1% in 2003.  In
particular, strong annual growth (of
around 2 or 3 %) was experienced
in Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic
and Spain. In contrast, employment
contracted by around 1% in
Denmark, Germany, Poland and
Portugal. 
2.2.2. Overall developments in
unemployment
The overall unemployment rate for
the EU25 remained very stable over
the course of 2003, at around 9.1%
(chart 4). This follows the moderate
rises experienced in 2001 and 2002,
after the minimum level reached in
the second quarter of 2001. By the
last quarter of 2003, unemploy-
ment rates in the EU25 ranged from
as low as 3.9% in Luxembourg to as
high as 19.2% in Poland. 
In the US, the unemployment rate
peaked in the second quarter of
2003 at 6.2%, following the more-
or-less continual rise from the low
of 3.9% in the fourth quarter of
2000, before falling below the 6%
level in the last quarter of 2003. It
nevertheless remained at the sort
of levels last observed in the US in
the mid-1990s. Rates also peaked in
Japan in early 2003, at 5.4%, before
declining to 5.1% in the last quar-
ter. As a result of these develop-
ments, the gap between the EU25
unemployment rate and those for
the US and Japan was close to 3 and
4 percentage points respectively by
the last quarter of 2003.
2.2.3. Short-term prospects
According to the latest updates to
the European Commission’s 2004
Spring Economic Forecasts, the
recovery in the EU economy is
expected to gather momentum in
2004, with GDP growth for the
enlarged EU foreseen to rise to
2.0% in 2004 and to 2.4% in 2005.
Despite the foreseen improvement
in overall economic activity, the
protracted economic slowdown
experienced in the EU15 in the early
2000s is expected to continue to
weigh on the performance of the
labour market, leading to some-
what limited employment growth
also in 2004 and 2005. As a result,
Panorama of the European labour markets Chapter 1
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Chart 3 - Employment growth for EU Member States, 2003
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Chart 4 - Evolution of unemployment rates in the EU, US
and Japan since 1995 (seasonally adjusted quarterly data)
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Chart 3 - Employment growth for EU,Member States, 2003
Chart 4 - Ev lution of unemployment rates in the EU, US
and Japan since 1995 (seasonally adj sted quar erly data)
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. *No 2003 data for CY and MT.
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Box 1 - Recent policy developments and 
strengthening of the European Employment Strategy
In line with the Lisbon strategy, the new European Employment Guidelines established by the Council in 2003 (see
Employment in Europe 2003, Chapter 1) set three overarching objectives: full employment, quality and productiv-
ity at work, and strengthened social cohesion and inclusion. They consist of 10 specific guidelines and guidance
on improving governance of employment policies.
Recent reforms carried out in many Member States under previous employment guidelines have proved their
worth in improving labour market performance, as confirmed by the employment growth of earlier years and by
the resilience of employment in the recent economic slowdown. However, progress towards the Lisbon 2010 tar-
get of a 70% overall employment rate has come to a standstill and it is now clear that the EU will miss the inter-
mediate employment rate target for 2005 of 67%. Without further action the 2010 target will also be missed.
Against the background of the recent economic slowdown and at the request of Heads of State and Government
at the Spring Council of 2003, the Commission established a European Employment Taskforce headed by Wim Kok,
former Prime Minister of the Netherlands. The Taskforce identified priorities for action of general relevance for
Member States and specific reforms needed. The Employment Taskforce’s assessment and policy messages were
shared by the Commission and the Council. They are fully consistent with the European Employment Strategy, and
have been closely integrated in the 2004 Joint Council and Commission Employment Report (JER) to the European
Council.
Europe’s need to take urgent effective action to improve its labour market performance was underlined by the
European Council of March 2004, and, on 7 April, the Commission adopted new recommendations for national
employment policies with a view to strengthening the implementation of the European Employment Strategy.
The recommendations build on the revision of the European Employment Strategy in 2003 and take into account
the findings of the European Employment Taskforce. While the EU-wide Employment Guidelines remain
unchanged compared to last year, the shorter, more concentrated and strengthened recommendations should
ensure that all Member States are better able to focus action on those issues needing priority attention. 
Apart from the country-specific recommendations, there are four common recommendations to all Member
States which call on them to give immediate priority to:
• Increasing adaptability of workers and enterprises, inter alia, by promoting flexibility combined with secu-
rity in the labour market; by modernising and broadening the concept of job security; by maximising job
creation and raising productivity;
• Attracting more people to enter and remain on the labour market, and making work a real option for all,
inter alia, by building comprehensive active ageing strategies; by further developing policies to increase
labour market participation; by strengthening active labour market policies, with personalised services to all
those seeking employment; by pursuing “make work pay” policies through both financial and non-finan-
cial incentives;
• Investing more and more effectively in human capital and lifelong learning, inter alia, by sharing costs and
responsibilities between public authorities, companies and individuals; by broadening the supply of train-
ing, in particular for those most in need such as the low-skilled and older workers; and
• Ensuring effective implementation of reforms through better governance, inter alia, by building reform
partnerships to mobilise the support and participation of the social partners and various stakeholders; where
appropriate, by defining targets to reflect those set at a European level, and ensuring effective use of pub-
lic funds; by promoting the role of National Action Plans and increasing their visibility; and by strengthen-
ing the role of the country-specific recommendations and developing more effective mutual learning.
Together, the four common recommendations to all Member States and the country-specific recommendations
form a powerful package. Governance will be brought more to the fore of the European Employment Strategy
to ensure that, after defining objectives together, implementation follows. The implementation of these recom-
mendations should bring about a more effective European Employment Strategy, one that can contribute to tak-
ing the Lisbon process forward with more and better jobs for all. 
employment growth for the
enlarged EU is only expected to be
0.3% in 2004 before improving to a
more substantial 0.8% in 2005,
while the unemployment rate is
expected to remain stable in 2004
at around 9.0% before falling to
8.8% in 2005. The low employment
growth forecast for 2004 reflects
the impact of expected delays
before improved economic activity
is translated into increased employ-
ment and the impact of reduction
of surplus capacity and cost-cutting
in the corporate sector. 
Against the background of these
recent developments, and in partic-
ular the low employment growth
over the last two years, concerted
action has and is being taken
through the development and
adjustment of policies aimed at
improving Europe’s labour market
performance (box 1).
3. Labour market
situation in 2003 in
the enlarged EU
3.1. Unemployment
The average unemployment rate
for the EU25 was 9.1% in 2003, up
from 8.8% one year earlier and
some 3 percentage points higher
than for the US. Looking at devel-
opments at the level of individual
Member States, rates rose apprecia-
bly in 15 Member States between
2002 and 2003, with the largest
rises (of 1 percentage point or
more) occurring in Denmark, the
Netherlands and Portugal, and
remained generally stable in
Austria, Finland, Spain and the UK.
In contrast, rates declined notice-
ably in Greece, Italy, Lithuania and
Poland, and especially strongly in
Latvia (down 2.1 percentage points)
and the Slovak Republic (down 1.6
percentage points). Unemployment
rates in 2003 were particularly high
(over 10%) in the three Baltic States
and Spain, and exceptionally high
in Poland and the Slovak Republic
at 19.2% and 17.1% respectively.
This compares with annual rates of
just below 4% in Luxembourg and
the Netherlands (chart 5).
Within the enlarged EU, on average
women continue to be more sus-
ceptible to unemployment than
men. Furthermore, the disparity in
the average unemployment rate
according to gender showed little
change between 2002 and 2003,
with an unemployment rate of
10.0% for women and 8.3% for
men in 2003, compared to 9.9%
and 8.1% respectively in 2002. The
pattern of higher unemployment
rates for women than for men
holds in all Member States except
Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Sweden and the
UK. The largest disparity between
men’s and women’s unemployment
rates exists in Greece and Spain,
where in 2003 women’s unemploy-
ment rates were around 8 percent-
age points higher than those for
men, but the difference was also
close to 5 percentage points in
Malta and Italy. 
The youth unemployment rate
(which refers to the age group 15-
24) in the EU25 rose 0.4 percentage
points to 18.3% in 2003 and
remains twice as high as the overall
unemployment rate. Among the
EU25 Member States the youth
unemployment rate is particularly
high (above 25%) in Greece, Italy
and Lithuania, and especially so in
Poland and the Slovak Republic,
where the rates are around double
the EU average at close to 41% and
33% respectively (chart 6). This con-
trasts with rates as low as around
7% in Austria and the Netherlands.
Looking at changes in the unem-
ployment rate between 2002 and
2003, rates rose most noticeably 
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Chart 5 - Unemployment rates by gender, 2003
Chart 6 - Youth unemployment rates by gender, 2003
 
(by between 3 and 4 percentage
points) in Belgium, Estonia,
Lithuania and Portugal, but
declined markedly in Latvia and the
Slovak Republic (down by 6.3 and
4.7 percentage points respectively).
In the enlarged EU, long-term
unemployment affected 4.0% of
the labour force in 2003, marginally
up from the year before. For the
EU25 as a whole, long-term unem-
ployment had generally been fol-
lowing a gradually declining trend
before a marginal upturn in 2002
and 2003 (chart 7). The largest rises
between 2002 and 2003 occurred in
France, Germany and Portugal,
where rates all rose by close to 0.5
percentage points. However, rates
declined strongly in the three Baltic
States, Italy and the Slovak
Republic.
Among the Member States, long-
term unemployment is most com-
mon in Poland and the Slovak
Republic, where around 11% of the
labour force, or almost three times
the EU25 average, is affected, but it
also remains above 5% in Greece
and Lithuania (chart 8). In general,
long-term unemployment rates are
higher for women than men, the
average rates for the EU25 being
4.5% and 3.6% respectively.  Only
in Austria, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Ireland, Hungary, Malta,
Sweden and the UK are the rates
for women lower. The greatest dis-
parity between genders is found in
Greece, Italy and Spain, the differ-
ence in Greece being close to 6 per-
centage points.
Several countries (Austria, Cyprus,
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK)
have seen long-term unemploy-
ment rates stabilise at around the
1% level in recent years. Others
have recently seen noticeable
improvements in reducing their
rates from relatively high levels, in
particular Latvia and Spain almost
halved their long-term unemploy-
ment rates between 1998 and 2003
to around the EU25 average.
However, in contrast to the generally
declining trend, rates in the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic and
especially Poland have risen
markedly since 1998, in the latter
case by almost 6 percentage points.
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Chart 9 - Activity rates by gender, 2003
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Chart 7 - Evolution in long-term unemployment 
rates in the EU25 from 1998 to 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD (Structural Indicators)
Chart 8 - Long-term unemployment rates by gender, 2003
Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators. Note: * Data for MT refers to 2002.
Chart 9 - Activity rates by gender, 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for LU and MT refer to 2002
3.2. Activity rates
In 2003, the activity rate (of persons
aged 15-64) for the enlarged EU
stood at 69.3%, an increase of 0.3
percentage points on one year ear-
lier. Rates for the individual
Member States ranged from as low
as around 60% in Hungary, Italy
and Malta to as high as nearly 80%
in Denmark (chart 9). Among the
Member States, the strongest
increases in participation between
2002 and 2003 occurred in Cyprus
and Spain, where activity rates rose
in excess of 1 percentage point,
while a decline of 0.7 percentage
points was recorded in Poland and
Slovenia.
The gender gap in activity rates
within the EU25 stood at 16.2%,
slightly down on the previous year’s
level of 16.6%, and with the aver-
age activity rate for men at 77.4%
compared to 61.2% for women.
While male activity rates in 2003
remained essentially unchanged
from the previous year, those for
women rose by a more substantial
0.5 percentage points. This reflects
the recent trend at EU level in
which activity rates for men have
remained more-or-less constant at
just over 77% while those for
women have continued to increase,
rising over 3 percentage points
since 1997 (chart 10), and closing
the gap with male rates. 
The overall decline in the difference
in participation rates for men and
women at EU level was reflected in
the majority of Member States,
except, most notably, in Denmark,
Finland and Slovenia where the dif-
ference rose by around 0.5 percent-
age points compared to the previous
year, mainly driven by declines in
female participation. The greatest
reduction in the gender gap
occurred in Spain and Portugal,
where it declined by 1.3 percentage
points. Nevertheless, the gap in
activity rates remains substantial in
several Member States - Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg and Spain all have gen-
der differences in participation rates
of around 25 percentage points,
while in Malta the gap is as high as
around 45 percentage points.
In 2003, the strongest increases in
female labour market participation
within the EU took place in Cyprus
and Spain, where rates rose by 1.5
and 2 percentage points respectively.
Rates also rose in excess of 1 per-
centage point in Estonia, Greece
and Hungary. In contrast, female
participation rates fell by just under
1 percentage point in Slovenia,
while Denmark, Finland, Poland
and Sweden saw declines of the
order of 0.5 percentage points.
While female rates rose in the large
majority of Member States, devel-
opments in male participation rates
were rather more mixed, with
around half the Member States see-
ing rates decline, most notably in
the Czech Republic, Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and
Slovenia where rates fell in the
order of 0.5 percentage points,
while the other half saw rates rise
or remain stable.
Within the EU25 the average activity
rate for the youth age group was
45% in 2003, a decline of 0.6 per-
centage points on 2002. Across
Member States youth participation
rates vary from as low as around
30% in Hungary and Lithuania to as
high as close to 73% in the
Netherlands (chart 11). Only in
Malta and the Netherlands are
youth activity rates close to the cor-
responding average activity rate for
the working age population as a
whole, while in all other Member
States youth participation rates are
much lower. While the average
youth participation rate in the EU25
generally remains considerably
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Chart 10 - Evolution in EU-25 activity rates by gender, 1997-2003
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Chart 11 - Youth (aged 15-24) activity rates by gender, 2003
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below the overall activity rate, the
gender gap in participation for this
age group was the lowest at 7.2
percentage points on average.
Participation rates for older people
are generally much lower than
those for prime-age workers, aver-
aging 43% for the EU25 as a whole,
but are on the rise. Between 2002
and 2003 the average activity rate
for the older age group increased
strongly by 1.7 percentage points,
following on from a 1.3 percentage
point increase the previous year,
and thus continuing the rising
trend in participation of older peo-
ple observed in recent years (chart
12). At EU level increased participa-
tion between 2002 and 2003 was
fairly evenly split between older
men and older women, and was
observed in all Member States with
the sole exception of Slovenia,
where activity rates declined by 0.9
percentage points. The strongest
rises in participation of older peo-
ple in 2003 occurred in Denmark,
Hungary, Lithuania and the
Netherlands, all of which experi-
enced increases of around 3 or 4
percentage points. Participation of
older women increased in all
Member States with the sole excep-
tion of Cyprus, where it declined by
0.6 percentage points.
Activity rates for older people vary
widely across Member States (chart
13), and are very low, at below one
third, in Austria, Belgium, Hungary,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland
and the Slovak Republic, and as low
as 24% in Slovenia. In contrast, the
rate in Sweden is close to 72% and
in Denmark just above 63%. For all
Member States the activity rates for
older women are below those for
older men, with the gender disparity
averaging close to 21 percentage
points for the EU25 as a whole. This
is essentially due to very low partic-
ipation by older women, whose
average activity rate is around 33%
for the EU25, but as low as around
13% in Malta and the Slovak
Republic. The gender disparity is
highest in Cyprus and Malta, where
the difference between the activity
rates of older men and older
women is around 40 percentage
points, but also measures over 30
percentage points in Greece,
Ireland, the Slovak Republic and
Spain. This contrasts markedly with
gender gaps of only 3 and 6 per-
centage points in Finland and
Sweden respectively. 
3.3. Employment rates and the
Lisbon and Stockholm targets
While the structural reforms under-
taken over recent years have led to
increased resilience of the EU15
labour market to economic down-
turns (see later section in this issue),
the prolonged nature of the recent
economic slowdown has raised seri-
ous challenges to achieving the
Lisbon and Stockholm employment
targets (box 2).  
3.3.1. Overall employment rate
developments and progress in
relation to the Lisbon and
Stockholm targets
Following on from no change in
2002, the average employment rate
for the EU25 rose only by a very
marginal 0.1 percentage points in
2003, much lower than the annual
rate increases observed from the
late 1990s until 2001. The overall
employment rate (i.e. of those aged
15-64) in the EU25 reached 62.9%,
with the marginal increase due to
continued rises in the employment
rates for women, up 0.3 percentage
points on average to 55.0%, while
the rate declined 0.2 percentage
points to 70.8% for men (table 3).
As in 2002, the employment rate
for older people aged 55-64 rose
more noticeably, up some 1.5 per-
centage points to 40.2% in 2003, to
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Chart 12 - Evolution in EU25 activity rates 
for older people (aged 55-64), 1997-2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
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Chart 13 - Older people’s (aged 55-64) activity rates by gender, 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for LU and MT refer to 2002
register another substantial step
towards achieving the Stockholm
target for older workers. The above
employment rates equate to gaps
of around 7, 5 and 10 percentage
points respectively in relation to the
overall, female and older people’s
employment rate targets for 2010.
With nearly zero employment
growth in 2003 and limited growth
expected in 2004 and 2005, it now
seems certain that the intermediate
target of an overall employment
rate of 67% in 2005 will not be
achieved, although the employ-
ment rate target for women still
remains in reach. Looking further
ahead, it is estimated that for the
enlarged EU25 some 22 million jobs
would need to be created in order
to achieve the overall Lisbon
employment rate target for 2010.
This equates to a net employment
creation rate averaging over 3 mil-
lion per year, similar to the level
achieved by the EU15 in 2000, the
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Box 2 – Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate targets
The Lisbon European Council of 2000 set as a new strategic goal for the EU over the 2000-2010 decade “to
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. It specifically stated that the overall
aim of employment and economic policies should be to raise the employment rate to as close to 70% as possi-
ble by 2010 and to increase the employment rate for women to more than 60% by the same year, not least in
order to reinforce the sustainability of social protection systems.
In addition to the 2010 Lisbon targets, the Stockholm European Council of 2001 set intermediate targets for
employment rates in the EU in 2005 of 67% overall and 57% for women. It also set a new target for raising the
average EU employment rate for older men and women (aged 55-64) to 50% by 2010.
Table 3 - Employment Rates in EU Member States in 2003 and 
progress towards the Lisbon and Stockholm targets
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
Note: data for LU and MT refer to 2002. The change in column "1998-2003" for CY is 2000 to 2003 and for LU 1998 to 2002.
The column "Gap below 2010 target" is for illustrative purposes only, since the 2010 target is for the EU overall and not individual
Member States ">" indicates that the respective target has already been exceeded by the MS concerned.
Total employment rate Female employment rate Older workers' employment rate
2003
Gap below
2010 
target
Change
2002-
2003
Change
1998-
2003
2003
Gap below
2010 
target
Change
2002-
2003
Change
1998-
2003
2003
Gap below
2010 
target
Change
2002-
2003
Change
1998-
2003
BE 59.6 10.4 -0.3 2.2 51.8 8.2 0.4 4.2 28.1 21.9 1.5 5.2
CZ 64.7 5.3 -0.7 -2.6 56.3 3.7 -0.7 -2.4 42.3 7.7 1.5 5.2
DK 75.1 > -0.8 0.0 70.5 > -1.2 0.3 60.2 > 2.3 8.2
DE 64.8 5.2 -0.6 0.9 58.8 1.2 -0.1 3.0 39.3 10.7 0.6 1.6
EE 62.9 7.1 0.9 -1.7 59.0 1.0 1.1 -1.3 52.3 > 0.7 2.1
EL 57.9 12.1 1.2 2.4 43.9 16.1 1.4 3.7 42.3 7.7 2.6 3.3
ES 59.7 10.3 1.3 8.5 46.0 14.0 1.9 10.2 40.8 9.2 1.1 5.7
FR 62.8 7.2 0.0 2.6 56.7 3.3 0.2 3.6 36.8 13.2 2.1 8.5
IE 65.4 4.6 -0.2 4.8 55.8 4.2 0.2 6.8 49.0 1.0 1.9 7.3
IT 56.1 13.9 0.6 4.1 42.7 17.3 0.7 5.4 30.3 19.7 1.4 2.6
CY* 69.2 0.8 0.6 3.5 60.4 > 1.3 6.9 50.4 > 1.0 1.0
LV 61.8 8.2 1.4 1.9 57.9 2.1 1.1 2.8 44.1 5.9 2.4 7.8
LT 61.1 8.9 1.2 -1.2 58.4 1.6 1.2 -0.2 44.7 5.3 3.1 5.2
LU* 63.1 6.9 : 2.6 50.8 9.2 : 4.6 29.5 20.5 : 4.4
HU 57.0 13.0 0.8 3.3 50.9 9.1 1.1 3.7 28.9 21.1 3.3 11.6
MT* 54.5 15.5 : : 33.6 26.4 : : 30.3 19.7 : :
NL 73.5 > -0.9 3.3 65.8 > -0.4 5.7 44.8 5.2 2.5 10.9
AT 69.2 0.8 0.0 1.3 62.8 > 0.3 4.0 30.4 19.6 0.7 2.0
PL 51.2 18.8 -0.3 -7.8 46.0 14.0 -0.2 -5.7 26.9 23.1 0.8 -5.2
PT 67.2 2.8 -1.0 0.3 60.6 > -0.2 2.3 51.1 > 0.2 1.1
Sl 62.6 7.4 -0.8 -0.3 57.6 2.4 -1.0 -1.0 23.5 26.5 -1.0 -0.4
SK 57.7 12.3 0.9 -2.9 52.2 7.8 0.8 -1.3 24.6 25.4 1.8 1.8
FI 67.7 2.3 -0.4 3.1 65.7 > -0.5 4.5 49.6 0.4 1.8 13.4
SE 72.9 > -0.7 2.6 71.5 > -0.7 3.6 68.6 > 0.6 5.6
UK 71.8 > 0.1 1.3 65.3 > 0.0 1.7 55.5 > 2.0 6.5
EU15 64.3 5.7 0.1 2.9 56.0 4.0 0.4 4.4 41.7 8.3 1.6 5.1
EU25 62.9 7.1 0.1 1.7 55.0 5.0 0.3 3.2 40.2 9.8 1.5 4.4
2010 Target 70% More than 60 % 50%
best year for employment creation
in recent years. Progress towards
achieving the 2010 employment
rate targets will rely heavily on the
implementation of further labour
market reforms such as those iden-
tified by the Employment Task-
force, including increasing the
adaptability of workers and enter-
prises, making work a real option
for all, removal of disincentives to
female participation in the labour
force, keeping older workers in the
labour force longer and raising skill
levels in the labour force by invest-
ing more and more effectively in
human capital and lifelong learn-
ing, as well as better governance to
ensure more effective implementa-
tion of reforms. 
Concerning the situation for indi-
vidual Member States, only four
(Denmark, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK) currently
already meet the EU target for 2010
of an overall employment rate of
70%, and only five others are
presently within 5 percentage
points of the target (chart 14). Over
the last five years, Spain and Ireland
have made the biggest advances in
raising their employment rates, up
8.5 and 4.8 percentage points
respectively, while in contrast the
rate has fallen by almost 8 percent-
age points in Poland, which as a
result is currently around 19 per-
centage points below the EU tar-
get.
Eight Member States already meet
the 2010 female employment rate
target, and eight others are within
5 percentage points (chart 15).
However, the gap remains large in
Belgium, Hungary, Luxembourg
and the Slovak Republic, and espe-
cially so - at 14 percentage points
and over - in Greece, Italy, Malta,
Poland and Spain. However, Spain
has improved its female employ-
ment rate substantially over the last
5 years, with the rate increasing by
over 10 percentage points.
For the older people’s employment
rate target, six Member States are
already at or above the 2010 target,
but substantial gaps remain in
Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, the
Slovak Republic and Slovenia,
where in 2003 the gaps were all of
the order of 20 percentage points
or above (chart 16).
Chapter 1 Employment in Europe 2004
28
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT Sl SK FI SE UK
%
of
w
or
ki
ng
ag
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
Overall Lisbon ER target for 2010  (70%)
Chart 14 - Overall employment rates for EU Member States, 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note data for MT refers to 2002 only,  
CY 2003 only and LU to 1998 and 2002
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Lisbon older workers' ER target for 2010  (50%)
Chart 16 - Older workers’ employment rates for EU Member States, 
1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note data for MT refers to 2002 only,  
CY 2003 only and LU to 1998 and 2002
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Chart 15 - Female employment rates for EU Member States, 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note data for MT refers to 2002 only,
CY 2003 only and LU to 1998 and 2002
1998 2003
3.3.2. Employment rate
developments at Member State
level in 2003
Within the enlarged EU there are
large variations in employment
rates among Member States, which
in 2003 ranged from as low as 51%
in Poland to as high as 75% in
Denmark (chart 17). While there
was essentially little or no change in
the employment rate for the EU25
as a whole between 2002 and 2003,
several Member States experienced
declines in their rates, most notably
the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands, Port-
ugal, Slovenia and Sweden with
declines of between 0.5 and 1 per-
centage point. On the other hand,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain
saw rises in their employment rates
in excess of 1 percentage point, and
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Italy and
the Slovak Republic rises of bet-
ween 0.5 and 1 percentage point.
Driven by a marginal fall in the
average male employment rate and
a slightly stronger rise in the female
rate, the gender gap between male
and female employment rates in
the EU25 declined by 0.5 percent-
age points between 2002 and 2003,
to 15.8 percentage points. Never-
theless, large gaps of 27 to 29 per-
centage points remain in Greece,
Italy and Spain, countries in which
the employment rates for women
are all well below 50%, while in
Malta the gap is exceptionally high
at around 42 percentage points due
to an extremely low employment
rate for women of just below 34%. 
Focusing on older workers, the
employment rate for the EU25 for
those aged 55-64 stood at just over
40% in 2003. The lowest rate for
this age group was that for
Slovenia, at just under 24%, while
in Sweden the rate was almost
69%, far higher than for any other
Member State apart from
Denmark. Except for Poland and
Slovenia, the employment rate for
older people has increased over
recent years in all Member States,
with particularly marked rises (of
over 10 percentage points since
1998) in Finland, Hungary and the
Netherlands. Between 2002 and
2003 all Member States other than
Slovenia experienced rises in older
people’s employment rates, with
these rising by as much as over 3
percentage points in Hungary and
Lithuania compared to an average
rise of 1.5 percentage points for the
EU25 as a whole.
3.4. Recent employment trends
according to type of employment
3.4.1. Part-time employment
In 2003, just over 17% of workers in
the enlarged EU were in part-time
employment, an increase of some
0.4 percentage points on the previ-
ous year and continuing the rising
trend seen over recent years in the
occurrence of this form of employ-
ment. Increases of over 1 percentage
point compared to 2002 were
recorded in Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Sweden, while
Lithuania reported a decrease of a
similar order. 
Among Member States, the
Netherlands stands out as the coun-
try where part-time employment is
most common, where it accounts for
as much as 45% of total employ-
ment (chart 18). The next highest
rate occurs in the UK, with 25%,
while Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany and Sweden all have
shares of part-time employment
accounting for over 20% of total
employment. The rate for the
Netherlands is much higher than for
any other Member State owing to
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Chart 17 - Employment rate by gender, 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for LU and MT refer to 2002
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Chart 18 - Part-time employment by gender, 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * No recent data for CY and LV.  
No gender breakdown for GE. Data for LU and MT refers to 2002.
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the fact that almost three-quarters of
female employment in that country is
part-time. Indeed, part-time work
remains predominantly a feature of
female employment, with some 30%
of women in employment in the
EU25 in 2003 having a part-time job
compared to only 6.6% for men. 
For the EU25 as a whole, the share of
part-time employment rose by 1.4
percentage points between 1998
and 2003. Nevertheless, the propor-
tion of part-time employment
remains exceptionally low in the
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary
and the Slovak Republic, with shares
at 5% or below, and for most having
changed little since 1998. Those
Member States that have seen the
largest rises in the occurrence of
part-time employment over the last
five years were Austria, Belgium and
Germany, where the share of part-
time employment rose around 4 per-
centage points, and especially the
Netherlands where it rose around 6
percentage points (chart 19). 
Part-time work is more frequent in
some age groups than in others
(chart 20). At EU25 level there is a
greater proportion of part-time
employment among youth (23%)
and older people (around 21%) than
for prime-age workers (15%). Part-
time work is therefore more com-
mon at the beginning and end of
people’s working lives while full-
time employment is concentrated in
the middle years. There is also a clear
gender distinction in the occur-
rence of part-time work by age. In
general, men are most likely to be in
part-time employment during their
youth, while for women it is during
the latter stages of their working
lives. Furthermore, while the share
of part-time employment for men
decreases sharply from youth to
prime-age, for women the share
remains roughly the same across
these age categories.
3.4.2. Fixed-term employment
Fixed-term contracts were held by
just under 13% of EU25 employees
in 2003. While only 5% or less of
employees were employed under
such contracts in Estonia, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta and the Slovak
Republic, close to 31% worked
under fixed-term employment in
Spain and around 20% in Poland
and Portugal (chart 21). 
Unlike part-time work, fixed-term
employment is more evenly spread
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Chart 19 - Change in the share of part-time 
employment in total employment between 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * No recent data for CY and LV.  
Data for LT and Sl refer to 2000 and 2003, and for LU to 1998 and 2002. 
No data for MT for 2003 nor prior to 2000
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Chart 20 - Share of part-time employment 
in the EU25 by age group and sex, 2003
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
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Chart 21 - Fixed-term employment by gender, 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * No recent data for CY and LV. 
Data for LU and MT refers to 2002
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among men and women at EU level.
In 2003, the average share of fixed-
term employment for the EU25 was
13.7% for women and 12.2% for
men, although more sizeable gen-
der differences do exist in several
Member States. Generally the share
of women in fixed-term employ-
ment is higher than that for men,
most notably in Belgium, Spain and
Sweden where the gender gap is
around 5 percentage points, and in
Finland where it exceeds 7 percent-
age points. Only in Austria, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and the
Slovak Republic are larger shares of
men employed on a fixed-term basis
than women.
In the EU15 the share of fixed-term
employment continued to decline
marginally in 2003 to 12.8% of all
employees, the occurrence of this
type of employment having peaked
in 2000 at 13.6%. However, the
trend for the enlarged EU25 as a
whole is still one of an increasing
share of fixed-term employment, as
it becomes more common in the
new Member States. In particular,
Poland has seen a dramatic rise in
the use of this form of employment,
with the share of employees affected
rising from below 5% in 1998 to
almost 20% in 2003 (chart 22).
3.5. Skills and employment
The skill content of the EU25 work-
ing age population continues to
rise. In 2003, high-skilled people
(tertiary education completed)
made up 18.5% of the working age
population in the EU25, while the
low-skilled (below upper secondary
education) accounted for just under
35% (table 4). This compares with
17.8% and 35.6% respectively the
year before and reflects the ongo-
ing improvement in the levels of
human capital. 
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Chart 22 - Developments in the share of employees 
in fixed-term employment between 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * No recent data for CY and LV.  Data for LT and Sl refer 
to 2000 and 2003, and for LU to 1998 and 2002. No data for MT for 2003 nor prior to 2000.
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
Notes: low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary), high (ISCED 5-6: tertiary); * LU and NL data refer to 2002;
**UK: GSCE levels included under 'medium* LU and NL data refer to 2002.
Total Men Women
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
BE 40.6 34.8 24.6 41.2 34.8 23.9 40.0 34.7 25.3
CZ 18.4 71.7 9.9 15.0 74.0 11.0 21.7 69.5 8.8
DK 24.9 48.0 27.2 24.3 50.4 25.3 25.4 45.5 29.0
DE 23.3 56.2 20.6 20.3 55.4 24.3 26.3 56.9 16.8
EE 21.2 54.1 24.8 23.1 57.9 19.0 19.4 50.5 30.1
EL 45.9 38.8 15.3 45.1 38.8 16.0 46.6 38.8 14.6
ES 56.5 20.4 23.0 57.0 20.1 22.9 56.1 20.7 23.2
FR 38.4 40.6 21.0 37.0 43.2 19.9 39.9 38.0 22.1
IE 39.2 37.6 23.2 41.9 35.9 22.2 36.5 39.4 24.1
IT 53.5 37.3 9.2 53.5 37.4 9.1 53.5 37.3 9.2
CY 37.0 36.9 26.1 35.0 37.7 27.2 38.8 36.2 25.0
LV 26.5 58.5 15.0 30.4 57.2 12.3 22.9 59.6 17.5
LT 22.9 57.5 19.6 25.5 57.8 16.7 20.5 57.2 22.3
LU* 41.2 42.6 16.2 37.2 44.2 18.6 45.3 41.0 13.7
HU 30.3 56.9 12.9 27.5 60.4 12.2 33.0 53.5 13.5
MT 77.9 13.7 8.4 75.9 15.0 9.1 79.9 12.5 7.6
NL* 36.0 42.6 21.4 33.6 43.2 23.3 38.4 42.1 19.5
AT 26.2 59.6 14.2 21.0 63.6 15.4 31.3 55.6 13.1
PL 24.8 63.9 11.3 24.3 65.8 9.9 25.2 62.1 12.7
PT 76.3 14.9 8.7 78.6 14.5 6.9 74.1 15.3 10.6
SI 25.8 59.9 14.4 23.4 64.3 12.2 28.1 55.3 16.6
SK 20.7 69.9 9.4 18.3 72.6 9.1 23.1 67.3 9.6
FI 29.3 43.4 27.2 31.0 45.2 23.8 27.6 41.7 30.7
SE 22.2 53.9 23.9 23.8 55.7 20.5 20.6 52.0 27.4
UK** 16.9 55.9 27.2 15.2 56.9 27.9 18.7 54.9 26.4
EU-15 36.9 43.2 19.8 35.6 43.9 20.5 38.2 42.6 19.2
EU-25 34.8 46.7 18.5 33.6 47.5 18.9 36.0 45.8 18.1
Table 4 - Share (as %) of the working age population (15-64) by educational attainment levels in 2003
 
There are important variations
across Member States in the skills
composition of the working age
population. Despite the generally
improving situation, the low-skilled
still account for very large propor-
tions of the working age popula-
tion in certain Member States. The
highest share of low-skilled people
is found in Malta and Portugal, with
shares of around 78% and 76%
respectively, while in Spain and Italy
the low-skilled also account for
more than half of the working age
population. The countries with the
largest proportions of high-skilled
in 2003 were Denmark, Finland and
the UK, all with shares of just over
27%. In contrast, high-skilled peo-
ple make up less than 10% of the
working age population in the
Czech Republic, Italy, Malta,
Portugal and the Slovak Republic.
The skills composition at EU level is
broadly similar for both men and
women, although the distribution
for the male population shows a
moderately higher skills content.
The proportion of the working
population in the low-skilled group
shows the largest gender differ-
ence, accounting for 33.6% of men
and 36% of women. At Member
State level this is most pronounced
in Austria, where the share of low-
skilled women was over 10 percent-
age points higher than the share of
low-skilled men, although in con-
trast several Member States, espe-
cially the Baltic States, Ireland and
Portugal, actually have smaller
shares of low-skilled women than
men. Similarly, large differences
exist in the proportion of high-
skilled men and women.  For exam-
ple, in Germany and Luxembourg
there is a much smaller share of
high-skilled women than men,
while in Finland, Sweden and the
three Baltic States the reverse situa-
tion applies.
As might be expected, the employ-
ment rate is generally greater the
higher the educational attainment
level (table 5). In 2003, the average
employment rate in the EU25 for
the high-skilled was 82.5% and for
the medium-skilled (upper second-
ary completed) 68.4%, a difference
of just over 14 percentage points.
The gap between average employ-
ment rates for the medium-skilled
and the low-skilled was even larger
at around 22 percentage points, the
average employment rate for low-
skilled being 46.6%. A similar pat-
tern is found with regard to activity
rates across skill levels, with only
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Table 5 - Employment, unemployment and activity rates by education levels in 2003 (age group 15-64)
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results. 
Note: * LU and NL data refer to 2002, ** UK : GSCE levels included under ‘medium’.
Total. irrespective of 
education level High Medium Low
ER UR AR ER UR AR ER UR AR ER UR AR
BE 59.3% 7.7% 64.3% 82.3% 3.8% 85.6% 65.0% 8.0% 70.6% 40.5% 11.7% 45.9%
CZ 64.9% 7.6% 70.2% 85.7% 2.1% 87.5% 72.4% 6.9% 77.8% 24.3% 22.1% 31.2%
DK 75.1% 5.5% 79.4% 84.8% 4.8% 89.1% 78.7% 4.4% 82.3% 57.5% 9.0% 63.2%
DE 64.9% 9.9% 72.1% 82.9% 5.0% 87.3% 69.0% 10.1% 76.7% 42.2% 15.7% 50.0%
EE 62.3% 11.0% 70.1% 79.8% 5.4% 84.4% 67.3% 12.5% 76.9% 29.1% 18.8% 35.9%
EL 58.0% 9.1% 63.8% 80.9% 6.3% 86.3% 58.1% 12.0% 66.0% 50.2% 7.7% 54.3%
ES 59.6% 11.2% 67.1% 78.6% 8.2% 85.6% 60.0% 11.5% 67.8% 53.5% 12.7% 61.4%
FR 62.6% 9.1% 68.9% 77.3% 6.3% 82.5% 69.6% 8.1% 75.8% 47.2% 12.8% 54.2%
IE 65.0% 4.6% 68.1% 84.7% 2.8% 87.1% 70.6% 3.9% 73.5% 47.7% 7.3% 51.5%
IT 56.1% 9.0% 61.6% 81.2% 5.6% 86.0% 64.9% 8.2% 70.7% 45.7% 10.7% 51.2%
CY 69.2% 4.2% 72.2% 87.8% 3.8% 91.3% 73.4% 4.0% 76.4% 51.8% 5.1% 54.6%
LV 61.7% 10.7% 69.1% 80.1% 6.3% 85.5% 69.4% 10.3% 77.4% 34.3% 17.6% 41.7%
LT 62.8% 13.0% 72.1% 84.6% 6.4% 90.4% 69.0% 13.8% 80.1% 28.4% 22.4% 36.6%
LU* 63.6% 2.6% 65.3% 83.6% 1.7% 85.0% 69.1% 1.5% 70.2% 50.8% 4.7% 53.3%
HU 57.0% 5.8% 60.6% 82.4% 1.4% 83.6% 66.6% 5.4% 70.4% 28.4% 12.4% 32.4%
MT 54.6% 7.5% 59.1% 84.1% 3.7% 87.4% 69.3% 7.2% 74.7% 49.0% 8.3% 53.4%
NL* 74.5% 2.6% 76.5% 86.8% 1.7% 88.4% 79.8% 2.1% 81.5% 61.7% 3.7% 64.0%
AT 68.2% 4.7% 71.6% 84.4% 2.4% 86.5% 73.7% 4.2% 76.9% 46.9% 8.8% 51.5%
PL 51.4% 19.7% 64.0% 81.4% 7.1% 87.7% 56.7% 20.9% 71.7% 23.9% 28.0% 33.1%
PT 67.3% 6.6% 72.1% 86.7% 5.6% 91.8% 62.6% 6.9% 67.3% 66.0% 6.7% 70.8%
SI 62.5% 6.6% 66.9% 85.2% 3.8% 88.5% 67.5% 6.3% 72.0% 38.2% 11.2% 43.0%
SK 57.9% 17.2% 69.8% 86.6% 4.4% 90.6% 66.7% 15.9% 79.3% 15.1% 47.1% 28.7%
FI 68.7% 10.5% 76.8% 84.9% 4.2% 88.6% 72.4% 10.9% 81.2% 48.2% 18.6% 59.3%
SE 73.6% 5.6% 77.9% 85.9% 3.5% 89.0% 79.1% 5.3% 83.5% 57.0% 8.8% 62.5%
UK** 71.7% 4.9% 75.3% 87.5% 2.6% 89.8% 77.1% 4.9% 81.1% 51.4% 9.4% 56.7%
EU-15 64.3% 8.1% 69.9% 82.5% 4.9% 86.8% 70.2% 7.7% 76.1% 49.5% 11.2% 55.7%
EU-25 62.9% 9.1% 69.2% 82.5% 4.9% 86.8% 68.4% 9.4% 75.5% 46.6% 12.2% 53.0%
just over half of the low-skilled
population in the EU25 active in the
labour market compared to nearly
87% of the high-skilled.
The range in employment rates
across Member States is most
noticeable for the low-skilled,
where rates vary by as much as 51
percentage points, from as low as
15% in the Slovak Republic to 66%
in Portugal. Except for Cyprus and
Malta, which have rates around the
average level for the EU15, the
countries where employment rates
for the low-skilled are exceptionally
low (below 30%) are all found
among the new Member States,
reflecting the generally low level of
participation by the low-skilled in
these countries. For the high-skilled
the variation in employment rates is
much less pronounced, ranging
from about 77% in France to
almost 88% in Cyprus and the UK. 
In the EU25, average unemploy-
ment rates for the low-skilled are
more than double those for the
high-skilled. Substantial differences
of over 20 percentage points exist
between the unemployment rates
for the low- and high-skilled in the
Czech Republic and Poland, but the
most extreme situation is found in
the Slovak Republic, where the
unemployment rate for low-skilled
is 47% compared to only around
4% for the high-skilled. This con-
trasts markedly with the situation
in countries such as Cyprus, Greece,
the Netherlands and Portugal
where unemployment rates for
low- and high-skilled differ by less
than two percentage points. 
3.6. Developments in the labour
market situation for young people
Following a period of rising youth
participation and employment and
declining youth unemployment
between 1997 and 2001, the labour
market situation for young people
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Table 6 - Recent develoments in youth labour market situation in the EU25. EU15 and the group of new Member States
Developments in labour market indicators for young people (aged 15-24) in the EU25 between 1997 and 2003
EU25 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Activity Rate Total 45.5 45.8 46.1 46.1 46.0 45.6 45.0
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 49.5 49.7 49.8 49.7 49.7 49.2 48.5
Women 41.4 41.9 42.4 42.6 42.3 41.9 41.3
Employment Rate Total 36.4 37.1 37.6 38.0 38.0 37.4 36.7
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 40.3 40.8 41.1 41.4 41.4 40.5 39.5
Women 32.5 33.4 34.1 34.5 34.7 34.3 33.7
Unemployment Rate Total : 18.6 18.3 17.6 17.5 17.9 18.3
(% of labour force 15-24) Men : 17.4 17.2 16.6 16.7 17.6 18.1
Women : 20 19.5 18.9 18.3 18.3 18.6
Unemployment Ratio Total : 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.1
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men : 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.6
Women : 8.2 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.7
Developments in labour market indicators for young people (aged 15-24) in the EU15 between 1997 and 2003
EU15 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Activity Rate Total 46.7 47.2 47.7 47.8 47.7 47.6 47.2
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 50.4 50.8 51.2 51.3 51.4 51.1 50.6
Women 43.0 43.5 44.1 44.2 44.0 44.0 43.6
Employment Rate Total 37.2 38.2 39.4 40.4 40.8 40.5 39.7
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 40.8 41.8 42.9 43.9 44.3 43.6 42.5
Women 33.6 34.6 35.9 36.8 37.3 37.3 36.7
Unemployment Rate Total 20 18.5 16.9 15.4 14.6 15.1 15.8
(% of labour force 15-24) Men 18.6 17.2 15.8 14.2 13.8 14.8 15.7
Women 21.6 20 18.3 16.8 15.6 15.5 15.9
Unemployment Ratio Total 9.3 8.7 8.1 7.4 7.0 7.2 7.3
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 9.3 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.1 7.5 7.7
Women 9.2 8.7 8.1 7.5 6.9 6.8 6.9
Recent Developments in labour market indicators for young people (aged 15-24) 
in the new Member States. from 1997 to 2003
NMS10 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Activity Rate Total 40.3 40.2 39.7 39.5 39.3 37.4 35.9
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 45.9 45.1 44.1 43.1 43.1 41.2 39.9
Women 34.8 35.4 35.4 35.8 35.5 33.6 31.9
Employment Rate Total 33.2 32.4 30.1 28.3 26.9 25.2 24.3
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men 38.3 36.7 33.6 31.1 29.7 27.9 27.2
Women 28.1 28.3 26.6 25.5 24.2 22.5 21.3
Unemployment Rate Total : 19.3 25 28.6 31.3 32.1 31.8
(% of labour force 15-24) Men : 18.5 24.4 28.1 30.8 31.5 30.8
Women : 20.4 25.7 29.3 31.9 32.9 33.1
Unemployment Ratio Total : 7.9 10.0 11.3 12.3 12.1 :
(% of pop aged 15-24) Men : 8.4 10.7 12.1 13.2 13.0 :
Women : 7.5 9.3 10.6 11.4 11.1 :
(i.e. persons aged 15-24) in the EU
has generally deteriorated over the
last two or three years (table 6). This
overall development for the EU25
hides somewhat different trends in
the EU15 and the group of new
Member States, but recent develop-
ments in the labour market situation
for youth have generally been nega-
tive across most Member States and
are of particular concern in countries
such as the Czech Republic,
Lithuania and Poland.
For the EU15, the labour market sit-
uation for youth improved signifi-
cantly between 1997 and 2001, a
period of strong employment
growth in general in the EU15, but
then deteriorated over the follow-
ing two years (chart 24). Between
1997 and 2001 the activity rate of
young people increased 1 percent-
age point, but the employment rate
rose by a more substantial 3.6 per-
centage points, with this increase
being fairly evenly split between
male and female youth. At the same
time, the youth unemployment rate
in the EU15 declined substantially,
by 5.4 percentage points, with
young women seeing a larger
decrease than young men. As a
result, the employment rate for
young people in the EU15 peaked in
2001 at 40.8% while youth unem-
ployment dipped to a low of 14.6%.
However, developments over the
subsequent two years saw the youth
employment rate fall to 39.7% and
unemployment rise again to 15.8%,
while youth participation in the
labour market also fell. Young males
were the most affected by this
downturn, with their employment
and unemployment rates falling and
rising respectively by close to 2 per-
centage points.
For the group of new Member
States as a whole, the labour market
situation for young people in 2003
was much worse than in the EU15,
with the youth unemployment rate
double that of the EU15, and the
activity and employment rates some
11 and 15 percentage points lower
respectively. This reflects the con-
trasting development in the group
of new Member States compared to
Chapter 1 Employment in Europe 2004
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Change in youth unemployment ratio between 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for LU refers to 1998 and 2002. 
No data for 1998 and/or 2003 for CY and MT
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Change in youth unemployment rates between 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for SK refers to 1999 and 2003. 
No data for 1998 and/or 2003 for CY and MT
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Change in youth employment rates between 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for LU refers to 1998 and 2002. 
No data for 1998 and/or 2003 for CY and MT
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Chart 23 - Developments in the labour market situation 
for young people (aged 15-24) in the EU15 between 1998 and 2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for LU refers to 1998 and 2002. 
No data for 1998 and/or 2003 for CY and MT
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Change in youth activity rates between 1998 and 2003
the EU15; in the former the labour
market situation for youth has
declined continuously from 1997
onwards. While the employment
rate for young people in the group
of new Member States stood at just
over 33% in 1997, by 2003 it had fallen
almost 9 percentage points to just
over 24%, mainly driven by decreas-
es in employment of young men. At
the same time, the unemployment
rate jumped over 12 percentage
points, from 19.3% in 1998 to 31.8%
in 2003.  The rise in the unemploy-
ment rate was evenly spread
between male and female youth,
due to a stronger decline in partici-
pation of young men (down 6 per-
centage points) than for young
women (down 3 percentage points).
Nevertheless, participation remains
much higher among young males
than young females in the group of
new Member States, with the gen-
der gap similar to that in the EU15.
Taking a look at developments over
the last five years at individual
Member State level (chart 23), the
vast majority of Member States expe-
rienced declines in youth employ-
ment rates relative to the rates
observed in 1998, with particularly
strong declines in the Czech Republic
and Lithuania of over 10 percentage
points. Employment rates for youth
only rose in seven Member States,
most notably in Spain and the
Netherlands with rises of around 6
percentage points. Activity rates for
youth followed broadly similar
developments as the employment
rates, with many Member States
experiencing declines in youth partic-
ipation. However, in Poland youth
activity rates remained stable
between 1998 and 2003, so the
decline in the employment rate for
young people was reflected through
a sharp rise of almost 19 percentage
points in youth unemployment,
equivalent to a rise in the ratio of
youth unemployed to the total
youth population of 7 percentage
points. While the overall labour mar-
ket situation for young people has
therefore deteriorated in most
Member States between 1998 and
2003, developments in Finland,
France, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden went against this
general trend, with these Member
States seeing rises in youth participa-
tion and employment rates and
declines in youth unemployment.
The position of youth can also be
reviewed according to their own
perception of their situation. The
distribution of young people by
self-perceived main status2 (chart
25) indicates that for all Member
States (for which data are avail-
able) other than Austria and
Malta, the greatest proportion of
young people are those whose
perceived main status is that of
student. The share of this status
among young people is generally
between 50% and 60%, although
as high as nearly 70% in Slovenia.
In Austria and Malta, the propor-
tion is greatest for those whose
main activity status is employed,
where the share is 48% and 45%
respectively, while in Sweden the
shares of youth with “employed”
or “student” as their main status
are very similar at close to 45%.
“Unemployed” is the main activity
status for sizeable shares of youth
in Italy, Poland and the Slovak
Republic, where 12-15% of youth
in these countries declare them-
selves to be in this situation. For
certain Member States there are
quite significant shares of youth
who are neither in the labour
force nor in education. For
Hungary and Poland, this share
amounts to as much as around 8%
of young people, and for most
Member States it is in the region
of between 3% and 6%.
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Chart 24 - Developments in the labour market 
situation for young people (aged 15-24) in the EU-15 between 1997 and 2003
Source: Eurostat QLFD and harmonised series on unemployment
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Chart 25 - Share of youth population by declared 
main status in EU Member States, 2003
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2 Main activity status concerns each person's self perception regarding his/her activity status; for instance, students with small jobs
will in general classify themselves as students.
4. Focus on specific
developments in the
EU15 and the new
Member States
In order to provide a degree of con-
tinuity with the analysis presented
in preceding versions of
Employment in Europe, the follow-
ing sections present separate
reviews of developments in the
EU15 and the new Member States
up to the year 2003. This is neces-
sary in order to provide a coherent
follow up to the analysis in last
year’s report on the resilience of
employment in the EU15 as well as
to give a special focus in this year’s
report on the situation and trends
for the new Member States, and in
particular present a review of sec-
toral employment developments in
these countries similar to that pre-
sented last year for the EU15.
4.1. Continued overall resilience of
the EU15 labour market to the
recent slowdown, but concerns in
specific areas
In contrast to the strong economic
growth in the US and Japan, eco-
nomic recovery in the EU15 contin-
ued at only a very modest pace over
2003, with GDP growth estimated to
have been a limited 0.7% in 2003,
slightly down on the previous year’s
growth of 1.0%. Among the EU15
Member States, GDP growth
remained particularly weak in
Denmark, France, Germany and Italy,
and turned noticeably negative in
the Netherlands and Portugal.
Despite the low average growth in
2003, the EU15 economy ended 2003
on a more upbeat note than in
recent years. The slowdown which
the EU15 economy had experienced
since 2000 finally seems to have
come to an end in mid-2003, with
the economy picking up gradually
over the second half of the year. 
As reported on in last year’s
Employment in Europe, until the
end of 2002 the EU15 labour mar-
ket had shown only moderate reac-
tion to the recent world-wide eco-
nomic downturn, with employment
showing greater resilience than in
previous economic slowdowns. This
resilience also continued into 2003,
with the EU15 unemployment rate
essentially remaining stable at
around 8.1% over the course of
2003, while employment growth,
albeit very subdued over 2003 at
0.2%, remained positive (chart 26).
Consequently, overall employment
levels have continued to show no
decline since the beginning of the
slowdown. Nevertheless, although
employment remained resilient
overall, the labour market situation
in certain sectors and Member
States, and for certain elements of
the labour force, has shown clear
signs of a deterioration. Among the
EU15 Member States, employment
performance clearly declined in
Finland, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Portugal, and
remained weak in Belgium,
Denmark and Germany. In addition,
long-term unemployment in the
EU15 appears to be on the rise
again, increasing from 3.1% in 2002
to 3.3% in 2003, a change from the
trend of progressive decline
observed over preceding years.
4.1.1. Overall developments and
comparison with developments in
the US 
Focusing in more detail on develop-
ments since the start of the latest
slowdown, GDP growth (compared
to the same quarter of the previous
year) for the EU15 declined over the
period from the second quarter of
2000 until the first quarter of 2002.
Although growth subsequently
picked up, this was only temporary
as by the second quarter of 2003
the rate had fallen back to around
0.4%. GDP growth then rose only
slowly over the remaining quarters
of 2003 to end at 0.9%, well below
the growth rates in the US and
Japan. In line with the continued
sluggishness in GDP growth,
employment growth in the EU15
remained at a virtual standstill for
most of 2003, having fallen steadily
over 2001 and 2002 from the peaks
of 2000. Nevertheless, overall
employment has not declined at
any point since the slowdown
began, and employment growth
remained positive and even picked
up moderately over the course of
2003.
In contrast, GDP growth in the US
bottomed out with zero growth in
the second half of 2001 but then
experienced a strong and sustained
recovery from early 2002 onwards.
Indeed, the US has maintained
growth levels above 2% since mid-
2002, with the last two quarters of
2003 seeing GDP growth accelerat-
ing strongly to 3.6% and 4.3%. US
employment growth reacted in
close synchrony with the slowdown
in GDP growth, declining strongly
from the end of 2000 onwards and
becoming negative from the last
quarter of 2001 until the second
quarter of 2002. However, employ-
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Chart 26 - Employment and GDP growth in the EU15 and the US, 2000-2003 
(quarter over quarter of the previous year)
Source: Eurostat (QLFD and national accounts) and US BLS
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ment growth has also shown such
close synchrony with the strong
pick-up in GDP growth at the start
of 2002, with positive growth
resuming soon after (some 2 quar-
ters) to reach levels of around 1%
over 2003. 
Looking at overall changes in
employment since the slowdown
began, comparison of develop-
ments in total employment in the
EU15 and the US between the sec-
ond quarter of 2000 and the
fourth quarter of 2003 shows that
much greater employment cre-
ation occurred in the EU15 over
the whole period (table 7). For the
EU15, employment grew by 4.1
million while in the US it rose by a
more limited 1.5 million. However,
over the year to the fourth quar-
ter of 2003, employment creation
was larger in the US, with employ-
ment growing 1.7 million com-
pared to 0.6 million in the EU15,
reflecting the more advanced
stage of the pick-up in economic
activity in the US. 
4.1.2. Sectoral employment
developments
Sectoral employment develop-
ments continue to show that the
services sector remains the driver
behind the continued, albeit mod-
erate, expansion in overall employ-
ment in the EU15. Employment in
this sector has followed a generally
rising trend, increasing by around
5.8 million since the start of the
slowdown and by 1.2 million
between the last quarter of 2002
and that of 2003 (chart 27). While
the services sector has seen contin-
ued growth, employment in both
agriculture and industry has
declined from the levels seen at the
start of the economic slowdown.
Between the second quarter of
2000 and the first quarter of 2003
employment in the agriculture sec-
tor declined by around 0.46 million,
but then recovered slightly over the
rest of 2003 to end only around
0.36 million down from the start of
the slowdown, and more-or-less
stable with regard to the same
quarter of the previous year.
Developments in the industry sector
have been more marked.
Employment declined rapidly
between the third quarter of 2002
and the first quarter of 2003 (down
around 1.1 million), and had not
recovered significantly from this fall
by the last quarter of 2003. Indeed,
the decline in employment in indus-
try over the 12 months to the
fourth quarter of 2003 (0.6 million)
was about the same as that over
the entire previous two and a half
years, highlighting the impact of
the prolonged slowdown on this
sector in particular. 
Even though employment growth
in services remained positive over-
all, there were significant differ-
ences in developments within sub-
sectors. Both the “wholesale and
retail trade, repair of motor vehi-
cles, and hotels and restaurants”
and “transport, storage and com-
munication” sectors saw dramatic
declines in employment growth in
the first quarter of 2003 and have
not recovered substantially since
(chart 28). Employment in the
“transport, storage and communica-
tion” sector has been hit especially
hard, remaining around the nega-
tive 5.5% level throughout 2003,
partly in reaction to the impact of
events in Iraq and the continued
threat from terrorism. Only in the
“financial intermediation, real
estate, renting and business activi-
ties” and “public administration
and defence, social and health serv-
ices etc.” sectors has employment
growth remained reasonably stable
over 2003, but even here at levels
generally down on those of the
previous year. Nonetheless, the con-
tinued growth in overall employ-
ment in the EU15 was essentially
due to the resilience exhibited by
these particular two sectors.
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in 2000q2
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
Table 7- Comparison of the evolution in employment since 2000Q2 
in the EU15 and USA (employment in millions) 
Total Employment Change in employment
2000Q2 2002Q4 2003Q4 Change 2000Q2 to 2003Q4
Change 2002Q4 
to 2003Q4
EU15 167.4 170.9 171.5 4.1 0.6
USA 137.2 136.9 138.6 1.5 1.7
4.1.3. Employment developments
by age-group, gender and type of
employment
Comparing the evolution in employ-
ment in the EU15 over the two peri-
ods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003 (corre-
sponding to respective periods of rel-
atively strong economic growth and
economic slowdown) reveals impor-
tant differences in terms of employ-
ment growth according to type of
employment, gender and age group
(table 8 and chart 29). During the
period 1997-2000, growth across all
age groups was positive and at
broadly similar levels, with growth
slightly stronger for young (15-24
years) and “prime-age” workers (25-
54 years) than for older workers (55-
64 years). During the subsequent
period of slowdown, however, while
overall employment growth slowed
to around half, the impact was not
evenly distributed across age groups.
Employment of older people expand-
ed even more strongly than during
the 1997-2000 period (although this
partly reflects the ageing of the pop-
ulation, since employment rates for
older people have changed less
markedly, from 36.4% in 1997 to
37.8% in 2000, and to 41.7% in 2003),
while employment growth for prime-
age workers slowed significantly, and
for young people employment even
declined marginally. In terms of gen-
der, employment of women contin-
ued to grow strongly during the peri-
od of slowdown, while for men
growth slowed more noticeably.
Fixed-term employment grew sub-
stantially (around 19%) between
1997 and 2000, but it is this form of
employment which was most
affected by the subsequent slow-
down, falling by around 3%
between 2000 and 2003. In con-
trast, growth in permanent employ-
ment remained relatively strong
and did not decline dramatically
from the growth achieved over the
period 1997-2000. Finally, while
self-employment did not expand
noticeably during the years of
strong economic growth, there was
a more marked increase in this form
of employment during the period of
slowdown, when it grew by 3.6%.
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Chart 28 - Employment growth in the main service sectors in the EU15, 2000-2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
Table 8 - Relative employment changes 1997-2000 and 2000-2003 by age
group, gender and type of employment
Relative change in
employment between
1997 and 2000 (as % of
1997 employment level)
Relative change in
employment between
2000 and 2003 (as % of
2000 employment level)
By age group
15-24 5.7 -0.2
25-54 6.0 2.0
55-64 4.9 13.9
65+ 3.0 12.1
By gender
Women 7.4 4.9
Men 4.7 1.7
By permanent or fixed-
term employment
Permanent 5.5 4.4
Fixed-term 18.8 -2.7
By  employment status
Employee 7.2 3.2
Self Employed 0.1 3.6
Total
5.8 3.1
Source: Eurostat, LFS; Note: estimates based on LFS, spring results.
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Chart 29 - Comparison of relative change in employment 
in the EU15 over the two periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003 
Source: Eurostat, LFS. Notes: estimated based on LFS, spring results
The results shown in chart 29, and
those shown for developments at
Member State level indicate that
while overall employment levels in
the EU15 remained resilient during
2003, different sectors, groups and
countries have been affected to dif-
fering degrees during the slow-
down, with some having experi-
enced a clear deterioration.
Perhaps of most concern are the
recent developments regarding
employment in the industry sector
and specific sub-sectors in services,
as well as the labour market situa-
tion for youth in general. 
Looking ahead, there are now
clearer signs of a recovery, albeit
gradual, in the EU15 economy,
which point to a likely improve-
ment in the labour market over
2004. Economic sentiment and con-
sumer confidence generally seem to
be rising, with employment expec-
tations improving against the back-
ground of stabilisation in the
unemployment rate. However,
while there is no clear obstacle to
increasing employment as the econ-
omy picks up, there may be a risk
that the labour market displays the
same moderate reaction to the
upswing as occurred during the
downturn, with firms replacing
labour with capital and raising pro-
ductivity to meet the rising
demand.
4.2. Labour market developments
in the new Member States 1998-
2003
4.2.1. Developments in 2003
In contrast to the weak economic
growth in the EU15 in 2003,
strong private consumption in the
group of new Member States
helped their economies to grow
by 3.6% on average, up from 2.4%
in 2002. Despite their strong over-
all economic growth, employment
in the group of new Member
States remained more-or-less stat-
ic on average in 2003. This relative
stability in employment for the
group of new Member States is
nevertheless an improvement
compared to the situation in the
preceding years and could mark
an end to the long period of
declining employment experi-
enced in these countries as a
whole. Similarly, developments in
unemployment in the new
Member States were positive on
average, with the unemployment
rate declining to 14.3% from
14.8% in 2002.
4.2.2. Longer term developments
in the labour market
Looking at longer term labour
market developments in the new
Member States from 1998 until
2003, the final year before their
accession as members of the EU,
reveals that progress has been
mixed. In terms of overall employ-
ment of the working age popula-
tion, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and
especially Poland have experi-
enced a deterioration in their
labour markets, with employment
in the latter falling by more than
10% over this period (chart 30). In
contrast, employment of the
working age population rose in
Hungary, Latvia and also marginal-
ly in Slovenia between 1998 and
2003, as well as in Cyprus (based
on data from 2000 to 2003). As a
result, for the group of new
Member States as a whole, overall
employment of those aged 15-64
fell by close to 5% between 1998
and 2003, equivalent to a net
decline in employment of the
working age population of just
over 1.5 million. 
Generally in line with the develop-
ments in overall employment,
employment rates declined in six of
the new Member States (table 9
and chart 31), most notably in
Poland which experienced a
decrease of almost 8 percentage
points. Only Cyprus, Hungary and
Latvia saw rises in overall employ-
ment rates. As a result, and against
the background of recent rises in
the employment rate for the EU15,
the difference between the aver-
age employment rate for the new
Member States as a group and that
for the EU15 increased from 1.4
percentage points in 1998 to 8.5
percentage points in 2003, mainly
driven by the developments in
Poland which in 2003 had an
employment rate 13 percentage
points below the EU15 average. By
2003, only Cyprus and the Czech
Republic had employment rates
above the EU15 average, compared
to five of the new Member States in
1998.
In all the new Member States,
except Slovenia, the recent devel-
opments in employment rates for
women, although declining in
many new Member States, have
been better than those for men. For
the group of new Member States as
a whole, the employment rate for
women declined 2.7 percentage
points between 1998 and 2003,
compared to a 5.7 percentage
points decline for men. The largest
differences were in Cyprus, where
between 2000 and 2003 rates for
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Chart 30 - Relative change in total employment of 
the working age population (aged 15-64) between 1998 and 2003 
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: * Data for CY refer to 2000 and 2003, no 2003 data for MT
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Table 9 - Employment rate developments in the new Member States between 1998 and 2003
Total ER Male ER Female ER Youth ER Older People's ER
1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003
CZ 67.3 64.7 76.0 73.1 58.7 56.3 41.5 30.0 37.1 42.3
EE 64.6 62.9 69.6 67.2 60.3 59.0 35.5 29.3 50.2 52.3
CY* 65.7 69.2 78.7 78.8 53.5 60.4 37.0 37.6 49.4 50.4
LV 59.9 61.8 65.1 66.1 55.1 57.9 33.3 31.5 36.3 44.1
LT 62.3 61.1 66.2 64.0 58.6 58.4 33.1 22.5 39.5 44.7
HU 53.7 57.0 60.5 63.5 47.2 50.9 33.9 26.8 17.3 28.9
MT* : 54.5 : 75.3 : 33.6 : 51.0 : 30.3
PL 59.0 51.2 66.5 56.5 51.7 46.0 28.5 21.2 32.1 26.9
SL 62.9 62.6 67.2 67.4 58.6 57.6 37.5 29.1 23.9 23.5
SK 60.6 57.7 67.8 63.3 53.5 52.2 35.0 27.4 22.8 24.6
NMS10 60.0 55.8 67.3 61.6 52.9 50.2 32.4 24.3 30.9 31.7
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Chart 31 - Employment rate developments 
in the new Member States between 1998 and 2003
Change in total employment rate
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.  Note: * Data for CY refer to 2000 and 2003, and for MT to 2002
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Change in male employment rate
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Change in female employment rate
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Change in youth employment rate
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Change in older people’s employment rate
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. Note: Data for CY refer to 2000 and 2003, no 2003 data for MT
women rose by close to 7 percent-
age points while those for men
remained static (but at already high
levels), and in Poland, where male
rates dropped 10 percentage points
between 1998 and 2003 compared
to 5.7 percentage points for
women.
Apart from Cyprus, youth employ-
ment rates fell noticeably in all new
Member States between 1998 and
2003, with marked declines in
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the
Slovak Republic and Slovenia, and
especially strong decreases in the
Czech Republic and Lithuania,
which both saw declines of over 10
percentage points. As a result,
other than for Cyprus and Malta,
youth employment rates in the new
Member States in 2003 were well
below the average for the EU15,
and almost 19 percentage points
below in Poland. For the new
Member States as a whole, the dif-
ference between the average youth
employment rate and that of the
EU15 increased from around 6 per-
centage points below in 1998 to
over 15 percentage points below in
2003.
In contrast to the generally declin-
ing rates for other groups in most
new Member States, employment
rates of older people (aged 55-64)
have mainly improved between
1998 and 2003. All new Member
States other than Poland and
Slovenia experienced rises in these
rates, with a particularly strong rise
of around 12 percentage points in
Hungary, albeit starting from a very
low rate of just over 17% in 1998.
While half of the new Member
States have employment rates for
older people above the EU15 aver-
age, rates nevertheless remain rela-
tively low (below 30%) in Hungary,
Poland, the Slovak Republic and
Slovenia.
Developments in unemployment
have also been mixed for the new
Member States (chart 32). The
unemployment rate for the group
as a whole rose from 9.4% in 1998
to 14.3% in 2003, a rise of almost 5
percentage points, and reached as
high as 14.8% in 2002. The majority
of new Member States have experi-
enced increases in the unemploy-
ment rate over the last five years,
with the largest rise occurring in
Poland, where it almost doubled
between 1998 and 2003. In con-
trast, rates have fallen quite signifi-
cantly in Hungary and Latvia, by 2.6
and 3.8 percentage points respec-
tively, and more moderately in
Cyprus and Slovenia. In 2003, the
unemployment rates in the three
Baltic States and especially Poland
and the Slovak Republic were sig-
nificantly above the EU15 average,
while for the new Member States as
a whole the average unemploy-
ment rate has risen from parity with
the EU15 average in 1998 to more
than 6 percentage points above it
in 2003.
Long-term unemployment rose
markedly in the Czech Republic, the
Slovak Republic, and especially
Poland, up around 2, 3 and 6 per-
centage points respectively
between 1998 and 2003 (chart 33).
Only in Latvia and Hungary have
the rates declined substantially
since 1998. As for overall unemploy-
ment, long-term unemployment
was exceptionally high in Poland
and the Slovak Republic in 2003,
where rates exceeded 10%.
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Chart 32 - Developments in unemployment rates 
for new Member States, 1998-2003
Source: Eurostat, harmonised series on unemployment. 
Note: * Data for CY and MT refer to 2000 and 2003, for SK to 1999 and 2003
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Chart 33 - Developments in long-term 
unemployment rates for new Member States, 1998-2003 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators. 
Note: * Data for CY refers to 2000 and 2003, for MT to 2002 and for SK to 1999 and 2003
5. Sectoral
employment
structure and trends
5.1. Sectoral employment structure
in the EU25 in 2003
5.1.1. Comparison of employment
structure in the EU25, EU15 and
new Member States
In 2003, the sectoral employment
structure
3
of the enlarged EU25
consisted of 5.3% of total employ-
ment in agriculture, 28.3% in indus-
try and 66.4% in services (table 10
and chart 34). Comparing the sec-
toral employment structure of the
group of new Member States with
that of the EU15 reveals that as a
whole the new Member States have
a substantially larger proportion of
employment in agriculture (12.4%
versus 4.0%), a higher share in
industry (31.9% versus 27.6%), and
a markedly lower share of employ-
ment in services (55.6% versus
68.3%). Within the industry sector
it is employment in manufacturing
which accounts for most of the dif-
ference, as the employment share
in construction is broadly similar.
Within services, all sub-sectors with-
in the group of new Member States
are less developed in terms of
employment share compared to the
EU15, except in “transport, storage
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results. Note data for NL and LU refer to 2002
3 by main employment, resident concept
Table 10 - Employment structure in 2003 (% of total employment 15+)
Sector (NACE rev1
description)
EU-
25
EU-
15
NM
S10
BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Agriculture. fishing
and forestry
5.3 4.0 12.4 1.7 4.5 3.3 2.4 6.3 16.3 5.6 4.5 6.4 4.7 5.2 14.6 18.7 2.0 5.4 2.5 2.9 5.5 18.2 12.9 8.4 6.0 5.3 2.5 1.2
Mining and quarying 0.4 0.3 1.3 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.2 2.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4
Manufacturing 19.1 18.7 21.9 17.8 27.8 15.8 23.0 22.0 12.8 17.8 17.1 16.0 22.4 11.0 16.4 18.0 10.3 23.6 19.3 13.9 19.3 19.2 20.1 29.7 26.2 19.0 16.2 14.9
Electricity. gas and
water supply
0.9 0.7 1.7 0.7 1.6 0.5 0.8 1.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.1 2.5 1.6 0.7 1.7 2.3 0.5 1.0 1.8 0.7 1.0 2.1 0.9 0.6 0.7
Construction 7.8 8.0 7.0 6.4 9.4 6.6 7.2 6.6 7.9 12.1 6.7 10.8 8.3 10.7 7.6 7.2 9.1 7.8 7.6 6.5 8.2 5.6 11.8 5.8 9.0 6.6 5.6 7.6
Wholesale and retail
trade. repair of motor
vehicles. motorcycles
and personal and
household goods
14.6 14.7 14.2 13.7 13.4 15.4 14.0 13.1 17.0 15.7 13.3 14.2 15.8 18.3 14.6 15.0 12.4 14.2 14.0 15.8 15.9 14.5 14.9 13.3 12.7 12.1 12.2 15.5
Hotels and restaurants 3.9 4.1 2.7 3.1 3.5 2.4 3.4 3.0 7.0 6.3 3.1 6.5 4.1 8.8 2.7 2.1 4.3 3.7 8.3 4.0 5.7 1.7 5.1 4.1 3.6 3.3 2.8 4.2
Transport. storage and
communication
6.3 6.2 6.8 7.9 7.4 7.2 5.6 10.0 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.3 5.3 5.3 9.4 6.4 6.9 7.7 8.8 6.1 6.5 6.1 4.2 6.7 6.9 7.0 6.4 7.1
Financial intermedia-
tion
3.2 3.4 2.0 3.6 2.1 2.8 3.8 1.5 2.5 2.4 2.9 4.1 3.1 5.0 1.3 0.9 10.7 1.8 3.6 3.7 3.5 2.1 1.7 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.1 4.5
Real estate. renting
and business activities
8.8 9.4 5.6 9.4 6.1 9.1 9.1 8.2 5.6 8.0 10.2 8.7 8.0 6.9 4.6 4.1 8.2 6.8 5.4 12.7 8.4 5.1 4.7 6.0 4.9 11.0 13.0 11.2
Public administration
and defence. compul-
sory social security
7.5 7.7 6.6 9.7 6.6 5.7 8.0 6.1 7.4 6.5 9.4 5.1 8.5 7.5 6.3 4.9 11.3 7.4 9.2 7.6 5.8 6.4 6.2 5.6 7.6 5.0 5.7 6.9
Education 7.1 6.9 7.7 8.5 6.2 7.4 5.7 9.3 6.4 5.7 7.0 6.5 7.3 6.5 7.2 9.5 7.0 8.2 7.8 6.6 6.2 7.9 5.5 7.0 7.4 6.8 11.1 8.5
Health and social
work
9.5 10.0 6.2 12.9 6.3 18.3 10.9 5.8 4.3 5.9 11.4 9.5 6.0 4.4 6.3 6.7 7.9 6.9 6.5 15.0 8.6 5.9 5.8 5.3 6.7 14.8 16.0 11.3
Other community.
social and personal
service activities
4.6 4.7 3.8 4.0 3.9 5.0 5.3 5.4 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 5.3 5.6 3.9 3.8 4.5 4.0 4.5 4.6 3.4 2.9 4.2 3.6 5.7 5.4 5.5
Private households
with employed per-
sons
1.0 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.3 2.7 2.7 0.5 0.9 3.3 0.6 0.4 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 3.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5
Total Agriculture. fish-
ing and forestry
5.3 4.0 12.4 1.7 4.5 3.3 2.4 6.3 16.3 5.6 4.5 6.4 4.7 5.2 14.6 18.7 2.0 5.4 2.5 2.9 5.5 18.2 12.9 8.4 6.0 5.3 2.5 1.2
Total Industry 28.3 27.6 31.9 24.9 39.9 23.1 31.4 31.3 22.0 30.8 24.8 27.8 31.8 22.9 26.8 27.2 20.1 33.4 29.9 21.0 28.7 28.5 32.9 37.1 38.1 26.7 22.6 23.5
Total Services 66.4 68.3 55.6 73.1 55.6 73.4 66.1 62.5 61.7 63.6 70.7 65.8 63.4 71.2 58.6 54.1 77.9 61.2 67.6 76.1 65.6 53.2 54.2 54.4 55.8 68.0 74.8 75.2
and communication” and “educa-
tion”. The most noticeable differ-
ences in employment shares within
services are those in the “real
estate, renting and business activi-
ties” and “health and social work”
sub-sectors. 
Noticeable differences remain
between individual Member States
in terms of the relative importance
of employment shares within main
sectors (chart 35). For example, in
Poland and Lithuania the agricul-
ture sector still accounts for more
than 18% of total main employ-
ment, and over 12% in Greece,
Latvia and Portugal, compared to as
little as 1.2% in the UK.  The pro-
portion of employment in the
industry sector ranges from 20% in
Luxembourg to just under 40% in
the Czech Republic, while employ-
ment in the services sector ranges
from 53% in Poland to 78% in
Luxembourg.
5.1.2. Sectoral developments in the
EU25 in 2003
Between 2002 and 2003, employ-
ment growth in the enlarged EU25
continued to be driven by develop-
ments in the services sector (chart
36). Growth in this sector stabilised
over 2003 at around 1%, following
the previous decline from a level of
around 2.5% in mid-2000. In con-
trast, employment in the agricul-
ture and industry sectors continued
to contract in 2003. Annual employ-
ment growth in the agriculture sec-
tor declined strongly to -3.5% in
the first quarter of 2003 before
recovering over the rest of the year
to a lower rate of decline.
Employment growth in industry
recovered somewhat from the high
negative growth of the previous
year but remained at around -1.5%
over the course of 2003. 
Looking at sectoral developments
in the four largest Member States
(chart 37), these generally experi-
enced contracting employment in
agriculture, and most in industry,
while all but Germany saw contin-
ued positive employment growth in
services. Germany continued to
experience strong negative employ-
ment growth in the industry sector
in 2003, although the rate of
decline seems to have peaked in
the first quarter and then slowed
over the course of the year. As in
2002, the rate of employment
decline in agriculture continued to
slow over 2003, but worryingly
employment growth in services
turned negative in the first quarter
of the year and only just became
positive again in the last quarter.
Nevertheless, employment growth
in all three sectors seems to be on
an upward path. In France, the rate
of decline of employment in indus-
try stabilised to a certain degree fol-
lowing the acceleration in negative
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Chart 34 - Comparative employment structure of the EU25,
EU15 and group of new Member States in 2003
Source: Eurostat, LFS. Note data for LU and NL refer to 2002
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
PL LT PT S
I
CZ SK LV HU E
L EE IT ES AT IE DE
EU
25 MT F
I
FR CY BE DK SE UK NL LU
Agriculture Industry Services
Chart 35 - Comparative employment structure (by main employment) 
of the EU Member States by main sector, 2003
Source: Eurostat, LFS. Note: Data for LU and NL refer to 2002
%
 t
o
ta
l e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
20
00
q0
1
20
00
q0
2
20
00
q0
3
20
00
q0
4
20
01
q0
1
20
01
q0
2
20
01
q0
3
20
01
q0
4
20
02
q0
1
20
02
q0
2
20
02
q0
3
20
02
q0
4
20
03
q0
1
20
03
q0
2
20
03
q0
3
20
03
q0
4
%
ch
an
ge
on
sa
m
e
pe
rio
d
of
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
Agriculture Industry Services
Chart 36 - Employment growth by main sector in the EU25, 2000-2003
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
employment growth seen over
2002, while the negative employ-
ment growth in agriculture deceler-
ated over 2003 and almost turned
positive in the last quarter.
Meanwhile, employment in services
continued to grow in 2003, but
with the rate of growth declining
further over the course of the year. 
In the UK, the long period of
unbroken negative employment
growth in agriculture came to an
end over the second half of 2003
with growth turning positive in the
third quarter. Employment in indus-
try also showed more positive signs
with growth almost turning posi-
tive in the last quarter. Employment
growth in services remained posi-
tive and stable at around the levels
observed over 2002. In Italy,
employment growth in agriculture
also turned positive at the end of
2003, having reached a peak in
negative growth in the second
quarter. Growth in industry and
services remained positive over
2003, although rates in both
declined noticeably over the second
half of the year.
5.2. Changes in sectoral
employment in the new Member
States in recent years
In last year’s Employment in Europe
report a detailed review was present-
ed of the longer term changes in sec-
toral employment in the EU15
between 1997 and 2002. In this year’s
report a similar analysis is presented
but focusing on the changes in the sec-
toral employment structure of the
new Member States between 1998
and 2003. All new Member States are
examined apart from Malta, where no
detailed sectoral employment data is
available prior to 2001. Moreover, due
to data limitations, the sectoral devel-
opments in Cyprus and Poland only
refer to those between 2000 and
2003. It should be noted that the
analysis focuses on sectors with rea-
sonably sizeable employment shares;
those sectors which nearly always
account for significantly less than two
percent of total employment in the
new Member States (namely “mining
and quarrying”, “electricity, gas and
water supply” and “private house-
holds with employed persons”) are
not included.
Looking at the sectoral employment
trends in terms of the relative
growth in employment between
1998 and 2003 (i.e. the changes as a
percentage of the 1998 sectoral
employment levels, table 11 and
chart 38) indicates that the relative
changes in employment by sector
have been quite marked in certain
sectors within the new Member
States. All new Member States apart
from Cyprus experienced declines in
employment in the “agriculture,
fishing and forestry” sector, with
Estonia, Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic recording particularly
strong reductions of between 27%
and 35%.  The majority also experi-
enced declines in employment in
industry, but to a lower degree, with
Poland seeing the largest fall in
employment in this sector with a
decline of around 14%. Within
industry, employment also generally
declined in manufacturing, with
only Hungary registering a marginal
rise in employment in this sector.
Developments in employment in the
construction sector have been more
varied across new Member States,
with strong growth in Hungary and
Latvia of around 35% and 40%
respectively compared to a decline
of close to 30% in Poland. Overall
employment in services has increa-
sed in all new Member States other
than Poland, where employment
has remained relatively static com-
pared to 2000. Cyprus, Hungary,
Latvia and Slovenia have seen rises in
employment in the services sector on
a par with the average for the EU15,
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Employment growth by main sector in Germany, 2000-2003
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Employment growth by main sector in Italy, 2000-2003
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Employment growth by main sector in France, 2000-2003
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Employment growth by main sector in the UK, 2000-2003
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Chart 37  - Sectoral employment growth in the four largest Member States, 2000-2003
 
but in the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic
growth was well below the EU15
average.
Within services, the growth in
employment in “real estate, renting
and business activities” has general-
ly been the most significant, with all
new Member States seeing employ-
ment rise markedly in this sector.
Rises were in most cases over 35%,
significantly higher than the average
for the EU15, and with employment
increasing by almost two-thirds in
Hungary. Only in the Czech Republic
and Slovenia was employment
growth in this sector more subdued
and below the EU15 average,
although even here it reached
around 14%. All new Member
States apart from Poland also saw
employment rise in “health and
social work”, although rises were
fairly limited in Estonia, Lithuania
and the Slovak Republic. In the
“hotels and restaurants” sector,
while the three Baltic States,
Hungary and the Slovak Republic
registered marked rises in employ-
ment well above the average for the
EU15, growth was negative in the
Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovenia, and somewhat subdued in
Cyprus. Employment growth in
“education” and “wholesale and
retail trade, repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and
household goods” was in most cases
relatively subdued or negative, apart
from Cyprus and Hungary (for the
latter sector), and for the majority of
countries well below the growth
experienced by the EU15 in these
sectors. In the “public administration
and defence, compulsory social secu-
rity” sector, employment rose appre-
ciably in Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia and, along with the Czech
Republic, more so than in the EU15,
while in the other new Member
States it either declined or showed
only limited growth.
Taking developments across sectors
as a whole, Cyprus, Hungary and
Latvia have seen relative growth in
many sectors greater than that in
the EU15. In contrast, sectoral
growth in the Czech Republic was
below the EU15 average for all 
sectors except “manufacturing” and
“public administration and defence,
compulsory social security”. Further,
as mentioned previously, together
with Slovenia, the Czech Republic
was the only new Member State
where employment growth in “real
estate, renting and business activi-
ties” was not superior to that in the
EU15. Employment growth in
Poland was also generally below the
EU15 average in almost all sectors,
the exceptions being in “real estate,
renting and business activities” and
“public administration and defence,
compulsory social security” (al-
though the sectoral employment
changes in Poland only refer to the
period 2000-2003 as opposed to
1998-2003 for the EU15 and most
other new Member States).
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. Note: estimates based on LFS, spring results; * For CY and PL data refer to the 2000 to 2003 period only, no data
for MT for 2000 and before
Table 11 - Relative change in employment by sector in the new Member States from 1998 to 2003
Sector (NACE rev1 
description)
EU-15 CZ EE CY* LV LT HU MT* PL* SI SK
Agriculture. fishing and
forestry -8.0 -20.9 -34.9 6.9 -22.0 -4.9 -21.0 : -8.3 -30.9 -27.4
Manufacturing -3.9 -2.8 -2.1 -4.5 -12.5 -6.6 1.1 : -8.5 -8.4 -1.6
Construction 10.1 -8.6 -13.1 21.3 40.5 5.5 34.9 : -29.0 2.2 -4.3
Wholesale and retail trade.
repair of motor vehicles.
motorcycles and personal and
household goods
5.9 -1.5 -9.4 11.1 2.8 5.8 18.5 : -2.5 7.1 3.5
Hotels and restaurants 11.7 -5.1 19.9 2.0 44.6 34.9 17.7 : -4.6 -5.4 29.9
Transport. storage and 
communication 10.4 -6.2 4.8 1.5 21.7 -6.1 1.4 : -8.0 16.4 -14.2
Financial intermediation 5.0 1.4 28.9 -1.3 13.1 -19.9 -13.0 : -21.1 22.5 15.4
Real estate. renting and 
business activities 27.5 13.8 35.6 29.3 40.5 49.0 65.9 : 38.2 14.4 43.4
Public administration and
defence. compulsory social
security
7.9 8.7 3.6 -5.2 -3.7 -3.8 14.1 : 12.9 21.4 5.3
Education 9.7 -1.8 -0.3 26.6 -15.2 -0.1 5.4 : 7.9 3.6 -3.4
Health and social work 13.4 12.5 0.8 30.4 22.1 4.3 13.1 : -13.4 13.1 1.8
Other community. social and
personal service activities 11.2 4.3 10.9 28.9 26.9 -1.6 3.2 : -11.8 27.1 5.8
Total Agriculture. fishing and
forestry -8.0 -20.9 -34.9 6.9 -22.0 -4.9 -21.0 : -8.3 -30.9 -27.4
Total Industry -0.4 -6.5 -8.2 7.2 1.0 -6.9 3.5 : -13.5 -7.1 -4.9
Total Services 11.3 2.2 4.7 13.1 10.6 4.6 14.0 : -0.3 11.1 4.8
Chapter 1 Employment in Europe 2004
46
EU-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ag
ric
ult
ur
e,
fis
hin
g
an
d
fo
re
str
y
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Co
ns
tru
cti
on
W
ho
les
ale
an
d
re
ta
il t
ra
de
, r
ep
air
of
m
ot
or
ve
hic
les
Ho
te
ls
an
d
re
sta
ur
an
ts
Tr
an
sp
or
t,
sto
ra
ge
an
d
co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n
Fi
na
nc
ial
int
er
m
ed
iat
ion
Re
al
es
ta
te
, r
en
tin
g
an
d
bu
sin
es
s a
cti
vit
ies
Pu
bli
c a
dm
ini
str
at
ion
an
d
de
fe
nc
e,
co
m
pu
lso
ry
so
cia
l s
ec
ur
ity
Ed
uc
at
ion
He
alt
h
an
d
so
cia
l w
or
k
Ot
he
r c
om
m
un
ity
, s
oc
ial
an
d
pe
rs
on
al
se
rv
ice
ac
tiv
itie
s
To
ta
l A
gr
icu
ltu
re
, f
ish
ing
an
d
fo
re
str
y
To
ta
l In
du
str
y
To
ta
l S
er
vic
es
%
ch
an
ge
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
ti
n
19
98
Czech Republic
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
ch
an
ge
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
ti
n
19
98
CZ EU-15
Ag
ric
ult
ur
e,
fis
hin
g
an
d
fo
re
str
y
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Co
ns
tru
cti
on
W
ho
les
ale
an
d
re
ta
il t
ra
de
, r
ep
air
of
m
ot
or
ve
hic
les
Ho
te
ls
an
d
re
sta
ur
an
ts
Tr
an
sp
or
t,
sto
ra
ge
an
d
co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n
Fi
na
nc
ial
int
er
m
ed
iat
ion
Re
al
es
ta
te
, r
en
tin
g
an
d
bu
sin
es
s a
cti
vit
ies
Pu
bli
c a
dm
ini
str
at
ion
an
d
de
fe
nc
e,
co
m
pu
lso
ry
so
cia
l s
ec
ur
ity
Ed
uc
at
ion
He
alt
h
an
d
so
cia
l w
or
k
Ot
he
r c
om
m
un
ity
, s
oc
ial
an
d
pe
rs
on
al
se
rv
ice
ac
tiv
itie
s
To
ta
l A
gr
icu
ltu
re
, f
ish
ing
an
d
fo
re
str
y
To
ta
l In
du
str
y
To
ta
l S
er
vic
es
Estonia
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
%
ch
an
ge
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
ti
n
19
98
EE EU-15
Ag
ric
ult
ur
e,
fis
hin
g
an
d
fo
re
str
y
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Co
ns
tru
cti
on
W
ho
les
ale
an
d
re
ta
il t
ra
de
, r
ep
air
of
m
ot
or
ve
hic
les
Ho
te
ls
an
d
re
sta
ur
an
ts
Tr
an
sp
or
t,
sto
ra
ge
an
d
co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n
Fi
na
nc
ial
int
er
m
ed
iat
ion
Re
al
es
ta
te
, r
en
tin
g
an
d
bu
sin
es
s a
cti
vit
ies
Pu
bli
c a
dm
ini
str
at
ion
an
d
de
fe
nc
e,
co
m
pu
lso
ry
so
cia
l s
ec
ur
ity
Ed
uc
at
ion
He
alt
h
an
d
so
cia
l w
or
k
Ot
he
r c
om
m
un
ity
, s
oc
ial
an
d
pe
rs
on
al
se
rv
ice
ac
tiv
itie
s
To
ta
l A
gr
icu
ltu
re
, f
ish
ing
an
d
fo
re
str
y
To
ta
l In
du
str
y
To
ta
l S
er
vic
es
Cyprus
-25
-15
-5
5
15
25
35
%
ch
an
ge
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
ti
n
20
00
CY* EU-15
Ag
ric
ult
ur
e,
fis
hin
g
an
d
fo
re
str
y
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Co
ns
tru
cti
on
W
ho
les
ale
an
d
re
ta
il t
ra
de
, r
ep
air
of
m
ot
or
ve
hic
les
Ho
te
ls
an
d
re
sta
ur
an
ts
Tr
an
sp
or
t,
sto
ra
ge
an
d
co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n
Fi
na
nc
ial
int
er
m
ed
iat
ion
Re
al
es
ta
te
, r
en
tin
g
an
d
bu
sin
es
s a
cti
vit
ies
Pu
bli
c a
dm
ini
str
at
ion
an
d
de
fe
nc
e,
co
m
pu
lso
ry
so
cia
l s
ec
ur
ity
Ed
uc
at
ion
He
alt
h
an
d
so
cia
l w
or
k
Ot
he
r c
om
m
un
ity
, s
oc
ial
an
d
pe
rs
on
al
se
rv
ice
ac
tiv
itie
s
To
ta
l A
gr
icu
ltu
re
, f
ish
ing
an
d
fo
re
str
y
To
ta
l In
du
str
y
To
ta
l S
er
vic
es
Chart 38 - Relative change in employment by sector in the new Member States from 1998-2003, 
compared to the EU average
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As a result of these sectoral develop-
ments, the overall employment struc-
ture (by main employment) has
changed more noticeably in certain
new Member States than others
between 1998 and 2003 (chart 39).
For example, there has generally
been relatively little change in the
overall sectoral employment struc-
ture in the Czech Republic, Lithuania
and the Slovak Republic. In all these
countries the share of total employ-
ment in “manufacturing” changed
very little and generally much less so
than in the other new Member
States. Similarly, apart from a more
noticeable decline in employment in
“construction” and a significant rise
in employment in “real estate, rent-
ing and business activities”, Poland
has also seen little change in overall
employment structure, although
once again the period referred to in
this case is limited to 2000 to 2003. 
Among the other new Member
States, Hungary and Latvia have
seen the greatest adjustment in sec-
toral employment structure over
recent years. Both saw marked
reductions in the shares of overall
employment in “agriculture, fishing
and forestry” and “manufacturing”
combined with shifts of employ-
ment into the “construction” and
“real estate, renting and business
activities” areas. In addition, Latvia
experienced sizeable changes in the
share of employment in “transport,
storage and communication” and
“health and social work”, where
the shares rose, and a significant
reduction in the share of employ-
ment in “education”. 
For all new Member States, the
share of employment in agriculture
has declined, although only mar-
ginally so in Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Lithuania and Poland. The
share in manufacturing remained
little changed in the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Poland and the
Slovak Republic, but declined
noticeably in all other new Member
States. Within services, all new
Member States have seen shares of
employment in “real estate, renting
and business activities” rise, and
apart from Poland in “health and
social work” also. On the other
hand, the share of employment in
“wholesale retail trade, repair of
motor vehicles etc.” has remained
somewhat static in nearly all the
countries, together with “educa-
tion” in most cases.
In 2003 several of the new Member
States have employment structures
very similar to the average profile
for the EU15. In particular, the sec-
toral employment profiles for
Hungary and the Czech Republic in
2003 were quite close to the EU15
average, the only sizeable differ-
ences being the noticeably larger
shares of employment in these
countries in “manufacturing” and
the significantly lower shares of
employment in “real estate, renting
and business activities” and “health
and social work” compared to the
EU15 average. Since 1998 the
changes in employment structure in
Hungary have resulted in the
employment shares in almost all
sectors moving closer to the corre-
sponding averages in the EU15.
Although most pronounced in
Hungary, this convergence towards
the employment structure in the
EU15 has been a general feature of
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. Note: * For CY and PL data refer to the 2000 to 2003 period only, 
no data for MT for 2000 and before EU15 aggregate for 2003 includes 2002 data for LU and NL.
developments for all new Member
States, with employment shares in
the majority of sectors moving
towards the corresponding average
for the EU15, although less so in
Estonia and Poland. Nevertheless,
employment shares in “manufac-
turing” and “agriculture, fishing
and forestry” remain substantially
higher than the EU15 averages in
many of the new Member States,
while in all cases the services sectors
“real estate, renting and business
activities” and “health and social
work” remain particularly under-
developed in comparison with the
employment shares in the EU15.
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Czech Republic 1998-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Estonia 1998-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Cyprus 2000-2003
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Chart 39 - Changes in the sectoral employment structure in 
new Member States between 1998 and 2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Poland 2000-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Latvia 1998-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Lithuania 1998-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Hungary 1998-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Slovenia 1998-2003
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Sectoral employment structure changes: Slovak Republic 1998-2003
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Table 12 - Population change in 2003 (first estimates)
Country Population
1.1.2003
Natural
increase
Net 
migration
Total
increase
Population
1.1.2004
Natural
increase
Net 
migration
Total
increase
(1000) per 1000 population
EU25 453683 202 1015 1217 454900 0.4 2.2 2.7
EU15 379483 294 983 1276 380759 0.8 2.6 3.4
Belgium 10356 6 35 41 10397 0.6 3.4 3.9
Denmark 5384 7 7 14 5398 1.3 1.3 2.6
Germany 82537 -152 160 8 82545 -1.8 1.9 0.1
Greece 11018 -2 30 29 11047 -0.1 2.7 2.6
Spain 40683 70 225 295 40978 1.7 5.5 7.2
France 59629 207 60 267 59896 3.5 1.0 4.5
Ireland 3964 33 28 61 4025 8.3 7.0 15.3
Italy 57321 -47 208 161 57482 -0.8 3.6 2.8
Luxembourg 448 1 1 3 451 3.0 2.5 5.6
Netherlands 16193 62 3 65 16258 3.8 0.2 4.0
Austria 8067 0 25 25 8092 0.0 3.1 3.1
Portugal 10408 9 63 72 10480 0.9 6.1 6.9
Finland 5206 8 6 14 5220 1.6 1.1 2.7
Sweden 8941 5 29 34 8975 0.6 3.2 3.8
United Kingdom 59329 86 103 189 59518 1.4 1.7 3.2
New Member States 74201 -92 32 -60 74141 -1.2 0.4 -0.8
Cyprus 715 2 10 13 728 3.3 14.1 17.4
Czech Republic 10203 -16 24 8 10211 -1.6 2.4 0.8
Estonia 1356 -5 0 -5 1351 -3.7 -0.1 -3.8
Hungary 10142 -40 12 -27 10115 -3.9 1.2 -2.7
Latvia 2332 -12 -1 -13 2319 -5.2 -0.3 -5.6
Lithuania 3463 -11 -5 -15 3447 -3.0 -1.4 -4.5
Malta 397 1 2 2 400 1.8 3.9 5.7
Poland 38219 -10 -15 -25 38194 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
Slovak Republic 5379 0 2 2 5381 0.0 0.3 0.3
Slovenia 1995 -2 4 2 1997 -1.0 1.8 0.8
Bulgaria 7846 -47 : -47 7799 -5.9 : -5.9
Romania 21773 -56 -1 -57 21716 -2.6 0.0 -2.6
Source: Demographic Statistics, Eurostat
6. Demographic trends
The total population of the EU25 is
estimated to have increased by 1.2
million in 2003, equivalent to an
annual growth rate of 0.27%, to
reach an overall level of close to 455
million by the start of 2004 (table
12). Most of this increase was
accounted for by net migration flow
into the EU, estimated at just over 1
million, while natural population
growth (live births minus deaths)
accounted for only around 0.2 mil-
lion. For the group of new Member
States as a whole, the overall popu-
lation continued to decline moder-
ately, driven by negative natural
growth and even though net migra-
tion became positive in 2003.
During 2003, the natural increase in
the population was the main com-
ponent of total population increase
only in Finland, France, Ireland,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
In contrast, negative natural growth
- there were more deaths than births
– was the main component of popu-
lation decreases in the three Baltic
States and Hungary. For all the
remaining Member States other
than Denmark (where net migration
and natural increase were the same)
and Poland (where net migration
was more negative than natural
change), net migration accounted
for by far the largest share of the net
increase in population. In the Czech
Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy and
Slovenia negative natural increase
was more than offset by the much
larger increases in net migration,
leading to net increases in their pop-
ulations. In terms of net migration
per 1,000 population, migration was
highest in Cyprus, Ireland, Malta,
Portugal and Spain. These five
Member States also had the highest
overall relative increase in popula-
tion. While most Member States saw
overall increases in total population
it declined in the three Baltic States,
Hungary and Poland.
7. Update on
immigration and
labour market
integration: recent
trends in the EU15
Employment in Europe 2003
reported on the labour market sit-
uation of immigrants in the EU15
using information on third-coun-
try nationals in the EU. However,
international definitions of
migrants refer to people who are
born in another country than
where they live (and work) now.
Data from the Community Labour
Force Survey (LFS) have become
available and allow distinguishing
between third-country nationals
and people born in another coun-
try. The following text uses this
new information to provide an
insight into the situation of
migrants in the EU15
4
. As soon as
comparable data is available for
the EU25 reporting will cover all
Member States.
In 2003, the EU25 counted 455 mil-
lion inhabitants. The EU15 had a
total population of 381 million
people. The remaining 74 million
lived in the 10 New Member
States.
In 2003, of the 381 million people
living in EU15 countries some 6 mil-
lion were EU-citizens living in
another country and some 14 mil-
lion were third-country nationals
(non-EU). But the number of peo-
ple not residing in their country of
birth or citizenship was estimated
at 33-36 million
5
. A precise figure is
not available as several EU Member
States do not distinguish between
native and foreign-born residents in
their official statistics but only
between EU citizens and third-coun-
try nationals. The growing differ-
ence between the legal foreign resi-
dent population and the foreign-
born (= migrant) population is large-
ly a result of higher naturalisation
rates observed since the 1990s. The
EU15’s migrant population repre-
sents roughly 8% of the total popu-
lation.
In 2003, the EU15 gained approxi-
mately 1.0 million people from
migration. This accounts for more
than 80% of Europe’s total popula-
tion growth (+1.3 million people in
2003). In many countries recent
inflows were dominated by families
reuniting and asylum-seekers. In
other EU Member States particularly
in Ireland and Southern Europe eco-
nomic migration plays a major role.
Between 1997 and 2003 the num-
ber of people employed in the
EU15 (less Germany and Italy)
increased by around 11 million, out
of which 9.2 million were EU
nationals and more than 1.8 million
were third-country nationals. While
the share of third-country nationals
in total EU employment was below
4%, they contributed to employ-
ment growth by about 13% during
the period 1997-2003 (table 13). If
we also account for foreign born
naturalized citizens of EU15 coun-
tries the contribution of immigrants
to employment growth is likely to
be higher.
Migrants’ contribution to employ-
ment growth is particularly visible
for prime-age workers (25-54). In
1997, the employment rate of EU
nationals already stood at 79% for
the medium-skilled and at 87.5%
for the high-skilled. Owing to
strong job creation, it had further
risen to almost 82% and 89%
respectively in 2002, thereby
reaching levels that would not be
easy to increase further. Indeed,
among third-country nationals,
these two categories experienced
the strongest increases in employ-
ment. The number of medium
skilled third-country nationals
increased by 50% and that of the
high-skilled doubled.
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*   includes Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and EFTA, ** includes Asia and the rest of Africa. Source: EU Labour Force Survey, Spring results
4 Italy and Germany do not make information on people born in another country available, therefore the comparisons are based on
the EU15 without Germany and Italy.
5 Rainer Münz, Heinz Fassmann, Migrants in Europe and their Economic Position; paper prepared for the European Commission; June
2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/immigr_new_stud_en.htm
Table 13 - Distribution of employment growth (1997-2003) EU15 (less DE and IT)
Male Female Total
foreign national foreign born foreign national foreign born foreign national foreign born
1.Other EU15 1.3 2.2 1.8 3.2 1.8 2.6
2.CEE 3.9 2.7 5.6 4.1 3.3 4.8
3.Other Europe* 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.6 0.1 1
4.North Africa 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.9
5. North America + Oceania 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0
6.Other countries ** 7.3 5.5 13.4 10.1 6.3 11.6
7. National/Natives in their country 85.9 88.4 78.1 81.8 87.3 80.1
8. No Answer 0.7 0.5 -1.2 -0.7 0.6 -1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
The employment rate of the foreign-
born population (age groups 15-64)
varies according to the place of ori-
gin (table 14). People from Western
and Southern Europe living in another
EU country and immigrants from
other industrialised countries have
similar or even higher employment
rates (EU: 67%; North America,
Australia: 76% compared to 66 %
for the EU average) and lower
unemployment rates than the EU
average; employment rates for
workers from Central and Eastern
Europe are also close to the EU aver-
age although somewhat lower.
Immigrants from other parts of the
world have substantially lower
employment and higher unemploy-
ment rates. Employment rates for
workers born in North Africa are
around 50% or just above.
Employment is higher than the
male EU average of 74% among
men from other EU Member States
(75%), and from North America
and Australia (86%) while those
from North Africa (and other coun-
tries) have employment rates 7-10
percentage points below the male
EU average.
Differences are larger among
women. Only roughly 1/3 of the
female immigrants from North
Africa are counted as employed in
the Labour Force Survey compared
to 58% for the EU average while
women born in other EU countries
and in other industrialised coun-
tries have higher employment rates
than the EU average.
When comparing legal foreign resi-
dents with the EU15 average, the
differences are, for some foreign
national populations, considerably
larger. The overall employment rate
of third country nationals residing
in the EU15 is 52% compared to
57% for those born outside of the
EU an EU average of 64%. This dif-
ference is marked for men and even
more so for women from North
Africa. This analysis remains valid
when looking at educational break-
downs, as in the subsequent para-
graphs.
Employment rates vary to a consid-
erable degree with acquired educa-
tional levels. High and medium
skilled male migrants have similar
employment rates to the average
for men in the EU with the excep-
tion of migrants from North Africa
for whom employment rates are
lower. High skilled migrant women
have similar employment rates to
the EU average except those from
North Africa. Gaps are large for the
medium and in particular the low
skilled women from North Africa.
This contrasts with the employment
rate of low skilled women born in
southern EU countries which are
actually higher than the EU average
of low skilled women that is well
below 40%. This reflects the well
known fact that the EU does not
fully utilise the skilled female
employment potential among
migrants and that women migrants
are concentrated in less attractive
industries and occupations.
The analysis for Europe clearly
shows the importance of citizenship
for the process of integration.
There is, however, no simple causal-
ity. On the one hand, naturalization
may help to gain access to certain
segments of the labour market – in
particular the public service – and
to reduce discrimination. On the
other hand, it is evident that suc-
cessful economic integration of
immigrants makes it more likely
that they become citizens of the
receiving country. Migrants with
higher educational levels do much
better than others reflecting the
skills needs of the EU economies as
well as their capacity to adjust. This
suggests that improving educational
levels and training should promote
integration. Moreover, the analysis
underlines the importance of immi-
grants for EU employment, particu-
larly in periods of stronger economic
activity, even before the demo-
graphically induced decline of the
working age population starts to
fully affect Europe.
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*   includes Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and EFTA, ** includes Asia and the rest of Africa. Source: EU Labour Force Survey, Spring results.
Table 14 - Employment rate of the 15-64 years population for EU-15 (less DE and IT)
Male Female Total
foreign national foreign born foreign national foreign born foreign national foreign born
1. Other EU15 73.6 74.1 59.9 60.2 66.8 66.9
2. CEE 75.4 73.3 53.6 55 63.9 63.4
3. Other Europe* 67.9 69.8 30.5 37.7 50.4 54.5
4. North Africa 54.2 59.5 25.4 39.5 41.2 50.2
5. North America + Oceania 86.2 82.9 66.7 67.7 75.8 75
6. Other countries ** 63.4 68.5 45.4 50.4 54.1 59.1
7. National/Natives in their country 74.3 74.5 58.9 59 66.6 66.8
Total 74 74 58.3 58.3 66.2 66.2
8. Medium-term
employment rate
projections for the
European Union
The Lisbon/Stockholm
Employment Targets
The Lisbon European Council of
March 2000 set “a new strategic
goal for the European Union to
become the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge based econo-
my in the world capable of sus-
tainable economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion”. To this end the
(Lisbon) Council agreed overall
employment targets and employ-
ment targets for women
6
for the
year 2010. These were completed
at the Stockholm European
Council of March 2001 with inter-
mediate targets for 2005
7
, and an
additional target for 2010, reflect-
ing the demographic challenge,
for the employment rate of older
people
8
(aged 55 to 64). In this
respect, it should be noted that
the report of the Employment
Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok
9
,
while highlighting the importance
of the Lisbon agenda to make the
EU competitive and raise the rate
of economic growth, remarks that
“unless the Member States step up
their efforts, it is looking increas-
ingly unlikely that the overarching
goal for 2010, and the employ-
ment objectives, will be attain-
able”. This section will analyse the
outlook for reaching the employ-
ment targets.
The employment rate targets
The revised Employment Guidelines
of 2003
10
fully integrate the
Lisbon/Stockholm employment tar-
gets, being central to the European
Employment Strategy. According to
these Guidelines, policies shall con-
tribute towards achieving “on aver-
age for the European Union” the
employment rate targets as pre-
sented in table 15. 
How are employment rate trends
assessed?
Rather than to carry out projections
of employment trends based on
long-term forecasts of economic
growth, the assessment looks at
long-term labour supply trends and
whether they are consistent with
the employment rate targets. The
methodology extrapolates past
labour supply trends up to 2010.
Clearly, it contains no assumption
on economic growth or labour
demand trends and only therefore
assesses the potential for reaching
the employment targets. Two peri-
ods are considered 1983-2003 and
1993-2003. The first period repre-
sents “long-term” trends of partici-
pation behaviour, the second period
should show us whether participa-
tion behaviour has changed and if
so in what direction. Given the low
levels of participation and employ-
ment in the last two decades, the
change in behaviour - if there is any
- needs to be towards a substantial
increase. The timeframes used for
the assessment represent a suffi-
ciently long time span and start in
comparable cyclical positions in
order not to be distorted by short-
term or cyclical effects
11
. 
Employment rates are indirectly cal-
culated. Participation rates are pro-
jected, conditional on the assump-
tion that unemployment rates will
converge towards a structural/
benchmark unemployment rate.
Although the concept of a
Nawru/Nairu
12
is subject to some
controversy, it provides an accept-
able benchmark for unemployment
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Table 15 - Employment rate targets for the EU
Targets
2005 2010
Overall employment rate 67.0 70.0
Employment rate for women 57.0 60.0
Employment rate for older workers
(aged 55 to 64)
—- 50.0
6  Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23/24 March 2000: "the overall aim of these measures [which, inter alia,
cover areas related to employability, lifetime learning, increasing employment in services, and furthering all aspects of equal oppor-
tunities] should be to raise the employment rate from an average of 61% today [level of 1999] to as close as possible to 70% by
2010 and to increase the number of women in employment from an average of 51% today [level of 1999] to more than 60% by
2010. Recognising their different starting points, Member States should consider setting national targets for an increased employ-
ment rate. This, by enlarging the labour force, will reinforce the sustainability of social protection systems".
7 Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council of 23/24 March 2001: "the European Council has agreed to set interme-
diate targets for employment rates across the Union as a whole for January 2005 of 67% overall and 57% for women and accord-
ingly invites Member States to consider setting in their National Employment Plans intermediate employment targets taking due
account of their particular national and regional circumstances".
8 Presidency conclusions of the Stockholm European Council of 23/24 March 2001: "the European Council has agreed to set an EU tar-
get for increasing the average EU employment rate among older women and men (55-64) to 50% by 2010".
9 Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok: "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Creating more employment in Europe", November
2003.
10 OJ L 197/13 of 5.8.2003.
11 It should be noted that this methodology does not take into account the impact of any announced (labour market or other) policy
measures or of any country characteristics, which could eventually have a bearing on participation/employment rates. Moreover,
this methodology is a partial equilibrium. Such type of analysis can generate unchecked trends.
12 A non accelerating wage rate of unemployment (Nawru), or a non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (Nairu).
 
rate trends. Estimates from the
Directorate General for Economic
and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) of the
European Commission for a non
accelerating wage rate of unem-
ployment (Nawru) are used in order
to project unemployment rate val-
ues. Consequently, the employment
rate is calculated as the difference
between projected participation
and unemployment rates. For each
of the 11 countries for which data
are available for a sufficiently long
time span
13
, participation rate equa-
tions are estimated by gender and
age group (10 five year sub -groups)
using ordinary least squares
14
. 
Using this methodology, two sce-
narios are considered. In both sce-
narios participation rates are
regressed on a time trend and on a
cyclical variable, namely the unem-
ployment gap (i.e. the difference
between the actual unemployment
rate and the Nawru rate)
15
. Given
the assumption that actual unem-
ployment rates gradually converge
towards the benchmark Nawru
rate, reaching negligible differ-
ences by 2010, employment rates
are therefore obtained by calculat-
ing the difference as explained
before
16
. 
The first scenario, hereafter called
the “long-term” scenario, assumes
that unemployment rates will con-
verge by 2010 towards the structur-
al unemployment rates projected
using ECFIN’s Nawru estimates.
Furthermore, the “long-term” sce-
nario is based on the entire dataset
available from 1983 to 2003. 
The second scenario, hereafter called
the “medium-term” scenario assumes
that unemployment rates will con-
verge by 2010 to the Nawru estimates
of ECFIN or the average of the three
lowest historical Nawru values for the
period 1980 - 2003
17
(whatever is
lower). Furthermore, participation
rates are estimated using data for the
sub-period 1993-2003. The use of a
shorter period in the “medium-term”
scenario is an attempt to capture the
more recent favourable trends in a
majority of EU countries, which seem
to have been at least partially
induced by policy measures raising
participation rates, particularly of
older people, in a number of EU
Member States. 
In most of the countries considered,
the “medium-term” scenario projects
higher participation/employment
rates than the “long-term” scenario,
because the former assumes lower
structural unemployment (Nawru)
rates, together with the fact that in
most countries more recent participa-
tion/employment trends are more
favourable than historical ones.
However, in some countries the dif-
ferences between the two scenarios
are small, on account basically of sat-
uration effects resulting from signifi-
cant improvements in participation/
employment rates dating back from
the 1980s. 
How to interpret the scenarios’
results?
The results of the two scenarios
should be interpreted as follows.
The “long-term” scenario attempts
to capture historical trends also
conditional on the cyclical behav-
iour of participation rates (by gen-
der and age groups), using the
complete dataset available (1983-
2003). The “medium-term” sce-
nario seeks to extrapolate the more
favourable recent trends (1993-
2003), for labour market ratios in a
majority of countries. Moreover,
the “medium-term” scenario assu-
mes the convergence of the unem-
ployment rate towards the mini-
mum of the Nawru estimates and
the three lowest historical Nawru
values for the period 1980-2003. For
nine countries, namely Germany,
Greece, Spain, France, Portugal,
Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Luxembourg this implies an effec-
tive lowering of the actual unem-
ployment rate by 2010 compared
with the “long-term” scenario,
which instead assumes a gradual
convergence of the unemployment
rate towards the Nawru estimates
(of ECFIN), virtually converging to
them by 2010. 
Summarising, the projections
reported in this section should be
interpreted as the possible out-
comes of participation/employment
rates assuming that the unemploy-
ment gap gradually declines,
becoming negligible by 2010, and
recent/historical trends remain
broadly valid until 2010 respectively
in the “medium-term” and “long-
term” scenarios. As explained
above this simple methodology
considers only “supply” factors.
Obviously, real outcomes will
depend on actual economic devel-
opments, including the impact of
Chapter 1 Employment in Europe 2004
56
13 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
14 Adding to a total of 220 regressions per scenario considered (i.e. 220=11*2*10).
15 The Nawru is calculated for the economy as a whole (i.e. there is no breakdown either by gender or by age group).
16 In addition, aggregate values for participation and employment rates are a weighted average of the respective rates by gender/age
group. For those countries for which data series are not sufficiently long to allow for the estimation of regressions, labour market
variables (i.e. participation and employment rates) are assumed to move in parallel, according to the proportional rule, with the
estimated aggregate values for the 11 countries for which estimates were computed. For the period 2004-2010, demographic pro-
jections from Eurostat and the UN are used. Demographic projections from Eurostat are available for the EU15 (i.e. the Member
States of the Union prior to 1.5.2004); for the new 10 Member Countries, demographic projections from the UN are used. However,
the demographic projections from Eurostat are somewhat outdated, having being last revised in 1999. An update of Eurostat's
demographic projections, including forecasts for all 25 EU Member Countries, is scheduled to be finalised in the last quarter of
2004. For the 10 new EU Member Countries, the UN demographic projections of 2002 are used. 
17 This implies that increased policy efforts are also needed in the following EU countries: Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Portugal,
Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg, because in these countries the assumed Nawru values for 2010 are lower than the val-
ues that result from ECFIN estimates.
“demand” factors not taken on
board by the present methodology
(e.g. economic growth, employ-
ment elasticities, etc.).
Main results
The long-term scenario (i.e. the EU
would go back to long-term labour
supply trends) suggests that the
70% overall employment rate and
the 50% employment rate for older
workers targets are out of reach
(table 16). By contrast, the 60%
employment rate target for women
is likely to be met even in this worst
case scenario. 
While the medium-term scenario
(which both extrapolates more
recent participation trends and
assumes a more pronounced reduc-
tion of structural unemployment)
suggests that substantial progress
can be made towards meeting
these objectives, although continu-
ing to fall short of the actual tar-
gets (for overall and older age
employment rates). 
In fact, extrapolation of the more
recent trends into the period 2004-
2010 (the “medium-term” sce-
nario), through the adoption of
policies that contribute towards
achieving the targets set in the
employment guidelines, is estimated
to bring about improvements of
about 2 percentage points, 1.5 per-
centage point, and 4 percentage
points respectively for the overall
employment rate, the employment
rate for women, and the employ-
ment rate for older workers com-
pared with the “long-term” sce-
nario (table 16). 
Given the projections for (overall)
employment rates and popula-
tion
18
, it is straightforward to calcu-
late the (implicit) employment
growth rates. However, it should be
acknowledged that these (employ-
ment growth) estimates are subject
to a high degree of uncertainty
resulting from the (accumulation
of) errors in the projections of
employment rates and demographic
variables. 
In order for the EU14
19
(EU20) to
comply with the overall employ-
ment target of 70% in 2010,
employment would have to grow by
at least 1.3% (1.6%) per year in the
period 2004-2010 (table 17 and table
18). According to the two scenarios
considered, employment is project-
ed to grow by just 0.4% (0.4%) or
0.8% (0.9%) respectively in the
“long-term” and the “medium-
term” scenarios. Therefore, in order
to meet the overall employment
rate target of 70% in 2010, policy
measures  have to increase annual
employment growth by at least
0.5% (0.7%). While for the EU14 this
basically corresponds to a return to
the historically high level of employ-
ment growth registered in the peri-
od 1995-2000 (i.e. before the last
economic slowdown), for the EU20
(table 18) this implies a significant
acceleration in the growth rate of
employment creation in comparison
with the period 1999-2003 (1.6% as
against 0.9%). 
The enlargement of 1.5.2004 reduced
aggregate employment rates in the
EU. The impact of enlargement can
be illustrated by comparing EU14
with EU20 (table 19). 
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Table 16 - Comparison of employment rate projections for the EU14a)
in the two scenarios (as percentage)
Actual
data
“Medium-
term”
“Long-
term”
“Medium-
term”
“Long-
term”
2003 2005 2005 2010 2010
Overall employment
rate
64.3 66.2 64.8 67.8 65.7
Employment rate for
women
55.9 58.4 57.2 61.5 60.1
Employment rate for
older workers (aged
55 to 64)
41.6 43.5 41.8 45.8 41.8
Table 17 -  Overall employment rate and (implicit) 
employment growth rates for the EU14 (as percentage)
Period/Scenario Long-term Medium-term Target-compatible
1995-2000 1.4 1.4 na
2001-2003 0.6 0.6 na
2004-2010 0.4 0.8 1.3
Table 18 - Overall employment rate and (implicit) 
employment growth rates for the EU20
Period/Scenario Long-term Medium-term Target-compatible
1995-2000 0.9 0.9 na
2004-2010 0.4 0.9 1.6
18 The demographic scenarios used are presented in footnote 16.
19 The main aggregate calculated includes data for only 14 countries (EU15 excluding Luxemburg) in order to secure comparability
over time. EU14 includes: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, United
Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Data for EU20 include the 25 Member Countries, excluding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, and Malta.
a) EU15, excuding LU due to lack of data for 2003
Attainment of employment rate
targets by country
Although the employment rate tar-
gets were set for the EU as a whole,
it is worthwhile to assess the poten-
tial for compliance across countries,
together with the pace of progress.
Consequently, countries are classi-
fied in a matrix table, according to
the likelihood of meeting an
employment target by 2010 (in col-
umn) and the pace of progress
towards this objective (in row).
Given the uncertainty involved,
each of these attributes is classified
in three categories: the intermedi-
ate corresponding to a high degree
of uncertainty as regards the actual
outcome.
In the “medium-term” scenario,
about half of the total number of
countries considered are projected
to be in a position to comply with
the overall employment target by
2010 as compared with about one
third in the “long-term” scenario
(tables 20 and 21). 
As regards the pace of convergence
towards the overall employment
target, the position of between
about 1/3 (in the “long-term” sce-
nario) and 1/4 (in the “medium-
term” scenario) of a total of 20
countries is particularly worrying,
because they are in the worst possi-
ble situation, namely: i) in an
“unlikely” position to meet the tar-
get, and ii) making “slow” progress
towards it. Particularly worrying are
the positions of France and Italy in
both scenarios, and also that of
Germany but only in the “long-
term” scenario. As regards large
countries, Spain is projected to
(continue) to make rapid progress
towards the overall target in both
scenarios, although not attaining it
by 2010. 
Among the six largest EU coun-
tries
20
, only Germany and the UK
have the potential to comply with
the overall employment target in
the “medium-term” scenario, and
only the UK in the “long-term” sce-
nario. This relatively unfavourable
performance among the largest
countries pulls down significantly
the EU average. 
As regards the female employment
rate target, there are few differ-
ences between the two scenarios
considered (tables 22 and 23). In
both scenarios, slightly more than
half of the 20 countries considered
are projected to be in a position to
comply with the female employ-
ment rate target. Again, some
large countries pull down signifi-
cantly the EU average. 
As regards the old age employment
rate target there are significant dif-
ferences between the two scenar-
ios. Extrapolation of the most
recent trends (i.e. the “medium-
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Table 19 - Comparison of employment rate projections for the EU14 
and the EU20 in the “medium-term” scenario (as percentage)
EU14
2003
EU20
2003
EU14
2005
EU20
2005
EU14
2010
EU20
2010
Overall employment rate 64.3 62.9 66.2 64.9 67.8 66.5
Employment rate for
women
55.9 54.9 58.4 57.5 61.5 60.5
Employment rate for
older workers (aged 55
to 64)
41.6 40.1 43.5 41.9 45.8 43.8
Table 20 - Potential for reaching the overal employment rate 
target across countries
(of 70.0% in 2010) in the "medium-term" scenario and pace of progress
Pace/Likelihood Likely a) Possibly b) Unlikely c)
Rapid d) countries
count
NL, FI, CY
3
IE
1
EL, ES
2
Close to average e) countries
count
SE
1 0
BE, HU,SK
3
Slow f) countries
count
DK, DE, PT, UK, AT
5 0
FR, IT, CZ,PO, SL
5
Table 21 - Potential for reaching the overall 
employment rate target across countries
(of 70.0% in 2010) in the "long-term" scenario and pace of progress 
Pace/Likelihood Likely a) Possibly b) Unlikely c)
Rapid d) countries
count
NL, 
1
IE
1
ES, FI,CY
3
Close to average e) countries
count 0 0
BE, HU, SK
3
Slow f) countries
count
DK, PT, UK, SE
4
AT
1
DE, FR, IT, CZ, PO, SL,  SK
7
20 Germany, France, Italy, UK, Spain and Poland.
a) Target achieved by date. 
b) Projection lower by less than 1 percentage point than the target. 
c) Projection lower by more than 1 percentage point than the target. 
d) Rapid progress towards the target (i.e. in the 1990-2010 period, the average annual
growth rate of the employment rate is expected to increase faster than the average
for the EU14); 
e) “Close to average” (i.e. in the 1990-2010 period, the average annual growth rate for
the employment rate is expected to increase between the average for the EU14 and
2/3 of it; 
f) Slow progress towards the target, (i.e. in the 1990-2010 period, the average annual
growth rate for the employment rate is expected to increase below 2/3 of the
employment rate average for the EU14). 
term” scenario) suggests that about
half of EU countries are likely to be
in a position to respect it by 2010,
compared with less than one third
in the “long-term” scenario (tables
24 and 25). Again, some of the
large countries reduce significantly
the EU average.
Conclusion
According to the results of the two
scenarios presented in this section,
and in line with the recommenda-
tion of the Employment Taskforce
chaired by Wim Kok, Member
States need to step up their efforts
in order to accelerate convergence
towards the Lisbon/Stockholm
employment rate targets. In fact,
even the more favourable “medium-
term” scenario, which extrapolates
recent labour market trends, clearly
suggests that further policy action is
needed in order to meet employ-
ment rate targets. The gap
between employment rate projec-
tions and target values is especially
large in the case of older workers;
while the projected attainment of
the female employment target is
insufficient to secure compliance
with the overall employment rate
target. Consequently, further policy
measures are necessary in order to
increase labour supply in general
and, in particular, to ensure that
older workers stay longer in
employment and that more women
enter and remain longer in the
labour market. It is worth noting
that the methodology employed in
this section did not make any
detailed analysis of a number of rel-
evant issues such as the factors that
determine the participation rate of
older workers and migration flows,
basically for reasons of data avail-
ability and to preserve the overall
consistency of this scenario exercise.
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Table 22 - Potential for reaching the female 
employment rate target across countries 
(of 60.0% in 2010) in the "medium-term" scenario and pace of progress 
Pace/Likelihood Likely a) Possibly b) Unlikely c)
Rapid d) countries
count
IE, NL, CY
3
0
BE, EL, ES
3
Close to average e) countries
count
DE, PT, FI
3 0
IT, HU
2
Slow f) countries
count
DK, UK, AT, SE, SL
5
FR, CZ
2
PO, SK
2
Table 24 - Potential for reaching the old age (55 to 64 years) 
employment rate target across countries (of 50.0% in 2010) in the 
"medium-term" scenario and pace of progress 
Pace/Likelihood Likely a) Possibly b) Unlikely c)
Rapid d) countries
count
IE, NL, CY
3
0
BE, HU, SL, SK
4
Close to average e) countries
count
DE, SE, CY
3 0
CZ
1
Slow f) countries
count
DK, PT, UK
3
0
EL, ES, FR, IT, AT, PO
6
Table 25 - Potential for reaching the old age (55 to 64 years) 
employment rate target across countries (of 50.0% in 2010) in the 
"long-term" scenario and pace of progress 
Pace/Likelihood Likely a) Possibly b) Unlikely c)
Rapid d) countries
count
IE
1
0
BE, NL, FI, HU, SL, SK
6
Close to average e) countries
count
DE, SE, CY
3 0
DE
1
Slow f) countries
count
DK, PT, UK, SE, CY
5
0
EL, ES, FR, IT, AT, CZ, PO
7
Table 23 - Potential for reaching the female 
employment rate target across countries 
(of 60.0% in 2010) in the "long-term" scenario and pace of progress 
Pace/Likelihood Likely a) Possibly b) Unlikely c)
Rapid d) countries
count
IE, NL, CY
3
0
BE, EL, ES
3
Close to average e) countries
count
DE, PT, FI
3 0
IT, HU
2
Slow f) countries
count
DK, UK, AT, SE, SL
5
CZ
1
FR,PO, SK
3
*) See footnote of table 20
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Chart 40 - Comparison between the “Medium-term” and “Long-term” 
scenarios for the EU14  
1. Introduction
The years following the 1990s’
recession have been years of deep
transformation of the European
labour markets. From a peak in
1994 the EU unemployment rate
has fallen by about 2 percentage
points, reaching 7.4% of the labour
force in 2001. Despite this decline
there have been no signs of price
and wage inflation. In the same
period, the rate of price inflation
declined from about 3% to about
2%, with the core rate1 following
the same pattern. Wage pressures
have been subdued as well. As doc-
umented in Employment in Europe
2002, the decline in the unemploy-
ment rate occurred with no price
and wage pressure, supporting the
view of a decline in the structural
unemployment rate, as measured
by the NAIRU. It is remarkable that
the unemployment decline was
associated with intense job creation
and strong growth of the labour
force. More jobs were created for
an increasing number (as a percent-
age of the working age population)
of those willing to work.
Nevertheless, progress has been
uneven across countries. While in
some countries the improvements
are relatively recent, in others, such
as the Netherlands, Ireland and the
UK, they have been ongoing for
several years.
The uncertainty of the economic
cycle of the last two years does not
seem to have changed the overall
picture of European labour mar-
kets. Notwithstanding the weak
economic growth, the EU employ-
ment and participation rates kept
growing and reached their highest
levels of the last three decades2.
Unemployment, although increas-
ing, stood at a level lower than the
average of the first half of the
1990s. 
As documented in previous
reports3, these developments re-
flected exogenous developments
in the macroeconomic environment
and changes in the structure of the
labour supply - revealed by increas-
es in the levels of skills and by
changes in the gender and age
composition of the work force.
These changes interacted with
labour market reforms that pro-
moted new forms of contracts
(part-time and fixed-term con-
tracts), and of work organisation
that made labour markets more
flexible and at the same time
allowed a better reconciliation of
family life with working life4. 
There has been extensive research
on the causes of the rising and per-
sistent EU unemployment rate.
Some authors identified the origins
of persistent and high unemploy-
ment rate in the interaction
between the labour market institu-
tions, broadly defined, and the
exogenous shocks of the early 80s
and early 90s. Others stressed the
effect of the rising interest rates on
the unemployment rate5.
The structural nature of the recent
improvements in labour market
performance has been widely
acknowledged6. 
Several analyses have focused on
the role of policy variables and
labour market institutions in the
rise of unemployment7. For exam-
ple, studies such as those of
Elmeskov et al. (1998), Blanchard
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Labour Market Performance
1 The core inflation is the inflation rate which excludes the volatile energy and food components. It is a measure of the underlying
inflation eschewing the more volatile components. The core inflation represents therefore the long-term component of the infla-
tion rate.
2 However, in some Member States the bleak economic growth of 2001-2003 had an impact on employment which has been so far
stronger than in other Member States. 
3 Employment in Europe 2002 and 2003.
4 Although positive at the aggregate level, the availability of more flexible working arrangements may increase the risks of unem-
ployment or of inactivity for groups at risks such as low skilled and older workers; see Employment in Europe 2002 and 2003.
5 The approach followed here is slightly different from those of other authors that limit the analysis of institutions to the interplay
between them and certain specific shocks (e.g.. O. Blanchard and J. Wolfers (1999) The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of
European unemployment: The aggregate evidence). By contrast the chapter tries to identify whether labour market performance is
influenced by specific institutional settings. Usually labour market institutions are defined in a very broad sense and are identified
with those characteristics of the labour market deemed to change very slowly over time (replacement rates, benefit duration,
ALMPs’ expenditures, EPL, level of bargaining co-ordination). This definition of institutions is not satisfying because, firstly, it is not
clear why slow moving variables should be treated as institutions. Secondly, rather than the variables themselves, the labour market
institutions should be defined by the set of rules governing their determination (e.g. social partners and government involvement
in wage setting, fixation of minimum wages and expenditures on LMPs, level of bargaining at which wages are determined, etc). In
this chapter we have chosen to follow the  “narrow” approach, although due to the lack of time series information, we have limited
the institutions to the extent of bargaining co-ordination and centralisation between employers on one side and employees on the
other.
6 See for example Employment in Europe 2002, EU Economy Review 2002, 2003 and Employment Outlook 2003.
7 Blanchard O. and Wolfers J. (2000) The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European unemployment: The aggregate evi-
dence, The Economic Journal, 110, pp. 1-33. Belot M. and Van Ours J.C. (2000) Does the recent success of some OECD countries in
lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labour market reforms?, IZA Discussion paper No.147. Fitoussi J-
P, Jestaz D., Phelps E.S., Zoega (2000), G. Roots of the recent recoveries: Labor Reforms or Private Sector forces?, Brooking Papers on
Economic Activity, pp 237-291. Nickell S., Nunziata L. Ochel W., Quintini G. (2001) The Beveridge curve, unemployment and wages
in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s, CEP Discussion Paper no. 
and Wolfers (2001), Belot and Van
Ours (2000), Bertola et. al (2001)
and Nickel et al. (2001) draw atten-
tion to the impact of labour market
institutions and the interactions
between policies and institutions.  
This chapter aims to contribute to
the debate on determinants of
labour market performance focuss-
ing on drivers of the EU15 employ-
ment rate over time and investigat-
ing the sources of the improve-
ments it underwent in the second
half of the 1990s. Although this is
not the first analysis that looks at
the role of labour market institu-
tions, it takes the employment rate
as the appropriate measure of
labour market performance rather
than the unemployment rate, as
done in a large set of recent studies
on labour market institutions and
labour market performance.  
Indeed, the effects of policy meas-
ures on the unemployment rate
may be underestimated - when
they affect in the same direction
employment and participation
rates - or overestimated - when
they influence employment and
participation in opposing ways. 
The effect of policy variables on the
employment rate is also of interest
per se, as the employment rate is
the quantitative target set by the
Lisbon European council. This chap-
ter looks at the labour market insti-
tutions as main determinants of
employment performance. It tries
to identify how labour market insti-
tutions have influenced the evolu-
tion over time of the employment
rate and to what extent they can
explain the cross-country distribu-
tion of the employment rate
changes of the second half of the
1990s. In doing so, this analysis will
make use of the historical patterns
of the employment rate and of the
policy variables. 
2. A broad frame-
work to analyse the
determinants of
labour market 
performance 
Employment is determined by the
interplay between labour demand
and wage bargaining and/or
labour supply. Hence, any variable
which affects firms’ hiring deci-
sions and the outcome of bargain-
ing between employers and
employees is likely to influence
the level of employment, making
the competing claims of employ-
ers and employees for a share of
output per head coherent.
Moreover, for a given bargaining
framework, factors increasing
labour supply may affect job cre-
ation through endogenous wage
moderation. Finally, changes in
the structure of labour supply
influence job creation when they
improve the match between jobs
and vacancies.
Although the variables that deter-
mine labour market performance
are numerous, it is useful to think
of them as belonging to three
groups. The first group includes
variables under the direct control
of policy makers: active and pas-
sive LMPs, taxes on labour,
employers’ and employees’ social
security contributions and unem-
ployment benefits8. The second
group includes variables describ-
ing the nature of bargaining and
the socio-economic structure of
the labour market. These variables
tend to change only slowly over
time and, consequently, shape
labour market outcomes primarily
through their interactions with
those of the first group. Hence,
the second group also includes the
interactions of the slow burners of
employment performance (e.g.
level of centralisation and co-ordi-
nation of bargaining and variables
identifying the socio-demographic
structure of employment) with
those of the first group. Finally,
the last set of determinants con-
trols for rate of technological
growth, efficiency of the produc-
tion process and the degree of
economic openness. 
The following sections describe
first how the key variables in each
of these groups influence labour
market performance, and second
the observed trend in these vari-
ables.
2.1 Taxes 
Labour taxes may affect employ-
ment if they change labour costs
and modify the incentive for job
creation for given after-tax wages.
Changes in taxes affect labour
supply decisions when they alter
the gap between in-work and out-
of-work income9. The total effect
on labour supply decisions is theo-
retically uncertain and depends on
the relative strength of income
and substitution effects10. The
response of wage-setters also mat-
ters for the employment effect of
changes in labour taxes. If wage-
setters internalise the effect of
higher labour taxes on their tax-
Chapter 2 Employment in Europe 2004
62
8 These policy elements are at the core of the European Employment Strategy and, in particular, guideline 8 addressing the issue of
making work pay.
9 Out-of-work income may include all out-of-work benefits either in the form of unemployment benefits or future income flows
deriving from social security payments. If the non-labour income is taxed at a lower rate than labour income, an increase in labour
taxes increases the net replacement rate and thus the relative convenience between working and non-working, with a negative
effect on the decision to participate,  and thus, on employment. 
10 Income effects operate through the impact of income levels on the decision to enter into the labour market or to increase the
number of hours worked. Substitution effects are related to the effect of relative wages on the decision to enter the labour market
or to increase the number of hours worked. G. Carone and A. Salomaki (2001), Reforms in the tax and benefit systems in order to
increase employment incentives in the EU Economic Papers No. 160 European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and
Financial Affairs.
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financed benefits, labour taxation is
less distorting and employment per-
formance better than when the
effect is not internalised11.
Labour demand is affected by
changes in taxes if they alter labour
costs. This occurs when labour costs
rise in response to a change in one
component of the tax wedge as real
wages change to keep workers’ liv-
ing standard constant12. Hence, an
increase in labour taxes raises
labour costs and reduces employ-
ment if not associated with a reduc-
tion of the after-tax wage13. This is
only a short-term effect. The
increase in unemployment triggers
a downward adjustment of wages
that reduces labour costs and brings
employment in the long-term to the
level prevailing before the tax rise.
Labour market performance is also
not affected in the long-term by
changes in labour taxation when
the reservation wage adjusts pro-
portionally to the real consumption
wage. Finally, changes in the com-
position of the tax burden at an
unchanged average labour tax rate
can have an impact on job creation.
This occurs when a shift of employ-
ers’ social contributions towards
personal taxation - including both
employees’ social contributions and
income taxes - modifies the costs of
production of domestic goods rela-
tive to foreign goods and improves
competitiveness, therefore acting as
a real exchange rate depreciation
(see Alesina-Perotti (1994)).
The empirical evidence of the
effects of taxes on labour costs and
unemployment is mixed. Some
authors find significant effects of
taxes on labour costs or unemploy-
ment (Tyrväinen (1995), Elmeskov
et. al (1998), Nickell and Layard
(1999), Daveri and Tabellini (2000)).
Others (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000)) find few effects of taxes on
labour costs. Moreover, there is
some evidence (Elmeskov et. al
(1998)) that the effect of taxes on
labour market outcomes is relatively
low in both highly decentralised
and highly centralised bargaining
systems or when co-ordination is
strong14. In Daveri and Tabellini
(2000) the effect tends to be larger
in Continental Europe than else-
where. 
Table 26 reports the tax wedge for
two different socio-economic groups.
The tax wedge is a measure of the
non-wage component of the labour
costs in total labour costs and is
defined as the difference between
the after-tax and the before-tax
labour costs as a percentage of total
before-tax labour costs. The tax
wedge is calculated from the OECD
Taxing Wages publication that pro-
vides annual data for the period
1980-200015. The cross-country cor-
relation of the tax wedge between
the two categories “single worker
with no children” and “married
couple with two children” is high
and stable over time. Hence coun-
tries with a high level of the wedge
for the former category also tend to
have a high level of the wedge for
the latter over time16. There are dif-
ferences between countries which
persist over time, mainly within
rather than between each of the
two decades considered. Moreover,
when Member States are ranked
according to the level of the tax
wedge, those countries with a rela-
tively low wedge in the first half of
the 1980s (Austria, Spain, Germany
and Greece) worsened their relative
position in the second half of the
1990s. 
11 Gruber, Summers and Vergara (1993) contend that centralised unions look through the (public) budget, internalising the effect on
the tax base of their wage claims, and allowing for a less distorting labour taxation and better labour market performance. Hence,
countries with centralised bargaining should have higher income taxes and higher employment when compared to decentralised
wage setting. Along the same line, a given reduction of the tax rate on wages implies a declining wage and increasing employment
in countries with centralised bargaining and an increasing wage and falling employment in decentralised bargaining systems; see
for example J. Kilponen and P. Sinko (2003) , Does Centralised wage setting lead into higher taxation? Vatt, Government Institute
for Economic Research, Helsinki,  Discussion Paper 314. A similar argument explains why progressive income taxation should be
associated with better employment performance. 
12 For an individual firm producing only one good, the labour cost is defined as nominal labour cost divided by the output price:
W(1+sscer)/p, where W is the before tax wage and sscer the employers’ social security contributions. Assuming that all workers con-
sume the output produced, the consumption wage is the nominal net wage divided by the consumer price: W (1 - sscee) (1-ti) / p(
1+ tc) where W is the before tax wage, ti the income tax rate, and tc the indirect tax rate. The wedge is the ratio between the con-
sumption and the production wage:(1+sscer)(1+tc ) / (1 - sscee) )(1-ti ). 
13 For the same reason a reduction in the tax wedge reduces labour costs and stimulates job creation when improvements in workers’
costs of living due, for example, to a reduction in the indirect tax rate, are not passed onto labour costs through real wage modera-
tion.
14 The argument made popular by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) is different from that of Gruber, Summers and Vergara (1993).
According to Calmfors and Driffill very centralised (at national or multi-industry level) and very decentralised (at the level of firms)
bargaining systems are likely to perform better than intermediate bargaining systems because the former internalise the effect of
high wage claims on aggregate demand while the latter internalise the effect of high wages on firms’ labour demand. In the case
of intermediate systems, the mechanisms of internalisation are too weak to lead to significant wage moderation. When bargaining
occurs at the industry level, firms are able to transfer higher labour costs on the final ouput prices without suffering competitive
losses. Of course, in open economies wage restraint occurs also in intermediate systems. See also L. Calmfors (1993) Centralisation
of Wage Bargaining and  Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey, OECD Working Paper No. 131. According to Gruber, Summers and
Vergara only countries with centralised unions perform better. 
15 An alternative indicator is the implicit tax rate on employed labour, which is defined as all taxes and social contributions levied on
employed labour income divided by the total compensation of employees. This is a macro indicator based on actual tax revenues
and it is an approximation of the average effective tax burden on labour in the economy. It is published in the yearly report
'Structures of the taxation systems in the EU' by the European Commission and Eurostat.
16 This correlation is of at least 0.8 and allows considering one family type only as statistically representative of the other.
 
Charts 41 and 42 display the evolu-
tion of the tax wedge for two fam-
ily types. In countries such as the
UK, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg, taxes on labour
declined throughout the 1980s and
the 1990s while in Denmark, Italy,
Portugal, Sweden and Ireland the
decline began in the second half of
the 1980s. The reduction was also
stronger in Ireland and Denmark in
the second half of the 1990s. For
the remaining countries the wedge
increased, with increases after 1995
coming to a halt or being more
moderate in the case of France and
Greece and continuing in the case
of Germany. In the case of a mar-
ried couple with children, there is
less variation of the tax wedge over
time but its time pattern is similar
to that observed for the “single
worker with no children”.
The correlation with the tax wedge
of respectively the unemployment
and the employment rate is com-
plex and dominated by country-
specific patterns, with significant
differences in both the cross-coun-
try and the cross-time comparisons
(Charts 43-45). If one looks cross-
section, there is virtually no correla-
tion between the tax wedge and
the unemployment and employ-
ment rate (Table 27).  On the other
hand, even though it is not easy to
interpret in terms of causality, with-
in each country there is a significant
time correlation between labour
taxes and employment perform-
ance. In Member States such as
Germany, Greece, Spain, France,
Ireland, and to a lesser extent,
Austria, a high (low) unemploy-
ment rate is associated with a high
(low) tax wedge and vice versa
17
.
The correlation, negative for the
Scandinavian countries, Belgium
and Finland in the 1980s, became
significantly positive in the 1990s.
Compared to the 1980s, it markedly
decreased in the 1990s in Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
In addition, with only a few excep-
tions, the correlation between the
unemployment rate and the tax
wedge is higher in the first half
than in the second half of the
1990s, and in both sub-periods
higher than in all the decade. This
suggests that the temporal aspect
plays a crucial role in the relation-
ship between taxes and unemploy-
ment, which cannot be fully under-
stood if the focus is on a cross-coun-
try comparison at a certain point in
time.
These findings do not change sig-
nificantly when the correlation is
calculated with respect to the
employment rate or the structural
unemployment rate (charts 44-45).
The time correlation between
labour taxes and structural unem-
ployment is usually highly signifi-
cant and higher than that between
taxes and unemployment. As
expected, a negative correlation
between taxes on labour and
employment rates is found for
almost all Member States (chart 45).
This first zoom-in on the data shows
that, although the cross-country
correlation between unemploy-
ment and the tax burden on labour
is not very significant - i.e. countries
with high taxes on labour and high
employment  co-exist with coun-
tries with high taxes on labour and
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Source: own calculation on OECD data. The tax wedge is computed as the sum of income tax, employers’ and employees’ social security con-
tributions as a percentage of gross earnings and employers’ social security contributions. Missing data within sample have been interpolated.
APW:  average production worker.
17 Since a correlation does not imply in any sense causality, it is equally correct to say that a country with a high (low) tax wedge had
also had a high (low) unemployment rate. 
Single without children 100% of APW Married couple with two children one-earner 100% of APW
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-2002 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-2002
Austria 38.2 39.8 39.6 44.8 27.6 28.7 28.0 33.4
Belgium 50.0 52.6 54.2 56.6 39.7 41.9 41.1 44.1
Denmark 44.5 47.4 46.3 44.5 36.6 37.0 34.0 33.1
Spain 36.4 36.8 37.5 38.4 32.5 32.8 32.8 32.5
Finland 43.8 45.8 48.1 48.5 36.1 37.6 40.1 44.5
France 38.7 41.2 43.4 44.1 41.4 41.2
Germany 43.0 45.0 47.2 51.8 34.0 34.7 36.1 35.5
Greece 28.5 32.5 33.9 35.8 15.1 30.1 33.3 35.7
Ireland 37.9 41.8 38.9 32.9 26.4 31.1 29.8 23.3
Italy 48.1 50.3 49.3 48.7 43.6 45.7 44.4 42.8
Luxembourg 38.3 36.6 34.7 34.7 20.2 17.5 15.0 13.6
Netherlands 49.7 49.1 46.0 44.0 44.3 43.3 39.5 36.2
Portugal 30.9 34.4 33.6 33.7 27.6 30.7 27.2 27.6
Sweden 50.7 51.8 47.3 50.3 45.9 47.0 42.8 46.8
United Kingdom 38.4 35.9 33.1 31.5 29.9 27.5 26.2 26.1
Table 26 - Tax Wedge
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Chart 41 - Average tax wedge single worker no children Chart 42 - Average tax wedge married 
couple with children
 
low employment - the correlation
over time between unemployment
and taxes is positive.18 Un-
employment is not necessarily high
(low) in countries with high (low)
tax wedge, but, in the average rep-
resentative country, it tends to be
higher after increases in the wedge.
This implies that changes in the tax
wedge are likely to account more
for the country-specific response of
the (un)employment rate than for
the cross-countries differences at a
certain point in time. 
Although bivariate correlations are
not indicative of the direction of
causality between two variables19,
the existence of significant correla-
tion is suggestive of labour taxes
being a factor affecting labour mar-
ket performance. This first evidence
suggests that the mechanism relat-
ing taxes to labour market perform-
ance is not simple. Since employ-
ment and unemployment react
often with lags, such dynamics
should be properly taken into
account in order not to underesti-
mate the long-run impact on
employment.  The role of taxes will
be investigated jointly with that of
LMPs and other potential determi-
nants of labour market perform-
ance in the next section.
2.2 Active Labour Market Policies
The rationale of ALMPs is based on
their effect on the skills level of the
labour force. Skills and upgrading of
skills serve to prepare the labour
force to cope with the challenges of
structural change and to prevent the
unemployed from dropping out of
the labour force. By reducing struc-
tural imbalances, ALMPs may also
increase the adaptability of the
labour force to shifts in the labour
demand from unskilled to skilled
labour. Finally, ALMPs may prevent
transitory increases in unemployment
from becoming structural in nature. 
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Chart 4- NAIRU and tax wedge
(pairwise correlation coefficients)
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Chart 5- Employment and tax wedge
(pairwise correlation coefficients)
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18 Actually, the possibility that the correlation is zero can be excluded at a high level of confidence. This means that for a given coun-
try, a high level of taxes in one (sub-) period is associated to a high unemployment rate. Of course also the opposite holds.
19 A significant correlation between the two variables is equally consistent with a causality from taxes to unemployment and vice versa.
Apart from the expected causality from labour taxes to (un)employment, a shock leading to unemployment may require an increase
in the level of taxes necessary to provide direct or indirect transfers to the unemployed. Moreover, the correlation of (un)employment
with taxes, can be highly significant but the effect of taxes in quantitative terms extremely small. 
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ALMPs may increase job creation
when labour demand and labour
supply expand as a consequence of
such programmes. The effects on
labour demand work through
improvements to the matching
process, increases in productivity,
and substitution effects. An increase
in matching efficiency weakens the
incentives of the employers to
attract workers by pushing up
wages, reducing the structural rate
of unemployment20. ALMPs may also
raise the efficiency of labour (labour
productivity) and increase net job
creation. This happens when as
workers become more efficient, the
incentives to increase labour
demand are stronger than those to
reduce it21. 
However, not all types of ALMPs may
expand employment. This is likely to
occur when direct job creation meas-
ures crowd-out those workers that
do not participate in these pro-
grammes, because employers have
the incentive to replace regular
workers with subsidised labour
(Dalhber and Forslund (1999), 
Source: own calculation on OECD data. The tax wedge is computed as the sum of income tax, employers’ and employees’ social security con-
tributions as a percentage of gross earnings and employers’ social security contributions. Missing data within sample have been interpolated.
20 In theory the ‘structural rate of unemployment’, can be defined in different ways. Employment in Europe 2002 provided short expla-
nations and references to the different concepts. The demarcation between ‘structural’ unemployment and other forms of unemploy-
ment is difficult in empirical research. Although it is quite established now that unemployment is a phenomenon going beyond the
business cycle, high ‘conjunctural’ unemployment has its impact on ‘structural’ unemployment, so the two are not independent from
each other, which can also be seen by the fact that in an economic upturn, so-called marginalised groups are often quickly drawn
back into the labour market. One theoretical concept often used is the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU),
which is, as well known, subject to measurement errors. Nevertheless, different estimates of the NAIRU by the Commission, the OECD
and the IMF all point towards a reduction of the EU 15 structural unemployment rate. 
21 The marginal productivity of labour is likely to rise if technological progress is of the labour augmenting type, i.e. more output can
be produced because labour becomes more efficient. This effect, ceteris paribus, is likely to reduce labour demand, as the same
amount of output can be produced by fewer and more efficient workers: Calmfors (1995), Does Active labour-market policy increase
employment? Theoretical considerations and some empirical evidence from Sweden, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no.1.
22 L. Calmfors (1995), Does Active labour-market policy increase employment? Theoretical considerations and some empirical evi-
dence from Sweden, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no.1
Unemployment rate Employment rate
1980-
1984
1985-
1989
1990-
1995
1996-
2002
1980-
1984
1985-
1989
1990-
1995
1996-
2000
Austria 2.2 3.2 3.6 4.2 Austria 65.4 66.0 68.4 67.6
Belgium 9.9 9.2 8.0 8.7 Belgium 54.4 52.9 55.8 58.1
Denmark 7.5 5.8 8.0 5.1 Denmark 70.4 75.7 73.9 75.5
Spain 12.7 16.3 16.4 14.9 Spain 48.1 45.9 47.8 51.4
Finland 5.1 4.4 11.6 11.7 Finland 73.6 74.2 59.7 64.3
France 7.7 9.7 10.4 11.0 France 64.6 60.7 60.0 60.3
Germany 5.2 6.4 6.8 8.7 Germany 64.4 62.8 65.9 64.3
Greece 5.4 6.8 8.0 10.6 Greece 56.3 55.0 53.9 55.3
Ireland 12.1 16.2 14.3 7.8 Ireland 54.7 49.9 52.0 59.6
Italy 7.6 9.2 9.8 11.3 Italy 54.2 53.2 52.3 51.8
Luxembourg 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.6 Luxembourg 59.2 59.2 60.2 60.7
Netherlands 8.9 7.4 6.0 4.2 Netherlands 59.9 57.0 63.1 69.2
Portugal 7.8 7.2 5.5 5.6 Portugal 62.7 63.4 64.8 65.7
Sweden 2.9 2.2 6.3 8.0 Sweden 77.9 80.2 70.7 69.7
United Kingdom 9.2 9.7 8.9 6.5
United
Kingdom
65.4 67.1 68.7 70.1
Correlation tax wedge and
unemployment and 
employment
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Table 27 - Unemployment and employment rate 
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Calmfors (1995), (2000))22. The higher
the degree of substitution between
subsidised and unsubsidised labour,
the larger the displacement effect
due to a fall in the price of sub-
sidised labour23. However, displace-
ment effects are less of a problem
when ALMPs are targeted at disad-
vantaged workers (e.g. long-term
unemployed) even at the expense of
short-term unemployed24. Further-
more, dead-weight costs may occur
when participants would have got a
job anyway even if they did not join
such programmes. 
ALMPs may affect the labour supply
when they increase the matching
efficiency and enhance the employa-
bility of the labour force through
labour market training. Direct job
creation may have positive effects on
labour supply if it helps individuals to
maintain their motivation and skills
and, thus, keep them in contact with
the world of work (Martin (1998)).
By enhancing the employability of
unemployed people, direct job cre-
ation may affect the economy’s
potential and non-inflationary
growth. Improvements in employa-
bility of all workers may also increase
competition among them and pro-
vide an incentive for wage restraint
(Calmfors 2002)25. However, partici-
pation in active programmes may
weaken the intensity of job search, if
it leads job seekers to evaluate their
employment prospects better than
in the case of non-participation. Im-
provements in labour market
prospects due to the effects of
ALMPs may also decrease the wel-
fare reduction of being jobless, by
increasing either the reservation
wage or the subsequent probabili-
ties of being re-employed. In both
cases wage pressure rises and
employment drops. 
The aggregate impact of ALMPs is
relatively complex as active measures
have both direct and indirect
effects26. While the former come into
play at the static level, the latter start
playing a role when economic
agents react to the likely impact of
direct effects. Indirect effects are
likely to be positive when an increase
in the labour supply affects in-work
and out-of-work income in such a
way that labour becomes cheaper
than non-labour. This may happen
when an increase in labour supply
moderates wage claims, and reduces
total unemployment and the contri-
bution of employers to unemploy-
ment insurance schemes. However,
negative indirect effects may occur
in the case of displacement or substi-
tution effects or when ALMPs in-
crease the reservation wages. 
Because of this complexity, the
effectiveness of ALMPs depends on
the design of adequate incentives to
take up work. In particular, the
unemployment benefits eligibility
conditions may affect the re-
employment probabilities of partici-
pants in active programmes. The
importance of interactions between
preventive measures and tax and
benefit systems has been recognised
in the guidelines for employment
policies. Indeed, the Employment
Guidelines stress the need to develop
preventive and employability-ori-
ented strategies, building on the
early identification of individual
needs27 and to review the tax, bene-
fit and training systems to ensure
that they support the employability
of unemployed persons. However, it
should be kept in mind that these
are necessary conditions, given that,
to be effective, ALMPs need to have
a sufficient demand for labour. 
The net effect of ALMPs is theoreti-
cally unclear and can be only gauged
with the help of empirical analysis.
When positive effects dominate neg-
ative or neutral ones, labour market
measures may reduce the long-term
unemployment component by atten-
uating inflationary pressures in the
economy. The empirical analysis will
also try to give an indication of the
effects that changes in the percent-
age of GDP diverted to different cat-
egories of ALMPs have on labour
market performance. Indeed, there is
no reason to assume that diverse cat-
22 L. Calmfors (1995), Does Active labour-market policy increase employment? Theoretical considerations and some empirical evidence
from Sweden, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no.1; L. Calmfors and Holmlund (2000) Unemployment and Economic
Growth: a partial survey Swedish Economic Policy Review vol. 7 107-153. The recognition that subsidised employment schemes may
crowd out regular employment led the Swedish authorities to replace relief works (temporary jobs where employers received a sub-
sidy for hiring employees from the pool of individuals registered with the public employment services) with work experience schemes
covering activities that “would otherwise not have occurred”. L. Calmfors, A. Forslund and M. Hemström (2002)  Does Active Labour
Market Policy Work? Lessons from the Swedish Experiences Seminar Paper n. 700 Institute for International Economic Studies,
Stockholm University.
23 The displacement effect of ALMPs may be direct or indirect according to whether they have or not wage-rising effects; M. Dahlberg
and A. Forslund (1999) Direct Displacement effects of Labour Market Programmes: the Case of Sweden.
24 J. de Koning (2000) Models for Aggregate impact analysis of active labour market policy, in Labour Market policy and Unemployment
eds. J. de Koning and H: Mosley, Edward Elgar.
25 The competition for jobs may also increase activity rates if individuals perceive that ALMPs preserve or increase the level of skills
(Calmfors 2002). In this case, ALMPs may maintain the motivation to seek work actively reducing discouraged worker effects.
26 The quantification of the overall effect of ALMPS on aggregate employment is different from the evaluation of the efficiencies and
effectiveness of specific ALMPs measures targeted at specific groups. The second type of analysis is essentially based on individual data
of participants in programmes and is aimed at evaluating their income and employment prospects conditional to participation in such
programmes and not their effect on increasing aggregate employment. Thus, the two levels of analysis provide different and com-
plementary information on the role that ALMPs have in determining the labour market performance. In this chapter, we focus only
on the evaluation of the aggregate net impact of ALMPs on job creation.
27 OJ of the European Communities (2002/1777/EC), Council Decision of 18 February 2002 on guidelines for Member States’ employment
policies for the year 2002. The 2002 Guidelines ask Member States to make efforts such that within one year every unemployed per-
son is offered a new start before reaching six months of unemployment in the case of young people, and 12 months of unemploy-
ment in the case of adults in the form of training, retraining, work practice, a job, or other employability measure…-. 
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egories of ALMPs have the same
impact on overall labour market per-
formance28. 
Before exploring the empirical links
between ALMPs variables and the
unemployment and employment
rates, it is useful to describe the evo-
lution of spending on ALMPs both
as a percentage of GDP and with
regard to its composition29. Within
each country, labour market expen-
diture is usually strongly related to
the evolution over time of the
unemployment rate. There has been
also a shift of labour market expen-
ditures towards ALMPs, particularly
in Ireland, Italy, France and Spain
(table 28). Despite this common time
pattern, sizeable differences exist
across countries with shares of active
spending as percentage of total
labour market expenditures higher
than the average in Italy, Sweden,
Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
ALMPs consist of five categories:
expenditures for public employ-
ment service and administration
(PES); labour market training30;
youth measures; subsidised
employment (DJC); and disability
programmes31. Significant differ-
ences exist across Member States
both in the composition and in the
evolution of the components of
ALMPs. Table 29-30 and charts 46
and 47 show the composition of
active spending for the 1980-2002
period subdivided into four sub-
periods. In all periods, more than a
quarter of ALMPs expenditure was
allocated to disability measures in
the Netherlands and Sweden32. 
28 The econometric analysis of section 3.6 will explore the effect of the intensity of spending of ALMPs and several categories of active
programmes on the aggregate unemployment and employment rate. The analysis will be on the aggregate impact and will not eval-
uate the effectiveness of ALMPs at the micro level (i.e. the effect on participants’ re-employment probabilities and or their earning
profiles). 
29 Data are from the OECD labour market database. Eurostat LMP database collect more comparable data. Unfortunately its use is lim-
ited by the lack a long time series.  
30 This chapter is based on an econometric analysis focusing on certain determinants of labour market behaviour in particular ALMPs
and related training measures. As previous Employment in Europe reports and other chapters in this report show, human capital more
generally is an important factor and this issue is taken up in chapters 3 and 4 of the current report.
31 See Martin J. (2000) What works among active labour market policies: Evidence from OECD countries’ experiences in Policies Towards
Full Employment, Paris OECD. 
32 By nature, this analysis only allows to look at expenditure, while more in-depth analysis of the impact of education on labour mar-
kets would need to take account of the general role of education, the pros and cons of initial training compared with on-the-job
training, the various  types of training, the length and quality of education and training, who finances it (public/private), etc.
Source: OECD, Social Expenditures database. For the 1995-2000 period data are from the Employment Outlook 1999, 2000, 2001.
1 Total labour market expenditures include ALMPs and passive measures (expenditures for unemployment compensation and early retirement for
labour market reasons). Expenditures are expenditures paid and controlled by the general government and mandatory private social expendi-
tures. 
2 For Spain, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal passive measures include only unemployment compensation. 
3 For Greece and the Netherlands passive measures include only unemployment compensation. For Ireland and Portugal early retirement for
labour market reasons are only available since 1990.
4 Data refer only to public expenditures; 1996-2002 for Austria, Spain, Finland, Germany, Sweden; 1996-2001 for Belgium, France, Ireland, the
Netherlands and the UK; 1996-2000 for Denmark and Portugal; 1996-1999 for Italy 1996-1998 for Greece; 1996-1997 for Luxembourg (a) 1985
Active expenditure % of total labour market expenditureTotal expenditures % of GDP
Table 28 - Labour Market Expenditures in the European Union1
1980-19842 1985-19893 1990-1995 1996-20024 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-20024
Austria : 1.3 1.6 1.8 : 22.7 21.0 27.0
Belgium : 4.4 4.0 3.8 : 30.3 31.1 35.5
Denmark 6.0 4.5 6.3 5.2 13.1 25.3 24.2 32.8
Spain 2.5 3.1 3.5 2.3 10.3 21.0 19.3 31.4
Finland 1.8 2.3 4.9 3.8 55.3 41.0 32.8 33.0
France 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 22.3 25.9 36.2 43.3
Germany : 2.1 3.3 3.5 : 41.9 41.2 36.8
Greece : 0.6 0.8 0.9 : 38.2 45.2 47.0
Ireland : 4.6 4.2 2.7 : 31.9 34.2 51.4
Italy : 1.8 2.5 1.9 : 38.1 58.7 56.7
Luxembourg 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.9 51.6 33.0 26.2 30.3
Netherlands 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.2 20.6 29.9 33.6 39.4
Portugal : 0.7 1.4 1.6 : 58.8 52.8 47.3
Sweden 2.2 2.7 5.0 3.5 67.7 70.7 55.9 53.2
United Kingdom 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.0 28.7 35.3 29.1 38.1
Unweighted
Average
2.8 2.6 3.2 2.7 33.7 36.3 36.1 40.2
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Table 29 - Categories of ALMPs absorbing the maximum share 
of LMPs expenditures
1985-1989 1990-1995 1996-2002
Austria PES PES TRAINING
Belgium DJC DJC DJC
Denmark TRAINING TRAINING TRAINING
Spain DJC DJC
Finland DJC DJC DJC
France TRAINING TRAINING DJC
Germany TRAINING TRAINING TRAINING
Greece DJC TRAINING TRAINING
Ireland TRAINING DJC DJC
Italy YOUTH YOUTH DJC
Luxembourg DISABILITY YOUTH YOUTH
Netherlands DISABILITY DISABILITY DISABILITY
Portugal TRAINING YOUTH YOUTH
Sweden DISABILITY DISABILITY DISABILITY
United Kingdom PES PES PES
Source: OECD Social Expenditure database. For the 1995-2002 data from the Employment Outlook.
Note: Data may not add up to 100 due to rounding. For Greece data on “Measures for disabled” are not available for 1995.
For Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal data available until 1997; for Greece data available until 1993.
1 1983-1984 for the Netherlands ; 2 1986-1989 for Portugal
3 Data refer only to public expenditures; 1996-2002 for Austria, Spain, Finland, Germany, Sweden; 1996-2001 for Belgium, France, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands and the UK; 1996-2000 for Denmark and Portugal; 1996-1998 for Greece; 1996-1997 for Luxembourg.  In the case
of Italy it is assumed that Expenditures on Public Employment Services and Administration represented the same share as in 2000
(a) 1985
(b) 1989
Table 30 - ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMMES 
( as % of total active labour market expenditures)
Employment service 
and administration
Labour market training Youth measures Subsidised employment Disability programmes
1980-
19841
1985-
19892
1990-
1995
1996-
20023
1980-
19841
1985-
19892
1990-
1995
1996-
20023
1980-
19841
1985-
19892
1990-
1995
1996-
20023
1980-
19841
1985-
19892
1990
1995
1996-
20023
1980-
19841
1985-
19892
1990-
1995
1996-
20023
Austria : 36.6 35.7 28.1 : 31.7 31.7 36.5 : 6.8 3 6.3 : 13.1 13 17.9 : 11.8 16.6 11.3
Belgium : 13 15.9 14.8 : 15.7 19.5 19.3 : 1.3 3.4 0.5 : 58.2 49.7 56.4 : 11.8 11.5 9
Denmark 11.5 9.1 6.8 6.9 26.2 33.7 34.6 56.6 3.5 20.8 15.6 5.7 41.3 20.9 24.8 14.8 17.5 15.5 18.1 16
Spain : : 16.3 11.1 : : 20.3 25.8 : : 13.5 9.2 : : 48.4 50.5 : : 1.6 3.5
Finland : 9.9 10 10.5 : 26.8 26.8 31.9 : 5.5 6 15.6 : 46.9 47 33.9 : 11 10.1 8.1
France 20.1 16.7 12.9 12.7 43.3 39.2 34.6 22.2 24.3 30.2 23.9 26.6 4.7 7.2 21.6 32 7.5 6.7 7 6.5
Germany : 23.3 16.5 17.9 : 28.9 34 28 : 5 4 6.3 : 20.6 28 26 : 22.2 17.6 21.8
Greece : 24.5 28.7 25.4 : 27.8 33.8 29.1 : 13.1 10.1 22.4 : 32.9 23.5 19.1 : 1.7 3.8 3.9
Ireland : 10.7 17.5 17.1 : 36.1 18.2 16.4 : 31.3 20.2 14.6 : 17.1 35.7 48.3 : 4.8 8.4 3.6
Italy : 10.8 3.3 5.2 : 3.3 1.1 8.9 : 75 49.4 33.2 : 10.8 46.2 52.6 : : : :
Luxem. 4.9 9 14.2 11.5 2.4 3.5 8.9 3.8 6.2 19.1 38.2 48 72.1 16.1 11.5 21.2 14.4 52.3 27.3 15.4
Netherl. 10.2 26.3 28.6 18.2 14 16.5 18 24.4 2.6 3.8 6.1 3.6 13.4 3.5 5.9 20.3 59.8 49.9 41.4 33.5
Portugal : 18.5 12.4 14.2 : 37.2 27.9 33.3 : 20.1 44.7 34.7 : 17.4 8.6 12.6 : 6.8 6.3 5.2
Sweden : 12.4 9.5 18 : 27.4 29.8 22.3 : 6.6 6.4 1.3 : 13.8 23.7 26.5 : 39.8 30.6 32
United Kingdom 24.5 22.6 37.4 39.6 14.6 14.8 26.8 14.5 30.8 32.4 26.6 36.3 25.2 26.4 4.6 4.3 4.9 3.8 4.6 5.4
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Youth measures were allocated a
similar proportion of expenditure
in Luxembourg, UK, Portugal, and,
to a lesser extent, in Italy and
France. Direct job creation absorbed
the highest amount of funds ear-
marked to labour market expendi-
tures in Belgium, Italy, Spain and
Ireland, with a share of about 50%
of total ALMP expenditure in the
period 1996-2002. Similarly, in
France and Finland, it accounted for
about 30% of total ALMP expendi-
ture, although in the latter it had
fallen by more than 10 percentage
points since the second half of the
1990s. While Austria and Denmark
are the only EU countries with a
large and increasing share of expen-
ditures attributed to training, in the
remaining Member States it
accounts for less than 30% of total
ALMPs expenditure, with Portugal,
Greece and Finland allocating more
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Source: OECD Social Expenditure database. For the 1995-2002 data from the Employment Outlook see footnotes table 34.
Chart 46 - Composition of active spending in the EU 1990-1995
Composition of active spending in the EU 1996-2002
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Chart 47 - Composition of active spending in the Union (as a % of total ALMP)
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than the others to this category.
Finally, only in Ireland, Sweden and
particularly the UK, is the financing
of the public employment services
high and increasing over time. 
Almost all Member States have
shifted resources for active spend-
ing to training. However, the strong
increase in the amount of total
resources allocated to this item by
Denmark, the Netherlands, and, to a
lesser extent, by Italy, Spain, Finland
and Austria is remarkable. The only
relevant exceptions are France and
Ireland that have redistributed
resources from training to public
employment services in the case of
Ireland and to direct job creation in
the case of both countries. France,
which in the second half of the
1980s had a comparatively high
share of active spending devoted to
training, earmarked in the 1996-
2002 period a below (un-weighted)
average share to this category.
Youth measures absorb an increas-
ing share of active spending in
Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland and
Greece.
Charts 48-49 give a snapshot of the
relation between labour market
performance and the expenditures
as a percentage of GDP, respective-
ly, on total ALMPs and some of its
components. From these charts a
common pattern does not emerge
neither across countries nor over
time. For some countries and in cer-
tain years, (e.g. Spain in the 1990s
and Germany in the 1980s) the cor-
Source: DG Employment calculations on OECD Social
Expenditure database and Employment Outlook. 
Notes: Points below the solid lines represent a reduc-
tion in the share with respect to the 1985-1989 peri-
od. Points above the solid lines represent an increase
in the share with respect to the 1985-1989 period.
relation is positive, implying that
high (low) employment rates are
associated with high (low) percent-
ages of GDP on expenditures on
ALMPs. In other Member States
(e.g. Denmark, France, and, only in
the 1990s, Sweden) the relationship
is negative, so that high (low)
employment is associated with low
(high) expenditures on ALMPs.
The interpretation of these findings
is complicated by the different signs
found for the correlation for cer-
tain countries and in certain peri-
ods. When negative it may reflect
reverse causation from employ-
ment to ALMPs. If some exogenous
shock has pushed the employment
rate down, expenditures on labour
market policies (passive and active)
rise. Low employment rates lead to
ALMP expenditure, not the oppo-
site. The positive correlation may
reflect either a causal relationship
between active policies and job cre-
ation, or a spurious correlation such
as a third common component that
drives both employment and
expenditures on ALMPs. For exam-
ple, when the economy and
employment grow, tax receipts rise
and the funds available for ALMPs
rise as well. Although a correlation
does not imply any type of causality,
these findings are suggestive of
some link between expenditures on
active policies and labour market
performance. However, the nature
of this link can be understood by
only controlling for all the possible
factors influencing the labour market
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Source: Commission Services calculation on OECD Social
Expenditure database and Employment Outlook.
Notes: Points below the solid lines represent a reduction
in the share with respect to the 1985-1989 period; Points
above the solid lines represent an increase in the share
with respect to the 1985-1989 period.
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Employment rate and ALMPs' expenditures
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Chart 48 - Correlation between employment rate and some categories of ALMPs expenditures
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Unemployment rate and ALMPs' expenditures
(pairwise correlation coefficient)
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Chart 49 - Correlation between unemployment rate and some categories of ALMPs expenditures
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Chart 50 - Share of fixed term and part-time in total employment
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performance. Before doing so, this
section ends with a description of
potential factors, other than taxes
and ALMPs, which are likely to
influence the evolution of the
employment rate. 
2.3 Other factors influencing
labour market performance 
ALMPs and labour taxes are only
some of the factors influencing
employment performance. It is
important to control for other fac-
tors, otherwise their effects on
employment would be wrongly
attributed to taxes or ALMPs. The
following section gives a brief
review of the role of other vari-
ables, and their effect on employ-
ment.
2.3.1. Unemployment benefits
system
In theory the level of unemploy-
ment benefits affects negatively
employment performance when
they reduce the cost of non-
employment and induce unem-
ployed people to wait for a job
which suits them. However, unem-
ployment benefits act also as search
subsidies, which may improve pro-
ductivity by improving the match
between jobs and vacancies.  The
recent evidence has also pointed
toward the importance of the
design of the unemployment bene-
fits regime. The duration of the
entitlements, the strictness with
which the benefit system is operat-
ed and the coverage of the system
can be even more important than
the level of wages replaced by the
unemployment benefits. Also the
funding of the regime matters.
There is substantial theoretical and
empirical literature showing that
unemployment benefits are not
necessarily detrimental for employ-
ment. This occurs when workers’
recognise the link between contri-
butions paid and the benefits
received. In this case, unemploy-
ment benefits allow workers to
“buy” insurance against employ-
ment risks which takes the form of
lower wage claims. Hence, unem-
ployment benefits, as part of work-
ers’ expected income, helps to
smooth out income fluctuations
and to stabilise consumption. At
the same time unemployment ben-
efits reduce the risks of non-
employment, raise workers bar-
gaining power and reduce employ-
ment when wages negotiated are
above productivity. 
2.3.2. Temporary and part-time
jobs
As a response to the high level of
unemployment and in order to
increase the flexibility of the labour
market, the conditions for the 
use of new forms of contractual
arrangements have been eased
everywhere in Europe. Temporary
and part-time contracts represent
two forms of more flexible of work-
ing arrangements. During the
1990s, the share of employed 
people with contracts of limited
duration rose in almost all Member
States, while more employed, espe-
cially women, made use of part-
time (Chart 50). Since allowing for
more temporary jobs to be created
entails an increase in both job cre-
ation and job destruction, the
effects on employment are uncer-
tain (Blanchard Landier (2000),
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2001)).
Furthermore, the more frequent
use of temporary contracts, with
unchanged firing costs, may induce
firms to substitute permanent with
temporary employment (Nunziata
and Staffolani (2001)). Because of
these ambiguous effects, empirical
analysis is needed to understand
the quantitative impact on aggre-
gate employment. Part-time and
more flexible working hour
arrangements reduce the cost of
raising a child and allow a better
reconciliation of private life with
working life. Consequently, labour
market participation rises, easing
the constraints from the labour sup-
ply side to expand labour demand. 
2.3.3. TFP and skills 
Technological progress or improve-
ments in production efficiency
(total factor productivity or TFP)
increases labour productivity and
shifts upward the demand for
labour. However, if wages grow as
much as productivity and the reser-
vation wage grows with the real
wages deflated by the consumption
price index (so-called consumption
wages), the initial effect on employ-
ment is transitory. Furthermore, the
nature of technological progress
also matters for employment. With
process innovation, the effect on
employment is likely to be negative
if jobs destroyed by the introduc-
tion of labour-saving technologies
are not substituted with jobs created
by the production of new goods
and services, made possible by new
technologies. New goods and serv-
ices are likely to be easily intro-
duced when there is a demand for
them, which occurs when the con-
sumers’ preferences change. The
presence of a skilled labour force
enables such a demand change to
be effective. Hence, even when
technological progress tends to
save labour, the interaction of these
innovations and a skilled labour
force allows new markets to be cre-
ated33. Moreover, a change in the
skill composition of the labour
force towards higher levels of edu-
cation tends to increase the weight
given to groups with high employ-
ment rates (e.g. the highly skilled),
pushing up the overall employment
rate34.
2.3.4. Openness
International competition in prod-
uct markets affects the wage and
price formation mechanism, limit-
ing inflationary pressures in the
economy. Indeed, the increase in
the degree of openness imposes a
constraint on price and wage
dynamics through the effects on
non-tradable producing sectors
exerted by the competition within
the tradable producing sectors.
When this occurs, the wage elasticity
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33 Pascal Petit and Luc Soete (2001) Technology and the future of European Employment, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
34 For a quantification of this effect see Employment in Europe 2002.
 
of the labour demand rises and the
labour demand shifts outwards (i.e.
there is more demand of labour at
a given wage rate). As a conse-
quence, employment and wages go
up and, if the labour force rises by
less than the increase in employ-
ment, unemployment declines.
Increased internal competition and
the removal of barriers to external
competition reduce the opportuni-
ties of rents seeking behaviour by
firms and workers, lower the bar-
gained wage and increases employ-
ment (Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2001)). Moreover, the increased
competition may change endoge-
nously the aptitude of unions
towards wage moderation leading
to more employment friendly bar-
gaining systems35. However, more
open economies and more glob-
alised markets tend to increase the
exposure to external shocks and
increase the demand of insurance
against employment and income
risks (e.g. Agell (2000) and Rodrick
(1998)). Hence, growing openness
to international competition can
have ambiguous effects on employ-
ment. These effects tend to be pos-
itive when they reduce the mark-up
of price on labour cost (i.e. the rents
in the product market) and, conse-
quently, the rent seeking behaviour
of unions that try to appropriate of
monopolistic rents in the product
market36.  The extent of openness
has negative effects when it raises
the demand for protection of
income and employment risks in a
way that enhance the bargaining
power of the “insiders” at detri-
ment of the “outsiders”. 
3. Econometric
estimates of the
determinants of the
employment rate 
The evolution of the employment
rate over time may be explained in
terms of the variables just men-
tioned. Of course, these variables
do not exhaust the entire set of all
possible determinants in the evolu-
tion of the employment rate. Nor is
it possible to exclude that some
labour market institutions absorb
some types of shocks better than
others. In this case, part of the cross-
country differences in the employ-
ment rates would be related to the
heterogeneity of institutions and to
the interactions between institu-
tions and policy variables. Moreover,
the fact that not only the “level” of
institutions, but also the changes in
the institutional set-up, may affect
the medium- to long-term labour
market performance makes the
analysis more complex. In particu-
lar, the response of the employ-
ment rate to a change in its deter-
minants may take some time to
work out. This implies that static
methods are not very informative
concerning the dynamic adjustment
processes, which characterise the
long-term component of the unem-
ployment rate. 
The empirical analysis will explore
the effects of several variables on
the employment rate, estimating a
reduced-form model of employ-
ment37 . We use econometric tech-
niques (dynamic panel) which allow
for the integration of the time
series and the cross-section dimen-
sion over the period 1980-2000 into
the analysis. Dynamic panel model-
ling takes account of the variability
over time of all those factors which
may affect the evolution of the
employment rate, and which are
not captured explicitly by the set of
explanatory variables already con-
sidered38. 
The employment rate is expressed
as a function of the output-gap
(included to capture the business
cycle); the tax burden on labour; its
components (i.e. employers’ and
employees’ social security contribu-
tions, income tax rate); technologi-
cal growth; the extent of openness
of the economy39; the intensity and
the composition of ALMP expendi-
tures40; the share of temporary or
part-time contracts. The lagged
employment rate is included as an
explanatory variable to account for
missing variables and for the
employment dynamics.
Table 31 shows the results of the
employment rate equation with
explanatory variables: the output-
gap; the rate of growth of total
factor productivity; the degree of
openness of the economy; the tax
wedge, and the gross replacement
rate (columns 1-2). There is no rea-
son to assume, as in columns 1 and
2, that labour market perform-
ance is invariant with respect to a
shift in the composition of the tax
wedge from one component to
the other. Column 3 verifies the
hypothesis of neutrality of the
composition of labour taxation.
Column 4 introduces the expendi-
ture on active labour market poli-
cies. The role of different cate-
gories of ALMPs and their interac-
tion with the generosity of the
unemployment benefits system
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35 It is not by chance that wage agreements that take account of international competitiveness are typical of small and very open
economies such as Belgium and the Netherlands.
36 In this case an increase in the degree of openness raises competition and put a limit to the price mark-up. With a more competitive
product market there is also a more competitive labour market. This implies that wages reflect more productivity developments than
the employers’ or employees’ bargaining power.  
37 In other words, we do not recover from the estimated coefficients the parameters that identify the labour demand and labour sup-
ply. This approach has been used by other studies (e.g.) Elmeskov et al. (1998), Layard et al. (2000), IMF (2003), Estevao (2003).
38 See annex to chapter 2  Estimation of employment rate equations.
39 The extent of openness is measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP.
40 The intensity of ALMPs is calculated as active labour market spending as a percentage of GDP divided by the unemployment rate. It
is a measure of the spending effort per person unemployed relative to the output per member of the labour force (Martin 1998).
 
Key Determinants of Labour Market Performance Chapter 2
79
Notes: The Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions with a c2 asymptotic distribution; degrees of freedom and p-values in
parentheses. The tests for first and second-order serial correlation are distributed asymptotically as a standard normal, p-values in
parentheses. Equations 1-3 balanced; equation 4 unbalanced. Instruments set in equations 1-3 Emprate(-3) and earlier values; in equa-
tion 4 Emprate(-3) ALMPU(-1) and GRR(-1) and earlier values. 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level (i.e. there is a 1 per cent probability that the estimated coefficient is not different from zero);  
** Statistically significant at 5% level * Statistically significant at 10% level; To get rid of the common component, all variables but the
output- gap have been expressed as deviations from country means.
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Table 31 - Short-run employment rate equations
(PANEL GMM)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Time Period 1983-2000 1983-1999 1983-1999 1986-1999 1989-2000 1989-2000
Employment rate (-1) 1.32  *** 1.35  *** 1.34 *** 1.22 *** 1.14 *** 1.08 ***
(19.2) (16.6) (17.4) (15) (12.3) (12.2)
Employment rate lagged (-2) -0.45 *** -0.48 *** -0.48*** -0.42 *** -0.37 *** -0.35***
(-8.2) (-6.76) (-6.94) (-7.84) (-5.61) (-5.01)
Macroeconomic Variables
Output gap 0.07 *** 0.05 * 0.06 * 0.08 *** 0.06 *** 0.08 ***
(3.5) (1.7) (1.9) (4.71) (2.68) (3.03)
TFP growth (-1) 0.08* 0.12 ** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.09 ** 0.12***
-1.71 -2.7 -2.83 -2.53 -1.8 -3.03
Openness -0.05** -0.04 ** -0.04 * 0.04 ** 0.015 *** 0.04***
(-2.03) (-2.07) (-1.68) (7.66) (2.55) (7.53)
Openness (-1) 0.08 *** 0.08 ** 0.08 **
(2.66) (2.53) (2.38)
Taxes, social security contributions, and Labour market policies
Tax wedge (-1) -0.031 -0.019 : -0.024 -0.06
(-1.15) (-0.64) (-1.19) (-1.60)
Gross replacement rate(-3) -0.02** -0.02 *
(-2.2) (-2.10)
Gross replacement rate -0.04 ** 
(-2.36)
Employers’ social security 
contributions(-1)
-0.05 ***
(-4.41)
Employees’ social security 
contributions
-0.013
(-0.48)
Income tax rate (-1) 0.009
(0.25)
Intensity of spending on active 0.04  ***
labour market policies1 (5.1)
Expenditure on ALMPs as % of
GDP1
Intensity of spending on direct
job creation
0.02 0.05 ** 
(0.68) (1.90)
Intensity of spending on Youth
Measures 
0.11*** 0.17 ***
(3.34) (4.38)
Intensity of spending on Public
Employment Services
0.29*** 0.30 ***
(4.86) (5.83)
Intensity of spending on Training
(-3)
-0.001 0.02 ***
(0.483) (2.00)
Intensity of spending on Youth
Measures * Replacement rate
0.005***
(2.76)
Intensity of spending on Training
measures * Replacement rate (-3)
-0.001 ***
(-1.77)
Number of observations 270 252 252 194 165 193
Test for  first-order serial 
correlation 
-2.87 -2.7 -2.73 -2.36 -2.76 -2.75
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.06)
Test for second-order serial 
correlation
0.59 0.28 0.32 -0.63 -0.56 -1.099
(0.56) (0.78) (0.75) (0.53) (0.58) (0.272)
Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions
160.6 146.8 139.8 217.7 184 206.6
(182, 0.87) (181, 0.97) (179, 0.99) (531, 1.00) (872, 1.00) (934, 1.00)
are explored respectively in col-
umns 5 and 6. Wages do not
appear in the table because the
above variables also influence
wages and employment. To verify
the consistency of the findings of
the employment and the wage
equations, it is necessary to study
separately the wage formation
mechanism. This is done in section
4 following the analysis below of
the factors influencing the em-
ployment rate.
3.1 The role of the macroeconomic
variables 
The employment rate is charac-
terised by a high degree of persis-
tency, implying that, following a
temporary shock, it takes about
two years for the employment rate
to start to revert towards the pre-
shock level. Cyclical recoveries and
downturns are respectively accom-
panied by increases and decreases
in the employment rate. Over a
long-time span the deviation of cur-
rent GDP from its potential is on
average zero, implying that the
output-gap is zero, and thus it does
not appear among the long-term
determinants of the employment
rate (table 32). 
The rate of growth of total factor
productivity (due to improvements
in the efficiency of production or to
pure technological progress) has a
positive impact on the employment
rate with a one-year lag. Both in the
short- and long-term, countries with
an increase in the TFP growth high-
er than average TFP growth tend
also to have an increase in the
employment rate higher than the
average employment rate41. Taking
all countries as a whole, the decline
by 0.6 percentage points observed
between the 1980s and the first
half of the 1990s in the average TFP
growth corresponds to a decline in
the employment rate of about 0.5
percentage points. In the second
half of the 1990s, the increase by
0.5 percentage points in TFP
growth is associated with an aver-
age increase in the employment
rate of about 0.4 percentage points. 
The extent of economic openness is
another factor influencing labour
market performance. Although an
increase in the degree of openness
has, in the same year, a negative
impact on the employment rate in
three out of six specifications (table
31), in the long-term it always has a
significant positive impact. An
increase in the degree of openness
by 10 percentage points is associated
with a rise in the employment rate,
according to the specifications,
between 1 and 3 percentage
points. The temporary negative
response is consistent with the pres-
ence of nominal rigidities42. As the
extent of openness of an economy
rises, the competitive pressure from
abroad rises as well. With sticky
prices and wages, a temporary fall
in competitiveness would depress
labour demand and reduce employ-
ment. This decline is only temporary
as the economy tends to adapt to
the new environment either
through changes in prices and
wages or through policies stimulat-
ing investment and innovation
aimed at reaping the benefits of a
more competitive macroeconomic
context.
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41 This is because all variables have been expressed as deviation from period means. In Estevao (2003) the overall impact of technologi-
cal growth on the employment rate is negative and it is interpreted as the effects of the introduction of labour-saving technologies
in the production process. This different finding may be explained by the different specifications used for the employment rate equa-
tions. Firstly, his study analyses a panel of 15 OECD countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and the United States,
while Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Ireland are excluded.  Secondly, Estevao focuses on the determinants of the business
sector employment rate while this chapter looks at factors influencing the total employment rate, i.e. including employment in the
public sector. Our findings might be biased by countercyclical changes of employment in the public sector that are not taken into
account in his analysis. In other words, public employment should have been managed over time to minimise the effect of technolog-
ical shocks on the volatility of the total employment rate. However, in this case the TFP growth should not have any long-term impact
on employment, which is in contrast with the evidence of table 6. It would also imply that public employment should have been more
volatile than private employment, as it would have more than compensated the reduction of business employment caused by the
introduction of labour saving technologies. The second argument is more technical as it concerns the specification of the employment
rate equations. The dynamic nature of the labour market performance requires dynamic expressions as those in table 6 to evaluate
the factors affecting such performance. On the basis of standard diagnostic tests, the equations in table 6 are well specified, while a
static estimate of the effect of TFP growth on the employment rate as those of Estevao is badly specified as it is affected by auto-cor-
related errors. Moreover, ignoring dynamics will strongly underestimate the effects on employment of explanatory variables. Marcello
Estevao (2003) Do Active labour Market Policies Increase Employment? IMF Working Paper/03/234
42 Nominal rigidities are widely documented in the case of both the EU and the US. See for example Galì and Gertler (1999) which shows
that the sticky price model fits US data well. In the European Commission Annual Economic Review (2003), it is shown that the
European degree of price stickiness is in he same ballpark as that of the US.
3.2 The role of labour taxes, social
security contributions and active
labour market policies 
The effect of the tax wedge on the
employment rate is negative but
very weak. By contrast, the gross
replacement rate (a measure of
unemployment and welfare-relat-
ed benefits as a proportion of  work
income) contributes to determine
the evolution over time of the
employment rate. However, the
response of employment to an
increase in the replacement rate
(i.e. a more generous unemploy-
ment benefit regime) is not imme-
diate. The replacement rate enters
with a coefficient different from
zero at lag 3 in the employment
rate equation. This implies that it
takes about three years for the
employment rate to react to a
change in the gross replacement
rate, but its effect does not disap-
pear in the long-term. Finally, there
is evidence that the composition of
the tax wedge matters. Employers’
social security contributions are the
only component with a statistically
significant effect on the employ-
ment rate. One percentage point of
decline in employers’ social security
contributions raises the employ-
ment rate by 0.05 percentage
points after one year and by 0.4
percentage points in the long-term. 
The above results change only
slightly when the intensity of spend-
ing on active labour market policies
(the expenditure on ALMPs as per-
centage of GDP normalised with the
unemployment rate and equal to
the expenditures per unemployed
as a percentage of GDP per member
of the labour force) is introduced
among the factors influencing the
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Table 32 - Long-term effects on the employment rate
1 2 3 4 5 6
1983-2000 1983-1999 1983-1999 1986-1999 1989-2000 1989-2000
Macroeconomic Variables
Openness 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.07 0.13
(0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.04) (0.027) (0.02)
TFP growth 0.60 0.93 0.87 0.69 0.39 0.44
(0.39) (0.47) (0.4) (0.4) (0.26) (0.08)
Taxes, social security contributions and Labour market policies
Tax wedge -0.25 -0.15 -0.11 -0.25
(0.21) (0.21) (0.08) (0.14)
Gross replacement rate -0.17 -0.15 -0.18
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Employers’ social security contr.
-0.38
(0.13)
Employees’ social security contr.
-0.09
(0.19)
Income tax rate 0.069
(0.28)
Intensity of spending on active 0.18
labour market policies (0.011)
Intensity of spending on Direct
job creation
0.08 0.2
(0.11) (0.099)
Intensity of spending on Youth
Measures 
0.45 0.62
(0.16) (0.18)
Intensity of spending on Public
Employment Services
1.25 1.11
(0.14) (0.12)
Intensity of spending on Training
-0.04 0.08
(0.08) (0.04)
Intensity of spending on Youth
Measures * Replacement rate
0.018
(0.008)
Intensity of spending on Training
measures* Replacement rate
-0.004
(0.002)
Standard errors in parentheses; In bold coefficient significant at least at the 5% level
employment rate (column 4, table
31)43. The estimated impact on the
employment rate of an increase in
the financial effort of ALMPs is rel-
atively small in the short-term (by
0.04 percentage points for an
ALMPs rise by 1 percentage point in
the same year) and relatively larger
in the long-run. An increase by 1
percentage point in the intensity of
spending on ALMPs is associated
with an increase of the employ-
ment rate by 0.2 percentage points.
Furthermore, contrary to the find-
ings of other studies (i.e. Scarpetta
(1996), Elmsekov et al. (1998) and
Estevao (2003)), the exclusion of
Sweden and Denmark does not
augment the impact of ALMPs on
the employment rate44. Finally, the
impact of the replacement rate (a
measure of generosity of unem-
ployment and welfare-related ben-
efits) is exactly counterbalanced by
that of the intensity of spending on
ALMPs. Hence, the employment
rate falls when the replacement
rate rises, but this decline is coun-
terbalanced by increases in the
intensity of spending on ALMPs.
Similarly, the employment rate is
likely to rise in response to a reduc-
tion of the generosity of benefits
and increases in the intensity of
spending on ALMPs. 
Columns 5-6 introduce the cate-
gories of ALMPs among the deter-
minant of the employment rate.
The econometric evidence on these
categories is mixed. “Public employ-
ment services and administration”
and “Youth measures” have a
direct impact on the employment
rate while “Training” and
“Subsidised Employment” do not
(column 5). These findings change
when we control for the interaction
between the replacement rate and
the expenditures on “Youth” and
“Training measures” respectively.
Accounting for such interaction
makes the impact of “Training” and
“Direct Job Creation” on the
employment rate significant and
positive. It is worth noting that it
takes about three years for an
increase in the intensity of spend-
ing on training per unemployed (as
a percentage of the workforce) to
raise the employment rate.
However, the effect of such an
increase is reduced when benefits
are generous. By contrast, “Youth
measures” seem to be more effec-
tive when associated with generous
unemployment and welfare-related
benefits. 
3.3 The role of centralisation and
co-ordination of wage bargaining
What is the role of labour market
institutions? Their importance in
influencing labour market perform-
ance has been widely recognised. In
particular, the relation between
wages and employment may
depend on the extent of centralisa-
tion and co-ordination of wage bar-
gaining. The main argument is that
both highly centralised and decen-
tralised systems perform better
than intermediate ones, as the co-
operative behaviour of the former
create incentives to moderate wage
claims, while market forces restrain
wages when bargaining occurs at
company level. By contrast, when
bargaining is at industry level,
wage increases for all firms in the
same industry can be transferred
onto consumer prices compensat-
ing the effect of higher product
prices on profits and holding back
the rise of the industry’s real pro-
duct wage (the wage deflated by
the output price). This will reduce
the employment loss derived from
a wage increase and the incentives
from wage restraint, implying less
wage moderation. Hence, the
theoretical relationship between
wage levels and centralisation is
hump-shaped – wages are relative-
ly low in low- and high- coordinat-
ed/centralised systems and high in
intermediate ones45. 
The role of centralisation and co-
ordination of bargaining is
analysed in table 33 which repro-
duces the estimates in table 32 but
with the effects of taxes, benefits
and social security contributions
conditional to the specificities of
the wage setting bargaining levels.
Before presenting the results, it
should be said that the level of cen-
tralisation refers only to the level at
which bargaining takes place (firm,
industry or economy-wide), while
co-ordination occurs when the
effects of wage setting on employ-
ment are taken into account.
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43 This time the coefficient of openness, lagged by one year, is not significant but that of the current year is. This different dynamic spec-
ification does not change the long-term impact on employment of the extent of openness. The precision of the estimate of the tax
wedge coefficient rises with respect to that in columns 1-3, although it continues to be far from the standard values for acceptance.
In other words, if someone is ready to accept a not very precise estimate, then it cannot be excluded that increases in the tax wedge
are associated with employment rate reductions. Note that in this case the panel is unbalanced. A panel is said to be unbalanced when
for the same variable(s) the period covered differs across units (in our case the Member States). Balanced ALMPs data for all Member
States is available only for the period 1986-1998. Data for Luxembourg and Greece is available only until 1997 and 1998. Data are
available for all Member States only since 1986. Rather than analyse a balanced panel for a shorter period of time, we opted for esti-
mating the unbalanced panel on a longer time span. To account for the endogeneity of the expenditures on ALMPs (which are high
when unemployment is high and employment is low), equation 4 has been estimated with GMM-dif panel data techniques treating
as endogenous the ALMPs expenditure as a percentage of GDP relative to the number of unemployed in the workforce. In addition,
the replacement rate has been estimated as endogenous although there is no difference in the estimation when it is assumed to be
determined independently of shocks to the employment rate.
44 Indeed, the differences are small. Moreover, when Sweden and Denmark are excluded from the panel the coefficient of ALMPs’
expenditures rises slightly in the long-run specification to 0.21 but is still at 0.4 in the short-run specification. This suggests that the
exclusion of these countries leads to the observed higher impact because they have a lower degree of persistency of employment or,
which is the same, because that of the countries remaining in the panel is higher. 
45 The hump-shape curve becomes flatter the more open the economy and/or the more competitive the product market. When there
are strong externalities across industries, the relationship between wages and the extent of centralisation becomes downward sloped
(i.e. the level of wages decline with the level of centralisation of bargaining. Given the negative relationship between employment
and wages, the level of employment grows with the level of centralisation/co-ordination). See Calfors (1993).
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Hence, co-ordination may be also
possible with intermediate levels of
centralisation in the presence 
of inter-industry co-ordination
between employers and employ-
ees. To capture both aspects we
used a summary measure of cen-
tralisation/co-ordination reported
in table 3346. 
The degree of employment persis-
tency and the effect of the macro-
economic variables is robust over
different specifications and coin-
cides with those effects already
described47. The short-term effects
of the tax wedge depend on the
nature of wage bargaining (tables
34-35). In systems with a high level
of centralisation/co-ordination,
changes in the tax wedge do not
significantly affect the employment
rate, confirming the hypothesis
that highly centralised and/or co-
ordinated systems enhance social
partners’ attitude of “looking
through the budget” - i.e. internal-
ising the effects of wage increases
on the tax base. 
However, when centralisation and
co-operation among employers on
the one hand and employees on
the other is low or intermediate,
the tax wedge has a negative and
significant impact on labour market
performance. Moreover, in coun-
tries with intermediate systems the
long-term negative response on
employment is twice as large as in
countries where the level of cen-
tralisation and/or co-ordination is
low. These findings are mildly sup-
portive of the hump-shaped
hypothesis (Chart 51)48, so that in
both centralised and decentralised
systems unions internalise the
impact of wage claims on the indi-
vidual and the aggregate labour
demand respectively.
These results are robust when we
control for the effect of the gen-
erosity of unemployment and wel-
fare-related benefits (tables 34-35
column 2). The impact of the
replacement rate is negative and,
more interestingly, depends, in a
way consistent with the hump-
shaped hypothesis, on the nature of
the bargaining system. An increase
in the gross replacement rate
reduces the employment rate, but it
does so more in intermediate than
in low- or high- centralised systems,
with the replacement rate having
similar negative effects in the last
two types of wage-setting (Chart
51). Finally, the composition of the
tax wedge does matter. Increases in
the income tax rate have the high-
est negative impact on employ-
ment, but only for intermediate
bargaining. Both centralisation and
decentralisation of wage bargain-
ing reduce the direct impact of
increases in employers’ and employ-
ees’ social security contributions. 
Column 4 of table 34 extends the
set of determinants of employment
performance to the intensity of
spending on ALMPs normalised
with the unemployment rate.  An
increase in the percentage of GDP
allocated to ALMPs per individual
unemployed (relative to the work-
force), is associated with an
employment rate increase only in
intermediate and centralised sys-
tems, with an impact in both cases
slightly below 0.2 percentage
points for a 1 percentage point rise.
Finally, the impact of the remaining
variables is qualitatively as expected
and as in the columns 1-2, although
the effect of the tax wedge is lin-
early related to the summary meas-
ure of centralisation/coordination.
The higher the centralisation and or
co-ordination of bargaining is, the
lower the decline in the employ-
ment rate due to an increase in the
tax wedge. This finding provides
some support to the idea that cen-
tralisation/co-ordination, by enhan-
cing the externalities across differ-
ent bargaining levels, contributes
to internalise the effect of the
Source: Elmeskov et al. (1998) 
Table 33 Summary Measure of centralisation/co-ordination: 1979-2000
Low Italy until 1991, UK from 1987.
Intermediate
Belgium; France; Portugal;
Finland since 1985; Sweden since 1991; Spain since 1996; 
Netherlands until 1981; Ireland until 1987; UK until 1986.
High
Denmark, Germany; Austria; 
Netherlands since 1982; Ireland since 1988; Italy since 1992;
Finland until 1984; Spain until 1985; Sweden until 1990.
46 The index is taken from Elmeskov J., Scarpetta S. and Martin J. (1998), Key lessons for labour market reforms: Evidence from OECD
countries experience, Swedish Economic Policy Review vol. 5 pp. 205-252. The data refer to the period 1983-1995. From 1995 on the
index takes the values of 1995.
47 The main difference is that in table 34 the openness variable, lagged by one year, has no significant impact on employment and that
the long-run effect of TFP growth is higher while that of openness lower than that implied by table 31. 
48 Mildly supportive because the coefficient of the tax wedge in the low bargaining systems is not as precisely estimated as in interme-
diate systems.
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Table 34 - Estimates for the employment rate, controlling for different levels of bargaining centralisation/co-ordination
1 2 3 4
Time Period 1983-2000 1983-1999 1983-1999 1986-1999
Employment rate (-1) 1.33  *** 1.33 *** 1.21 *** 1.13 ***
(20.0) (22.1) (13.6) (16.4)
Employment rate lagged (-2) -0.48 *** -0.50 *** -0.37 *** -0.39 ***
(-8.9) (-9.41) (-4.29) (-8.27)
Output gap 0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 *** 0.10 ***
(2.2) (2.21) (2.59) (9.41)
TFP growth (-1) 0.16  ** 0.16 ** 0.15 ** 0.13 ***
(2.32) (2.28) (2.33) (1.91)
Openness 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.046 ***
(2.7) (2.74) (3.42) (9.08)
Tax wedge (-1)  LOW co-ordination -0.18* -0.24*** -0.14 ***
(-1.88) (-2.87) (-3.55)
Tax wedge (-2)  LOW co-ordination 0.11** 0.15***
(2.08) (3.66)
Tax wedge (-1)  
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.16*** -0.20*** -0.10 **
(-3.09) (-3.19) (-1.93)
Tax wedge (-1)  
HIGH co-ordination
0.00296 0.004 -0.009
(0.063) (0.08) (-0.415)
Gross replacement rate  LOW co-ordination
-0.07 ***
(-7.51)
Gross replacement rate(-1)  
LOW co-ordination
-0.035  * 
(-1.63)
Gross replacement rate (-1) 
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.065 * -0.10 ***
(-1.71) (-3.14)
Gross replacement rate HIGH 
co-ordination
-0.07 ***
(-7.51)
Gross replacement rate (-3) 
HIGH co-ordination
-0.033
(-1.99)
Income tax rate (-1) 
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.14
(-3.88)
Employers’ social security contributions 
LOW co-ordination
-0.011
(-0.24)
Employers’ social security contributions 
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.11 ***
(-3.72)
Employers’ social security contributions 
HIGH co-ordination
-0.05 *
(-2.81)
Employees’ social security contributions 
LOW co-ordination
-0.041
(-0.23)
Employees’ social security contributions 
(-3) INTERMEDIATE co-ordinat. 
-0.08 ***
(-2.41)
Employees’ social security contributions 
HIGH co-ordination
-0.042
(-0.99)
ALMPs LOW co-ordination 0.03 ***
(1.23)
ALMPs INTERMEDIATE co-ordination 0.05 ***
(4.14)
ALMPs HIGH co-ordination 0.04 ***
(6.57)
Number of observations 234 234 234 181
Test for  first-order serial correlation -2.53 -2.54 -2.62 -2.18
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.029)
Test for second-order serial correlation 0.29 -0.2759 0.19 -1.092
(0.77) (0.78) (0.85) (0.275)
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 141.4 127 154 511
(180, 0.98) (177, 0.99) (195, 0.99) (196.7, 1.00)
Notes: The Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions with a c2 asymptotic distribution; degrees of freedom and p-val-
ues in parentheses. The tests for first and second-order serial correlation are distributed asymptotically as a standard normal, p-
values in parentheses. Instruments set in equations 1-3 Emprate(-3) and earlier values. In eq. 4 instruments Emprate(-3); Grr(-2);
ALMPU(-1) and earlier values. To get rid of the common component, all variables but the output- gap have been expressed as
deviation from country means. * * * Statistically significant at 1% level (i.e. there is a 1 per cent probability that the estimated
coefficient is not different from zero);  * * Statistically significant at 5% level; * Statistically significant at 10% level
 
wage claims on the tax base (and
on the budget), making labour tax-
ation less distorting.
3.4 The role of part-time and fixed
term contract
When fixed-term and part-time
contracts are included among the
determinants of the labour market
performance, the panel becomes
highly unbalanced49. Rather than
working with a balanced panel we
prefer to focus this section on a
panel of 11 EU countries with full
coverage in terms of fixed-term and
part-time contracts, implying that
the findings of this sub-section are
not necessary comparable with
those of the previous ones. With
this caveat in mind, the short- and
long-run impact on the employ-
ment rate of part-time and fixed-
term contracts has been estimated
after controlling for macro-eco-
nomic factors, the tax wedge and
the intensity of spending on ALMPs
(table 36 and table 37). In order to
check the robustness of the results
to the higher than average share of
fixed-term employment in Spain,
the same estimate has been done
on both a panel composed by all
the 12 Member States (columns 1-2)
and one that excludes Spain
(columns 3-4). 
As far as the macro-economic vari-
ables are concerned, the findings
are consistent with those found in
tables 31 and 32. The extent of the
openness of the economy and the
TFP growth (i.e. the efficiency of
the production process boosted by
technological and organisational
innovations) have a positive influ-
ence on the employment rate. The
results for the tax wedge are some-
what more uncertain – its effect is
negative as expected but only in
two cases statistically different from
zero – while increases in the gross
replacement rate do not seem to
lead to any substantial decline in
the employment rate. Finally, inde-
pendently of the presence of Spain
in the panel, an increase in the
financial effort on ALMPs per indi-
vidual unemployed (relative to the
workforce) helps to push up the
employment rate.
Turning to the role of fixed-term
employment, the evidence suggests
that an increase in its share is asso-
ciated with a small negative effect
on the employment rate in the
short-term which turns out surpris-
ingly high in the long-term. There-
fore, it cannot be excluded that an
increase in the temporary nature of
employment has led to a reduction
of total employment. However, this
is not the entire story. Employment
in Europe 2002 showed that the
increasing trend in the share of
temporary contracts accounted for
the increasing reactivity of employ-
ment to the evolution of the busi-
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Table 35 - Long-run effects on the employment rate 
for different levels of bargaining centralisation/co-ordination
1 2 3 4
Openness 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.035)
TFP growth 1.12 0.96 0.99 0.48
(0.59) (0.48) (0.49) -0.3
Tax wedge LOW co-ordination -0.49 -0.55 -0.53
(0.39) (0.33) (0.14)
Tax wedge INTERMEDIATE 
co-ordination
-1.14 -1.2 -0.37
(0.23) (0.29) (0.17)
Tax wedge HIGH co-ordination 0.02 0.026 -0.035
(0.32) (0.31) (0.08)
Gross replacement rate LOW 
co-ordination
-0.21 -0.27
-0.13 -0.04
Gross replacement rate 
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.39 -0.37
(0.24) (0.12)
Gross replacement rate HIGH 
co-ordination
-0.20 -0.25
(0.11) (0.06)
Income tax rate  INTERMEDIATE co-
ordination
-0.88
(0.27)
Employers’ social security 
contributions LOW co-ordination
-0.07
(0.30)
Employers’ social security contributions
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.71
(0.17)
Employers’ social security 
contributions HIGH co-ordination
-0.32
(0.14)
Employees’ social security 
contributions LOW co-ordination
-0.27
(1.19)
Employees’ social security contributions
INTERMEDIATE co-ordination
-0.55
(0.24)
Employees’ social security 
contributions HIGH co-ordination
-0.27
(-1.19)
Intensity of spending on ALMPs LOW
co-ordination
0.11
(0.096)
Intensity of spending on ALMPs INTER-
MEDIATE co-ordination
0.18
(0.042)
Intensity of spending on ALMPs HIGH
co-ordination
0.16
(0.012)
Standard errors in parentheses In bold coefficient significant at least at the 5% level
49 This is also the reason why their impact has been left at the end of this section. For the Netherlands 1984 and 1986 and Luxembourg
1995 data is not available. Finally, fixed-term contracts for Denmark and Germany are available only from 1984. For Austria, Finland
and Sweden data on fixed-term employment are available only since 1995, and for Spain and Portugal since 1987 and 1986 respec-
tively. After excluding Austria, Finland, Sweden and reducing the sample to the period 1987-2000 to get a balanced panel we are left
with 12 countries for 13 years (reduced to 10 when we consider lags in the employment equation) for a total of 109 observations.
Because of the small sample size, the findings of this sub-section may be subject to certain margins of statistical error.
 
ness cycle50. Employment is more
flexible in terms of quantity in
countries with a high and rising
share of temporary contracts.
However, the report also warned
against the risk of some substitu-
tion of temporary with permanent
jobs over the business cycle,  as an
increase in the actual share of tem-
porary contracts above its trend
was associated with a decline of
employment below its trend.  These
findings were limited to the effects
of temporary contracts on the cycli-
cal component of employment only
(i.e. on the employment gap) with
no direct implication for the overall
employment or employment rate.
This aspect has been further
explored in column 5 of table 36.
Following the analysis of EIE 2002,
column 5 distinguishes the effects
on the employment rate of the
cyclical and trend component of the
share of temporary contracts, con-
trolling for variables used already in
columns 1 and 3. This time the
effects of temporary contracts are
consistent with what was found in
the 2002 report, while the impact
of the remaining variables is as pre-
viously found. In the short-term,
the employment rate responds pos-
itively to a rising share of tempo-
rary contracts when this occurs for
the trend component of this share.
However, when the actual share of
temporary contracts rises more
than its trend, the employment
rate, ceteris paribus, tends to
decline. In addition, both in the
short- and in the long-term, the
positive effect tends to prevail over
the negative, which confirms the
overall role of temporary contracts
as one of the drivers of employ-
ment creation51.
Finally, both in the short- and the
long-term, an increase in the share
of part-time employment leads to
an increase in the employment rate,
which is even stronger when Spain
is excluded from the sample. This
positive impact may reflect the
response of the participation rate
to greater flexibility in work sched-
ules (part-time employment). The
greater flexibility in work sched-
ules, relaxing the labour demand
constrain on job creation, has stim-
ulated participation, in particular of
the female component.
3.5 What explains the
improvements in the employment
rates of the second half of the
1990s?
Table 38 shows the contribution of
each factor considered so far to the
change in the employment rate in
the sub-periods 1990-1995 and
1995-199952. The component of the
employment rate change not
accounted by any of these factors –
i.e. the gap between the effective
and the estimated change in 
the employment rate – appears in
the last column. This component 
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50 Note that in Employment in Europe 2002 the focus was on employment and not on the employment rate. However, given the strong
time correlation between the two measures the results concerning the former can be qualitatively extended to the latter. 
51 A formal test of hypothesis that the negative effect of the cyclical component of temporary contracts is in absolute value equal to the
positive effect of its trend is rejected at a high level of confidence. The statistics for this test distributed as a c2 with 1 degree of free-
dom gives a value of 12.26 and a p-value of 0.0005. 
52 The contributions of the explanatory variables are calculated taking into accounts the coefficients of lagged employment rates and
are equal to the coefficients of the long-run equation multiplied by the change of the explanatory factors over the relevant period.he
decomposition is based on the equation in column 2 of tables 11 and 12.
Chart 11- The extent of centralisation and impact of tax wedge and replacement rate on
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Chart 51 - The extent of centralisation and impact of 
tax wedge and replacement rate on the employment rate
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Table 36 - Short-run employment rate equations: 1987-1999
(PANEL GMM)
Spain
Excluded
Spain
Excluded (4)
Spain Spain 
Time Period -3 Excluded Excluded 
-1 -2 -5 -6
Employment rate (-1) 1.03 *** 0.94 *** 0.95  *** 0.82  *** 0.89 *** 0.82  ***
(8.23) (6.84) (7.7) (6.5) (7.35) (6.57)
Employment rate lagged (-2) -0.41 *** -0.36 *** -0.32 *** -0.26 *** -0.33 -0.28 ***
(-3.96) (-3.22) (-3.64) (-2.70) (-3.48) (-2.85)
Macroeconomic Variables and fixed-term and part-time contracts
Output gap 0.11 *** 0.08  * 0.14  *** 0.11  ** 0.11 *** 0.10 ***
(2.20) (1.74) (2.57) (1.91) (2.05) (1.74)
TFP growth (-1) 0.08 * 0.06 * 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
(1.75) (1.59) (1.44) (1.26) (1.55) (1.39)
Openness (-1) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05  *** 0.05 *** 0.06 ***
(2.41) (2.92) (2.24) (2.93) (4.70) (4.60)
Share of fixed term contracts -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 ***
(-2.50) (-2.47) (-2.09) (-2.07)
Cyclical component of the Share of
fixed term contracts 
-0.09 *** -0.09 *** 
(-2.64) (-2.38)
Trend in the share of fixed term
contracts
0.12 * 0.06
(1.7) (0.8)
Share of part-time contracts 0.20  *** 0.21  *** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.23 0.25
(2.72) (2.57) (4.23) (4.87) (5.9) (5.35)
Taxes, social security contributions and Labour market policies
Tax wedge (-1) -0.06 *  -0.04 -0.07 *  -0.04 -0.09 *** -0.06
(-1.51) (-0.80) (-1.71) (-0.82) (-2.17) (-1.29)
Gross replacement rate(-1) -0.001 -0.01 0.018 0.009 0.017 0.01
(-0.045) (-0.51) (0.78) (-0.50) (0.077) -0.55
Intensity of spending on active 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03***
labour market policies1 (3.03) (3.61) (2.45)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for  first-order serial correlation -2.59 -2.51 -2.37 -2.28 -2.38 -2.31
(0.01) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022) (0.02) (0.02)
Test for second-order serial correlation 0.024 -0.21 0.27 -0.04 0.072 -0.011
(0.98) (0.83) (0.78) (0.97) (0.94) (0.91)
Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions
103.4 102.1 89.67 89.02 84.09 84.9
(275, 1.00) (339, 1.00) (275, 1.00) (339, 1.00) (201, 1.00) (275, 1.00)
Notes: The Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions with a c2 asymptotic distribution; degrees of freedom and p-values in
parentheses. The tests for first and second-order serial correlation are distributed asymptotically as standard normal, p-values in paren-
theses. (1)- (4) balanced equations. Instruments are Emprate(-3) and earlier values, ALMPs relative to the unemployment rate (-2), GRR(-
1), share of fixed- term contracts (-1) and earlier values. Variables are expressed as deviation from period means.
*** Statistically significant at 1% level (i.e. there is a 1 per cent probability that the estimated coefficient is not different from zero);  
** Statistically significant at 5% level * Statistically significant at 10% level.
captures the effects of the interac-
tion between different policy vari-
ables, the nature of bargaining, the
efficiency of the matching between
unemployed and vacant posts, and
the change in the demographic and
skill structure of the population -
i.e. all the determinants not consid-
ered because of the limited time
series dimension. Since the short-
time span reduces the precision of
the estimated effects, the decom-
position is only indicative of a possi-
ble contribution. 
For all Member States, the extent of
openness and the share of part-
time contracts are the most impor-
tant factors accounting for the
changes in the estimated employ-
ment rate. The change in the
employment rate due to increases
in the degree of openness is esti-
mated to be between the 1.1 per-
centage points of Italy and the 8
percentage points of Luxembourg.
The increase in the share of part-
time contracts turns out to be an
important factor in countries such
as Belgium, Germany, France and
Italy53. By contrast, fixed-term
employment helps to keep the
employment rate up in Greece,
France, Ireland, Italy and the UK.
The tax wedge accounts for a rela-
tively small part of the change,
higher than 0.5 percentage points
only in the case of Italy and Ireland.
With the exception of Germany,
Greece and Italy, the expenditure
on ALMPs relative to the number of
unemployed in the labour force
seems to have played a positive
role. In Denmark, Spain, Ireland and
the Netherlands, ALMPs explain
about half percentage points of the
total increase in the estimated
employment rate in the period
1995-2000. Moreover, the cyclical
factors (both output gap and cycli-
cal component of fixed term con-
tracts) can not be ignored. 
Finally, the column “other factors”
provides an indication of how well
a simple model of the employment
rate is able to explain the past evo-
lution of the employment rate.
A negative sign implies that the
estimated change in the employ-
ment rate (the sum of the first eight
columns of table 38) is higher than
the actual employment rate, imply-
ing that factors other than those
considered above constrained the
employment rate. A positive sign is
an indication that “other factors”
contributed to keep the actual
employment rate higher than what
was actually estimated on the basis
of the variables considered. The
model performs quite well in the
case of Italy, France, the UK,  the
Netherlands, and Denmark with
the estimated employment rate
higher than the actual by 0.1, 0.3,
0.6, 0.4 and 1 percentage points
respectively. The estimated change
of the employment rate is lower
than the actual only in the case of
Spain and Portugal. In all remaining
countries, other factors not taken
into account by the set of variables
considered in the model limited
their effect on the employment
rate. 
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53 The finding that the share of part time contracts is an important factor in driving the employment rate is not striking if one consid-
ers that someone with few hours working week is counted as in employment and that the phenomenon increases over time. Ideally,
the sensibility of our findings should be checked against full time employment rates. However, data availability do not allow to
explore this aspect.
Table 37 - Long-run effects on the employment rate
Spain 
excluded
Spain 
excluded
Spain 
excluded
Spain 
excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Openness 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
TFP growth 0.2 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.14
(0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Share of fixed term contracts -0.20 -0.19 -0.21 -0.19
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Trend in the share of fixed term
contracts
0.29 0.13
(0.09) (0.17)
Share of part-time contracts 0.53 0.48 0.70 0.63 0.53 0.54
(0.23) (0.19) (0.25) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11)
Taxes, social security contributions and labour market policies
Tax wedge -0.16 -0.085 -0.19 0.09 -0.21 -0.14
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Gross replacement rate -0.003 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.065) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Intensity of spending on active 0.09 0.11 0.07
labour market policies (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses; In bold coefficient significant at least at the 5% level
4. Explaining the
evolution of real
wages
Most of the factors just considered
influence employment perform-
ance through their effects on real
labour costs. This occurs either
because these factors impinge upon
the bargaining power of workers
modifying the response of wages to
unemployment or because they put
a constraint on wage developments
from outside54. Thus, if an increase
in the generosity of the unemploy-
ment benefits (i.e. an increase in
the replacement rate) is associated
with low employment, then it
should also increase wage pres-
sures. Wages requests may be less
moderate if unemployment bene-
fits are too generous. If the employ-
ment rate does not react to
changes in the replacement rate, as
in tables 31 and 32, then the labour
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Table 38 - ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGES IN THE EMPLOYMENT RATE OF
TFP growth
Degree of
Openness
Share of
fixed-time
trend
Share of
part-time Tax wedge
Gross 
replacement
rate ALMPs 
Cyclical
factors
Other 
factors 
BE
1990-1995 -0.30 1.65 -0.34 1.46 -0.41 -0.07 -0.31 -0.27 -0.12
1995-2000 0.37 2.38 -0.34 3.79 0.02 0.00 0.36 0.27 2.64
DK
1990-1995 0.10 0.46 -0.18 -0.70 0.18 0.35 0.94 -0.04 3.46
1995-2000 0.03 2.15 -0.1 0.00 0.11 -0.02 0.57 0.87 1.03
DE
1990-1995 -0.29 -0.66 -0.11 0.60 -0.75 -0.02 -0.21 -0.17 0.89
1995-2000 0.03 2.07 -0.10 1.68 -0.14 0.07 -0.03 -0.18 2.69
El
1990-1995 0.37 0.62 0.10 0.43 -0.23 0.21 -0.05 0.63 2.49
1995-2000 0.32 2.28 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.25 1.51
ES
1990-1995 0.11 1.50 0.00 1.30 -0.33 -0.05 -0.25 -1.33 4.49
1995-2000 0.00 2.14 0.00 0.38 0.13 -0.02 0.40 0.82 -5.12
FR
1990-1995 -0.04 0.78 0.04 2.00 -0.25 0.00 0.14 -1.26 3.90
1995-2000 0.07 1.53 0.10 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.20 -0.05 0.28
IE
1990-1995 0.33 4.57 0.22 2.16 0.42 -0.05 0.21 -1.95 4.31
1995-2000 -0.17 6.75 0.22 2.49 1.12 0.07 1.10 2.84 3.93
IT
1990-1995 0.27 1.06 0.16 0.81 -0.25 0.37 0.15 -1.04 4.07
1995-2000 -0.16 1.10 0.16 1.35 0.54 0.02 -0.01 -0.41 0.14
LU
1990-1995 -0.36 1.32 -0.04 0.60 0.20 : -0.76 -1.35 -0.21
1995-2000 0.66 7.95 -0.30 1.79 -0.12 : 0.25 2.50 9.06
NL
1990-1995 -0.07 2.10 -0.51 3.08 0.22 -0.14 -0.12 -0.93 2.04
1995-2000 0.04 2.62 -0.38 2.16 -0.03 0.12 2.91 0.94 0.42
PT
1990-1995 0.35 1.15 0.14 0.70 0.00 0.05 -0.13 0.08 3.22
1995-2000 -0.44 1.62 0.34 0.97 0.03 0.23 0.30 -0.98 -2.53
UK
1990-1995 0.29 0.83 0.41 1.30 0.01 0.00 -0.25 -1.50 4.25
1995-2000 0.08 1.77 0.36 0.43 0.44 -0.02 0.11 0.17 0.59
54 For example, unemployment benefits and non-labour income raise the reservation wage reducing the costs of non-employment. On
the other hand, higher openness of the economy raises the pressures to keep labour costs in check.
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Table 39 - Short-run gross wage equations (PANEL GMM)
Time Period
1 2 3 4 5 6
1982-2000 1982-1999 1982-1999 1986-1999 1988-1998 1987-1999
Real Compensation per 
employee(-1)
0.91  *** 0.91  *** 0.92 *** 0.90 *** 0.90 *** 0.93 ***
(22.5) (20.3) (19.7) (17.2) (17.9) (21.1)
Macroeconomic Variables
Labour Productivity 0.54 *** 0.53 *** 0.52 *** 0.58 *** 0.58 *** 0.57 ***
(9.17) (7.75) (8.25) (6.18) (4.42) (4.11)
Labour Productivity (-1) -0.46 *** -0.45  *** -0.44 *** -0.50 *** -0.49 *** -0.51 ***
(-5.72) (-5.01) (-5.03) (-4.66) (-3.41) (3.26)
Openness -0.0002*** -0.0002 *** -0.002 * -0.0003 *** -0.0002 * -0.0002  *
(-3.43) (-2.24) (-1.6) (-3.39) (1.60) (-1.91)
Unemployment rate (-1) -0.002 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0028 *** -0.002 ** -0.0014
(-3.27) (-2.84) (-2.65) (-2.94) (-3.19) (-1.37)
Taxes, social security contributions and Labour market policies
Tax wedge 0.15 ** 0.11 0.23 *** 0.27 *** 0.19  ***
(1.97) (1.45) (2.71) (2.92) (2.31)
Indirect taxes -0.88 *** -0.93 *** -0.90 *** -0.81*** -0.79*** -0.89  ***
(-6.37) (-8.19) (-8.35) (-5.47) (-7.46) (-7.38)
Indirect taxes (-1) 0.51 *** 0.56 *** 0.53 *** 0.39 *** 0.36*** 0.55 ***
(3.31) (3.98) (3.88) (2.94) (2.65) (2.88)
Indirect taxes (-2) 0.41 *** 0.38 *** 0.39 *** 0.45 *** 0.41*** 0.47 ***
(6.66) (5.38) (5.21) (3.96) (3.96) (5.51)
Gross replacement rate -0.0017 *** -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.002 *  -0.0025 * 
(-1.95) (-1.89) (-1.64) (1.67) (-1.78)
Gross replacement rate (-1) 0.0019 0.002 ** 0.003 * 0.002 * 0.029 ** 
(2.19) (2.19) (1.78) (1.73) (1.97)
Personal tax rate 0.002 ** 
(2.14)
Personal tax rate (-1) -0.0017 * 
(-1.80)
Employers’ social security 
contributions 
0.0005 ** 
(2.19)
Intensity of spending on 
ALMPs1
-0.00006
(-0.325)
Expenditure on ALMPs as %
of GDP(-1)1
0.009 ***
(2.28)
Intensity of spending on 
Youth Measures 
0.005 ***
(2.88)
Intensity of spending on 
Direct job creation 
-0.002  **
(-1.94)
Intensity of spending on 
Direct job creation (-1)
0.0033 ***
(2.21)
Intensity of spending on 
Public Employment Services (-1)
-0.0014
(-0.84)
Intensity of spending on 
Training (-1)
0.00013
0.252
Number of observations 300 266 266 208 168 194
Test for  first-order serial 
correlation 
-2.619 -2.587 -2.527 -2.448 -2.22 -2.536
(0.009) (0.01) (0.012) (0.014) (0.027) (0.011)
Test for second-order serial 
correlation
-1.179 -1.174 -1.006 -1.097 -1.14 -1.324
(0.238) (0.24) (0.315) (0.273) (0.25) (0.185)
Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions
464.2 421.2 383.9 273.2 213.2 240.3
(1134, 1.00) (1029, 1.00) (1441, 1.00) (1131, 1.00) (923, 1.00) (1086, 1.00)
Notes: To get rid of the common component, all variables but the output- gap have been expressed as deviation from country means.
Labour costs and tax variables in logs. The Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions with a c2 asymptotic distribution; degree
of freedom and p-values in parentheses. The tests for first and second-order serial correlation are distributed asymptotically as a standard
normal, p-values in parentheses. Equations 1-3 balanced. GMM-SYS estimation combining transformed and level equations. In (1) employ-
ment is considered as endogenous, Wedge, Indirect taxes and the extent of openness predetermined, productivity exogenous. In (2)  in
addition the replacement rate is considered as exogenous. In (3)  in addition the components of the tax wedge are supposed predeter-
mined. (4) –(6) unbalanced panel. In (4) intensity of spending on ALMPs is predetermined. In (5) expenditure on ALMPs as % of GDP is
predetermined. In (6) categories of ALMPs are instrumented with ALMPs supposed to be  predetermined.
1 The intensity on spending on ALMPs is defined as Expenditure on ALMPs as % of GDP normalised by the unemployment rate
*** Statistically significant at 1% level (i.e. there is a 1 per cent probability that the estimated coefficient is not different from zero);  
** Statistically significant at 5% level;  * Statistically significant at 10% level.
costs should not react either. In gen-
eral, for any given (un)employment
rate and labour productivity any
variable that increases real wages
can potentially affect the rate of
job creation.
This section explores whether the
variables influencing the evolution
of the employment rate also allow
a fair description of the evolution
of real wages. Table 39 shows the
results for the short-term real wage
equations, extending in each col-
umn the set of possible determi-
nants to the tax wedge, the
replacement rate (column 2), and
the intensity of spending on ALMPs
and its composition (columns 4-6).
Column 3 provides evidence on
whether real labour costs are sensi-
tive to the structure of the tax
wedge. Table 40 reports the long-
term wage equation corresponding
to the short- term dynamic real
wage curves in table 39. Each speci-
fication control for macro-economic
variables such as the output-gap, a
measure of the business cycle, the
labour productivity, which con-
tributes to determine the part of
product distributed to wages, and
the degree of openness, which cap-
tures the extent of wage discipline
“imported” from abroad. Wages
are defined as compensation per
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Table 40 - Long-run effects on real gross wages
1 2 3 4 5 6
1982-2000 1982-1999 1982-1999 1986-1999 1988-1998 1987-1999
Macroeconomic Variables
Labour productivity 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.84
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Openness -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.0034
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.0027)
Unemployment rate -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.024 -0.02
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) -0.017
Taxes, social security contributions and Labour market policies
Tax wedge 1.77 1.36 2.35 2.56 2.68
(0.99) (1.00) (1.00) (1.26) (1.53)
Indirect taxes 0.49 0.23 0.29 0.3 -0.12 1.94
(1.22) (1.09) (1.07) (1.08) (1.24) (2.35)
Gross replacement rate 0.002 0.004 0.0014 -0.0009 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Personal tax rate 0.003
(0.007)
Employers’ social 
security contributions 
0.006
(0.004)
Intensity of spending
on active 
-0.0006
labour market policies (0.002)
Expenditure on ALMPs
as % of GDP
0.085
(0.04)
Intensity of spending
on Youth Measures 
0.066
(0.039)
Intensity of spending
on Direct job creation 
0.015
(0.0089)
Intensity of spending
on Training 
0.0019
(0.007)
Intensity of spending
on Public Employment
Services
-0.02
(0.023)
Standard errors in parentheses; In bold coefficient significantly different from zero  at least at the 5% level
employee (labour costs) deflated by
total consumption deflator.
Starting with the role of the macro-
economic variables, the degree of
openness contributes to wage mod-
eration in the short-term by pre-
venting wages from being set inde-
pendently of external competitive-
ness, while in the long-term it does
not affect real wages. The fact that
the degree of openness does not
permanently modify the cost com-
petitiveness but raises the employ-
ment rate is suggestive of the
advantages of economic integra-
tion being related not simply to
increases in the degree of price
competition, but also to the diffu-
sion of innovation and knowledge.
Moreover, productivity gains (or
losses) are only partially reflected in
higher (or lower) real wages in the
same year these changes occur. For
any increase of productivity by  real
wages rise in the same year by
about X%/2.  Notwithstanding a
temporary reduction of wages one
year later, about 90% of productiv-
ity gains are transferred in the long-
term into higher wages, producing
a decline in the labour share in
national income. An increase in
productivity growth by 20% - about
the (un-weighted) average produc-
tivity growth from 1990 to 2000) -
accounts for a decline in the wage
share by about 2.25%. Finally, rising
unemployment reduces real wages
while labour market tightness
increases them. 
Turning to the role of taxation, the
effect of indirect taxes is robust
over different specifications of the
wage equations. Increases in indi-
rect taxation are accompanied by
simultaneous declines of real
wages. However, such decline is off-
set by real wage increases occurring
during the following two years. In
the long-term, the effect of indirect
taxes on real labour costs wanes
out. This result coincides with that
obtained for both the dynamics
and the long-term effect in the case
of the gross replacement rate (a
measure of the generosity of unem-
ployment and welfare-related ben-
efits). Although the tax wedge
increases wage pressure, this effect
is not estimated precisely (i.e. it can
not be excluded that the impact is
not significantly different from
zero). 
Controlling for the intensity of
spending of ALMPs increases the
precision with which the impact of
the wedge is estimated (column 4).
However, the effect of the intensity
of ALMPs is not statistically differ-
ent from zero (actually is zero),
implying that what is found for the
tax wedge is not reliable. When the
expenditure on ALMPs as a percent-
age of GDP is used rather than the
expenditure on ALMPs as percent-
age of GDP normalised by the
unemployment rate, there is evi-
dence that increases in such expen-
ditures and/or in the tax wedge
raise the wage pressure. As to the
wage pressures stemming from dif-
ferent categories of ALMPs, we find
that the spending on youth meas-
ures and on direct job creation only
affects the real labour costs in the
short-term. Youth measures raise
wage pressures while direct job cre-
ation (subsidies to employment)
contributes to wage moderation in
the year the measure takes place
but this restrain is offset by wage
increases one year after. Finally, the
composition of the tax wedge does
matter but, again, only in the short-
term.  The increase in the real
labour costs following an increase
in the personal income tax is only
temporary and partly offset after
one year.
5.  Conclusions
Many observers have highlighted
the role of labour market institu-
tions as key determinants of labour
market performance: the level of
labour taxation; the characteristics
of the collective bargaining agree-
ments and the wage setting mecha-
nism; the features of the unemploy-
ment benefit systems and the level
and composition of ALMPs are all
possible determinants of labour
market performance. Some have
argued that these institutions can
have important effects on labour
market performance when they
reinforce each other’s effects on
employment. Hence, the interac-
tions between different set institu-
tions can potentially compensate
for the effects of what, in isolation,
can be considered an ill-designed
measure. Of course, the opposite
also applies: the interaction of insti-
tutions can be more important than
each single measure, and compen-
sate for the effects of what, in isola-
tion, can be considered a well-
designed measure.
The dynamic nature of the analysis
allows the temporary or permanent
impact of certain variables on the
employment rate to be deter-
mined. The employment rate was
chosen because it is a key element
of the Lisbon agenda and one cru-
cial component of the development
of GDP per capita55. A higher
employment rate with a higher
productivity level is clearly desirable
as it allows (on average) more peo-
ple in work to be more productive.
The main findings of the chapter
can be summarised as follows: 
The extent of economic openness is
the main driving factor impacting
labour market performance. In
1997, the flows of goods and servic-
es intermediated by the foreign
markets were on average 88% of
the average GDP. In 2000 this flow
(i.e. the degree of openness)
reached about 104% of GDP.
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According to the model specified in
this chapter, this increase explains
about 60% of the total change in
the employment rate observed in
this period. 
Then this chapter has analysed the
role of labour market institutions in
determining the evolution over
time of the overall employment
rate of the EU15 Member States.
• The increase by 3.5 percentage
points in the share of part-time
employment is a major determi-
nant according to this model
specification, explaining between
20% and 30% of the total change
in the employment rate.
• For data reasons, the impact of
ALMPs is measured by the expen-
diture on ALMPs; expenditure on
active policies as a percentage of
GDP relative to the number of
unemployed in the labour force
has a smaller impact on employ-
ment prospects. The increase in
the intensity of spending on
ALMPs (defined as the percent-
age of GDP allocated to ALMPs
divided by the number of unem-
ployed over the labour force) is
responsible for between 10% and
20% of the increase in the
employment rate observed
between 1997 and 2002. This
should be considered an upper
threshold for methodological rea-
sons that are underlined in the
main text.
• The category of ALMPs to which
resources are allocated is not irrel-
evant. In this chapter, four of the
five OECD categories on ALMPs
have been considered56. The
intensity of spending on youth
measures and on public employ-
ment services clearly seems to
have a positive impact on the
employment rate while the effect
is less pronounced for the other
categories. 
• These findings change when the
employment rate is explained as a
function of different categories
of expenditure also allowing for
their interactions with other insti-
tutions. When the interaction
between the gross replacement
rate (proxy for the unemploy-
ment benefit system, i.e. the per-
centage of gross wage replaced
by unemployment and welfare
related benefits) and the spend-
ing on youth measures and on
training respectively is taken into
account, all categories of ALMPs
expenditures have a positive
effect on the employment rate,
with the effect of public employ-
ment services and youth measures
stronger than that of direct job
creation and training. Further-
more, the effect of the intensity
of spending on youth measure is
larger in countries where the
replacement rate is relatively
high. In contrast, the positive
effect of training is slightly
reduced in countries where the
replacement rate is high. 
• In the long-term, increases in the
tax wedge have a negative
impact on the employment rate.
Between 1997 and 2000 the
EU15 (un-weighted) average
wedge declined by about 1 per-
centage point. This reduction is
responsible for less than 10% of
the increase in the employment
rate observed during the same
period. This effect is not estimated
precisely; it probably depends
on the short time period taken
into consideration and on the
fact that it may take some time
before the impact of a change
in taxes is visible (sometimes in
opposite directions). 
• When single components of the
wedge are allowed to play a role,
only the employers’ social security
contributions have an impact on
the employment rate. In the period
1997-2000 the EU15 (un-weight-
ed) average of the employers’
social security contributions
declined by about 0.5 percentage
point. Our estimate of the impact
on the employment rate suggests
that this reduction explains about
5% of the 3% increase in the
employment rate observed dur-
ing the same period. The moder-
ate increase in the gross replace-
ment rate marginally reduces the
positive effect of lower employ-
ers’ contributions. 
• The employment response to
changes in the gross replacement
rate and in the tax wedge is influ-
enced by the level of co-ordina-
tion of bargaining. Compared to
systems where bargaining occurs
at the intermediate (industry
level), the employment perform-
ance of systems where bargaining
occurs at both the decentralised
and centralised level tends be less
influenced by changes in the tax
wedge (especially employers’ and
employees’ social security contri-
butions) and the replacement
rate level. Finally, higher expendi-
ture on ALMPs raises the employ-
ment rate only in systems where
bargaining is at the intermediate
or centralised level. 
The findings of this chapter suggest
that labour market policies should
be designed consistently with the
mechanism insuring against unem-
ployment risks, and, more in gener-
al, with the rules governing the
welfare state. Training measures
can influence not only job creation
but also future aspirations of work-
ers. With higher replacement ratios
people may be tempted to wait
longer than otherwise before
accepting a job which fulfils their
aspirations, at the risk of remaining
longer out of employment. By con-
trast, too rigorous a system of
unemployment benefits will not
create the incentives to enter into
the labour market. This may explain
our finding that measures for
unemployed and disadvantaged
young people become more effec-
tive when the replacement rate is
relatively high. The findings high-
light the importance of pursuing
make work pay policies through
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57 Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the Implementation of Member States’ employment policies, (2004).
 
both financial and non-financial
incentives, including individual tax-
ation, quality in work in all its
dimensions, childcare and care facil-
ities and other measures to recon-
cile work and family life’ as stated
in the common recommendations
to all Member States in the
Guidelines on the implementation
of employment policies57. They also
underline the important role of
public employment services with
respect to advising and counselling
job seekers, which reduce the infor-
mation asymmetries in the labour
market.
As suggested by the reduction in
the NAIRU, the improvement in
labour market performance of the
late 1990s appears to have been
more than just a cyclical phenome-
non. However, the employment
record of the last two years has
been disappointing, partly on
account of macroeconomic devel-
opments. Employment growth
remained at a standstill in the third
quarter of 2003, this being the
fourth consecutive quarter of mod-
est growth. Following the moder-
ate rises seen in 2001 and 2002,
unemployment in the Euro area
stabilised at 8.8% over 2003, and
remained unchanged during the
first quarter of 2004. In some coun-
tries youth unemployment is too
high, and this is a matter of con-
cern. The EU economy continues to
recover at a very moderate pace
compared to the accelerating
recovery in the US and Japan. On
the more positive side, during the
recent years of modest growth the
EU participation kept rising while it
clearly declined in the US.
Notwithstanding the improve-
ments of the late 1990s, many
Member States still exhibit the
symptoms of structural problems in
their labour markets. These include
low labour force participation in
particular for women and older
workers and persistent regional dis-
parities in employment rates. The
structural nature of the problem is
reflected in the fact that over 40%
of unemployed people have been
out of work for one year or more,
compared to fewer than 20% in the
best-performing countries. And this
is a matter for concern that calls for
immediate action. 
The internationalisation of markets
accelerates the diffusion of shocks
and requires a much more rapid
adjustment than in the past of both
quantities and prices58. However, at
the same time a more rapid adjust-
ment can destabilise producers’ and
consumers’ expectations without
an efficient workers’ protection
against the income and the
employment risks associated with
such adjustment. In a more inte-
grated world economy the chal-
lenge for policy makers is to find
new and more efficient forms of
insurance against such risks; as stat-
ed in the 2004 Employment guide-
lines, ‘the concept of job security
should be modernised and broad-
ened with a view not only to cover-
ing employment protection but
also to building on women and
men’s ability to remain and
progress in work’59.  This may
include rebalancing the protection
of permanent and non-permanent
contracts in a number of Member
States, reforms of wage-setting
mechanisms that allow local market
conditions to be taken properly
into account, reforms to make work
pay, greater cost-effectiveness of
active labour market policies, and
enhanced labour mobility. Since
these changes can take years if not
decades, a small change in the
nature of regulation of labour
conceals significant effects which
are not captured by the indices
broadly used in these type of exer-
cises (e.g. the extent of coordina-
tion of bargaining and EPL). 
Finally a note of caution: in this
chapter, institutions have been
treated as exogenous parameters
so that a change in an institution-
al configuration (a labour market
reform) affects labour market per-
formance. This view can be too
simplistic. In reality, institutions
change only slowly over time, are
endogenous with respect to the
nature of income and employ-
ment risks and are intertwined
with the characteristics of govern-
ment interventions. For example,
the nature of employment protec-
tion (either on the job or in the
market) is not independent from
the frequency of shocks and effi-
ciency of distributive policies. And
the short period covered by our
analyses does not warrant any
conclusion without risks.
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GMM estimation of the employment rate and definition of variables
Panel data have important advantages1. Firstly, they allow for the use of both the cross-sectional and time dimension of data.
This implies that estimates based on panel data are relatively more accurate than other procedures. Secondly, econometric
techniques based on panel data, can take into account the effects of variables not taken explicitly into account and that tend
to vary over time and/or over each individual units. This implies that panel data techniques are more robust with respect to
incomplete model specification. Finally, they provide an easy way out to the problem of endogeneity of the explanatory vari-
ables. Panel data may be static or dynamic. In static models it is assumed that the variable of interest may be expressed as a
function of the contemporaneous values of some explanatory variables. In doing so they neglect the dynamics which char-
acterise the behaviour of economic agents (persistence, lagged effects of explanatory variables, habit formation etc).
Dynamic panel techniques have the advantage that they can take into account the lagged adjustment and the lagged effect
which is typical of all economic processes. Furthermore, dynamic modeling allows the explanatory variables to have both a
short-run and a long-run impact on the variables of interest. 
In practical terms, the dependent variable (in our case the employment or the unemployment rate) is expressed as a function
of its lagged level and some explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are the implicit tax rate, the intensity of spend-
ing on ALMPs or of different categories of ALMPs, the share of temporary or permanent contracts (or of different typologies
of such contracts), the output-gap, to capture the behaviour over the cycle of the employment and unemployment rate. 
In symbols the following dynamic fixed-effect model is estimated for both the unemployment and the employment rate.
γit = αi + µt +β1∗ γit-1 + Ζit β + εit
where γit is respectively the unemployment or the employment rate, αi is a fixed effect which identify country specific char-
acteristics which are invariant over time, µt is a time varying levels that affect all countries equally and Ζit a (K-1) x1 vector of
explanatory variables and εit is a random disturbance distributed normally. 
Introducing a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable creates a number of problems as the lagged value of the
dependent variable is correlated with the unobservable effect αi , introducing a correlation between the lagged dependent
variable and the error term which renders standard estimators of panel data biased. Moreover, the OLS estimates are incon-
sistent and FGLS technique also when there is heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals (Sevestre and Trognon
(1996)). A further complication is that some of our explanatory variables are clearly endogenous. This is certainly the case of
the intensity of spending on ALMPs whose values and dynamics clearly depend on the level and the evolution of the unem-
ployment rate. And also the share of temporary contracts can be considered as endogenous should its pattern follow the
increase in the unemployment rate. 
One solution to this problem is to first difference the model and estimate the first differenced model with OLS. However, even
if there is no autocorrelation in the error term of models in levels, the error term in first differences follows an MA(1) process
( with coefficient –1) and is correlated with the first differences of the dependent variable since εit-1 is correlated with  γit-1 . 
In order to account for this endogeneity of regressors, we adopt the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation pro-
cedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM procedure takes into account unobserved heterogeneity between
countries, endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable as well as possible endogeneity of explanatory variables. In prac-
tice the GMM estimator requires using lags of the dependent variable in levels as instruments for the lagged dependent vari-
able in first differences to generate consistent estimates of the parameters. Consistency of the GMM estimator requires lack
of second order serial correlation in the dynamic formulation, so tests are presented for assessing the validity of the empiri-
cal specification. Two such tests are considered in our analysis: the Sargan statistic for over-identifying restrictions, which ver-
ifies the lack of correlation between errors and the instruments, and the tests m1 and m2 testing for the absence of first and
second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. 
The results in the text are obtained starting from a general version of the equation above with explanatory variables lagged
at most 4 years. Insignificant coefficients were successively excluded from the model on the basis of the usual statistical tests.
Moreover, if there is autocorrelation in the levels equation, there will be second order autocorrelation in the first differenced
equation implying that the instruments used (dated t-2) are not adequate. In these cases yit lagged 3 periods and more may
be valid.  Therefore it is important to verify if there is second order autocorrelation, which is the crucial information for the
validity of the instruments with the Sargan tests. Finally, the estimator is robust when the number of cross section is large
and the time periods relatively small. Our data set with 15 countries and at most 18 time periods do not totally satisfy these
conditions, so that the result should be taken as indicative of possible direction of causality. The equation is estimated with
the DPD program written in GAUSS by Arellano and Bond (1998).
1
M. Verbeek (2000) Modern Econometrics
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1. Introduction
The extraordinary Council meeting
on employment issues (‘Jobs
Summit’) in Luxembourg in 1997
requested that the European
Commission analyse how individual
Member States could achieve a sig-
nificant increase in the EU’s average
employment rate. As a response,
the European Commission pub-
lished its Employment Rates 1998
report1 which argues that the
employment rate is an effective
measure of an economy’s perform-
ance in that it indicates the extent
to which the economy can provide
jobs for those able to work and
focuses attention on employment
and the employment potential of
the non-employed, including both
“economically inactive” people and
the unemployed.
Most notably, the report observes
that the employment rates2 – i.e.
the population shares of people in
employment – have evolved differ-
ently in the EU and the US over the
last two decades: up to the mid-
1970s, the EU’s employment rate
stood at 64%, slightly exceeding
that of the US at 62%. By 1997,
however, the EU rate had dropped
to 60.5%, whilst that of the US had
increased to 74%, a difference of
almost 14 percentage points – the
so-called EU-US employment gap.3
This gap was equivalent to about
34 million ‘missing’ jobs in the then
European Union as compared to
the US.
The report also describes the main
sources of the EU-US employment
gap. While employment rates for
prime-age males (25-54) were
found to be broadly similar to those
in the US, employment rates for
young people (15-24), prime-age
women, older people (55-64) and
low-skilled people were found to
be much lower in the EU, although
varying widely between the
Member States. The report further
notes that reversing the downward
trend in the EU and closing the
remaining gaps in employment
rates - both in comparison with the
US and across gender, age and skill
groups within the EU – offers three
main benefits: 
• Economic benefits: the low
employment rate in Europe
means that there is a high level
of unused potential labour
resources. Bringing such poten-
tial to work would boost eco-
nomic growth in the EU, beyond
the long-term growth trend
resulting from labour productivi-
ty increases;  
• Demographic benefits: higher
employment - a larger number
of individuals contributing to
welfare schemes - would help to
improve Member States’ public
finances and the sustainability
of social security systems strug-
gling to cope with an ageing
population;  
• Social benefits: Attachment to
the world of work enables people
to contribute to, and participate
in, active society, and enjoy the
benefits of progress and pros-
perity. It is also important to close
the gender gap. Women and men
should be able to participate in
the labour market on equal terms
with equal responsibilities. 
The report shows that the employ-
ment gap between the EU and the
US can be attributed almost entirely
to the services sector. Whereas the
proportion of the population
employed in agriculture and indus-
try was found to be roughly similar
in the US and the EU (3.1% and
18.2% respectively in the EU, 2.0%
and 17.7% in the US), employment
in services accounted for only
39.2% of working-age population
in the EU in 1997, as opposed to
54.2% in the US. This difference
existed for all services sectors - com-
munal services, distribution, hotels
and restaurants, and business and
financial services – and for both
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1 European Commission (1998), Employment rates 1998, Employment and social affairs DG
2 Note that, in much of the literature, the term ‘employment to population ratio’ is used instead of ‘employment rate’. For the sake
of consistency with other European Commission documents, in this chapter only the latter will be used.
3 Employment rates stated refer to the age group 15-64. It should be noted that some of the EU-US comparisons reported in this
chapter refer to different age groups or employment definitions: in the US, employment data usually refer to the age group 15+
and exclude, when based on establishment data, employment in agriculture and self-employment - contrary to the EU where
employment data refer to the working-age population 15-64, generally covering all types of employment.
Employment structures in
Europe and the US:
the role of skills, wages and
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low-paid, low-skilled and high-
paid, high-skilled services. 
According to the report, the same
differences in employment struc-
tures also exist between the
Member States with high and low
employment rates, with France,
Germany and Italy in particular hav-
ing below average employment
growth in these sectors. The report
therefore concludes that the serv-
ices sector offers the greatest
potential for employment growth
in Europe and that future increases
in the overall employment rate
would, to a large extent, depend
on an expansion of jobs in services.
Based on this analysis, the report
points to the areas where action
could be taken to remedy the situa-
tion on both the demand and sup-
ply sides of the economy. It calls for
significant improvements in the
employment situation particularly
in the three biggest Member States,
and in the areas of female employ-
ment, employment of older people
(55-64 years) and the services sec-
tors, which would clearly have a
major impact on the overall emp-
loyment rate in the EU.
The panorama of the European
labour markets in Chapter 1, as well
as previous editions of the
Employment in Europe report, have
both assessed Member States’ con-
tributions to the evolution of the
EU-level employment rate in recent
years. Employment in Europe 2003
provides an extensive comparison
of relative wage structures and
wage determinants in the enlarged
EU. Although it does not include an
analysis of the employment effects
of the different relative wage struc-
tures across countries, it does raise
the question of whether the cur-
rent wage structure supports job
creation in the services sector, and
in the high technology and knowl-
edge-intensive services sectors in
particular.
This chapter provides an up-to-date
description of employment struc-
tures within the EU25 as compared
to those of the US. It analyses the
employment structures in Europe
by sector and occupation, and the
determinants of differences in
employment structures across coun-
tries, paying attention to skills, rela-
tive wages, productivity and final
demand structures, following
approaches suggested in recent lit-
erature.4 Analyses are based on
data for the years 1998-2003 from
Eurostat for the EU and from the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for
the US. They are made comparable
where possible, including the
longer time series on employment
by gender and age group, and the
sectoral employment structures
from the OECD. The annexes con-
tain a detailed description of key
definitions, industry and occupa-
tional classifications, as well as the
correspondence tables that were
used to translate US classifications
into EU-type classifications.
2. EU-US employment
structures and
performance
This section first reviews the long-
term trends in employment rates
and employment by broad sectors
for the years 1970-2002, with a dis-
cussion on the most recent evolu-
tion for the years 1998-2003.5
Secondly, it provides a detailed
account of employment structures
by characteristics of the workforce
(gender, age, skills level), by sector
and by occupation and skill. Finally
it presents possible reasons behind
the EU-US employment rate gaps,
including differences in the skill
composition of the workforce, pro-
ductivity growth at sectoral level,
the relative wage structures and
final demand structures.
2.1. The EU-US employment gap:
long-term evolution and recent
trends
In both the US and the EU, the shift
of economic activity to employment
in services has contributed strongly
to job creation and increases in
overall employment. However, the
speed, intensity and success with
which this transition has so far
taken place differs between Europe
and the US, as reflected in the dif-
fering evolution of their employ-
ment rates since the mid-1970s.
Both started at around 63% in the
mid-1970s, but the US employment
rate subsequently increased steadily
to reach some 74% in the year 2000,
while the EU employment rate
declined to levels below 60% in the
mid-1980s, before rising to more
than 62% in 2000 (chart 52).
In the US, a pronounced shift to the
services economy has taken place.
Employment in the services sector
increased by more than 43 million,
or 72%, to more than 100 million in
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4 See e.g. Freeman and Schettkat (1999), The role of wage and skill differences in US-Germanemployment differences, Jahrbücher für
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 219(1-2), 49-66, and Gregory and Russo (2004), The employment impact of differences in demand
and production structures, DEMPATEM Working Paper No. 10, AIAS, University of Amsterdam 
5 Due to lack of data on sectoral employment, notably for Poland, no aggregate data on the enlarged European Union (EU25) are
available before the year 2000. Therefore, reference is made to the employment structures in the subgroup of the original EU15
Aggregates for the group of those countries who acceded the Union in 2004 – the ‘new’ Member States (NMS10) – are calculated
for those countries with available data only and will be reported where available.
Employment structures in Europe and the US Chapter 3
99
2000. At the same time, employ-
ment in both agriculture and indus-
try remained stagnant at around 33
million in 2002: 29.5 million in
industry and 3.5 million in agricul-
ture (for a definition of the broad
sectors "agriculture","industry" and
"services" used in the analysis, see
annex 6.2). The employment share
of services – i.e. the share of
employed in the services sector as a
percentage of total employment –
increased from 65% in the mid-
1970s to 71% in 1990 and up to
75% in 2000, while those of agricul-
ture and industry declined from 4%
to 2.5% and from 31% to 22.5%,
respectively. When measured as a
share of the total population of
working age, employment in servic-
es increased from 42% in 1977 to
54% in 2002. The employment rate
of industry declined considerably
from 20% in 1977 to 15% in 2002,
while that of agriculture was down
to 2% in 2002, from 2.5% 25 years
before.
The EU also experienced growth in
services sector employment over the
same period.6 However, this was not
strong enough to make up for the
heavy employment losses in industry
and agriculture: employment in
agriculture declined by more than
7.5 million, or 60%, reducing the
employment share of agriculture
from above 10% in the mid-1970s to
4% in 2002, and the employment
rate from 6% to below 3%.
Employment in industry declined by
one-fourth, or 12.5 million, reducing
the employment share of industry
by 10 percentage points to 29%,
and the employment rate by 5 per-
centage points to below 20%. The
services sector created more than 20
million new jobs, equivalent to an
employment growth of more than a
third. The employment share of
services increased to two-thirds, and
the employment rate to 42%, up
from 32% in the mid-1970s.
As a consequence of the above dif-
ferences in employment perform-
ance, the EU-US employment gap
opened up considerably over the
1970s and 1980s, before stagnating
over most of the 1990s.7 The widen-
6 Due to the lack of long time-series information on the new Member States, statistics here are only for the EU15.
7 According to academic literature, these trends of convergence or divergence in employment rates between the EU and the US are
shown to be even more pronounced when taking into account differences in hours worked per adult population. See e.g. Wiemer
Salverda, Stephen Bazen and Mary Gregory (2001), The European-American employment gap, wage inequality, earnings mobility
and skill: A study for France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, Final Report by the European
Low-Wage Employment Research Network (LoWER) to the European Commission, Employment and Social Affairs DG. This study
confirmed the existence of a significant jobs deficit and showed in particular that the largest single source of the jobs deficit is in
jobs for women – an area where the European economies have failed to match the employment growth achieved in the US. The
growth of part-time employment has provided only a modest offset to this. In fact, in each of the four EU economies covered by
the study, the biggest source of the jobs gap, by a large margin, was found to be the shortfall in full-time employment by women,
accounting for at least 55% (France) and up to 93% (UK) of the overall gap, although in the Netherlands and the UK part-time
employment for women contributes a partial offset. Differences in hours of work were found to be much less important, although
the shorter full-time hours worked by men in Germany and the Netherlands, and to some extent France, also contribute to the
employment gap. Furthermore, a significant part of the employment gap was shown to emerge from the shorter hours worked in
the European economies.
Chart 1- Employment rates in the EU and the US, 1971-2002
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Source: OECD, Labour market statistics database, Table 1
Notes: Employment rates using civilian employment in the age group 15-64, excluding employment in the armed forces and in institu-
tional households, and census-based population figures; aggregate employment rates for EU15, include those countries with available
data, with data missing for some of the countries missing in the following years: Austria (1973, 2002), Belgium (2000-2002), France (1990-
2002), Greece (1970-1980, 2000-2002), Italy (1972-1976), Netherlands (1970-1974), Portugal (1970-1979, 1982-1985), UK (2001-2002); 
* among the new Member States, data are available for Poland (1993-2001), Hungary (1992-2001), the Czech Republic (1975-2000) and
the Slovak Republic (1994-2001) only.
Chart 52 - Employment rates in the EU and the US, 1971-2002
ing of the EU-US employment gap
is due to two main trends: first, the
faster increase in services sector
employment in the 1970s and
1980s, and second, the less
favourable employment evolution
of industry and agriculture in the
EU. Almost the entire gap at the
end of the 1990s was determined
by differences in services sector
employment (chart 53).
As illustrated in chart 53, the long-
standing trend of an increasing EU-
US employment gap has been
slightly reversed since the late
1990s. In fact, the EU-US employ-
ment gap has decreased slightly
since 1997 – due to both a further
reduction in the employment gap
of services and a very unfavourable
employment evolution of the man-
ufacturing sector in the US since
2000. In the years 1998-2000, total
employment growth in the EU of
4% equalled that in the US, con-
tributing to a slight reduction of
the employment gap to 12 percent-
age points. In the services sector,
the EU actually outperformed the
US, with more than 5.5 million new
jobs in the services sector, equiva-
lent to an increase of 6%, com-
pared to an increase of 5% in the
US. In the subsequent years, against
the backdrop of the economic slow-
down, employment creation in the
services sector decelerated, coming
to an almost complete standstill in
the US, but still adding almost 4 mil-
lion new jobs in the EU.8
Job dynamics in the US services sec-
tor were not strong enough to
compensate for the strong job
destruction of almost 3 million jobs
in US manufacturing over the same
period, leading to a net decline in
the employment rate. In the EU, on
the other hand, net employment
creation continued to be positive,
albeit small and declining, through-
out 2003, and the services sector in
particular was able to compensate
for the more moderate job losses in
EU manufacturing. While the
employment rate increased by 3 per-
centage points to more than 64% in
the EU between 1998 and 2003
(2.5% in agriculture, 18% in indus-
try, 43.5% in services), in the US it
declined to 70% (2% in agriculture,
12.5% in industry, 55.5% in services),
down from more than 73% in 1998,
with changes driven equally by the
lower employment performance of
both industry and services (chart 54).
As a result, by 2003 the EU-US
employment gap had declined to
less than 10 percentage points,9 and
to around 12 percentage points in
the services sector (chart 55).
While the services sector in Europe
has contributed significantly to the
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Evolution of EU-US employment rates gap by broad sectors, 1977-2002
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Source: OECD, Labour market statistics database, Table 1
Notes: Due to missing information on employment by broad sector for a large number of Member States before 1977, the data for the
years 1971-1976 are not strictly comparable and therefore not reported in the chart. See also the notes of chart 52.
8 It should be noted that this recent 'trend reversal' in employment performance was accompanied by a change in productivity deve-
lopments across EU and US, apparently reversing a long-standing trend of higher labour productivity growth rates in the EU.
Productivity growth was much lower in the EU when compared to the US, notably in wholesale and retail trade and in ICT-using
services. For further details, see Employment in Europe 2003, chapter 2.
9 Please note that due to differences in definitions, coverage and underlying data sources, measures of the employment gap might
vary somewhat. Nevertheless, the recent trend in closing the EU-US employment gap is well confirmed when changing coverage or
using the various data sources. According to the various measures obtained, the EU-US employment gap has come down to levels
of 7-8 percentage points for the EU25, 5-7 percentage points for the EU15, and 12-13 percentage points for the NMS10 in 2003. 
Chart 53 -  Evolution of EU-US employment rate gap by broad sectors, 1977-2002
 
resilience of European labour mar-
kets to the recent economic slow-
down, there are various indications
that the services sector might also
be leading the recent upturn in eco-
nomic growth and employment
creation in the US, with yearly
employment growth rates of up to
10% between April and June 2004.
This is equivalent to more than half
a million new jobs in service-provid-
ing sectors, most notably in health
care and social assistance and in
professional and technical services,
including management and con-
sulting services, architectural and
engineering services, and computer
systems design and related services.
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Annualised employment growth rates by broad sector in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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Source: Eurostat, LFS for EU25; Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), OES and CPS for US
Notes: EU25 and NMS10 for the periods 1998-2000 and 1998-2003 excluding Poland due to the lack of detailed sectoral employment
data for Poland in 1998; data at sectoral level for EU25 not reported; only data on employment in agriculture for US based on CPS. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS for EU25; BLS, OES for US
Notes: EU25 and NMS10 by broad sector in 1998 excluding Poland due to the lack of detailed sectoral employment data; data at sec-
toral level for EU25 not reported.
Chart 54 -  Annualised employment growth rates by broad sector in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
Chart 55 -  Difference in employment rates by broad sector between the EU and the US,1998-2003
 
Retail trade employment, on the
other hand, was little changed.10
2.2. Further breakdown of the EU-
US employment gap …
This section presents the results of a
further breakdown of the differ-
ences in employment structures
between the EU and the US. Three
main issues are addressed: first, dif-
ferences by individual characteris-
tics of the jobholder (gender, age,
skill level); second, differences
across detailed sectors; and third,
differences across occupations and
skill levels.11
2.2.1. … by gender and age group
When looking at employment
rates and their evolution by gen-
der and age group12, it can be seen
that major differences exist for all
groups but most prominently for
women, the young (15-24) and
older (55-64) age groups. The
employment evolution of both
men and women has actually con-
tributed to the widening of the
EU-US employment gap. First,
while in the EU employment rates
of men have dropped by some 10
percentage points, down from
mid-1970s levels of 80% or more,
they have remained around 80%
in the US. Second, although
female employment rates have
increased strongly in both the EU
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10 In this context it should be noted that there is an ongoing debate in the US as to the type of employment created throughout the
latest recoveries. According to a report released on 21 June 2004 by CIBC World Markets, "[h]igh quality jobs in the U.S. have been
replaced in the past three years by lower-paying, less stable employment."  The report also states that since the economic expan-
sion got underway in the US in late 2001, the number of jobs in high-paying industries 
11 Breakdowns by skill level are based on data at broad ISCED level as used in the OECD Education at a glance report. Breakdowns by
sector are based on data at NACE-1 or NACE-2 level for the EU and, for the US, on data at SIC-3 level for the years 1998 and 2000
and at NAICS-4 level for the year 2003. 
Breakdowns by occupation are based on data at ISCO-1 level for the EU and at SOC-3 level for the US. For this purpose, US employ-
ment data by sector and occupation have been translated into the corresponding EU classification (NACE for sectors and ISCO for
occupations). The correspondence tables used in making the sectoral and occupational data comparable between the EU and the
US are presented in the appendix. See also annex 6.5 for detailed overview tables containing key indicators on employment, skills
and wages by detailed sector (NACE-1).
12 Note that figures presented here can deviate from those in the previous section in general, and in charts 1 and 2 in particular. This
is because in this and later sections, data are based on Tables 2 and 3 of the OECD Labour Market Statistics database in which all
data, including population, are from labour force surveys. Population data are either annual averages or for a specific month of the
year. Lower and upper age limits can vary from country to country. In Table 3 of the OECD Labour Market Statistics database,
labour force series reflect national survey coverage. Reporting date for labour force series can be different in both Tables (annual
average, a specific quarter, a specific month, etc.). Data in the previous section, on the other hand, are based on OECD Table 1 for
which population figures are census-based and are mid-year estimates. Furthermore, even though labour force series are from
labour force surveys they exclude armed forces that are reported separately from external sources.
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Source: OECD, Labour market statistics database, Table 2
Notes: Data might deviate slightly from those in charts 52 and 53 due to differences in the underlying definitions and data sources.
See also footnote 12.
Chart 56 -  Evolution of employment rates in the EU and the US by gender and age group, 1970-2003
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and the US, increases have been
stronger in the US. Increases in the
female employment rate to more
than 55% in the EU, up from 40%
in the mid-1970s, remain inferior
to those observed in the US where
the female employment rate
increased by almost 20 percentage
points between the mid-1970s and
2000, bringing the female employ-
ment rate close to 70%.
A further breakdown by age group
helps to qualify these results.
Among prime-age men, employ-
ment rates have traditionally been
similar between the EU and the US.
Among prime-age women, on the
other hand, there has generally
been a significant employment gap
of more than 10 percentage points,
although this has been halved since
1998. However, the biggest discrep-
ancy in employment rates between
the EU and the US is observed for
the young (15-24) and older (55-64)
age groups, with employment gaps
at record levels of around 20 per-
centage points in each of them in
the late 1990s. This can be attrib-
uted to the fact that, during the last
25-30 years, employment rates in
Europe have risen only for prime-
age women, and fallen among
prime-age men and other age
groups for both men and women.
By contrast, in the US employment
rates of young people have risen
slightly and employment rates of
older people are back to levels seen
in the early 1970s, after a drop of
some 10 percentage points bet-
ween the mid-1970s and the mid-
1980s (similar to that observed in
Europe). The US has experienced a
similar, though less pronounced,
trend reversal for the employment
rates of people aged 65 or above,
while in the EU employment rates
of this age group are some 10 per-
centage points lower than in the US
and have been declining steadily to
levels below 5% (chart 56).
While the employment gaps among
young and prime-age people have
recently declined again, progress in
closing the employment gap for
older workers is still very modest,
with employment rates in the EU, in
particular of older women, more
than 20 percentage points below
those in the US. Among prime-age
women, on the other hand, the gap
has narrowed to less than 5 per-
centage points (chart 57). 
These varying trends have led to
significant changes in the composi-
Chart 57 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by gender and age group, 2003
(differences in employment rates by gender and age group wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
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Source: OECD Labour market statistics database, Table 2
Notes: Data might deviate slightly from those in charts 52 and 53 due to differences in the underlying definitions and data sources. *EU25
includes those new member states with available data in the OECD database. See also footnote 12.
Chart 57 -  Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by gender and age group, 2003
(differences in employment rates by gender and age group wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
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tion of the EU-US employment gap
by gender and age group. While,
traditionally, the comparatively
lower employment of prime-age
women has contributed most
strongly – up to a third - to the
overall gap, its contribution to the
overall employment gap has nar-
rowed substantially since 1997. In
2003, the lower employment of
older women in the EU, as com-
pared to the US, was the strongest
contributing factor to the overall
employment gap. The contribution
of the lower employment of older
men, moreover, has also been
increasing steadily, while that of
young people has decreased slight-
ly (chart 58).
2.2.2. … by sector of employment
When looking at the EU-US
employment gap by sector, it is
clear that – as the Employment
Rates report in 1998 rightly states -
an employment gap between
Europe and the US exists for all
services sectors. The biggest gap of
up to 4 percentage points (4.1 per-
centage points for EU25, 3.5 for
EU15) is found in real estate and
business activities. In wholesale and
retail trade and hotels and restau-
rants, the employment rates in the
EU are 2-3 percentage points below
those in the US, while in education
and health and social services the
gap is around 2 percentage points.
Only in agriculture and industry are
employment rates higher in the EU,
exceeding those in the US by 4 per-
centage points in manufacturing,
and by just over one percentage
point in construction and agricul-
ture. Most interestingly, and some-
what at odds with widespread per-
ceptions, employment rates and
employment shares in public
administration are found to be
rather similar in the EU and the US
(chart 59).13
These results are confirmed when
analysing differences in EU-US
employment structures based on a
more detailed breakdown of
employment by sector at NACE-2
level. Of the ten sectors for which
employment rates exceed those of
the US by up to 1.5 percentage
points, only two are in the service
sector (two transport sectors).  The
others include agriculture, construc-
tion and six manufacturing sectors.
On the other hand, of the ten sec-
tors with the biggest employment
gap compared to the US all but two
– manufacturing of other transport
equipment including railway and
aircraft, and manufacturing of
office machinery and computers -
are from the services sector. They
include three sectors of compara-
tively lower productivity and/or
with above average employment
shares of the low-skilled (wholesale
trade, retail trade, and hotels and
restaurants), and five sectors of
comparatively higher productivity
and above average employment
shares of the high-skilled (public
administration, social security and
defence; financial intermediation,
insurance and pension funding;
health and social work; education;
and other business activities such as
consultancy, architecture, engineer-
ing and advertising) (chart 62).
Hence there are important differ-
ences in employment structures in
general and important gaps in serv-
Chart 58 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by gender and age group, 1977-2003
(contributions to the overall EU-US employment gap in percentage points)
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Source: OECD Labour market statistics database, Table 2
Notes: Data might deviate slightly from those in charts 52 and 53 due to differences in the underlying definitions and data sources. See
also footnote 12.
13 Differences in sectoral employment structures across the EU Members States and candidate countries will be described in the folow-
ing section. For more detailed data on the EU member states and candidate countries, see also the tables in annex 6.5.
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ices sector employment in particu-
lar, and this despite the fact that
employment growth in some of
these sectors, notably in the private
market services (wholesale and
retail trade, hotels and restaurants,
business services) has outpaced that
in the US in recent years. However,
in this context it is also important to
state that, with the exception of
business services, the EU did not
outperform the US with regard to
job creation in some of the other,
predominantly high-skilled services
sectors such as education, health
and social services, and public
administration – all sectors which
make a negligible contribution to
closing the services employment
gap compared to other private
market services mentioned before.
2.2.3. … by occupation and skill
level
An analysis of the differences in EU-
US employment structures by occu-
pation and by skill level confirms
the finding that the EU-US employ-
ment gap is due to differences in
employment in both predominant-
ly high-productivity, high-skilled
areas and in predominantly low-
productivity, low-skilled areas.
While the biggest occupation-spe-
cific employment gap is found
among services workers and market
sales workers - where the US
employment rate exceeds that of
the EU by more than 5 percentage
points - there are other, predomi-
nantly medium and high-skilled,
occupations which also contribute
significantly to the EU-US employ-
ment gap, notably managers and
clerks. On the other hand, workers
in the EU are comparatively more
often employed as craft and related
workers or as technicians and asso-
ciate professionals. Moreover, in
most of the central and eastern
European Member States, there is
also a considerably higher share of
workers in skilled agricultural occu-
pations. As in the sectoral analysis,
the employment gaps in most occu-
pational categories tend to be more
pronounced in the new Member
States (NMS10) than in the EU15.
This applies to managers, legisla-
tors, professionals and clerks, as
well as to service workers and mar-
ket sales workers (chart 60).
Finally, there are differences in
employment by skill level between
the EU and the US.14 Comparable
data on educational attainment
Chart 59 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by sector (NACE-1), 2003
(differences of sector-specific employment rates wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
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14 The skill data used in this chapter are from Eurostat, LFS for EU25 and candidate countries, and from the OECD Labour Market
Statistics database for the US. Educational attainment levels have been classified according to the broad ISCED classification
described in annex 6.4. It should be noted that these data are not completely comparable and that the findings on employment by
skill level therefore need to be interpreted with caution. In particular differences in the average intellectual capacities of the low
skilled in countries with large population shares in that category and of those in countries with small shares are likely to exist.
Furthermore, when comparing employment rates for the least educated quartile across countries, other studies find considerably
lower rates for the least qualified in Europe than in the US (See e.g. Andrew Glyn (2001), “Inequalities of employment and wages in
OECD Countries”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics). Alternative sources for the measurement of internationally compara-
ble skill levels are used in other studies. These sources include in particular the OECD Adult Education and Literacy Survey (AELS) and
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey. As will be discussed further below, results on skill distributions
across countries might vary considerably according to the underlying data source. Since no long time-series on employment by skill
levels are available from the above sources, this section focuses on current differences in employment by skill levels only. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS for EU25; BLS, OES for US
Notes: US employment data by sector at SIC-3 or NAICS-3 level have been converted to NACE-1 level according to annex 6.2.
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levels (ISCED) from the OECD indi-
cates that while labour market par-
ticipation and employment of the
medium- and high-skilled is generally
lower - and unemployment of these
groups generally higher - in the EU
than in the US, the opposite holds
for the low-skilled group in the
EU15. Both labour market partici-
pation rates and employment rates
of the low-skilled are found to be
around 5 percentage points higher
in the EU15 compared to the US.
Also unemployment rates of the
low-skilled are found to be slightly
higher in the US than in the EU15.
On the other hand, employment
prospects for the low-skilled in the
new Member States are significant-
ly less favourable, with participa-
tion and employment rates in that
group of more than 15 percentage
points below those in the US, and
unemployment rates of more than
10 percentage points higher than in
the US (chart 61).
Chart 60 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by occupation, 2003
(differences of occupation - specific employment rates wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
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Source: Eurostat, LFS for EU25; BLS, OES for US
Notes: US employment data by occupation at SOC-3 level have been converted to 
ISCO-1 level according to annex 6.3.
Chart 61 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by skill level (ISCED), 2003
(differences of skill-specific (un)employment and activity rates wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, for EU25; OECD, Labour market statistics database for US
Notes: See annex 6.4. for a definition of the broad ISCED categories used in defining educational attainment levels.
Chart 60 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by occupation, 2003
(differences of occupation - specific employment rates wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
Chart 61 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by skill level (ISCED), 2003
(differences of skill-specific (un)employment and activity rates wrt respective 
US rates in percentage points)
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2.3. Concluding remarks
As shown above, the overall EU-US
employment gap remains, and in the
services sector in particular. The struc-
tural findings of the 1998
Employment Rates Report continue
to be largely valid, and this despite
some reduction in the EU-US employ-
ment gap in recent years. Furthe-
rmore, the enlargement of the EU
has not considerably changed the sit-
uation: with the exception of agricul-
ture and the employment situation
of the low-skilled, employment pat-
terns and differences with respect to
the US are comparable between the
EU15 and the NMS10, even if more
pronounced in the latter. In this
context, however, the weak recent
employment performance in the EU
in general and in some of the new
Member States in particular is of
concern.
Various recent studies challenge sim-
ple explanations of this employment
gap, arguing that, at least for some
EU countries, it can probably not be
fully explained by differences in pro-
ductivity growth and wage structures
alone.15 These studies point in particu-
lar to the following additional argu-
ments: first, the link between skills
and wages, showing that the US has
experienced exceptional employ-
ment growth not only in some low-
wage and low-skilled retail trade sec-
tors, but also in some high-wage,
high-skill sectors, such as education
and research or business services; sec-
ond, the predominant role of increas-
ing participation in the US, notably
through increases in female partici-
pation and less recurrence to early
retirement; third, the differences in
household consumption patterns
and final demand structures notably
for services, in part as a consequence
of the above increases in labour mar-
ket participation by women and
older people; and fourth, and more
generally, the potentially crucial role
of the differences in working times as
reflecting differences in preferences
for leisure against work.16 These
issues will be explored in more detail
in the section on reasons behind the
EU-US employment rate gap.
3. Employment
structures in the
enlarged European
Union
This section analyses the employ-
ment structures within the EU, and
attempts to identify employment
gaps across the EU Member States in
comparison both to the EU average
and to the US. It focuses in particu-
lar on the services sector at detailed
NACE-2 level and on employment
rates rather than employment
shares. It also presents detailed
breakdowns of employment struc-
tures and employment growth rates
based on employment data by sec-
tor, occupation and skills. Since no
Chart 62 - Decomposition of the EU-US employment gap by detailed sector (NACE-2), 2003
(differences of sector-specific employment rates wrt respective US rates in percentage points)
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15  See section 4 on "Explaining differences in employment structures" for more detail and references to the most relevant studies.
16  Olivier Blanchard (2004), "The economic future of Europe", NBER working paper no. 10310, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Source: Eurostat, LFS for EU25; BLS, OES for US
Notes: The chart shows the employment gaps for those ten sectors with the highest positive employment rates gap in favour of the EU
(the upper panel of the chart) and for those ten sectors with the highest negative employment rates gap between the EU and the US
(the lower panel of the chart). Sectors are sorted in declining order from the top to the bottom, from largest positive employment gap
to largest negative employment gap. US employment data by sector at SIC-3 or NAICS-3 level have been converted to NACE-2 level
according to annex 6.2. For some sectors (construction, hotels and restaurants, education, health and social work), there is no further
disaggregation so that NACE-1 and NACE-2 coincide.
comparable long time-series data
are available for such a comparative
analysis across EU Member States,
the section focuses on employment
structures and employment per-
formance for the period 1998-2003.
Detailed key employment statistics
by sector at NACE-1 level can be
found in the annex 6.2.
3.1. Sectoral employment
structures
Table 41 gives an overview of
employment rates, employment
shares and annual employment
growth rates by broad sector in the
EU Member States and the candi-
date countries. Employment rates
in agriculture vary from less than
2% in Belgium, Germany, Sweden
and the UK to around 10% in
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and
Poland and to almost 20% in
Romania. Employment in agricul-
ture has continued to decline in all
EU Member States, with the excep-
tion of France, and in the candidate
countries. The employment decline
in agriculture was generally more
pronounced in the new Member
States – with employment declines
of 4% or more - notably in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and
Romania. Similar decreases in
employment in agriculture were
also observed in some of the EU15
Member States, notably Belgium,
Finland and the UK.
The lowest population shares in
employment in industry of around
15% are observed in Belgium,
France, Poland and, most notably,
Greece. Member States with com-
paratively high employment rates
in industry, on the other hand,
include Austria, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia. In all of
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Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Employment growth refers to annualised employment growth rates for the period 1998-2003. No data available for LU. No data
on the breakdown of total employment by broad industry available for NL. For MT, no data on employment rates 2003 available due to
the lack of population data for 2003. For CY, MT, BG and EU, no data on employment growth 1998-2003 available due to the lack of data
for 1998.
Employment rate Employment share Employment growth 1998-2003
Total Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services
BE 59.3 1.0 14.8 43.5 1.7 25.0 73.4 1.0 -4.6 -0.8 1.8
CZ 64.9 2.9 26.0 35.9 4.5 40.1 55.4 -0.5 -4.4 -1.3 0.5
DK 75.1 2.3 17.4 55.2 3.1 23.2 73.5 0.1 -2.0 -2.5 1.1
DE 64.9 1.5 20.5 43.0 2.3 31.5 66.2 0.2 -2.5 -1.6 1.2
EE 62.3 3.8 19.8 38.7 6.2 31.7 62.1 -0.9 -8.6 -1.9 0.6
EL 57.9 8.7 12.9 36.3 15.1 22.3 62.6 0.2 -1.6 -0.8 1.1
ES 59.6 3.3 18.4 37.9 5.5 30.9 63.6 4.0 -2.2 4.2 4.6
FR 62.8 2.7 15.7 44.2 4.3 24.9 70.3 2.0 2.2 0.8 2.3
IE 65.0 3.7 18.2 42.9 5.6 28.0 66.0 3.6 -3.5 2.7 4.8
IT 56.1 2.6 17.9 35.6 4.5 32.0 63.5 1.6 -2.4 1.0 2.3
CY 69.2 2.8 16.2 50.2 4.1 23.3 72.6
LV 61.7 8.8 16.8 36.2 14.2 27.1 58.7 0.5 -3.9 0.2 1.9
LT 62.8 11.4 17.4 34.0 18.2 27.7 54.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 0.8
LU : : : : : : : : : : :
HU 57.0 3.1 19.1 34.9 5.4 33.5 61.1 1.5 -4.5 0.7 2.6
MT : : : : 2.7 29.7 67.6 : : : :
NL 73.6 : : : : : : 1.9 : : :
AT 69.1 3.7 20.7 44.7 5.4 30.0 64.7 0.7 -1.9 0.8 0.8
PL 51.4 8.8 14.9 27.6 17.2 29.0 53.7 -2.1
PT 67.3 6.0 23.3 38.0 8.9 34.7 56.4 1.0 -2.3 -0.5 2.7
SI 62.5 4.2 23.4 34.4 6.7 37.5 55.1 0.0 -7.3 -1.5 2.2
SK 57.9 3.5 22.1 32.3 6.0 38.2 55.7 -0.3 -6.2 -1.0 0.9
FI 68.7 3.4 18.3 46.6 5.0 26.7 67.9 1.9 -4.3 0.8 2.9
SE 73.6 1.6 16.7 55.2 2.2 22.7 75.0 2.0 -2.2 -0.8 3.0
UK 71.7 0.8 16.9 53.8 1.2 23.6 75.0 1.1 -4.9 -1.4 2.1
EU 62.8 3.2 18.1 41.2 5.1 28.9 65.6 1.0 : : :
BG 53.1 5.3 17.3 30.5 9.9 32.6 57.4 : : : :
RO 58.7 19.7 18.3 20.8 33.5 31.1 35.4 -2.6 -3.9 -3.1 -0.9
Table 41 - Employment rates and employment shares in the EU Member States and 
the candidate countries by sector, 2003 
these countries, more than 20% of
the working-age population are
employed in industry, reaching up
to 26% in the Czech Republic – and
this despite recent decreases in
employment in industry of more
than 1 per cent per year in some of
these countries, notably the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Germany, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Employment in industry has also
declined to a similar extent in some
of those countries with below-aver-
age employment levels in industry,
including Lithuania, the UK and,
most notably, Denmark. The latter
had the strongest employment
decline in industry of, on average,
2.5% per year, exceeded only by
Romania which experienced
declines of around 3% per year. By
contrast, employment growth in
industry, and in construction in par-
ticular, was favourable in Ireland,
Italy and, most notably, Spain. In
the latter, annual growth rates of
more than 4% were observed
between 1998 and 2003, similar to
the employment growth rates in
the Spanish services sector in the
same period which were higher
than in all other EU Member States
except Ireland.
The services sector has the highest
employment rate in all Member
States and candidate countries
except Romania where all three
broad sectors have similar employ-
ment rates of around 20%.
Nevertheless, employment rates in
services of more than 50% of the
working-age population in Den-
mark, Sweden and the UK are in
sharp contrast to employment rates
in services of below 40% in the
NMS10 (except Cyprus and Malta)
and the southern European Member
States, and rates at or below 30% in
Bulgaria (30.5%), Poland (27.6%)
and Romania (20.8%).
In all the southern Member States,
most of the central and eastern
European Member States and the
candidate countries, there clearly
remains significant potential for job
creation in the services sector when
compared both to the US and to
the more advanced service econo-
mies within the EU. And indeed,
again with the exception of
Romania, employment in services
has grown in all Member States
between 1998 and 2003. However,
among those Member States with
comparatively low levels of service
sector employment, only the south-
ern Member States and Hungary,
Latvia and Slovenia have known
significant employment growth
rates of more than 1 per cent per
year in the period 1998-2003.
Among those Member States with
relatively high employment levels
in services, on the other hand,
employment growth in services in
general has also been above aver-
age in the period 1998-2003, with
annual employment growth rates
of at least 1 per cent.17
It is worth noting that there is no
evidence of a trade-off between
employment in industry and servic-
es. A closer look at the employment
performance of these two sectors
over the last five years shows that
employment developments in both
sectors go hand in hand, and for all
skill groups. So, while in Ireland and
Spain, employment continued to
grow strongly in both sectors,
employment growth notably in
services was well below the average
in the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Germany, Greece and the Slovak
Republic (charts 63 - 64).
Charts 65 and 66 further highlight
cross-country differences in employ-
ment rates and employment growth
within the services sector at detailed
sectoral NACE-2 level. The first set of
charts indicates the deviations of
Member States employment rate in
a given sector from the EU average
in percentage points. The second set
of charts shows the variation in
annual employment growth rates
across the Member States and candi-
date countries by sector. For compar-
ison, these charts also indicate the
Member States’ position relative to
the US. For more detailed key
employment statistics by sector,
including agriculture and industry,
see also annex 6.5.
The variation in employment rates
across the Member States is particu-
larly large in health and social services
– with an employment gap of more
than 10 percentage points between
the Member States with the highest
employment rates in this sector (the
Nordic member states) and those
with the lowest employment rates
(Cyprus and Greece and the candi-
date countries). Considerable
employment gaps within the EU of
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Notes: dotted line shows simple regression line
17 No employment growth data are available for Cyprus and Malta.
Chart 63 - Employment rates in industry and services in the EU 
and the candidate countries, 2003
up to 10 percentage points are also
observed in real estate and business
services, as well as in wholesale and
retail trade. There are further
employment gaps of around 5 per-
centage points in hotels and restau-
rants and in education, however, little
variation is observed in the employ-
ment rates across Member States in
transport and communication, finan-
cial intermediation and public admin-
istration (chart 65).
Although employment in the serv-
ices sectors has been growing in
most Member States and candidate
countries, there are considerable dif-
ferences in the growth rates across
countries. These variations are most
pronounced in real estate and busi-
ness services, education, health and
social services, and in hotels and
restaurants. In business services,
employment growth rates range
from more than 7.5% per year in
Lithuania, Spain, Sweden and, most
notably, Hungary, to less than 3% in
the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Slovenia, and the UK. In Romania,
moreover, employment in business
services has declined (chart 66).
A few Member States managed to
reach employment levels compara-
ble to those in the US: Cyprus, in
wholesale and retail trade and in
hotels and restaurants; Cyprus and
the UK, in financial intermediation;
Sweden, in education and in real
estate and business services; France
and Belgium, in public administra-
tion; the Nordic Member States and
the UK, in health and social services;
and, finally, most European coun-
tries show higher employment rates
in transport and communication. In
most Member States, however,
employment growth rates in the
above service sectors – except in
education - have recently exceeded
those in the US, thus contributing
to the closing of the EU-US employ-
ment gap since the late 1990s.
3.2. Employment structures by
occupation and skill level
Table 42 shows that differences in
sectoral employment structures are
also reflected in occupational
employment structures. The
employment rates among the most
skilled occupations - including legis-
lators, managers, professionals and
technicians – are highest in the
Nordic Member States and Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland
and the UK – where a third or more
of all employed are working in
these non-manual, skilled occupa-
tions. On the other hand, only
around one in four employed in the
southern Member States and in
most of the new Member States,
and only one in five in Poland and
the candidate countries, work in
these occupations. Furthermore,
the employment rates among man-
ual, skilled workers vary between
less than one-fourth in Belgium,
France, Germany, and the UK, to
30% or more in Austria, Czech
Republic, Greece, Lithuania,
Sweden, and Portugal. Finally, com-
paratively high employment rates
of unskilled workers of 7% or more
are observed in the Baltic Member
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Chart 64 - Employment growth in industry and services in the EU 
and the candidate countries, 1998-2003
States, Cyprus, Denmark, Portugal,
Spain and the UK.
As regards the recent employment
growth by broad occupation, the
highest growth rates have been
observed in the group of non-
manual, skilled occupations in all
Member States and candidate
countries, reaching annual aver-
age growth rates of more than 3%
notably in Italy, Portugal, and
Spain, and of 2-3% in France,
Hungary, Slovenia and Sweden.
Only in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland
and the Slovak Republic has
employment among non-manual,
skilled workers declined between
1998 and 2003. Employment in
unskilled occupations has also
increased in many Member States,
and in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Greece, Sweden and the
UK at even higher rates than in
non-manual, skilled occupations.
The performance of manual,
skilled workers across Member
States is more mixed, with em-
ployment growth rates per year
varying between around 3% in
Finland and Spain to around -3%
in Poland and Slovenia.
As for sectors, charts 67 and 68
highlight cross-country differences
in employment rates and employ-
ment growth within the services
sector at detailed occupational
ISCO-1 level. The first set of charts
indicates the deviations of
Member States’ employment rates
in a given occupation from the EU
average in percentage points. The
second set of charts shows the
variation in annual employment
growth rates across the Member
States and candidate countries by
occupation.
Employment rates 2003 Employment shares 2003
Annualised employment growth rates
1998-2003
Total
Non-
manual
skilled
Manual
skilled
unskilled
Non-
manual
skilled
Manual
skilled
unskilled Total
Non-
manual
skilled
Manual
skilled
unskilled
BE 59.3 33.9 19.0 5.7 57.2 32.0 9.6 1.0 1.4 -0.4 3.1
CZ 64.9 28.9 32.1 3.7 44.5 49.5 5.7 -0.5 0.4 -0.3 -8.0
DK 75.1 39.3 27.6 7.9 52.3 36.7 10.6 0.1 1.5 -0.6 -3.4
DE 64.9 34.9 24.0 4.9 53.7 36.9 7.6 0.2 1.1 -1.0 0.8
EE 62.3 26.5 28.5 7.0 42.4 45.8 11.3 -0.9 -1.2 -0.9 0.0
EL 57.9 23.3 30.2 4.0 40.2 52.1 6.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.0
ES 59.6 23.7 27.1 8.4 39.8 45.5 14.1 4.0 4.7 3.4 4.0
FR 62.8 31.9 24.7 5.3 50.7 39.3 8.4 2.0 2.4 1.1 3.5
IE 65.0 33.9 25.6 5.1 52.2 39.5 7.9 3.6 : : :
IT 56.1 25.2 25.5 4.8 45.0 45.4 8.5 1.6 3.9 1.1 1.4
CY 69.2 29.7 27.7 11.1 42.9 40.1 16.1 : : : :
LV 61.7 23.6 29.3 8.6 38.3 47.6 13.9 0.5 1.2 -0.4 1.2
LT 62.8 21.5 34.0 7.2 34.2 54.1 11.4 -0.2 -1.5 1.2 0.4
LU : : : : : : : : : : :
HU 57.0 23.7 28.2 4.5 41.6 49.4 7.9 1.5 2.5 1.0 -0.2
MT : : : : : : 12.8 : : : :
NL 73.6 : : : : : : 1.9 : : :
AT 69.1 31.9 30.6 6.4 46.1 44.2 9.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 1.6
PL 51.4 19.8 27.3 3.9 38.6 53.2 7.6 -2.1 -1.0 -2.6 -3.7
PT 67.3 22.7 35.2 9.0 33.7 52.2 13.4 1.0 3.2 -0.4 1.7
SI 62.5 28.9 29.8 3.0 46.3 47.7 4.8 0.0 2.7 -2.5 0.0
SK 57.9 23.6 28.8 5.2 40.7 49.8 9.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -3.2
FI 68.7 33.6 28.6 6.2 48.9 41.6 9.0 1.9 1.2 2.6 5.3
SE 73.6 38.6 30.4 4.2 52.5 41.3 5.7 2.0 2.6 1.1 3.8
UK 71.7 38.9 24.7 7.7 54.3 34.5 10.7 1.1 0.8 0.2 7.3
EU 62.8 30.2 26.2 5.7 48.0 41.6 9.2 : : : :
BG 53.1 20.4 26.1 6.3 38.4 49.2 11.8 : : : :
RO 58.7 14.3 39.9 4.4 24.4 68.0 7.6 -2.6 -1.4 -3.1 -1.8
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Table 42 - Employment rates and employment shares in the EU Member States and 
the candidate countries by occupation, 2003 
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Employment growth refers to annualised employment growth rates for the period 1998-2003. Employment shares by occupation
and skill level might not add up to 100% due to missing information. No data available for LU and MT, partly due to the lack of reliabil-
ity of existing survey information. No data on the breakdown of total employment by skill level available for NL. For CY, BG and EU, no
data on employment growth 1998-2003 are available due to the lack of data for 1998. For IE, no information on employment growth
1998-2003 by skill level is available due to the lack of data on the breakdown of employment by skill level in IE in 1998.
The extent to which employment
rates vary across Member States are
similar in the various occupational
categories, but are most pro-
nounced in the group of techni-
cians and associate professionals
group, implying an employment
gap in this occupational group of
more than 10 percentage points
between those Member States with
the highest employment rates
(Denmark and Sweden) and those
with the lowest (Greece, Ireland
and Portugal). Compared to the US,
none of the European countries
employ relatively more people as
clerks or services workers; few
employ relatively more managers
(Estonia, Ireland, and the UK) or
plant and machine operators
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia); half
employ relatively more profession-
als and technicians (most notably
the Nordic member states, Ireland
and the UK); and all employ rela-
tively more craft and related trade
workers (chart 67).
Although recent employment
growth rates by occupation also vary
considerably across EU Member
States, there are some common pat-
terns. In particular, employment
among professionals, technicians,
associate professionals and among
service workers grew in almost all EU
Member States, while it fell among
craft and related trades workers in
almost all Member States, except
Finland, Slovenia and Spain. Among
the other occupations, employment
performance was more mixed. This
applies in particular to the following
occupational groups: managers,
where high growth rates of around
5% per year in Hungary and Portugal
contrast with job losses of similar size
in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania; clerks, with annual
employment growth rates of around
4% in Latvia, Portugal and Spain,
compared to similar, or even higher,
job losses in Denmark, Lithuania,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic; and
elementary occupations, where,
again, employment growth rates of
around 5% or more a year in Finland,
France Spain, Sweden and the UK
contrast sharply with considerable
job destruction in the Czech
Republic, Denmark, the Slovak
Republic, and Poland (chart 68). 
As expected, with respect to the
skill level, the variation in employ-
ment rates across EU Member
States is largest among the low-
skilled, while much less pronounced
among the medium- and high-
skilled. Employment rates of the
low-skilled in particular vary from
25 percentage points above the EU
average in Portugal –the country
with the highest population share
of low-skilled as measured by com-
parable data on educational attain-
ment levels – and from more than
10 percentage points above the EU
average in Denmark and Sweden -
to more than 20 percentage points
below the EU average notably in
the Czech Republic, Poland and the
Slovak Republic. Belgium and
Germany also have employment
rates of the low-skilled well below
the EU average. Above average
employment rates of medium- and
high-skilled are found in particular
in Austria, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Sweden and the UK.
Moreover, there are important dif-
ferences in the employment rates
by skill level across sectors. While
the variation in employment rates
in industry is similar across skill lev-
els, in most of the services sectors,
and most notably in real estate and
business services, education, and
health and social services, there
tends to be much higher variation
in employment rates of the high-
skilled across countries than in the
employment rates of medium- or
low-skilled.
Most interestingly, in Germany,
above average employment rates
of the high-skilled contrast with
below average rates of the low-
skilled in industry, while in most of
the services sectors, employment
rates are found to be below aver-
age for both the low-skilled and the
high-skilled groups. This applies in
particular to business services, real
estate and education, where
employment rates of the high-
skilled are around 3 percentage
points below the EU average.
Finally, in health and social services
Germany has above average
employment rates for the low-
skilled and below average employ-
ment rates for the high-skilled.
This observation is in sharp contrast
to the employment rates by skill
level observed, for example, in
Sweden, where employment rates
of the low-skilled exceed the EU
average in all sectors, except agri-
culture and public administration –
and most notably in real estate and
business services and in health and
social services. On the other hand,
employment rates of the high-
skilled are above average only in
real estate and business services
and, most strongly, in education
and health and social services, while
considerably below average in
industry.
As regards recent employment
growth by skill level, in all EU
Member States, except Lithuania
and the Slovak Republic, the
employment evolution of the high-
skilled was positive over the 1998-
2003 period, exceeding 5% growth
rates in Austria, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. Over the same time period,
employment of the low-skilled
declined in most Member States,
with the exception of France,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. The contrast in the
diverging employment evolution of
the low-skilled and the high-skilled
is particularly pronounced in
Austria and in a number of new
Member States, including the Czech
Republic, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia.
While this finding of differing
employment evolution does hold in
general across all sectors, a closer
look at the sectoral employment
performance reveals some impor-
tant differences in job creation pat-
terns by skill level across countries:
first, the employment of the low-
skilled has been falling in particular
in industry in all Member States,
except Latvia, Portugal and Spain
while growing strongly among the
high-skilled in Latvia and Portugal
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(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
-5%
0%
5%
10%
CY US DK UK AT PT EL LT ES IE LV SE DE IT CZ SI EE FI FR BE HU BG PL SK RO
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Employment rates in financial intermediation in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
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Employment rates in real estate and business services in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Employment rates in public administration in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Employment rates in education in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Employment rates in health and social services in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Chart 65 - Employment rates by detailed services sector (NACE-2)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: US data highlighted in light blue. No data available for LU, MT and NL.
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Employment growth in wholesale and retail trade in the EU
and the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Employment growth in real estate and business services in the EU and
the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Employment growth in public administration in the EU and
the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Employment growth in education in the EU and the candidate countries, 1998-2003
(annualised employment growth rates in %)
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Employment growth in health and social services in the EU
and the candidate countries, 1998-2003
(annualised employment growth rates in %)
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Chart 66 - Employment growth by detailed services sector (NACE-2)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Employment growth refers to annualised employment growth rates for the period 1998-2003. US data highlighted in light blue.
EU15 and NMS10 averages (for countries with available data) highlighted in  light blue. EU25 averages not reported due to lack of infor-
mation on employment by sector for Poland in 1998. No data available for CY, LU, MT, NL, PL and BG.
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Employment rates of legislators and managers in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
-7,5%
-5,0%
-2,5%
0,0%
2,5%
5,0%
7,5%
UK IE EE US BE FI DK PT EL LV AT FR LT ES BG CZ HU SI DE SE SK PL IT CY RO
Employment rates of professionals in the EU and the candidate countries, 2003
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Employment rates of technicians and associate professionals in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Employment rates of clerks in the EU and the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Employment rates of service workers in the EU and the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
-7,5%
-5,0%
-2,5%
0,0%
2,5%
5,0%
7,5%
US SE DK UK CY FI IE AT PT IT EE ES LV SK EL CZ HU LT FR DE BG SI BE PL RO
Employment rates of craft and related trades workers in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Employment rates of plant and machine operators in the EU
and the candidate countries, 2003
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Employment rates of elementary occupations in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
(deviation from EU25 average employment rate in percentage points)
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Chart 67 - Employment rates by occupation (ISCO-1)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Information on the category of skilled agricultural workers not shown in the chart. US data highlighted in light blue. No data
available for LU, MT and NL.
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Employment growth of legislators and managers in the EU and
the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Employment growth of professionals in the EU and
the candidate countries, 1998-2003
(annualised employment growth rates in %)
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Employment growth of technicians and associate professionals in the EU and
the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Employment growth of clerks in the EU and the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Employment growth of service workers in the EU and the candidate countries,
1998-2003
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Employment growth of craft and related trades workers in the EU
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Employment growth of plant and machine operators in the EU
and the candidate countries, 1998-2003
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Chart 68 - Employment growth by occupation (ISCO-1)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Employment growth refers to annualised employment growth rates for the period 1998-2003. US data highlighted in light blue.
EU15 and NMS10 averages (for countries with available data) highlighted in grey blue. Information on the category of skilled agricul-
tural workers not shown in the chart. No data available for CY, LU and IE.
as well as in Austria and Italy.
Furthermore, in some services sec-
tors, notably transport and commu-
nication, financial intermediation
and public administration, employ-
ment of the low-skilled has been
declining over the past five years,
except in Belgium, France, Latvia,
Portugal and Spain, in transport
and communication; the Nether-
lands in financial intermediation;
and Latvia, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and Romania in
public administration. Employment
of the high-skilled in these sectors,
on the other hand, has continued
to increase in almost all Member
States.
Employment patterns by skill level
were somewhat different in the
remaining services sectors, includ-
ing, on the one hand, wholesale
and retail trade and hotels and
restaurants – two comparatively
low-paying, low-skill sectors – and
on the other, real estate and busi-
ness services, education, and
health and social services – three
comparatively high-skill, high-pay-
ing services. In all of these, there is
stronger evidence of positive
employment creation for both the
high-skilled and the low-skilled, in
a number of Member States. These
include Denmark, Finland, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
with regard to the low-skill, low-
paying services sectors, and
Austria, Greece, Italy and Sweden,
in the case of high-skill, high-pay-
ing sectors.
Real estate and business services con-
tinued to be the sector with the
strongest employment growth rates
for all skill groups. In this sector,
employment of the high-skilled con-
tinued to rise at high rates of up to
10% a year in all Member States.
Employment of the low-skilled in that
sector, on the other hand, declined in
the Czech Republic, Denmark and
Slovenia only, while also rising for the
low-skilled in all other Member
States, with employment growth
rates of around 5% a year in Greece,
Italy, Spain and Sweden, and of up to
10% a year in Estonia, Hungary, and
the Slovak Republic.
Sweden is furthermore a particularly
interesting case in that, similar to
the recent employment perform-
ance in the US, job reductions in the
comparatively low-skill, low-paying
sectors for all skill groups went
hand in hand with employment cre-
ation for all skill groups in some of
the high-skill, high-paying services
sectors, notably real estate and
business services and education.
Other countries with similar experi-
ences are Belgium and France,
where employment reductions in
the former sectors contrast with a
more positive evolution for all skill
groups in real estate and business
services as well as in health and
social services.
For further detail on employment
growth by skill level in the various
services sectors, see annex 6.5 which
contains detailed information on
employment rates, employment
shares and employment growth
rates by sector and skill level.
Furthermore it contains compar-
isons of employment growth rates
by skill level for the two distinct
sub-periods, 1998-2000 and 2000-
2003, showing that a more
favourable employment perform-
ance of the low-skilled in most sec-
tors in the first period was offset by
the often quite strong employment
decline in the second period.
4. Explaining
differences in
employment
structures
The analysis so far clearly shows that
important differences in employment
structures do exist both between the
US and Europe, as well as within the
European Union. Many of these dif-
ferences – such as the employment
gap in the services sector in the EU
when compared to the US - have
existed for several decades. There are,
however, signs of improvements since
the second half of the 1990s, with
employment growth in the period
1998-2003 in general more fav-
ourable in Europe than in the US,
allowing certain Member States to
increase their employment rates to
levels above those in the US. While in
1998, Denmark was the only EU
Member State with an employment
rate higher than that of the US, by
2003 the Netherlands, Sweden, and
the UK had also surpassed the US.
Clearly, the services sector has been
the driving force behind job creation
in all European labour markets, and
in most EU Member States employ-
ment growth rates for most services
sectors were higher than in the US. In
particular, in real estate and business
services and in transport and commu-
nication, almost all EU Member States
showed higher employment growth
rates than the US between 1998 and
2003. This was also true for wholesale
and retail trade, hotels and restau-
rants, and health and social services,
where employment growth rates in a
majority of EU Member States out-
performed those observed for the US.
Notwithstanding, employment rates
in these sectors in most EU Member
States remained well below those in
the US. With regard to these EU-US
comparisons it is important to note
that in the education sector both
employment rates and recent
employment growth rates were con-
siderably higher in the US than in all
EU Member States, apart from
Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the UK
where recent growth rates of
employment in education were high-
er, but – with the exception of
Sweden - employment rates still much
lower.
The previous two sections therefore
do raise questions as to the determi-
nants of employment structures, and
the link between employment struc-
tures and overall employment per-
formance. Does Europe, as is some-
times predicted, have lower employ-
ment levels in services just because of
higher labour productivity? Is it,
moreover, lagging behind because of
institutional labour market inflexibili-
ties and path dependence that cause
wage inflexibilities? Or are the differ-
ences in employment structures
across sectors or occupations instead
structural in that they reflect underly-
ing differences in the demand and
supply of skills, in relative wage struc-
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tures, in consumption patterns or,
more generally, in individual and soci-
etal preferences for work, leisure and
services?
After showing that there is little, if
any, evidence for the traditional
explanation that differences in
employment structures can be
accounted for by productivity dif-
ferentials across sectors and coun-
tries, this section sheds more light
on the various alternative potential
factors which might explain the
observed differences in employ-
ment structures: skills, wages and
final demand structures.
4.1. Theoretical explanations and
major hypotheses
Economic literature provides a series
of potential determinants of
employment structures in general
and services sector employment in
particular, from both the (labour)
demand side and the supply side.
On the demand side, the classical
development argument goes back
to Fourastié (1949) and Baumol
(1967, 2001) and their so-called
“cost disease” argument on differ-
ential productivity growth.18
According to this argument, some
sectors, such as the services sector,
have structurally lower labour pro-
ductivity growth rates, implying rel-
atively lower wages and labour
costs. In combination with higher
income levels, employment in the
long run is then shifted from more
costly, capital-intensive, high-pro-
ductivity industry sectors to less
costly, labour-intensive, low-pro-
ductivity services sectors. Capital
deepening might further lead to
changes in the skill requirements on
the various jobs, requiring more
skilled workers to fill jobs in the
high-productivity sectors in indus-
try. From a more short-term per-
spective, it is often argued that
“wage compression” and, most
notably, institutional rigidities on
downward wage flexibility are likely
to inhibit job creation in particular
in low-productivity services.
Based on cross-country comparisons
of levels of apparent labour pro-
ductivity, however, there is in gen-
eral no support for the view that
higher productivity levels account
for lower employment levels in the
services sectors. There is no clear
correlation between labour produc-
tivity and employment perform-
ance at sectoral level and, if any-
thing, a positive relationship exists
between labour productivity and
employment rates most notably in
real estate and business services
(chart 69).
Furthermore the recent strong
increases in labour productivity in
many services sectors and sustained
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Apparent labour productivity and employment rates in wholesale and retail trade in the EU and the
candidate countries
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Apparent labour productivity and employment rates in hotels and restaurants in the EU and
the candidate countries
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Apparent labour productivity and employment rates in transport and communication in the EU and
the candidate countries
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Apparent labour productivity and employment rates in real estate and business services in the EU
and the candidate countries
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Chart 69 - Labour productivity and employment rates by detailed sector (NACE-1)
Source: Eurostat, LFS for employment rates, and LCS for apparent labour productivity
Notes: No information available on gross added value for missing sectors, notably: financial intermediation, public administration, 
education, and health and social services; dotted lines show simple regression lines
18 Jean Fourastié (1949), Le grand espoir du XXe siècle, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris; William Baumol (1967), Macroeconomics
of unbalanced growth: the anatomy of urban crisis, American Economic Review, 57, 415-426, and (2001), Paradox of the services:
exploding costs, persistent demand, in: Thijs ten Raa and Ronald Schettkat (eds), The growth of service industries: The paradox of
exploding costs and persistent demand, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 3-28.
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job creation in the highly produc-
tive sectors in both the US and
many EU labour markets call into
question the existence of Baumol’s
“cost disease”19. There are, howev-
er, other demand-side factors that
may explain a similar trend towards
the services sector in the inter-
industry division of labour. These
include trade specialisation, struc-
tural change and outsourcing of
services activities. 
Trade specialisation can help
explain differences in employment
structures across countries, as in
particular those which have a high
share of net manufactured exports
to GDP also exhibit greater employ-
ment shares in manufacturing than
countries that are net importers of
manufactured goods. Trade in serv-
ices, on the other hand, is also
increasing. With regard to out-
sourcing, the most frequent out-
sourcing of activities is from manu-
facturing to services. Services might
be more frequent as intermediate
products in manufacturing than the
other way around, and indirect
employment (i.e. employment in
supply sectors compared to respec-
tive goods-producing or service-
producing sectors) is also generally
higher in services.20 Finally, inter-
industry wage differentials due to
either ‘efficiency wages’, rent shar-
ing or sorting effects – i.e. unob-
served heterogeneity of workers
and firms across industries – might
lead firms to adopt new technolo-
gies more easily or to revert to
training and workplace reorganisa-
tion as a response to the compara-
tively higher wages, allowing them
to substitute capital for labour and
further increase productivity.21
On the supply side, differences in
both the skill composition of the
population and the structure of the
labour supply behaviour of individ-
uals might contribute to varying
outcomes with regard to employ-
ment structures across sectors and
occupations. In particular, changes
in the labour supply behaviour of
households and parent couples
might lead to higher demand for
various services, such as care services
or restaurants. This may in turn lead
to differences in the ‘marketisation’
of services across countries. Such
variations in household consump-
tion and final demand structures -
brought about by changes in
labour supply behaviour, household
production or demographic struc-
tures - may also play an important
role for labour demand. For exam-
ple, economies with comparatively
higher birth rates have a higher
demand for education, or geo-
graphic areas specialised on tourism
have a specific seasonal demand for
services. Higher shares of final
demand for services as a share in
GDP and relative demand structures
that are more concentrated on serv-
ices, are likely to have an impact on
employment structures. At the
same time, by setting incentives,
relative wage structures might also
be of importance for individuals’
decisions regarding education,
labour supply, occupational choice
or inter-sectoral mobility.22
While noting the long list of poten-
tial determinants of employment
structures, three alternative
hypotheses will be addressed, fol-
lowing on from Freeman and
Schettkat (2001):23
1.“wage compression hypothesis”:
according to this hypothesis, the
more narrow wage distribution in
the EU than in the US, due to
wage-setting institutions, might
reduce low-wage employment in
the EU, especially in the services
sector. The US is considered as
having a more flexible wage
structure, responding with flexi-
ble downward adjustments in the
relative wages of low-skilled
workers to the relevant economic
shocks, such as oil price increases,
skill-biased technological change,
or globalisation and outsourcing
activities. This action protects
low-wage, low-skilled employ-
ment in industries and occupa-
tions that disproportionately use
low-skilled labour. By contrast, in
Europe the wages of unskilled
workers remain constant or even
increase relative to wages of
skilled workers, thus leading to
falling employment in low-wage,
low-skill sectors, and services sec-
tors in particular, in Europe rela-
19 See also Employment in Europe 2003, chapter 2 “Employment specialisation and productivity growth”.
20 For more detail, see e.g. Schettkat and Yocarini (2003), Demand Patterns and Employment Growth in Perspective: State-of-the-Art
Review, DEMPATEM Deliverable Report N°1,Utrecht University, Faculty of Social Sciences.
21  In the case of the US, e.g. Borjas and Ramey (2000), Market responses to interindustry wage differentials, NBER Working Paper
No.7799, show that there is a large degree of stability of inter-industry wage differentials over time, in line with efficiency wage or
rent sharing hypotheses.  In particular they do not find any evidence for offsetting adjustments by employment to high-wage levels
in an industry, but other long-term adjustments instead, notably of productivity and capital-labour ratios. Firms in fact are found to
respond to stable inter-industry wage structures “by raising productivity to equal [non-competitive] wages”, implying changing inter-
industry productivity structures over time, with high-wage industries becoming increasingly more productive. The authors show that
these are general results which are not just driven by deindustrialisation trends.
22  See in particular the related discussion in Employment in Europe 2003, chapter 3 “Wage structures and determinants in an enlarged
Europe”.
23  Freeman, Richard and Ronald Schettkat (2001), Differentials in service industry employment growth: Germany and the US in the com-
parable German American structural database, study report for the European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs. In their
study, the authors discuss a 4th hypothesis, namely that of measurement problems which would not necessarily allow to conclude that
differences in services sector employment between the EU and the US have a major structural component. According to this hypoth-
esis, the differences in employment structures and, notably, in services sector employment, between countries, and between the EU
and the US in particular, are a statistical artefact, owing to the fact that National Accounts Statistics classify firms into industry by their
main product. If European firms were less prone to outsource services activities than their US counterparts, services employment
would be underestimated in Europe, or US services sector employment overstated, since much of European business service activities
would be counted in manufacturing rather than services in the available statistics. This hypothesis, which is generally found to be
unsubstantiated, is not treated at any greater length in this chapter.
 
tive to the US. According to this
hypothesis, the differences in
employment structures between
the EU and the US should mainly
show up as differences in low-
wage employment in low-pro-
ductivity services. Measures which
promote such low-wage employ-
ment would reduce employment
gaps across countries, and the EU-
US employment gap in particular.
2.“skill compression hypothesis”:
according to this hypothesis, the
difference in wage structures
between countries, and between
the EU and the US in particular,
reflect differences in the distribu-
tion of skills across countries (as
indicated by official statistics on
educational attainment levels or by
comparable literacy surveys and
other international tests). Contrary
to the first hypothesis, differences
in wage structures are seen as mar-
ket conforming rather than market
distorting, taking into account the
differences in the skill base of the
workforce. This hypothesis also
puts forward that differences in
employment structures across
countries might reflect structural
differences in both skill supply and
skill requirements. Once these are
taken into account, differences in
wage structures would be signifi-
cantly reduced. Reductions in the
employment gaps across countries,
and between the EU and the US in
particular, would require changes
in either the skill composition of
labour supply or the skill require-
ments on the job, or both. Related
measures include education and
training of the existing workforce,
as well as increases in the potential
labour force through immigration
and integration.
3.“demand compression hypothe-
sis”: according to this hypothesis,
differences in household con-
sumption and in final demand
patterns - and therefore in the
services share in GDP - contribute
to explaining the differences in
employment structures across
countries, and between the EU
and the US. In particular, differ-
ences in the labour supply behav-
iour of households and in the age
structure of the population might
lead to diverging demand for var-
ious services, such as restaurants,
recreation activities or care services.
This hypothesis suggests that the
main explanation for the EU-US
gap in services employment is the
fact that there is generally a
greater marketisation of work in
the US than in the EU, notably
among women’s activities, while
in the EU, more goods and services
are being produced through
household production and less
through the market than in the
US. Measures to reduce employ-
ment gaps across countries, and
between the EU and the US in
particular, include stronger incen-
tives for women and older work-
ers to participate in the labour
market (notably through a review
of existing seniority pay schemes
and gender wage gaps, and the
provision of adequate care facil-
ities) and various other measures
with a potential to stimulate the
demand for services - e.g. targeted
tax reductions, longer, or more
adequate, shop-opening hours
and improvements in the quality
of the services provided. When
financing the provision of services,
such as education and health and
services through the public budg-
et, public finance policies also
play a key role in closing employ-
ment gaps.
These arguments have diverging
policy implications, and potentially
different impacts not only on over-
all employment performance, but
also on labour supply behaviour,
and mobility; quality in work and
productivity; innovation and life-
long learning; specialisation and
competitiveness; and social cohe-
sion. Consequently, the relative
importance of each argument
needs to be examined empirically.
Last but not least, a more detailed
knowledge of the driving factors
behind existing employment gaps is
crucial for the design of appropri-
ate economic and employment
policies aimed at better exploiting
the services sector employment
potential.
4.2. Previous studies and further
evidence
The EU-US employment gap and its
determinants have received consid-
erable attention in the economic
and sociological literature in recent
years, in an attempt to identify the
main reasons for the traditionally
lower employment dynamics in the
services sector in the EU as com-
pared to the US. Further to the find-
ings of the Employment Rates 1998
report much of the related empiri-
cal work of recent years was sup-
ported or financed by the European
Commission. The various studies
and initiatives include in particular:
• a joint seminar by the European
Commission, DG Employment and
Social Affairs, and the OECD in
1998 on “Wages and employ-
ment”;24
• a study by the Employment
Observatory RESEARCH network
in 2000 on “The job creation
potential of the service sector in
Europe”;25
• a study by Richard Freeman and
Ronald Schettkat in 1999-2000,
analysing the employment gap in
the services sector between
Germany and the US;26
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24 European Commission (1998), EC DG V – OECD/DEELSA seminar: Wages and employment, Employment and Social Affairs DG, Brussels.
25  The full report edited by Dominique Anxo and Donald Storrie from the Centre for European Labour Market Studies, Gothenburg, is
available at the following address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/publications/2001/ke2800616_en.html.
26  Freeman, Richard and Ronald Schettkat (2001), Differentials in service industry employment growth: Germany and the US in the com-
parable German American structural database, study report for the European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs. See
also the series of related NBER working papers by the same authors: The role of wage and skill differences in US-German employment
differences (No. 7474, January 2000); Skill compression, wage differentials and employment: Germany vs. the US (No. 7610, March
2000); Low wage services: Interpreting the US-German difference (No. 7611, March 2000); Marketization of production and the US-
Europe employment gap (No. 8797, February 2002); and, finally, Richard Freeman (2003), Can marketization of household production
explain the EU-US jobs gap puzzle?, paper presented at the DEMPATEM conference, 18.10.2003, Sevilla.
 
• the Benchmarking project by the
Low-wage Employment Research
Network (LoWER) at the
University of Amsterdam in 2001,
and their other related projects,
such as e.g. the ongoing analysis
on the topic “Can improving low-
skilled consumer-services jobs
help European job growth?”;27
• the DEMPATEM research project
in 2001-2004 on the link between
demand patterns and employ-
ment performance, a joint project
by the Universities of Amsterdam,
Utrecht, Oxford, Paris-Sorbonne I
and Madrid-Carlos III, University
College London and 17th Street
Economics in Washington.28
In parallel, the OECD has covered
the topic of employment in the
services sector on several occasions.
In its 2001 Employment Outlook,
the job quality in the services sector,
including wages and the incidence
of low pay, were analysed.29 In
Employment Outlook 2004, the
OECD provides further evidence on
the link between wage inequality
and employment performance,
concluding in particular that
“[c]ountries in which earnings
inequality increased more slowly
since 1970 (or fell) tended to fare
worse in terms of employment and
unemployment, than did countries
where the earnings inequality rose
more rapidly.” Using panel infor-
mation on inequality and employ-
ment performance across the
European regions Galbraith and
Garcilazo (2004), by contrast, find
that higher pay inequality in
Europe is associated with more, not
less, unemployment, in particular
for women and young workers.30
On the basis of establishment-level
data and matched employer-
employee data, the ongoing PIEP
project on “Pay Inequalities and
Economic Performance” is examin-
ing in more detail whether large
pay inequalities in themselves are
sufficient to generate good growth
and employment performance, as
competitive economic theory
would predict. It is also looking at
how far the exceptions to this view,
in which small inequalities coexist
with good performance, can be
explained by reference to different
approaches to performance man-
agement within firms and the way
firms manage their industrial rela-
tions.31
In several EU Member States, vari-
ous studies have been carried out
that analyse in more depth the job
creation potential of the services
sector, and the link between
employment structures, productiv-
ity and wages. In Germany and
Austria – both economies with
predominantly industrial struc-
tures as regards employment and
wages - there is an open debate as
to whether this predominance is
beneficial to overall productivity
and employment growth or not.32
Similar debates, with a particular
focus on the effect of industrial
structures on the transition to a
market economy, are taking place
in the most industrialised new
Member States, notably the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic.33
While these and other studies pro-
vide invaluable insights into the
nature of employment creation
(e.g. low-paying vs. high-paying
sectors) and into the determinants
of differences in employment struc-
tures across countries, based on
comparable data and advanced
econometric methodology, there
are also some major drawbacks:
first, they only cover one or a small
subset of EU Member States, in
view of resource constraints and
data problems; and second, most of
these studies focus on one specific
hypothesis. The study by Freeman
and Schettkat is an important
exception in that it covers several
hypotheses in parallel, while
remaining largely speculative on
the role of household consumption
and final demand structures for
employment – a speculation which
seems well confirmed by the pre-
liminary results from the DEM-
PATEM project.
This section will address the above
three major hypotheses by review-
ing the main findings from the
studies listed above, and add fur-
ther evidence for the enlarged EU,
replicating in part the Freeman and
Schettkat (2001) study. It should be
noted that a more in-depth empiri-
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27  Wiemer Salverda, Stephen Bazen and Mary Gregory (2001), The European-American employment gap, wage inequality, earnings
mobility and skill: A study for France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, Final report by the
European Low-Wage Employment Research Network (LoWER), study commissioned by the European Commission, Employment and
Social Affairs DG,  June 2001.
28  Among the various working papers and reports of the project, see e.g.: Gregory, Mary and Giovanni Russo (2004), The Employment
Impact of Differences in Demand and Production Structures, DEMPATEM Working Paper no. 10, February 2004; Andrew Glyn, Wiemer
Salverda, Joachim Möller, John Schmitt and Michel Sollogoub (2004), Employment differences in services: the role of wages, produc-
tivity and demand, DEMPATEM Working Paper no. 13, February 2004; and Ronald Schettkat and Wiemer Salverda (2004), Demand
patterns and employment growth, Consumption and services in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States, DEMPATEM Working Paper no. 13, February 2004. For more information, see: http://www.uva-aias.net/lower.asp.
29  OECD (2001), The Characteristics and Quality of Service Sector Jobs, chapter 3 in OECD Employment Outlook 2001, Paris, 89-128.
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cal analysis of the link between
wages, skills and employment struc-
tures on the basis of EU-wide data is
very much constrained by the con-
tinued lack of time-series data on
wages and skills, and by the lack of
information on changes in wage
structures in Europe over time. For
this reason, the analysis has so far
been restricted to cross-sectional
analysis and simple correlation
analysis. For a further analysis of
the role of trade, outsourcing and
globalisation on employment, see
chapter 5.
4.2.1. Skill composition of the
workforce
The level of skills and the returns on
them are two of the most impor-
tant factors cited to explain the
growing wage inequality in the US,
the difference in inequality
between the US and the EU, and,
consequently, the EU-US employ-
ment gap. It is argued that the rela-
tive wage of the unskilled in Europe
has not fallen sufficiently to stimu-
late relative demand in the labour
market for this category of skills – a
theory that will be discussed in the
next section. We will now take a
closer look at the skill distributions
across countries and at the employ-
ment situation of the various skill
groups.
Two types of data can be used for
this kind of comparison: first, inter-
nationally comparable data on edu-
cational attainment levels (ISCED);
and second, data from international
literacy or numeracy surveys, such
as the International Adult Literacy
Survey (IALS) or the OECD
Programme for International Stu-
dent Assessment (PISA). While the
former are easily available, they are
most appropriate for analyses of
changes over time within countries
but they can be difficult to compare
due to the significant cross-country
differences in educational systems.
The latter, on the other hand,
require specific surveys and are thus
only available for selected years,
but do provide more uniform data
on cognitive skills rather than the
usual classification of formal educa-
tional credentials.34
According to comparable data on
educational attainment levels, the
US stands out in that it has the
highest population share of high-
skilled workers (32%), compared to
48% medium-skilled and 20% low-
skilled. In the EU, countries with
comparatively high shares of high-
skilled workers include Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Nordic member states,
Spain and the UK. The US popula-
tion share of low-skilled is also rela-
tively low when compared to the
EU, where it ranges from around
20% in the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Sweden and the UK to around 40%
or more in Belgium, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and
Spain. In five of the countries in the
latter group, more than half of the
working-age population have less
than upper secondary level educa-
tion, and in Malta and Portugal
even more than three quarters of
the working-age population.
Moreover, compared to the US, the
population share of medium-skilled
is higher in most EU Member States,
notably in Austria, the Baltic States,
the Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Rep-
ublic, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK-
where more than half of the popu-
lation is medium-skilled, in part due
to the dual education or appren-
ticeship systems in place in these
countries (chart 70).
However, based on the above com-
parable data on educational attain-
ment levels, the employment situa-
tion of the low-skilled at EU level
seems somewhat more favourable
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Notes: See annex 6.4. for a definition of the broad ISCED categories used in defining edu-
cational attainment levels.
34  The great advantage of the IALS data is that it provides a uniform measure of (cognitive) skills across countries based on scores from
identical literacy tests. The survey was jointly organised by Statistics Canada and the OECD for a range of countries and was given to
respondents in 1994 and again in 1996 and 1998, covering in total 23 countries. Various types of intensive paper-and-pencil tests were
used: prose, documentation and quantitative literacy, and problem solving. The outcomes are highly correlated and their average has
been used in the analysis. The respondents were also interviewed about the skills needed for their jobs and these job characteristics
have been used to extend the analysis to labour demand. For more information on the IALS and related surveys, see also:
http://www.nald.ca/nls/ials/introduc.htm. Furthermore, PISA is a three-yearly survey (starting in 2000) of the knowledge and skills of
15-year-olds in the principal industrialised countries. It assesses how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired
some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society. Tests were administered in the domains of read-
ing, mathematical and scientific literacy, and problem solving - not merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, but also of
important knowledge and skills needed in adult life.
Chart 70 - Skill composition of the working-age population in 
the EU and the US, 2003
than in the US, with higher employ-
ment rates and lower unemploy-
ment and inactivity rates for the
low-skilled in the EU as compared
to the US.35 As stated earlier, the
employment evolution across all
skill groups has generally been
more favourable in the EU than in
the US in recent years. This notwith-
standing, there are important dif-
ferences in the employment situa-
tion of the low-skilled across the
EU. The relative employment situa-
tion of the low-skilled, as measured
by the share of the low-skilled in
employment relative to their popu-
lation share, is most favourable in
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Portugal and Spain – all countries
with excessively high population
shares of people of working age
with low skills – but also in coun-
tries with below average popula-
tion shares of the low-skilled, such
as France, the Netherlands and,
most notably, Denmark and
Sweden. On the other hand, even
when compared to the US, the
employment situation of the low-
skilled in most of the new Member
States, except Cyprus and Malta, is
much less favourable, notably in
the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic. Furthermore, in Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Germany and the
UK, the employment situation of
the low-skilled seems roughly com-
parable, and, although possibly
slightly more favourable than in the
US, in any case well below average
in the enlarged EU (chart 71a).
The share of the low-skilled
among the unemployed is higher
than their population share in
almost all countries, except in the
southern Member States (includ-
ing Cyprus and Malta) – all coun-
tries with comparatively high pop-
ulation shares of the low-skilled of
50% or more – as well as in the
Baltic States, Poland and Romania.
However, the share of low-skilled
among the unemployed is higher
in the US than in all EU Member
States and candidate countries.
Those EU Member States coming
closest to the high US figure are
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35 When interpreting the results in this section, cross-country differences in the population shares of low-skilled and high-skilled have
to be borne in mind.
c - Shares of the low-skilled in inactivity relative to their population share
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, for EU25; OECD, LFS database for US
Notes: See annex 6.4 for a definition of the broad ISCED categories used in defining 
educational attainment levels. See also footnote 14.
b - Shares of the low-skilled in unemployment relative to their population share
in the EU and the US, 2003
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Chart 71 - Shares of the low skilled in employment, unemployment,
and inactivity relative to their population share in the EU 
and the US, 2003
Austria, the Czech Republic,
Luxembourg, the Nordic member
states and the UK (chart 71b). And
while the low-skilled are overrep-
resented in inactivity in all coun-
tries, they are less likely to join the
labour force in the US than in
most EU Member States, with the
exceptions of the Baltic states, the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Rep-
ublic, and the UK. On the other
hand, participation of the low-
skilled in the labour force is rela-
tively most favourable in the
Benelux countries, France, Ireland,
southern EU Member States and
Romania (chart 71c).
When taking account of the dif-
ferences in population shares of
the low-skilled and high-skilled,
however, it is seen that the skill
distributions within sectors are
generally similar across countries,
and not that different from those
observed in the US. The low-
skilled are employed more fre-
quently in agriculture and indus-
try, and in manufacturing in par-
ticular. They are also over-repre-
sented in some services sectors,
such as private households and in
hotels and restaurants. The high-
skilled, on the other hand, are
employed more frequently in the
services sector, and in financial
intermediation, real estate and
business activities, extra-territorial
organisations, and education, as
well as health and social services
and other community, social or
personal services in particular.
In addition, the relative skill con-
tent of employment within the
services sector is largely compara-
ble across countries. In all EU
Member States and candidate
countries, employment in hotels
and restaurants is predominantly
low-skilled, most notably in
Denmark, Germany and Luxem-
bourg. The low-skilled are also
over-represented in wholesale and
retail trade and in transport and
communication in most countries,
with the exception of some of the
new Member States and the can-
didate countries. Employment is
more skewed towards the medi-
um- and low-skilled in the other
services sectors, not only in finan-
cial intermediation, real estate
and business services and educa-
tion, but also in public administra-
tion and health and social services
(chart 72).
Finally, based on cross-country
analysis, there is no obvious corre-
lation between the use of low-
skilled labour in a sector and the
employment performance or
employment rate of that sector.
Among the predominantly low-
skilled sectors, there seems to be a
weak positive correlation between
the use of low-skilled labour and
employment rates in wholesale
and retail trade and in transport
and communication, while there is
no such evidence at all for the
hotels and restaurants sector.
Moreover, there is some indication
of a slight positive correlation
between the use of low-skilled
labour and the employment rate
in some of the predominantly
high-skilled sectors (chart 73).
The positive correlation between
the use of low-skilled labour and
employment rates at sectoral level
is probably strongest in real estate
and business services and in health
and social services. The Nordic
Member States and the UK offer
interesting examples: first, in par-
ticular when compared to Ger-
many, they both have higher
employment rates and relatively
lower shares of low-skilled in
employment in these sectors; sec-
ond, in the case of Sweden
employment growth has been
strongest for both low-skilled and
high-skilled in these two compara-
tively high-skill, high-wage services
sectors, allowing Sweden eventu-
ally to overtake the US in terms of
the overall employment rate. It
therefore seems that not only a
more highly qualified labour force
in general, but also a better inte-
gration of the low-skilled into the
high-skill, high-wage services sec-
tors might explain the higher
overall employment rates in some
of the more successful EU Member
States, including Sweden.
Clearly, the above provides little
evidence to support the skill com-
pression hypothesis, i.e. the lack of
low-skilled employment due to
the lack of low-skilled workers.
Indeed, the employment prospects
of the low-skilled – as measured
by the formal level of highest edu-
cational attainment - seem to be
most problematic in countries
with comparatively low popula-
tion shares of low-skilled, notably
the new Member States and the
US. On the other hand, while their
employment situation seems more
favourable in countries with com-
paratively high population shares
of low-skilled, notably the south-
ern EU Member States, most of
these countries are also among
those with the lowest employ-
ment rates - thus less favourable
overall employment prospects for
all skill groups – and lower levels
of labour productivity.
While the above findings could be
considered somewhat unexpected,
especially with regard to the
employment situation of the low-
skilled in the US, the analysis of the
link between skills and employment
in the Benchmarking project -
based on literacy scores from the
International Adult Literacy Survey
(IALS), which provides more uni-
form data on cognitive skills than
the usual classification of formal
Chapter 3 Employment in Europe 2004
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Relative skill distribution in wholesale and retail trade in
the EU and the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in hotels and restaurants in
the EU and the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in transport and communication in
the EU and the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in financial intermediation in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in business services in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in public administration in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in education in the EU and
the candidate countries, 2003
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Relative skill distribution in health and social services in the EU
and the candidate countries, 2003
(ratio of low-skilled : high-skilled employed in the sector wrt
that ratio in total employment)
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Chart 72 - Skill distributions by detailed sector (NACE-1)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Values indicate the ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled employed in the respective sector relative to that share in total employ-
ment. A value of 1 thus indicates that the relation of low-skilled to high-skilled in a given sector is equal to that in the total economy.
A value larger (smaller) than 1 indicates that low-skilled are relatively over-represented (under-represented) in a given sector.
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in wholesale and
retail trade in the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in hotels and restaurants in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in transport and
communication in the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in financial intermediation in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in real estate and
business services in the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in public administration in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in education in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative skill balance and employment rates in health and social services in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Chart 73 - Skill distributions and employment rates in the services sector (NACE-1)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled employed in the respective sector relative to that share in total employment on the horizon-
tal axis; sector-specific employment rate on the vertical axis; dotted lines show simple regression lines
educational credentials at an inter-
national level 36 - provides slightly
different results.37
First, it finds that there are impor-
tant differences between the inter-
nationally standardised educational
credentials (ISCED) and the literacy
scores, and that the lower educa-
tional credentials in the Cont-
inental countries covered by the
project (Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands and Sweden) are
associated with much higher levels
of literacy than in the Anglo-Saxon
world (Ireland and the UK). For
people with less than secondary
education, the average literacy
score across the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries is considerably lower than in
the Continental countries. Similarly,
the literacy of people with lower
secondary education is much better
in Continental countries. For upper
secondary and tertiary education,
on the other hand, no systematic
differences occur.
Second, the project developed an
internationally standardised skill
distribution for each of the coun-
tries by assigning each person to a
literacy decile based on the distribu-
tion of the pooled data for all ten
countries covered in the survey, i.e.
for each country the proportion in
each of the deciles of the pooled
distribution was calculated38. Using
this measure, it was found that
there were comparatively high pro-
portions of low-skilled persons in
the Anglo-Saxon countries, and low
shares in the Continental countries.
At the other extreme, the US was
also found to have among the high-
est shares of the best educated,
although still below that observed
for Sweden, where 22% of the
population are found to be in the
highest IALS decile (chart 74).
Third, and most importantly, the
project examined how skills, as
measured by the literacy scores,
related to pay, and how both
wages and skills related to
employment, thus testing the
trade-off hypothesis. A particular
focus was the pay gap between
the median and the lower quin-
tiles of the literacy distribution. As
a result, not only the negative
impact of low literacy on wages
appeared to be significantly larger
for the Anglo-Saxon countries
compared to the Continental
ones, but also relative employ-
ment chances at lower literacy lev-
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Chart 74 - National skill distributions of populations aged 15-65
(international literacy deciles; proportion in each of the deciles of the pooled distribution in %)
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Source: Salverda et al. (2001), op. cit., figure 4.2
Notes: In the research, each person in the dataset was assigned a literacy decile based on
the distribution of the pooled data for all ten countries analysed, i.e. for each country
the proportion in each of the deciles of the pooled distribution was calculated. In the
case that countries have the same skill distributions, each of these proportions should
equal 10%. Values above (below) 10% indicate that the share of people in a given liter-
acy decile is comparatively higher (lower) than in the other countries. Data for Canada,
New Zealand and Switzerland omitted to improve readability.
Table 43 - Estimated coefficients of first-to-third literacy quintile to wages 
and employment
Dependent
variable
BE DE IE NL SE UK US
Earnings -0.076 -0.079 -0.313 -0.139 -0.092 -0.141 -0.291
Employment -0.926 -0.794 -0.98 -0.711 -0.934 -1.135 -1.208
Source: Salverda et al. (2001), op. cit., table 4.1
Notes: Estimates of wage effects and effects on the probability of employment, respective-
ly, of the first literacy quintile relative to the third quintile for those EU member states cov-
ered in the benchmarking project and for the US.
36 There are important differences between the internationally standardised educational credentials (ISCED) and the literacy scores.
Particularly striking is that the lower educational credentials in the Continental countries are associated with much higher levels of
literacy than in the Anglo-Saxon world. For people with less than secondary education (ISCED 0-1) the average literacy score across
the Anglo-Saxon countries is 208, which compares to 248 on the Continent. Similarly, the literacy of people with lower secondary edu-
cation (ISCED 2) is much better in Continental countries. For upper secondary and tertiary education, on the other hand, no system-
atic differences occur. The later extension of the IALS, for 1998, to a few more countries could not be used as no microdata have yet
been made available.
37 The purpose of the Benchmarking project was to see whether labour market outcomes by skills depend on the differences in labour
market institutions or, alternatively, on the supply and demand of different levels of skills. The former view, expressed by Krugman,
asserts a trade-off between higher relative wages for the low-skilled and lower employment. According to the supply-and-demand
view, however, higher wages for the low-skilled reflect a better labour market position and go together with a favourable employ-
ment situation. As the argument hinges on skills, their calibration by means of literacy levels rather than educational attainment may
affect the debate substantially.
38 For more detail see Peter Mühlau and Justine Horgan (2001), "Labour Market Status and the Wage Position of the Low Skilled", LoWER
Working Paper No.5, July 2001.
 
els were found to be better in the
Continental countries (table 43).
There was no indication that higher
wages are indeed traded-off
against lower employment. Based
on the plotting of estimated regres-
sion coefficients against the
employment rates, the authors of
the Benchmarking study conclude
that the relationship between rela-
tive wages and relative employ-
ment chances of low-skilled work-
ers is not negative as predicted by
the trade-off hypothesis. On the
contrary, across all countries, the
relationship is found to be slightly
positive, which is consistent with
the supply-and-demand hypothesis.
The Benchmarking project finally
examines whether there are differ-
ences in the skill requirements of
jobs between countries and
whether these correspond to the
above skill endowments of the
countries. It finds that the propor-
tion of low-requirement jobs is
much higher in the Anglo-Saxon
countries than on the Continent,
with the exception of Belgium,
while the proportion of high-level
jobs is also considerably larger in
the US. On average, the highest job
requirement level was established
for Germany, the lowest for Ireland.
It was estimated that Ireland with
18% has the highest share of jobs
suited for low-skilled (first-quintile)
workers, followed by Belgium.
Relatively low proportions of such
jobs, on the other hand, were
found for Sweden and Germany.
However, from a demand-and-
supply perspective, the ratio of
people with a given level of skill to
the number of jobs requiring this
level of skill is more important as a
determinant of the relative labour
market position of a skill group
than the number or share of suit-
able jobs.
Based on a net-supply index for the
skill groups constructed by dividing
the number of people belonging to
a literacy decile by the number of
jobs available to them, the study
showed that the demand for the
low-skilled relative to their supply is
significantly smaller in Anglo-Saxon
than in Continental countries.
Although Ireland has by far the
largest number of jobs for people
with low cognitive skills, it also has
the highest, i.e. most disadvanta-
geous, ratio of low-skilled workers
to jobs, closely followed by the UK.
The Netherlands and Sweden, on
the other hand, have the lowest
ratios. Although Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries have higher shares of jobs
which are suited for workers with
low cognitive skills, the demand for
the low-skilled relative to their sup-
ply is significantly smaller in Anglo-
Saxon than in Continental countries
(chart 75, table 44).
The study therefore concludes that
the situation of the low-skilled for
both pay and employment com-
bined, is better in the Continental
countries than in the Anglo-Saxon
world, thus contradicting Krug-
man’s hypothesis of a trade-off
between higher levels of relative
pay and lower levels of employ-
ment. By contrast, the hypothesis
stating that a favourable supply of
low-skilled workers compared to
demand can lead at the same time
to higher wages and better
employment prospects, is found to
be broadly consistent with the data.
Taken together, the above evidence
shows that, while internationally
comparable data leave doubt as to
the relative importance of the low-
skilled in the labour force in the EU
when compared to the US, Europe
as a whole has considerably lower
shares of high-skilled workers, both
in the labour force and in employ-
ment. There is, furthermore, evi-
dence from both data on educa-
tional attainment and on interna-
tionally comparable literacy scores
that the low-skilled face a more dif-
ficult employment situation in the
US than in many of the EU Member
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Chart 75 - National distributions of job requirements by skill level
(international literacy deciles; proportion in each of the deciles of the pooled distribution in %)
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Source: Salverda et al. (2001), op. cit., figure 4.5
Notes: Figures indicate the relative proportions of job requirements by skill level, based
on an internationally comparable scale constructed from self-reported data in the IALS
on the reading and writing skills required in the job. See also the notes of chart 23. Data
for Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland omitted to improve readability.
Source: Salverda et al. (2001), op. cit., table 4.2
Notes: Estimates of labour demand and supply indicators for the low-skilled for those EU
member states covered in the benchmarking project and for the US. For more detail on the
underlying definitions, see Salverda et al. (2001).
Table 44 - Demand and supply of low-skilled workers
Indicator BE DE IE NL SE UK US
Demand 16.5 11.6 18.1 14 12.1 13.8 14
Supply 2.21 2.01 3.25 1.54 1.01 3.18 2.57
States. Finally, based on cross-coun-
try analysis, there is no obvious cor-
relation between the use of low-
skilled labour and employment per-
formance at sectoral level, while
there is some indication of a posi-
tive relationship notably in compar-
atively high- skill, high-wage services
sectors, such as real estate and busi-
ness services and health and social
services.
4.2.2. Relative wage structures
The “Benchmarking project” also
looks at the role of wages by iden-
tifying the EU jobs’ deficit within
the different earnings categories:
low-, medium- and high-wage
employment. The study identifies a
clear and substantial jobs deficit in
both high-wage jobs and low-wage
jobs in the European economies,
with a gap in high-wage employ-
ment found to be particularly pro-
nounced for women. This deficit
may be due, in part, to the narrower
distribution of earnings, particular-
ly in Continental Europe. However,
the EU-US jobs gap emerges clearly
at both ends of the earnings distri-
bution, and it is divided approxi-
mately equally between the two.
So, while low-wage and high-wage
employment contribute an almost
equal share to the overall employ-
ment rate in both the US and in
each of the EU economies covered
by the study, their actual contribu-
tion is much lower in the EU than in
the US. In regard to the deficit in
low-wage jobs, the study shows
that the extent of earnings mobility
is at least as great in the European
economies as in the US. In regard to
the jobs deficit in high-wage
employment, on the other hand,
the further analysis of skills indi-
cates that while the numbers of
skilled workers have been rising,
skill wage premia are showing little
change.
The study goes on to discuss the rel-
ative pay structures across sectors
and occupations. It finds that the
structures of pay inequalities are
strikingly similar across the five
countries. In particular, the low-
paying industries are quasi univer-
sal: agriculture, retail trade, hotels
and catering, and personal services
– covering between 14% and 23%
of total employment. The industry
distribution of high pay, on the
other hand, shows a less universal
pattern, and the high-wage
employment gap seems to relate
more strongly to personal charac-
teristics than to industry. The high-
paying sectors common to the five
countries are utilities, financial serv-
ices and education. Taken together
they represent a considerably smaller
share of employment than the four
low-paying industries. Beyond this,
high-paying industries tend not to
coincide closely across countries,
nor is their employment share relat-
ed to their wage position. For
example, in the industries that pay
comparatively high wages in the
US, Europe has an employment
advantage, but European wages in
these industries are not necessarily
high. On the other hand, European
high-wage industries pay wages
that exceed the average by less
than US high-wage industries,
while employment tends to be
lower than in the US.39
As to the relative risk of low pay,
the study reveals that the groups at
highest risk are broadly similar
across countries: young workers,
the low-educated, hotel and cater-
ing workers, retail workers, agricul-
tural workers, workers in miscella-
neous services, manual workers,
shop and services workers, men in
part-time jobs, women in part-time
jobs, women in full-time jobs and
workers with low seniority.
Amazingly, however, in spite of the
lower overall incidence of low pay
in Europe, certain groups in
European labour markets have a
higher risk of being low paid than
the same groups in the US. The
high-wage categories, by contrast,
are more dispersed. There are eight
common categories: managers, pro-
fessionals, the highly educated,
financial services workers, utilities
workers, prime-age employees, the
education sector and men in full-
time work.
Finally, when examining earnings
mobility at the individual level across
the four selected European
economies, and between them and
the US, it is found that there is no
systematic support to the view of
rigid labour markets in the
European economies inhibiting job
growth. In fact,  each of the Euro-
pean economies, with the exception
of France which is on a par with the
US, shows greater earnings mobility
than the US. The same holds for
downward wage flexibility: in terms
of downwards earnings change for
workers continuing in employment,
with or without a job change, the
evidence does not support wage
rigidity in the European economies
by contrast to the US. Rather  a sig-
nificant minority (25% to 45%) of
workers experience reductions in
real hourly earnings in a given year
in all countries. Downwards earn-
ings adjustments are actually found
as frequently in the European
economies as in the US and, at the
individual level, wages show a sub-
stantial degree of downwards as
well as upwards flexibility, in the
European economies as in the US. 40
The study concludes that the EU-US
employment gap is as much a prob-
lem of a deficiency of high-wage
jobs as of low-wage jobs. At the
same time, it stresses that European
economies showed a strong per-
formance in employment rates at
intermediate levels of earnings.
Furthermore, based on the observa-
tion that there is substantial earn-
ings flexibility and mobility in the
European economies, the study
argues that “the European-
American employment gap and the
earnings mobility record of four
European economies (France,
Germany, the Netherlands and the
UK) relative to the US does not
endorse the bleak picture of a ‘scle-
rotic’ Europe which fails to match
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39 The findings from a comparison between US-German employment and wage structures at sectoral level in Freeman and Schettkat
(2001) are similar. 
40  See chapter 4 for more information on earnings mobility in European labour markets.
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Chart 76 - Relative wages by detailed sector (NACE-1)
Source: Eurostat, LCS 2000 for EU25; BLS, OES for US.
Notes: Relative gross hourly wages in % of the country-specific average gross hourly wage. Values above (below) 100 indicate that a sec-
tor is comparatively high (low) paying. Data refer to 2000. US data highlighted in light blue. No data available for BE and MT. For NACE
sectors L (public administration), M (education) and N (health and social services), data are not available from the Labour Cost Survey
2000 due to the lack of survey coverage of these sectors for the EU15 – except the UK - and only available for the new Member States
– except Malta - and the candidate countries. 
the wage flexibility of the US. The
employment gap in the European
economies continues to pose chal-
lenges, but these economies have
areas of significant achievement.
More strikingly, the stereotype of
wage rigidity in the European
economies is not confirmed.”
With regard to the policy implica-
tions, the authors argue that down-
wards wage adjustments, whether
through the weakening of wage-
setting institutions or otherwise,
are not a necessary, or even appro-
priate, response to the low employ-
ment rates. They further conclude
that the relatively unchanged skill
premia do not appear to signal a
shortage in the supply of skilled
workers. They also note the remain-
ing divergence between the rising
educational attainment of women
and their still low employment
rates. The deficit in high-wage jobs
would therefore, according to the
authors of the study, seem to lie
more with the limited demand for
skills by firms in the European
economies than with shortfalls in
their supply, although they note
that there is no easy recipe for stim-
ulating high-wage jobs growth.
Coming back to the relative pay
structures across sectors and occu-
pations, there is further evidence
based on the Labour Cost Survey
2000 for the enlarged EU that rela-
tive wage structures in Europe are
neither out of line with those
known in the US nor necessarily
correlated with the observed
employment structures. Only in
hotels and restaurants and in
financial intermediation are the
relative wages in the US well below
those in most European economies.
In the former, relative wages in the
US are 55% of the average wage
and only those in Luxembourg and
Germany come close to this level. In
the latter, only Denmark, Germany
and Finland have relative wages
that are less favourable than in the
US (chart 76).
In most other sectors, relative
wages in many EU Member States
are well below those in the US. In
wholesale and retail trade, for
example, relative wages in Greece,
Ireland and the UK are below those
in the US, as are their employment
rates. On the other hand, the
employment rates in wholesale and
retail trade in Cyprus or Denmark
are at least as high as in the US, and
this despite the fact that relative
wages in this sector are much higher
than in the US. In industry, finally,
the US is found to be the economy
with the highest relative wage of
around 110% of the average wage,
while in most European countries –
with the exception of Austria,
Germany, Ireland and Spain - aver-
age wages in industry are below
the average.
When looking at the relationship
between relative wage structures
and employment performance
across countries, it is not clear
whether lower relative wages at
sectoral level are beneficial to
employment in that sector.
Although the results have to be
interpreted with caution, in indus-
try, transport and communication,
and financial services there is some
tentative evidence of a negative
correlation between relative wage
levels and employment rates, while
in hotels and restaurants there is no
evidence at all for any relationship
between relative wages and
employment. On the other hand, in
wholesale and retail trade as well as
in business services, there is, if any-
thing, a positive correlation across
countries between relative wages
and employment rates. In real
estate and business services, coun-
tries such as Sweden, the UK and
the US combine both comparatively
high wages and high employment
rates. However, employment rates
in business services differ by up to 5
percentage points between coun-
tries with similar relative wages,
e.g. between Austria and Sweden,
or between France and the US
(chart 77).
Relative wage positions of sectors
and occupations are generally
found to be comparable in the EU
and the US, with significant differ-
ences probably only in education
and health and social services – sec-
tors for which the Labour Cost
Survey does unfortunately not pro-
vide data for a majority of EU
Member States – and in business
services where average wages in
particular in Italy, Spain and the
candidate countries stand well
below the respective country aver-
age, contrary not only to the US but
also to all other EU Member States. 
On the other hand, it has yet to be
established to which extent
changes in the relative wage posi-
tion of sectors and occupations over
time do actually accompany the
move towards a knowledge economy,
notably by exploiting the remain-
ing employment potential in the
services sector described above.
While the available data for Europe
do not allow us to study such
changes for the enlarged EU as a
whole, it might be worthwhile to
take a closer look at the US experi-
ence where - as discussed in detail
in section 2 of this chapter – the
move to the services economy prob-
ably took place some 20 years earlier
than in Europe.
Using the US classification of sec-
tors, it is found that pay levels have
traditionally been slightly more
favourable in the goods-producing
industries, notably in construction
and in natural resources and min-
ing, while slightly below average in
the private service-providing sec-
tors. There have been, however,
important changes in the relative
wage levels of sectors accompany-
ing the changes in employment
structures since the mid- 1970s. In
industry, relative pay levels rose
during the 1970s, and have been
slowly levelling off since the 1980s.
In manufacturing, relative pay lev-
els have been standing at average
wages in the economy since the
mid-1980s before slightly falling
short of the average since the late
1990s - in combination with an
important decline in employment.
In services, on the other hand,
diverging evolutions of relative pay
levels can be observed for the vari-
ous sectors. In information activities
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and business services – the two sec-
tors with traditionally the highest
rewards - the relative pay levels fell
over the 1970s while basically stag-
nating since the 1980s, although
remaining at high levels well
above the average. In trade, trans-
port and utilities, moreover, the
relative earnings position has gone
down over the last 30 years, with
relative pay levels below the aver-
age since the 1980s.
On the other hand, there have
been particular strong improve-
ments in the relative earnings posi-
tion of some other services sectors
over the last decades, including
financial services, education and
health and social services, and
other community, social and per-
sonal services. The former two
moved from below to above aver-
age, while the latter increased
from around 50% of average
wages in the mid-1970s to almost
90% by 2003. However, in hotels
and restaurants, relative wages
have remained more or less the
same since the early 1970s at
around 45% below the average
wages (chart 78).
It is difficult to predict what, if any,
changes in relative wages are nec-
essary to stimulate job creation in
the European services sector.
Relative wage structures at sectoral
level are in particular rather similar
between the EU and the US, and
cannot in general account for the
differences in employment struc-
tures and in services. For example,
relative wages in the German hotels
and restaurants sector are similar to
Chapter 3 Employment in Europe 2004
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Relative wages and employment rates in industry in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Relative wages and employment rates in financial intermediation in
the EU and the candidate countries
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Chart 77 - Relative wages and employment rates in the services sector (NACE-1)
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Notes: Average gross hourly wages in the respective sector as a share of average gross hourly wages in industry and serrvices on the hor-
izontal axis; sector-specific employment rate on the vertical axis; dotted lines show simple regression lines
those in the US, but employment
rates in Germany remain less than
half those in the US. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that
in several Member States, relative
wages in some of the most dynamic
services sectors - such as real estate
and business services, education,
and health and social work – still
compare unfavourably with those
in the US. This observation is possi-
bly in line with the well-known
presumption that Europe as a
whole is lagging some 20 years
behind the US - relative wage lev-
els in these sectors in the US were
still significantly below average in
the mid-1980s. An exception is
Spain where both relative wages
and recent employment growth in
education and health and social
services are seen to be well above
average.
On the other hand, relative pay in
some other services sectors is found
to be well above that in the US,
notably in hotels and restaurants as
well as in financial intermediation –
and this, in the latter case, despite a
strong increase in relative pay levels
in US financial services. Studies that
estimate wage premia also generally
find that the above differences in
pay across sectors disappear, or are
even inverted, once other personal
and job-related characteristics are
controlled for in the analysis. It is
therefore not possible to establish
any clear-cut link between relative
wages and employment perform-
ance at sectoral level.
One way to better understand the
link between relative wages and
employment performance is to esti-
mate the determinants of relative
employment structures while tak-
ing simultaneous account of pro-
ductivity differentials, relative
wages and the skill composition of
the workforce across sectors.
Preliminary results from such a
regression analysis – not reported
here - confirm that there is no sig-
nificant relation between wage
structures and employment.41 A
more ambitious project would be
to look at wage distributions both
within sectors and within establish-
ments, based on detailed firm-level
data. However, these analyses are
clearly beyond the scope of this
chapter and should be dealt with in
more detail in future research
based on matched employer-
employee data.
4.2.3. Marketisation of services,
household consumption and final
demand structures
As seen in the previous sections,
neither cross-country variations in
productivity differentials nor cross-
country variations in wage and skill
structures across sectors - control-
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Chart 78 - Evolution of relative pay levels by sector in the US, 1964-2003
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41 Such regression models analysing the link between employment structures and relative wages across time and across countries were
tested in the study report by Freeman and Schettkat mentioned before. The authors conclude that "none of these calculations yield
a systematic statistically significant relation between wage structures, changes in relative wages and employment", and that "[i]n
sum, our examination of the wage compression hypothesis (like that of other empirical researchers) finds little empirical support for
the belief that lack of jobs in the EU is due to the effect of the compression of wages on employment in low skill industries". For more
detail, see: Freeman, Richard and Ronald Schettkat (2001), Differentials in service industry employment growth: Germany and the US
in the comparable German American structural database, study report for the European Commission, DG Employment and Social
Affairs, pp. 24-25, 32.
 
ling for differences in sector-level
productivity - can account for the
observed differences in employ-
ment structures. More recent
research into the determinants of
employment structures has there-
fore focused on alternative expla-
nations and, most notably, on the
important role of cross-country dif-
ferences in household consumption
patterns and final demand struc-
tures.
Indeed, there are important differ-
ences across EU Member States both
with respect to the level of final
demand expenditures and to the
composition of final demand across
the various goods and services.
According to the latest comparable
information available, final con-
sumption expenditure of house-
holds in 1998 as a percent of GDP
ranged from less than 50% in
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nordic
Member States and the
Netherlands, to more than 60% in
the UK, the US, as well as in most
southern European Member States,
the NMS10 and candidate coun-
tries. Overall, demand per head of
the population in working age is
about 40% higher in the US than in
Europe, which affects both goods
and services. Despite this gap in
services demand, all countries show
a trend towards services in final
demand.42
Household expenditures for servic-
es vary from around 10-15% of GDP
in the Baltic States, the candidate
countries and the Nordic Member
States, to more than 20% in the
southern European countries, as
well as in the UK and the US. The
variation in household expenditure
is particularly pronounced in hotels
and restaurants, ranging from
below 3% of GDP in countries such
as Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands and Sweden to more
than 4% in the US, 7% in the UK
and 10% in the southern Member
States most specialised in tourism,
notably Cyprus, Greece, Malta and
Spain. There is also a strong varia-
tion in private demand by house-
holds for recreation and cultural
activities, and transport, ranging
between 5 and 12% of GDP in the
former case, and between 3 and
7.5% in the latter. The US shows,
furthermore, the highest final
demand shares in education and in
health and social services, mainly
due to the differences in their
financing - predominantly market
services in the US and public servic-
es in most of Europe (chart 79).
Moreover, there are important dif-
ferences in the expenditure shares
of goods and services and in con-
sumption patterns of households,
both within the EU and between
the EU and the US. While house-
hold expenditures for food, hous-
ing and transport tend to be higher
in most EU Member States when
compared to the US, the US has a
higher share of services in final
demand of about 10 percentage
points.43 US households, on the
other hand, spend almost one-fifth
of their total expenditure on health
and education, eight times as much
as Swedish households do, largely
reflecting the varying coverage of
education and health services
through either private market services
or tax-financed state provision.
There is hence a clear trade-off
between private and public expen-
ditures on services depending on
the national institutional arrange-
ments. In part, US households
spend a higher share of their dis-
posable incomes on services
because they need to buy services
which are provided publicly in
Europe. That said, no clear pattern
emerges from the US-EU differ-
ences in private final consumption
even in categories where public
provision is unimportant (e.g.
‘restaurants, hotels’). Furthermore,
in all countries private consump-
tion is the most important demand
component for services followed
by government consumption that
together account for about 80 to
95% of all final demand for servic-
es, while imports (and exports) of
services are marginal in overall
final demand and in household
final consumption. Collective con-
sumption in GDP, finally, is roughly
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42 At the same time, the services share in value added is bigger in the US than in Europe.
43 These results are confirmed when taking price developments into account. Price trends are in fact similar across countries, with serv-
ices rising in relative prices whereas overall goods prices are falling in every country. On the other hand, there are important differ-
ences in the relative price levels, with relative prices for goods rather than for services being lower in the US than in Europe. This is
mainly the result of relatively low prices for health and education in Europe, which are usually mixed public-private services in Europe.
Other services, especially ‘market services’ have substantially lower relative prices in the US. As a consequence, when measured in
international prices, the gap in relative service demand between the US and the European countries narrows but the gap remains.
See Schettkat, Ronald and Joep Damen (2004), Demand patterns and employment structures: An aggregate analysis, DEMPATEM
Working Paper no. 11, February 2004.
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Chart 79 - Private household consumption (in % of GDP), 1998
similar in all countries and, if any-
thing, higher in the US than in
Europe. 
The above differences in household
consumption patterns and final
demand structures notwithstand-
ing, it is not easy to establish clear-
cut correlations between house-
hold consumption expenditures, on
the one hand, and employment
rates at sectoral level, on the other.
Based on cross-country analysis,
there is some significant correlation
between final demand for services
and services sector employment for
market services in general and for
hotels and restaurant, retail trade
and transport in particular.
However, no obvious correlation
can be found between demand
structures and employment in sec-
tors commonly financed through
the public budget such as education
and health and social services. If
anything, there is a negative rela-
tionship between household expen-
diture and employment rates,
reflecting the comparatively higher
employment rates in the Nordic
countries where education and
health are fully publicly financed
(chart 80).
A more in-depth analysis of the link
between demand patterns and
employment structures was carried
out between 2001 and 2004 by the
research project on “Demand pat-
terns and employment growth:
consumption and services in France,
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK
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Final consumption shares and employment rates in services (G-Q), 1998
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Final consumption shares and employment rates in market services (G-K), 1998
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Final consumption shares and employment rates in hotels and restaurants, 1998
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Final consumption shares and employment rates in retail trade
and hotels and restaurants, 1998
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Final consumption shares and employment rates in education, 1998
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Final consumption shares and employment rates in health and social work, 1998
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Chart 80 - Final demand shares and employment rates by detailed sector (NACE-1)
 
and the US”, or DEMPATEM.44 The
main purpose of the project was to
analyse the causal mechanisms
between economic growth and
services demand and the reverse
causation that services sector
expansion promotes economic
growth.
Thus, for the first time a research
project provides an analysis of
product and labour markets in an
international comparison of
employment trends and their causes,
using the US as the benchmark
country. The project covered four
main areas of research: first, an
analysis of aggregate demand com-
ponents using data from input-out-
put and national accounts statistics,
with a special focus on private con-
sumption; second, an analysis of
household consumption behaviour,
relating budget patterns to house-
hold characteristics, including
demographics, employment partici-
pation and income, on the basis of
microdata from consumer budget
surveys; third, an analysis of the
employment effects of demand
patterns, considering the entire
production chain in vertically inte-
grated sectors based on input-out-
put data; and fourth, an analysis of
the employment structure of services,
focused on the main employment
gap in private-sector services,
namely the distribution sector
(trade, hotels and restaurants).
While not all of the study results
can be summarised here, its most
significant finding is that product
demand patterns have an impact
on the level of employment and do
account for a part of the EU-US
employment gap. Compared to the
level of demand, however, the
effect on employment is rather
small. Higher US employment
relates to higher income and
demand, which is largely – but not
exclusively – achieved by higher
employment participation and
longer working hours.
With regard to the four areas cov-
ered by the project, the first – the
aggregate analysis - confirms that
services do play a large role in final
demand, primarily through public
and private consumption, which is
more important in the US than in
Europe. The analysis also reveals
the impact of institutional arrange-
ments (public-private) concerning
the provision of services, indicating
that part of the gap in private-
household service expenditures
between the US and Europe disap-
pears once the public provision of
individual services, such as health
care in Europe is taken into
account. The remaining collective
consumption is at similar levels in
the US and in Europe.
Second, the analysis of household
expenditure surveys shows that
household characteristics have a
very limited impact on the evolu-
tion of the share of services in
expenditures in each of the coun-
tries. Among the household charac-
teristics, the expenditure level
seems to be the most important for
both relative services demand
trends over time and the differ-
ences between the EU and the US.
This indicates the most important
role of incomes for services
demand. Overall, the shift towards
services runs parallel between the
US and Europe, but at a higher level
in the US.45
Third, the analysis of product
demand on employment, based on
vertically integrated sectors which
take account of the whole produc-
tion chain, showed that the relative
employment-friendliness of demand
in individual sectors remained fairly
constant over time within countries.
They are also fairly similar across
countries, and the employment
intensities of services and goods
demand are roughly equal. Based
on input-output techniques to
assess the contribution of patterns
of final demand and consumption
to the differing employment rates
observed across countries, the proj-
ect concludes that final demands
originating in both manufacturing
and services were increasingly gen-
erating jobs located in services.
It further shows that the changing
patterns of final demand have been
significantly employment-friendly
in the European economies, but
employment-neutral in the US. Also
the final demand mixes of the
European economies are more
employment-friendly than the US
pattern. In a counterfactual exer-
cise, the demand mixes of all the
European countries were found to
raise US employment, while the US
mix would result in lower employ-
ment in the European economies.
The changing mix of consumption,
on the other hand, has been signif-
icantly less employment-friendly
than final demand, and only a
minor source of employment
growth within each economy. The
European consumption patterns
tend to be less employment-friend-
ly than that of the US. The con-
sumption patterns of France and
Germany would reduce US employ-
ment by 3-5% respectively, while
those of Spain and the UK would
have little effect. Conversely, if the
US consumption mix were adopted
in the European economies, employ-
ment would be 2-4% higher.
Overall, the project finds that the
levels of demand play a much more
important role for the EU-US
employment gap than the struc-
tures of demand. Demand growth
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44 This research project was a joint undertaking of the Universities of Amsterdam, Utrecht, Oxford and Paris-I Sorbonne, and the
University Carlos III in Madrid, University College London and 17th Street Economics, Washington DC. The main network partners
involved were Wiemer Salverda (Amsterdam), Ronald Schettkat (Utrecht/Wuppertal), Mary Gregory and Andrew Glyn (Oxford),
Michel Sollogoub and François Gardes (Paris), Javier Ruiz-Castillo (Madrid), Stephen Machin (University College London) and Joachim
Möller (Regensburg). The project was financially supported by the Socioeconomic Key Action of the Fifth Framework Programme of
the European Commission (HPSECT- 2001-00089). For further information on the network's research output, see also footnote 28.
45 These results were achieved on the basis of micro data internationally standardised in expenditures and households characteristics,
and limited to those expenditures (between 55 and 75 per cent of total) which are unaffected by the institutional differences of pub-
lic/private provision.
has been the major source of
employment growth, offset by job
losses through labour productivity
gains. Structural change along the
supply chain, including outsourc-
ing, both creates and destroys jobs,
with only a small net effect. In the
US, stronger demand growth has
brought more job creation, while
weaker productivity gains have
been less job-destroying than in the
European economies. These are,
according to the DEMPATEM proj-
ect, the major factors which have
opened up the employment gap.
Finally, with regard to the specific
employment gap in the distribution
sector (trade, hotels and restau-
rants), the project confirms that the
wage structure of retailing relative
to the rest of the economy provides
no convincing evidence that, in
comparison to Europe, US retailing
benefits from higher wage flexibility,
offering possibilities of paying
lower wages. Notably, no particular
contribution was found for pay dif-
ferentials at low levels of skill nor at
the bottom end of the wage distri-
bution. On the other hand, more
rapid productivity growth in the
European distribution sector did
contribute to the jobs gap in distri-
bution in the 1970s but not during
the two later decades. The much
higher macroeconomic level of
goods consumption per capita in
the US as compared to Europe is
important for explaining the gap in
retail employment, thus substan-
tially mitigating the importance of
potential constraining effects of
wages and productivity.46
5. Conclusions 
While the EU-US employment gap
has narrowed considerably over the
period 1998-2003 due to stronger
employment performance of services
in the EU and a less unfavourable
employment evolution in industry,
the US still has the highest employ-
ment rate in services (55.4%) and
the lowest employment rate in
industry (12.6%) compared to the
EU as a whole and the individual EU
Member States. As a consequence,
the remaining EU-US employment
gap is entirely due to a gap in serv-
ices sector employment, thus sug-
gesting the existence of a further
untapped job creation potential in
the European services sector.
In many of the central and eastern
EU Member States and the south-
ern EU Member States, a large gap
in employment rates in the services
sector remains, while in Spain and
Ireland, employment in services has
risen by more than 20% between
1998 and 2003. At the same time,
the Czech Republic, Germany,
Greece, and the Slovak Republic in
particular showed employment
growth in the services sector well
below the average.
The EU-US employment gap in
services is most acute for women
and older workers – the latter
being the only population group
for which there has not been any
significant closing in the EU-US
employment gap in recent years.
Moreover, with regard to the sec-
toral and occupational composi-
tion, the EU-US employment gap
exists at two levels: on the one
hand, in comparatively low-skill,
low-paying sectors, such as whole-
sale and retail trade and hotels
and restaurants, and on the other,
in comparatively high-skill, high-
paying sectors, such as real estate
and business services, education
and health and social services. The
latter sectors are those in which
the most successful EU Member
States have created most jobs
from 1998-2003. The same obser-
vation holds for the EU-US emp-
loyment gap by occupation, which
is found to be highest among serv-
ices workers and shop assistants,
on the one hand, and among
clerks, legislators and managers,
on the other.
The breakdown of the EU-US
employment gap thus helps to
identify the areas with the greatest
job creation potential in the EU:
female employment, employment
of older people, and employment
in the services sector and in certain
comparatively high-skill, high-pay-
ing sectors, such as business services,
education and health and social
work. However, the various posi-
tive experiences in several of the
EU Member States also offer use-
ful benchmarks. By 2003, for
example, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK had joined
Denmark in overtaking the US in
terms of the employment rate.
While in the case of the Nether-
lands, this might have been to a
large extent due to the strong
expansion of part-time work, the
picture looks different for Sweden
and the UK, where a strong per-
formance in services sector job cre-
ation in the high-skill, high-paying
services sectors strongly compen-
sated for the important job losses
in industry. In fact, in all of these
EU ‘benchmark countries’ employ-
ment rates in services are close to
those in the US, while employ-
ment rates in industry continue to
be much higher.
The chapter also casts some doubt
as to what extent the recent US
experience and the US employment
structures are necessarily a bench-
mark for the EU. The various studies
summarised in this chapter con-
clude that differences in employ-
ment structures are to a large extent
structural, and that they are the out-
come of substantial differences in
household consumption patterns
and demand structures, most
notably of lower increases in the lev-
els of final demand in the EU than in
the US. These differences, in turn, are
a consequence of important changes
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46 In this context, the study also shows that productivity in France, the Netherlands and West Germany has caught up with US levels and
that, by the end of the last century the income gap between the US and these countries roughly corresponded to the labour-input
gap, while Spain and the UK, by contrast, still have lower productivity levels. While acknowledging that the shift of the causes of the
American income advantage from production technology to labour input was hard to explain with conventional macroeconomic
arguments, given that it would require substantial changes in labour supply and consumption behaviour, the project leaves open the
"pressing question for further research (…) why the USA raised labour input so much and why the European countries fail to achieve
higher participation: preferences or constraints?"
in labour supply behaviour, especially
of women and older people, as well
as a consequence of demographic
changes and changes in household
formation.
Furthermore, there is no clear and
binding evidence in support of the
conventional perception that dif-
ferences in employment structures
between the EU and the US are pre-
dominantly due to either too rigid
relative wage structures or more
favourable productivity patterns in
the EU (which would prevent in
particular the low-skilled from
acceding the labour market).
According to information on formal
education credentials and interna-
tionally comparable literacy tests,
the employment situation of the
low-skilled is actually less
favourable in the US than in the EU
as a whole - and this despite higher
supply of, and higher demand for,
unskilled labour in the US. The
strong labour market performance
in services in the US has dispropor-
tionately benefited the high-skilled.
Relative wage structures are gener-
ally similar across countries and are
not found to be a significant deter-
minant of employment structures.
For example, although relative
wages in the hotels and restaurants
sector in Germany are at US levels,
and productivity levels are similar,
the German employment rate in
that sector is not even half that in
the US. For the US in particular,
there is further evidence that the
increases in services employment
were matched by strong increases in
relative wages - not only in business
services, but also in education,
health and social services, and other
personal or communal services -
there is no evidence for offsetting
adjustments by employment to high
wage levels in an industry. Instead,
there are other long-term adjust-
ments, notably of productivity and
capital-labour ratios, with high-
wage sectors becoming increasingly
more productive.
Finally, the employment intensities
of demand in industry and services
are in general found to be similar,
and there is also evidence that spill-
over effects of final demand on
employment might in some cases
well be stronger for industry
demand than for services demand.
In conclusion, the key to increasing
employment in services is in the cre-
ation of jobs in the comparatively
high-paying, high-productive services,
such as business services, education
and health and social services. To
achieve this, the spill-over effects on
employment in services from prod-
uct demand in industry need to be
better exploited and further increas-
es in final demand for services are
necessary. The latter will follow on
from further increases in the labour
market participation of women and
older people, from more, and more
efficient, investment in human capi-
tal and lifelong learning, sharing
the related costs and responsibilities
between public authorities, compa-
nies and individuals, and from the
support of public spending in areas
such as education and health and
social services.
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6. Annexes to chapter 3
Annex 6.1. Employment, skills and
wage data for the EU and the US
Data on employment and skill lev-
els in this chapter are based on data
from the European Community
Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the
years 1998-2003. Population and
employment data generally refer to
the age group 15-64 unless indicated
otherwise. Structural employment
data by sector or occupation fur-
ther generally refer to the second
quarter of the year, except when
indicated otherwise. For Lithuania
and Austria, data on employment
growth by skill level in the period
1998-2003 are missing in part due
to recent breaks in the series of
educational atainment levels for
these countries. Long-term employ-
ment data by broad sector for the
years 1977-2002 are from the
OECD. Data on relative and hourly
wages are based on the 2000
Labour Cost Survey, a structural
enterprise survey, covering industry
and services, and excluding in most
EU Member States agriculture, pub-
lic administration and enterprises
with less than 10 employees. In the
future, it will be carried out every
four years. The coverage of a num-
ber of sectors is therefore either
weak or missing, notably of
“Education, health and social serv-
ices”, “Public administration and
defence”, and “Social and personal
services”. No information is provid-
ed on the self-employed. The sur-
vey contains detailed information
on the level and structure of labour
costs, wages and salaries, working
hours and employment at the
national, regional and sectoral
(NACE-2) level and by establish-
ment size. Latest structural data
from the Labour Cost Survey (LCS)
are available for the year 2000. In
that survey, no data are provided
for Belgium, Malta and Turkey.
Wage information from the 2002
Structure of Earnings Survey was
not yet available at the time of
publication of this report.
Data on employment and wages
for the US used in this chapter are
based on data National Industry-
Specific Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) for the years 1998-
2003, provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). Population
and employment data generally
refer to the age group 16-64 unless
indicated otherwise. Structural
employment data by sector or occu-
pation are annual averages, except
when indicated otherwise. The sec-
toral and occupational data have
been re-classified into the standard
European classification systems
(NACE for sectors, ISCO for occupa-
tions) according to the correspon-
dence tables below. Long-term
employment data by broad sector
for the years 1977-2002 are from
the OECD Labour Market Statistics
database. Hourly wages are calcu-
lated based on a “year-round, full-
time” figure of 2,080 hours. Data
on skill levels by labour force status
are from the OECD. Data on skill
levels by sector are based on the
Current Population Survey (CPS).
The OES National Industry-Specific
Occupational Employment and
Wage Estimates are calculated from
data collected in a national survey
of employers. These data are used
to calculate industry-specific occu-
pational employment and wage
estimates for most 3, 4, and 5-digit
North American Industry Classi-
fication System (NAICS) industry
groups. Self-employed persons are
not included in the survey. With
regard to the occupational employ-
ment structure, since 1999, the OES
program has used the Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC)
system. With regard to the sectoral
employment structure, the Stan-
dard Industry Classification (SIC) has
been used in 1998 and 2000, and
the North American Industry Classi-
fication System (NAICS) in 2003. The
surveys covered in principal the sec-
tors SIC 071 to SIC 497 (agricultural
services; mining; construction; man-
ufacturing; transportation and
public utilities; wholesale and retail
trade; finance, insurance, and real
estate; and services). For all analyses
of employment rates by sector in
this chapter, aggregate data on
employment in agriculture (annual
averages) from BLS have been
added.
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Annex 6.2. Sectoral classifications (NACE, SIC and NAICS)
NACE-1 - SIC-3 conversion NACE-1 - NAICS conversion
AGRICULTURE (NACE A-B)
Agriculture, hunting and forestry (NACE A)
71 Soil Preparation Services 113000 Forestry and Logging
72 Crop Services 115000 Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry
73 Veterinary Services
74 Animal Services, Except Veterinary
241 Logging
Fishing (NACE B)
INDUSTRY (NACE C-F)
Mining and quarrying (NACE C)
10 Metal Mining 211000 Oil and Gas Extraction
12 Coal Mining 212000 Mining (except Oil and Gas)
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 213000 Support Activities for Mining
14 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels
Manufacturing (NACE D)
20 Food and Kindred Products 311000 Food Manufacturing
21 Tobacco Products 312000 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
22 Textile Mill Products 313000 Textile Mills
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products Made 314000 Textile Product Mills
From Fabrics and Similar Materials
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 315000 Apparel Manufacturing
25 Furniture and Fixtures 316000 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
26 Paper and Allied Products 321000 Wood Product Manufacturing
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 322000 Paper Manufacturing
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 323000 Printing and Related Support Activities
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 324000 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 325000 Chemical Manufacturing
31 Leather and Leather Products 326000 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 327000 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
33 Primary Metal Industries 331000 Primary Metal Manufacturing
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 332000 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
and Transportation Equipment
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery 333000 Machinery Manufacturing
and Computer Equipment
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment 334000 Computer and Electronic Product 
and Components, Except Computer Equipment
37 Transportation Equipment 335000 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and 
Component Manufacturing
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling 336000 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
Instruments; Photographic, Medical and 
Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 337000 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
339000 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
511000 Publishing Industries (except Internet)
Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE E)
491 Electric Services 221000 Utilities
492 Gas Production and Distribution
493 Combination Electric and Gas, and Other 
Utility Services
494 Water Supply
496 Steam and Air-Conditioning Supply
497 Irrigation Systems
Construction (NACE F)
15 Building Construction General Contractors 236000 Construction of Buildings
and Operative Builders
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16 Heavy Construction Other Than Building 237000 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction
Construction Contractors
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 238000 Specialty Trade Contractors
SERVICES (NACE G-Q)
Wholesale and retail trade (NACE G)
50 Wholesale Trade--Durable Goods 423000 Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods
51 Wholesale Trade--Non-Durable Goods 424000 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 425000 Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and 
and Mobile Home Dealers Brokers
53 General Merchandise Stores 441000 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers
54 Food Stores 442000 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 443000 Electronics and Appliance Stores
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 444000 Building Material and Garden Equipment and 
Supplies Dealers
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment 445000 Food and Beverage Stores
Stores
59 Miscellaneous Retail 446000 Health and Personal Care Stores
447000 Gasoline Stations
448000 Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores
451000 Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, and Music 
Stores
452000 General Merchandise Stores
453000 Miscellaneous Store Retailers
454000 Nonstore Retailers
811000 Repair and Maintenance
Hotels and restaurants (NACE H)
581 Eating and Drinking Places 721000 Accommodation
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, 722000 Food Services and Drinking Places
and Other Lodging Places
Transport, storage and communication (NACE I)
40 Railroad Transportation 481000 Air Transportation
41 Local and Suburban Transit and Interurban 482000 Rail Transportation
Highway Passenger Transportation
42 Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 483000 Water Transportation
44 Water Transportation 484000 Truck Transportation
45 Transportation By Air 485000 Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 486000 Pipeline Transportation
47 Transportation Services 487000 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation
48 Communications 488000 Support Activities for Transportation
492000 Couriers and Messengers
517000 Telecommunications
518000 Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals,
and Data Processing Service
519000 Other Information Services
Financial intermediation (NACE J)
60 Depository Institutions 521000 Monetary Authorities - Central Bank
61 Non-Depository Credit Institutions 522000 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
62 Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, 523000 Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other 
Exchanges, and Services Financial Investments and Related Activities
63 Insurance Carriers 524000 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 525000 Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles
Real estate, renting and business activities (NACE K)
74 Veterinary Services 531000 Real Estate
78 Landscape and Horticultural Services 532000 Rental and Leasing Services
65 Real Estate 533000 Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets 
(except Copyrighted Works)
73 Business Services 541000 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
751 Automotive Rental and Leasing, Without Drivers 551000 Management of Companies and Enterprises
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811 Legal Services 561000 Administrative and Support Services
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, 
Management, and Related Services
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security (NACE L)
90 Government (OES designation) 999000 Federal, State, and Local Government (OES 
Designation)
Education (NACE M)
82 Educational Services 611000 Educational Services
Health and social work (NACE N)
80 Health Services 621000 Ambulatory Health Care Services
83 Social Services 622000 Hospitals
623000 Nursing and Residential Care Facilities
624000 Social Assistance
Other community, social, personal service activities (NACE O)
495 Sanitary Services 512000 Motion Picture and Sound Recording 
Industries
72 Personal Services 515000 Broadcasting (except Internet)
75 Automotive Repair, Services, and Parking 516000 Internet Publishing and Broadcasting
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 562000 Waste Management and Remediation Services
78 Motion Pictures 711000 Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and 
Related Industries
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 712000 Museums, Historical Sites, and Similar 
Institutions
84 Museums, Art Galleries, and Botanical and 713000 Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation 
Zoological Gardens Industries
86 Membership Organizations 812000 Personal and Laundry Services
89 Services, not elsewhere classified 813000 Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, 
and Similar Organizations
Private households with employed persons (NACE P)
-- --
Extra-territorial organisations and bodies (NACE Q)
-- --
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Annex 6.3. Occupational classifications (ISCO and SOC)
ISCO-1 - S0C-3 conversion
Legislators, senior officials and managers (ISCO 1)
Management occupations (1100)
Business and financial operations occupations (1300)
Legal occupations: lawyers and judges (2310)
Food preparation and serving related occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (3510)
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (3710)
Personal care and service occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (3910)
Sales and related occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (4110)
Office and administrative support occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (4310)
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (4510)
Construction and extraction occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (4710)
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (4910)
Production occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (5110)
Transportation and material moving occupations: first-line supervisors, managers (5310)
Professionals (ISCO 2)
Computer and mathematical occupations (1500)
Architecture and engineering occupations: architects and engineers (1710-1721)
Life, physical, and social science occupations: scientists (1910-1930)
Community and social services occupations: counselors and therapists (2110-11 - 2110-15)
Community and social services occupations: clergy and religious activities (2120)
Education, training, and library occupations: teachers, archivists and librarians (2510-2540)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: arts directors, artists (2710-11 - 2710-13)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: actors, producers (2720-11 - 2720-12)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: dancers, choreographers, musicians (2720-31 - 2720-42)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: PR specialists, writers, editors, translators (2730-31 - 2730-91)
Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations: medical doctors and therapists (2910, 2911-21 - 2911-31)
Technicians and associate professionals (ISCO 3)
Architecture and engineering occupations: technicians (1730)
Life, physical, and social science occupations: technicians (1940)
Legal occupations: legal assistants (2320)
Community and social services occupations: social workers and assistants (2110-21 - 2110-93)
Education, training, and library occupations: teacher assistants (2590)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: commercial and industrial designers (2710-21 - 2710-27)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: athletes, sports competitors (2720-21 - 2720-23)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: announcers, news analysists(2730-10 - 2730-20)
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations: audio and video technicians, photographers (2740)
Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations: Registered nurses (29-1111)
Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations: health technicians (2920 - 2990)
Healthcare support occupations (3100)
Protective service occupations: first-line supervisors, inspectors, detectives (3310, 3320-21 - 3330-21, 3390-21)
Office and administrative support occupations: executive secretaries and administrative assistants (4360-11 - 4360-13)
Transportation and material moving occupations: pilots, air traffic controlers (5320)
Transportation and material moving occupations: traffic technicians and transport inspectors (5360-40 - 5360-51)
Clerks (ISCO 4)
Office and administrative support occupations (4300, except 4310 and 4360-11 - 4360-13)
Service workers and shop and market sales workers (ISCO 5)
Protective service occupations: fire fighters, police officers, control workers, security guards (3320-11, 3330-31 - 3390-11,
3390-13 - 3390-91)
Food preparation and serving related occupations (3500, except 3510)
Personal care and service occupations (3900, except 3910)
Sales and related occupations (4100, except 4110)
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO 6)
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations (except 4510)
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Craft and related trades workers  (ISCO 7)
Construction and extraction occupations (4700, except 4710, 4720-61, 4730, 4750-81)
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations (4900, except 4910, 4991-98)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers (ISCO 8)
Production occupations (5100, except 5110 and 5191-98)
Transportation and material moving occupations: drivers, locomotive engineers, railroad conductors (5320-5340)
Transportation and material moving occupations: transport operators (5370-11 - 5370-51)
isco9 Elementary occupations (ISCO 9)
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations (3700, except 3710)
Construction and extraction occupations: laboureres and helpers (4720-61, 4730, 4750-81)
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations: helpers (4991-98)
Transportation and material moving occupations: station and parking lot attendants (5360-11 - 5360-31)
Transportation and material moving occupations: cleaners, labourers, packagers, etc. (5370-51 - 5371-21)
ISCED categories
Low-skilled
ISCED 0/1:
Pre-primary and primary education 
ISCED 2:
Lower secondary education 
Medium-skilled
ISCED 3A:
Upper secondary education. Programmes at level 3 designed to provide direct access to ISCED 5A
ISCED 3B:
Upper secondary education. Programmes at level 3 designed to provide direct access to ISCED 5B
ISCED 3CL:
Upper secondary education. 'Long' is dependent on the theoretical duration of the programmes at that level.
ISCED 3CS:
Upper secondary education. 'Short' is dependent on the theoretical duration of the programmes at that level.
ISCED 4:
Post-secondary, non-tertiary education
High-skilled
ISCED 5A:
First stage of tertiary education: The programmes provide the level of education required for entry into a profession
with high skills requirements or an advanced research programme.
ISCED 5B:
First stage of tertiary education. The programme content is typically designed to prepare students to enter a particular
occupation.
ISCED 6:
Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification). It prepares recipients for faculty
posts in institutions offering ISCED 5A programmes, as well as research posts in government and industry.
Following the classification used by the OECD in Education at a Glance, educational attainment categories are defined
with reference to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of 1997:
Annex 6.4. Classifications of educational attainment levels (ISCED)
Employment structures in Europe and the US Chapter 3
145
Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
Pu
b
lic
 a
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
U
S
EU
-2
5
EU
-1
5
N
M
S1
0
B
E
C
Z
D
K
D
E
EE
EL
ES
FR
IE
IT
C
Y
LV
LT
LU
H
U
M
T
N
L
A
T
PL
PT
SI
SK
FI
SE
U
K
B
G
R
O
To
ta
l 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
(i
n
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
20
03
10
 1
66
14
 0
87
12
 2
78
1 
87
7
39
3
30
5
15
2
2 
87
1
35
29
5
1 
08
0
2 
26
8
90
1 
85
6
24
62
71
:
28
8
14
:
21
2
86
6
31
0
49
16
3
11
9
24
5
1 
94
0
22
8
45
9
20
00
9 
64
9
13
 7
26
11
 9
78
1 
74
8
41
2
30
5
15
8
2 
97
8
30
29
2
96
6
2 
13
4
77
1 
82
7
26
72
74
20
26
3
:
52
8
22
8
76
5
31
9
53
16
0
11
5
21
4
1 
71
0
19
4
42
8
19
98
9 
60
1
:
11
 5
33
90
1
36
8
27
9
15
7
3 
03
1
35
27
7
86
2
2 
07
7
70
1 
77
7
:
64
75
17
25
2
:
50
6
23
5
:
27
4
41
15
5
11
4
20
8
1 
55
8
:
38
0
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 (
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
19
98
-2
00
3
56
5
:
74
5
72
25
26
-5
-1
60
0
18
21
8
19
1
20
79
:
-2
-4
:
36
:
:
-2
3
:
36
8
8
5
37
38
2
:
79
19
98
-2
00
0
49
:
44
5
56
44
26
1
-5
3
-5
15
10
4
57
7
50
:
8
-1
3
11
:
22
-7
:
45
12
5
1
6
15
2
:
48
20
00
-2
00
3
51
6
36
1
30
0
11
5
-1
9
0
-6
-1
07
5
3
11
4
13
4
13
29
-2
-1
0
-3
:
25
:
:
-1
6
10
1
-9
-4
3
4
31
23
0
34
31
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
5.
9
:
6.
5
8.
0
6.
8
9.
3
-3
.2
-5
.3
0.
0
6.
5
25
.3
9.
2
28
.6
4.
4
:
-3
.1
-5
.3
:
14
.3
:
:
-9
.8
:
13
.1
19
.5
5.
2
4.
4
17
.8
24
.5
:
20
.8
19
98
-2
00
0
0.
5
:
3.
9
6.
2
12
.0
9.
3
0.
6
-1
.7
-1
4.
3
5.
4
12
.1
2.
7
10
.0
2.
8
:
12
.5
-1
.3
17
.6
4.
4
:
4.
3
-3
.0
:
16
.4
29
.3
3.
2
0.
9
2.
9
9.
8
:
12
.6
20
00
-2
00
3
5.
3
2.
6
2.
5
6.
6
-4
.6
0.
0
-3
.8
-3
.6
16
.7
1.
0
11
.8
6.
3
16
.9
1.
6
-7
.7
-1
3.
9
-4
.1
:
9.
5
:
:
-7
.0
13
.2
-2
.8
-7
.5
1.
9
3.
5
14
.5
13
.5
17
.5
7.
2
A
n
n
u
al
is
ed
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
1.
1
:
1.
3
1.
5
1.
3
1.
8
-0
.6
-1
.1
0.
0
1.
3
4.
6
1.
8
5.
2
0.
9
:
-0
.6
-1
.1
:
2.
7
:
:
-2
.0
:
2.
5
3.
6
1.
0
0.
9
3.
3
4.
5
:
3.
8
19
98
-2
00
0
0.
3
:
1.
9
3.
1
5.
8
4.
6
0.
3
-0
.9
-7
.4
2.
7
5.
9
1.
4
4.
9
1.
4
:
6.
1
-0
.7
8.
5
2.
2
:
2.
2
-1
.5
:
7.
9
13
.7
1.
6
0.
4
1.
4
4.
8
:
6.
1
20
00
-2
00
3
1.
8
0.
9
0.
8
2.
1
-1
.6
0.
0
-1
.3
-1
.2
5.
3
0.
3
3.
8
2.
1
5.
3
0.
5
-2
.6
-4
.9
-1
.4
:
3.
1
:
:
-2
.4
4.
2
-0
.9
-2
.6
0.
6
1.
1
4.
6
4.
3
5.
5
2.
4
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
(i
n
 %
)
20
03
7.
8
7.
4
7.
6
6.
6
9.
8
6.
6
5.
7
8.
1
6.
2
7.
6
6.
5
9.
3
5.
2
8.
5
7.
6
6.
3
4.
9
:
7.
4
9.
5
:
5.
7
6.
5
6.
5
5.
6
7.
5
5.
0
5.
7
6.
9
8.
1
5.
2
20
00
7.
3
7.
4
7.
6
6.
1
10
.1
6.
6
5.
9
8.
3
5.
4
7.
6
6.
4
9.
3
4.
7
8.
9
9.
1
7.
8
5.
4
11
.1
7.
0
:
6.
8
6.
2
5.
4
6.
8
6.
1
7.
7
4.
9
5.
3
6.
2
6.
8
4.
4
19
98
7.
6
:
7.
6
3.
1
9.
6
5.
8
5.
9
8.
6
5.
9
7.
2
6.
3
9.
4
4.
8
8.
9
:
6.
7
5.
2
10
.0
7.
0
:
6.
9
6.
5
:
6.
1
4.
7
7.
1
5.
3
5.
4
5.
9
:
3.
8
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
5.
4
4.
7
4.
9
3.
7
5.
8
4.
3
4.
3
5.
2
3.
8
4.
4
3.
9
5.
8
3.
4
4.
8
5.
2
3.
9
3.
1
:
4.
2
:
:
3.
9
3.
3
4.
4
3.
5
4.
4
3.
4
4.
2
4.
9
4.
3
3.
1
20
00
5.
4
4.
6
4.
8
3.
5
6.
1
4.
3
4.
5
5.
4
3.
3
4.
2
3.
6
5.
7
3.
0
4.
7
5.
9
4.
5
3.
2
7.
0
3.
9
:
4.
9
4.
2
3.
0
4.
6
3.
8
4.
3
3.
3
3.
8
4.
4
3.
5
2.
8
19
98
5.
6
:
4.
7
1.
8
5.
5
3.
9
4.
5
5.
5
3.
8
4.
0
3.
2
5.
6
2.
9
4.
6
:
4.
0
3.
2
6.
0
3.
7
:
4.
8
4.
4
:
4.
1
3.
0
4.
3
3.
3
3.
7
4.
1
:
2.
5
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
h
ig
h
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
10
.3
10
.3
10
.6
10
.6
8.
8
8.
9
12
.2
12
.4
17
.8
15
.2
9.
1
8.
8
7.
0
15
.8
12
.2
10
.8
7.
0
10
.6
5.
6
9.
7
4.
8
13
.4
6.
4
15
.3
10
.3
10
.8
8.
2
10
.3
15
.8
13
.1
20
00
:
:
10
.0
:
11
.2
8.
2
6.
9
13
.1
14
.6
17
.6
15
.3
8.
5
7.
1
6.
7
19
.9
12
.7
16
.7
6.
1
9.
9
:
9.
9
5.
3
8.
9
6.
1
16
.5
9.
3
10
.5
8.
0
8.
7
15
.1
12
.7
19
98
:
:
8.
3
:
9.
5
7.
3
7.
2
:
15
.2
14
.7
13
.2
7.
4
:
6.
0
:
9.
7
15
.6
:
8.
3
:
9.
3
3.
9
:
5.
4
11
.5
8.
1
10
.1
7.
7
:
6.
0
10
.2
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
83
.6
83
.3
87
.0
79
.3
89
.9
90
.2
84
.9
86
.8
76
.2
75
.0
80
.4
87
.4
79
.9
80
.5
85
.7
88
.5
79
.5
85
.1
58
.8
85
.4
92
.7
85
.5
72
.4
83
.9
88
.7
87
.3
90
.3
88
.3
77
.0
83
.5
20
00
:
:
82
.7
:
76
.6
90
.5
91
.3
82
.6
84
.1
74
.9
73
.5
80
.3
88
.6
78
.5
75
.8
85
.7
83
.0
79
.8
85
.7
:
85
.5
90
.8
90
.1
70
.2
82
.7
89
.0
87
.1
90
.0
89
.7
81
.7
85
.6
19
98
:
:
80
.7
:
78
.0
91
.0
90
.8
:
83
.4
77
.6
75
.0
80
.2
:
77
.4
:
88
.7
83
.1
:
86
.4
:
86
.1
92
.1
:
70
.9
86
.2
89
.3
87
.4
90
.4
:
91
.2
87
.8
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
6.
1
6.
4
2.
4
10
.1
1.
3
0.
9
3.
0
0.
8
6.
0
9.
8
10
.5
3.
8
13
.1
3.
7
2.
1
0.
7
13
.6
4.
3
35
.6
4.
9
2.
5
1.
1
21
.2
0.
8
1.
0
1.
9
1.
5
1.
4
7.
2
3.
4
20
00
:
:
7.
3
:
12
.2
1.
3
1.
8
4.
2
1.
3
7.
5
11
.1
11
.2
4.
4
14
.8
4.
2
1.
5
0.
2
14
.1
4.
4
:
4.
6
3.
9
1.
1
23
.7
0.
8
1.
7
2.
3
2.
0
1.
6
3.
2
1.
8
19
98
:
:
11
.0
:
12
.5
1.
8
2.
0
:
1.
4
7.
7
11
.8
12
.5
:
16
.6
:
1.
6
1.
3
:
5.
4
:
4.
6
4.
0
:
23
.7
2.
3
2.
5
2.
5
1.
9
:
2.
8
2.
0
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
h
ig
h
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
8.
4
8.
1
10
.0
6.
7
9.
7
7.
7
8.
8
6.
6
11
.0
7.
4
6.
7
5.
2
8.
2
8.
7
10
.1
7.
2
:
9.
3
6.
7
:
5.
0
10
.7
9.
2
11
.1
11
.6
7.
5
8.
6
7.
7
8.
3
11
.1
20
00
:
:
7.
6
9.
1
7.
1
9.
2
7.
2
9.
1
7.
2
11
.0
7.
3
6.
6
4.
6
8.
5
10
.1
9.
4
6.
5
5.
5
9.
3
:
8.
3
5.
5
9.
3
9.
9
12
.8
11
.8
6.
9
7.
0
6.
5
8.
4
11
.3
19
98
:
:
7.
0
4.
7
5.
9
9.
0
7.
4
:
7.
8
9.
4
6.
7
6.
0
:
8.
3
:
7.
8
5.
7
:
8.
3
:
8.
4
7.
3
:
8.
6
9.
4
10
.7
7.
1
7.
0
:
:
9.
8
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
5.
4
5.
9
3.
7
7.
4
4.
5
4.
2
5.
5
4.
0
5.
5
5.
7
6.
9
4.
4
7.
2
6.
8
3.
7
2.
9
:
4.
5
6.
5
:
5.
0
3.
2
6.
9
3.
1
4.
6
2.
4
3.
7
5.
6
4.
6
3.
5
20
00
:
:
5.
9
3.
8
7.
8
4.
7
5.
1
5.
7
3.
1
5.
4
5.
0
6.
8
4.
4
7.
2
8.
1
4.
9
2.
1
8.
6
4.
3
:
5.
8
5.
2
3.
2
7.
8
3.
6
4.
6
2.
5
3.
3
5.
2
4.
1
3.
3
19
98
:
:
6.
2
2.
0
7.
3
4.
3
5.
0
:
3.
2
5.
9
4.
9
6.
8
:
7.
1
:
4.
5
2.
5
:
4.
2
:
5.
8
5.
4
:
7.
4
2.
9
4.
7
3.
0
3.
4
:
:
3.
0
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
2.
3
2.
5
0.
7
3.
9
0.
7
0.
8
1.
9
0.
5
1.
2
1.
9
4.
3
1.
3
2.
6
1.
4
1.
0
0.
4
:
1.
6
4.
6
:
1.
3
0.
4
3.
5
0.
3
0.
5
1.
2
1.
7
1.
7
1.
9
0.
6
20
00
:
:
2.
8
0.
6
4.
3
0.
7
1.
5
2.
9
0.
7
1.
4
1.
9
4.
3
1.
2
2.
8
1.
2
0.
7
0.
1
5.
6
1.
4
:
2.
2
1.
8
0.
4
3.
7
0.
3
0.
8
1.
4
1.
8
1.
7
0.
8
0.
3
19
98
:
:
2.
8
0.
5
3.
9
0.
9
1.
6
:
0.
8
1.
3
1.
8
4.
4
:
2.
9
:
0.
8
0.
7
:
1.
6
:
2.
0
1.
7
:
3.
6
0.
7
1.
1
1.
2
1.
6
:
:
0.
4
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
h
ig
h
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
:
:
31
.5
17
.9
25
.4
27
.6
35
.5
:
-1
6.
5
25
.2
44
.6
36
.4
:
27
.8
:
36
.4
:
:
37
.2
:
12
.3
:
:
44
.5
48
.3
29
.0
21
.1
19
.6
:
:
28
.8
19
98
-2
00
0
:
:
18
.3
17
.2
28
.6
14
.8
-2
.3
:
-1
4.
0
18
.0
26
.2
19
.2
:
13
.8
:
27
.0
14
.0
:
21
.5
:
10
.4
:
:
32
.8
50
.6
13
.8
11
.4
8.
6
:
:
22
.9
20
00
-2
00
3
:
11
.6
10
.5
20
.1
-2
.4
11
.1
38
.6
-2
.3
-2
.9
6.
1
14
.6
14
.4
46
.0
12
.3
6.
7
7.
4
:
18
.9
12
.9
:
1.
8
-3
.7
44
.6
8.
8
-1
.5
13
.4
8.
7
10
.1
28
.8
8.
7
4.
8
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
:
:
9.
7
8.
0
8.
1
5.
9
-2
0.
2
:
32
.4
3.
0
25
.2
10
.1
:
12
.8
:
-2
2.
5
:
:
12
.3
:
7.
0
:
:
20
.4
14
.5
4.
5
-1
4.
8
25
.3
:
:
13
.9
19
98
-2
00
0
:
:
3.
9
5.
7
6.
7
9.
7
1.
5
:
0.
5
0.
1
4.
7
3.
5
:
8.
7
:
6.
0
-1
9.
9
:
3.
3
:
-0
.3
:
:
19
.9
27
.9
3.
2
-1
5.
6
-4
.7
:
:
11
.1
20
00
-2
00
3
:
4.
0
4.
6
1.
6
1.
3
-3
.4
-2
1.
3
-0
.6
31
.8
2.
9
19
.6
6.
4
4.
9
3.
8
-1
7.
2
-2
6.
9
:
9.
6
8.
7
:
7.
4
-2
.3
0.
4
0.
4
-1
0.
5
1.
3
0.
9
31
.5
9.
6
7.
6
2.
5
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
:
:
-6
.6
-2
4.
2
-9
.2
-2
3.
7
-5
1.
5
:
-3
9.
6
-1
9.
1
4.
5
-6
.5
:
-1
4.
8
:
40
.5
:
:
-1
4.
5
:
15
.9
:
:
8.
2
-6
1.
6
-6
1.
2
-1
2.
1
-9
.3
:
:
70
.0
19
98
-2
00
0
:
:
-3
.2
-2
5.
2
7.
0
-2
2.
6
-9
.2
:
-2
0.
2
-4
.1
2.
6
-7
.6
:
-9
.9
:
-1
0.
4
-7
9.
5
:
-1
7.
1
:
5.
3
:
:
16
.9
-6
5.
6
-3
2.
2
2.
2
10
.3
:
:
-1
3.
1
20
00
-2
00
3
:
-6
.1
-6
.4
24
.6
-1
5.
1
-1
.4
-4
6.
5
-2
5.
9
-2
4.
3
-1
5.
6
1.
8
1.
2
2.
7
-5
.4
18
.3
56
.8
:
0.
6
3.
0
:
10
.0
-3
1.
7
-0
.6
-7
.4
11
.7
-4
2.
7
-1
4.
0
-1
7.
7
-6
.5
12
8.
4
95
.6
Employment structures in Europe and the US Chapter 3
155
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
U
S
EU
-2
5
EU
-1
5
N
M
S1
0
B
E
C
Z
D
K
D
E
EE
EL
ES
FR
IE
IT
C
Y
LV
LT
LU
H
U
M
T
N
L
A
T
PL
PT
SI
SK
FI
SE
U
K
B
G
R
O
To
ta
l 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
(i
n
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
20
03
11
 8
63
13
 0
67
11
 0
35
2 
17
8
34
6
28
4
19
4
2 
04
9
50
25
7
94
8
1 
70
9
11
3
1 
60
0
21
71
13
5
:
32
0
12
:
21
8
1 
06
3
27
2
62
16
0
16
3
47
5
2 
38
2
21
3
40
2
20
00
11
 1
86
12
 6
05
10
 5
04
2 
10
1
34
8
28
9
18
1
1 
90
2
42
24
1
83
9
1 
74
2
10
1
1 
49
7
17
81
16
0
12
30
9
:
47
0
23
1
98
5
28
0
57
16
1
16
2
32
2
2 
18
8
21
0
43
6
19
98
10
 6
13
:
10
 2
58
1 
09
2
34
2
28
8
18
9
1 
95
8
52
24
0
81
4
1 
72
1
92
1 
45
2
:
84
13
8
10
30
5
:
47
3
21
6
:
27
4
59
16
6
15
7
28
9
2 
02
7
:
44
5
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 (
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
19
98
-2
00
3
1 
25
0
:
77
7
-1
0
4
-4
5
91
-2
17
13
4
-1
2
21
14
8
:
-1
3
-3
:
15
:
:
2
:
-2
3
-6
6
18
6
35
5
:
-4
3
19
98
-2
00
0
57
4
:
24
6
7
6
1
-8
-5
6
-1
0
1
25
21
9
45
:
-3
22
2
4
:
-3
15
:
6
-2
-5
5
33
16
1
:
-9
20
00
-2
00
3
67
6
46
2
53
1
65
-2
-5
13
14
7
8
16
10
9
-3
3
12
10
3
4
-1
0
-2
5
:
11
:
:
-1
3
78
-8
5
-1
1
15
3
19
4
3
-3
4
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
11
.8
:
7.
6
-0
.9
1.
2
-1
.4
2.
6
4.
6
-3
.8
7.
1
16
.5
-0
.7
22
.8
10
.2
:
-1
5.
5
-2
.2
:
4.
9
:
:
0.
9
:
-0
.7
5.
1
-3
.6
3.
8
64
.4
17
.5
:
-9
.7
19
98
-2
00
0
5.
4
:
2.
4
0.
6
1.
8
0.
3
-4
.2
-2
.9
-1
9.
2
0.
4
3.
1
1.
2
9.
8
3.
1
:
-3
.6
15
.9
20
.0
1.
3
:
-0
.6
6.
9
:
2.
2
-3
.4
-3
.0
3.
2
11
.4
7.
9
:
-2
.0
20
00
-2
00
3
6.
0
3.
7
5.
1
3.
1
-0
.6
-1
.7
7.
2
7.
7
19
.0
6.
6
13
.0
-1
.9
11
.9
6.
9
23
.5
-1
2.
3
-1
5.
6
:
3.
6
:
:
-5
.6
7.
9
-2
.9
8.
8
-0
.6
0.
6
47
.5
8.
9
1.
4
-7
.8
A
n
n
u
al
is
ed
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
2.
3
:
1.
5
-0
.2
0.
2
-0
.3
0.
5
0.
9
-0
.8
1.
4
3.
1
-0
.1
4.
2
2.
0
:
-3
.3
-0
.4
:
1.
0
:
:
0.
2
:
-0
.1
1.
0
-0
.7
0.
8
10
.4
3.
3
:
-2
.0
19
98
-2
00
0
2.
7
:
1.
2
0.
3
0.
9
0.
2
-2
.1
-1
.4
-1
0.
1
0.
2
1.
5
0.
6
4.
8
1.
5
:
-1
.8
7.
7
9.
5
0.
7
:
-0
.3
3.
4
:
1.
1
-1
.7
-1
.5
1.
6
5.
6
3.
9
:
-1
.0
20
00
-2
00
3
2.
0
1.
2
1.
7
1.
0
-0
.2
-0
.6
2.
3
2.
5
6.
0
2.
2
4.
2
-0
.6
3.
8
2.
2
7.
3
-4
.3
-5
.5
:
1.
2
:
:
-1
.9
2.
6
-1
.0
2.
8
-0
.2
0.
2
13
.8
2.
9
0.
5
-2
.7
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
(i
n
 %
)
20
03
9.
1
6.
9
6.
9
7.
7
8.
6
6.
1
7.
3
5.
8
8.
8
6.
6
5.
7
7.
0
6.
5
7.
4
6.
6
7.
2
9.
4
:
8.
2
8.
1
:
5.
9
7.
9
5.
7
7.
1
7.
4
6.
8
11
.1
8.
5
7.
6
4.
6
20
00
8.
5
6.
8
6.
7
7.
3
8.
5
6.
3
6.
7
5.
3
7.
6
6.
3
5.
5
7.
6
6.
2
7.
3
5.
9
8.
8
11
.6
6.
7
8.
2
:
6.
0
6.
3
7.
0
5.
9
6.
5
7.
7
6.
9
8.
0
8.
0
7.
4
4.
5
19
98
8.
3
:
6.
8
3.
7
8.
9
6.
0
7.
1
5.
6
8.
7
6.
2
6.
0
7.
8
6.
3
7.
2
:
8.
8
9.
5
5.
9
8.
4
:
6.
4
6.
0
:
6.
1
6.
7
7.
6
7.
3
7.
4
7.
6
:
4.
4
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
6.
3
4.
3
4.
4
4.
3
5.
1
4.
0
5.
5
3.
7
5.
5
3.
8
3.
4
4.
4
4.
2
4.
1
4.
6
4.
5
5.
9
:
4.
7
:
:
4.
1
4.
1
3.
9
4.
4
4.
3
4.
7
8.
2
6.
1
4.
0
2.
7
20
00
6.
2
4.
2
4.
2
4.
2
5.
2
4.
1
5.
1
3.
5
4.
6
3.
5
3.
1
4.
7
4.
0
3.
9
3.
9
5.
1
6.
9
4.
2
4.
6
:
4.
4
4.
3
3.
8
4.
1
4.
1
4.
4
4.
7
5.
7
5.
7
3.
8
2.
9
19
98
6.
1
:
4.
2
2.
2
5.
1
4.
1
5.
4
3.
5
5.
7
3.
5
3.
0
4.
7
3.
8
3.
8
:
5.
2
5.
9
3.
5
4.
5
:
4.
5
4.
1
:
4.
1
4.
3
4.
6
4.
6
5.
1
5.
3
:
2.
9
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
h
ig
h
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
62
.6
63
.4
55
.1
76
.8
46
.8
66
.8
65
.7
67
.2
83
.0
82
.7
62
.8
74
.1
42
.5
87
.0
51
.3
58
.2
70
.1
61
.9
58
.0
73
.6
57
.3
61
.0
56
.2
60
.7
44
.9
66
.7
61
.7
62
.8
70
.7
43
.4
20
00
:
:
63
.8
:
78
.2
43
.0
67
.8
66
.3
60
.1
81
.7
82
.0
62
.9
73
.7
43
.1
87
.2
45
.2
76
.1
69
.3
61
.9
:
75
.7
59
.0
63
.7
55
.9
55
.5
39
.7
68
.7
71
.1
62
.1
69
.1
42
.4
19
98
:
:
62
.4
:
76
.7
39
.8
69
.4
:
60
.8
82
.3
80
.7
62
.0
:
42
.0
:
50
.2
69
.6
:
58
.7
:
75
.4
48
.4
:
57
.8
53
.8
39
.6
65
.5
69
.4
:
40
.0
40
.6
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
28
.0
27
.0
38
.2
14
.3
48
.8
24
.5
28
.0
28
.7
12
.5
8.
2
24
.3
14
.6
43
.5
10
.4
42
.4
35
.7
19
.3
27
.9
16
.9
19
.3
35
.7
33
.2
11
.9
32
.9
50
.7
25
.4
31
.7
30
.5
20
.8
50
.0
20
00
:
:
26
.0
:
11
.6
50
.6
23
.7
26
.5
35
.2
13
.5
7.
6
23
.4
14
.3
45
.5
8.
4
48
.7
18
.7
23
.7
25
.4
:
17
.3
34
.6
31
.1
10
.0
37
.5
53
.5
23
.1
21
.7
29
.9
22
.0
49
.9
19
98
:
:
25
.5
:
13
.4
52
.7
21
.1
:
33
.2
13
.0
7.
2
24
.0
:
45
.8
:
44
.7
24
.8
:
29
.0
:
18
.7
44
.9
:
11
.6
39
.4
50
.6
27
.0
20
.1
:
47
.6
50
.5
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
9.
3
9.
6
6.
7
8.
9
4.
5
8.
8
6.
2
4.
1
4.
5
9.
1
13
.0
11
.4
13
.9
2.
6
6.
3
6.
1
10
.6
10
.2
25
.1
7.
1
7.
1
5.
8
31
.9
6.
4
4.
3
7.
9
6.
6
6.
8
8.
6
6.
6
20
00
:
:
10
.2
:
10
.2
6.
4
8.
5
7.
2
4.
7
4.
8
10
.4
13
.6
12
.0
11
.4
4.
3
6.
0
5.
1
7.
0
12
.6
:
7.
0
6.
4
5.
2
34
.2
7.
0
6.
8
8.
3
7.
2
8.
0
8.
9
7.
7
19
98
:
:
12
.1
:
9.
8
7.
6
9.
5
:
6.
0
4.
7
12
.1
14
.0
:
12
.2
:
5.
1
5.
6
:
12
.3
:
5.
9
6.
7
:
30
.7
6.
7
9.
8
7.
5
10
.5
:
12
.4
8.
9
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
h
ig
h
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
16
.0
15
.1
20
.9
15
.9
19
.2
13
.9
12
.3
16
.3
20
.9
12
.5
12
.9
13
.8
19
.4
15
.5
15
.6
18
.1
:
22
.8
29
.1
:
18
.6
22
.3
25
.2
18
.6
20
.7
11
.5
22
.1
15
.5
16
.3
14
.7
20
00
:
:
14
.8
22
.4
17
.1
19
.1
16
.3
11
.6
12
.7
20
.4
12
.4
14
.8
15
.7
21
.4
15
.2
16
.1
15
.8
17
.0
24
.8
:
16
.2
19
.3
27
.2
30
.2
17
.8
21
.3
11
.8
15
.7
15
.4
17
.4
16
.6
19
98
:
:
17
.1
11
.0
17
.6
19
.7
17
.8
:
14
.6
20
.4
13
.6
15
.7
:
22
.4
:
18
.9
12
.2
:
25
.0
:
18
.2
28
.3
:
34
.9
20
.0
22
.5
12
.4
14
.7
:
:
17
.3
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
2.
8
2.
9
2.
5
2.
1
2.
8
2.
9
1.
9
3.
2
1.
2
1.
4
2.
7
1.
7
4.
9
1.
3
3.
3
3.
8
:
2.
3
5.
3
:
2.
5
2.
1
3.
1
2.
4
3.
1
2.
8
5.
1
3.
6
1.
7
2.
4
20
00
:
:
2.
7
2.
4
1.
8
3.
0
2.
4
1.
7
3.
2
1.
3
1.
2
2.
7
1.
5
5.
0
0.
8
4.
3
3.
2
2.
2
2.
1
:
1.
8
2.
4
1.
9
3.
0
2.
7
3.
4
2.
6
2.
7
3.
4
1.
7
2.
5
19
98
:
:
3.
1
1.
5
2.
1
3.
1
2.
2
:
3.
8
1.
3
1.
1
2.
9
:
5.
2
:
3.
8
3.
4
:
2.
4
:
2.
0
2.
9
:
3.
9
3.
0
3.
5
3.
0
2.
2
:
:
2.
6
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
20
03
:
1.
2
1.
2
1.
1
1.
1
1.
0
2.
0
1.
0
1.
2
0.
4
0.
6
1.
5
1.
2
1.
1
0.
3
1.
1
1.
6
:
1.
6
1.
4
:
1.
1
1.
0
1.
6
1.
1
0.
9
1.
3
2.
5
2.
7
1.
0
0.
5
20
00
:
:
1.
2
1.
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
3
1.
1
0.
4
0.
6
1.
6
1.
1
0.
8
0.
4
1.
3
1.
6
0.
7
1.
8
:
0.
8
0.
9
0.
8
1.
8
1.
0
1.
4
1.
3
1.
6
2.
8
0.
9
0.
6
19
98
:
:
1.
0
0.
7
1.
1
1.
6
1.
8
:
1.
6
0.
3
0.
6
1.
5
:
0.
8
:
1.
2
1.
5
:
1.
6
:
0.
7
0.
9
:
1.
8
0.
9
1.
8
1.
0
2.
0
:
:
0.
7
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
h
ig
h
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
:
:
8.
8
5.
6
0.
9
15
.7
0.
8
:
10
.1
8.
3
19
.2
0.
0
:
11
.6
:
-1
3.
4
:
:
11
.1
:
0.
2
:
:
-2
.3
17
.0
9.
7
5.
7
46
.8
:
:
-3
.3
19
98
-2
00
0
:
:
3.
9
7.
1
3.
6
9.
2
-8
.1
:
-1
8.
8
-0
.2
4.
7
2.
5
:
5.
4
:
-1
0.
5
30
.3
:
7.
3
:
-0
.4
:
:
-0
.3
-1
.8
-2
.3
8.
2
15
.0
:
:
2.
1
20
00
-2
00
3
:
5.
4
6.
2
2.
3
-2
.6
6.
0
9.
8
6.
7
35
.5
8.
6
13
.8
-2
.5
13
.1
5.
8
26
.3
-3
.2
:
13
.7
3.
6
:
0.
6
1.
0
3.
3
-2
.0
19
.1
12
.3
-2
.2
27
.6
10
.0
4.
3
-5
.2
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
:
:
9.
4
-3
.0
7.
7
-8
.9
21
.5
:
-1
3.
6
3.
0
32
.2
0.
0
:
4.
8
:
-1
9.
4
:
:
1.
5
:
6.
2
:
:
3.
4
-1
3.
7
-3
.1
-2
.1
16
1.
3
:
:
-1
0.
4
19
98
-2
00
0
:
:
-0
.7
-3
.8
-1
2.
5
-3
.1
5.
5
:
-1
2.
8
4.
2
9.
0
-1
.1
:
2.
3
:
8.
4
-1
0.
2
:
-1
0.
7
:
-8
.0
:
:
-1
1.
2
-9
.4
3.
0
-1
1.
8
21
.6
:
:
-3
.1
20
00
-2
00
3
:
10
.1
11
.0
7.
5
23
.1
-6
.0
15
.2
13
.8
-1
.0
-1
.2
21
.3
1.
1
14
.6
2.
5
55
.6
-2
5.
6
:
-8
.4
13
.6
:
15
.4
7.
4
15
.1
16
.3
-4
.7
-6
.0
11
.0
11
4.
9
10
.9
-4
.0
-7
.5
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
 (
in
 %
)
19
98
-2
00
3
:
:
3.
4
-2
4.
8
-8
.8
-4
2.
3
-2
.8
:
-3
2.
0
2.
9
-1
2.
1
-8
.4
:
26
.2
:
3.
8
:
:
-1
2.
6
:
24
.4
:
:
4.
5
-2
.0
-5
7.
5
9.
4
3.
3
:
:
-3
2.
2
19
98
-2
00
0
:
:
-1
.4
-7
.0
5.
5
-1
4.
8
-1
5.
2
:
-3
5.
8
2.
5
-1
1.
0
-1
.4
:
-4
.0
:
16
.9
8.
7
:
4.
4
:
18
.0
:
:
14
.7
-0
.8
-3
2.
5
14
.0
-2
3.
1
:
:
-1
5.
1
20
00
-2
00
3
:
0.
6
1.
3
-0
.1
-1
3.
6
-3
2.
2
14
.6
-7
.1
6.
0
0.
3
-1
.2
-7
.1
6.
5
31
.5
-2
3.
9
-1
1.
2
:
69
.6
-1
6.
2
:
5.
4
15
.1
21
.8
-8
.8
-1
.3
-3
7.
0
-4
.0
34
.3
-8
.5
-2
.2
-2
0.
1
Chapter 3 Panorama of the European labour markets
156
Chapter 3 Employment in Europe 2004
Annex 6.5. Key employment indicators by sector (NACE-1) in the EU and the US, 1998-2003
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1. Introduction
The acceleration of technological
innovation and the emergence of
the knowledge society, the globali-
sation process and the develop-
ment of the service sector have
caused the European economies to
undergo a particular process of
structural change since the 1970s.
This evolution in the economy as
been mirrored by changes in socie-
ty at large: the individualisation of
social and economic relations, the
evolving role and aspirations of
women, the growing importance of
new family arrangements (such as
lone parent families and cohabita-
tion), and greater opportunities
derived from better education and
health.
The consequence of all these fac-
tors on the labour market has been
to transform both working lives,
which are now more complex, and
working patterns that have become
more diverse and irregular.  This
means that individuals now have to
face a greater number of transi-
tions, including those from school
to work, between jobs and working
statuses, between work and train-
ing, between career breaks and
care periods, between working life
and retirement2. 
The three complementary and
mutually supportive objectives of
the European Employment Strategy
(i.e. full employment, quality and
productivity at work, and social
cohesion and inclusion) can only be
achieved through increased adapt-
ability to anticipate, trigger and
absorb this economic and social
change, with labour market flexibil-
ity as a key component of the
adaptability agenda. The greater
flexibility needed to face the
increasing transitional nature of
today’s labour market need to be
combined with security in terms of
long-term employability of the
workforce. 
2. The policy context
These issues are at the core of the
European Employment Strategy.
Guideline 3 of the 2003 Employ-
ment Guidelines aims at addressing
change and promoting adaptability
in the labour market. It calls on
Member States to “review and,
where appropriate, reform overly
restrictive elements in employment
legislation that affect labour mar-
ket dynamics…and undertake
other appropriate measures to pro-
mote: diversity of contractual and
working arrangements, including
arrangements on working time,
favouring career progression, and a
better balance … between flexibili-
ty and security”. It also highlights
the importance for workers, in par-
ticular low-skilled workers, to have
access to training and to promote
occupational mobility and remove
obstacles to geographical mobility.
Aspects related to the long-term
employability of the workforce and
to individual life chances in the
labour market have been recog-
nised as central dimensions of 
quality in work. The European
Commission identified ten dimen-
sions of job quality in a Comm-
unication in 20013. For each of
these, one or more indicators have
been proposed – and adopted at
the Laeken Council in December
2001 – as a means of assessing the
quality of work in Europe and mon-
itoring its evolution over time4. 
These indicators include the transi-
tions by pay level and contract sta-
tus (used to monitor the intrinsic
job quality dimension); the shares
of employees voluntarily and invol-
untarily in part-time work and fixed
term-contracts (used to monitor the
flexibility and security dimension);
the labour market transitions by
main activity status and of unem-
ployed people into employment
and training (used to monitor the
inclusion and access to the labour
market dimension)5.  
The need to promote flexibility
combined with security has been
further stressed by the report of the
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1 This chapter has been written with the invaluable contribution of Stefano Gagliarducci, European University Institute, Florence. 
2 For an overview of recent research on transitional labour markets, see G. Schmid and K. Schomann (eds), 2003, The concept of
Transitional Labour Markets and Some Policy Conclusions: the State of the Art, tlm.net working paper.
3 European Commission (2001), Employment and social policies: a framework for investing in quality, COM (2001) 313 final. 
4 European Council (2001), Indicators of quality in work, Report by the Employment Committee to the European Council, 14263/01. 
5 Figures presented in this report do not necessarily coincide with those related to the structural indicators due to definitional differ-
ences. In particular, in this chapter economic status is classified using self-defined main activity status and pay levels as proportions of
median gross hourly pay. Structural indicators used to monitor the Employment Guidelines are published each year in the Joint
Employment Report by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/employ-
ment_social/employment_strategy/employ_en.htm).
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Employment Taskforce chaired by
Wim Kok where it is stated that
better responsiveness of EU
economies to change requires a
high degree of flexibility in labour
markets, in particular through mod-
ern work organisation and a diver-
sity of contractual and working
arrangements. However, it is pointed
out that greater flexibility can only
succeed if combined with adequate
security for workers. In particular, in
the dynamic framework that is
needed to capture the increasing
transitional nature of today’s
labour markets, security is increas-
ingly associated not with the fact of
preserving a job for life, but rather
with building and preserving peo-
ple’s ability to remain and progress
in the labour market, while using
the welfare system as an instrument
of last resort. 
More specifically, the report urges
Member States and social partners
to ensure that there is adequate
security for workers under all forms
of contracts and to prevent the
emergence of a two-tier labour
market6. It has been pointed out
that the risk of segmentation of the
labour market is not only between
non-employed (‘outsiders’) and
employed (‘insiders’), but also
between permanently employed
‘insiders’, who can look forward to
a life of continuous employment
and careers offering promotion and
raising incomes and precariously
and informally employed ‘out-
siders’7. In other words, between
employment and non-employment,
attention has been drawn to that
grey area represented by workers in
precarious employment. Due to
market and institutional failures,
these individuals “at the lower
end” of the labour market suffer
from discontinuous employment,
little improvement in their human
capital and, consequently, few
opportunities to move up the job
ladder8.
If it is true that “the best safeguard
against social exclusion is a job”, as
stated in the conclusions of the
Lisbon Council, it is also important
to note that social exclusion can
also be seen as not having the
prospect of a career that evolves
over time, not having access to the
resources needed to ensure
employability and not being able
fully to participate in all spheres of
social life because of a lack of
secure employment prospects9. 
3. Key issues 
The focus of this chapter will be on
the issue of employment security
and in particular on the two key
aspects of job retention and
advancement. The former refers to
the capacity of individuals to
remain in employment, either by
holding the same job or by moving
between jobs. However, transitions
in the labour market are not
restricted to those between
employment and non-employment
(either inactivity or unemploy-
ment). Transitions between differ-
ent types of employment (either
temporary or permanent) and
between employment and self-
employment or education and
training are also taken in considera-
tion. 
Self-employment can be an effec-
tive way for individuals to respond
to changes in labour demand, to
fully utilise their entrepreneurial
potential or to adjust to changes in
personal circumstances. At the
same time, this category often
includes hybrid forms of contractual
arrangements that are open to
potential abuse. This category has
been referred to as ‘pseudo self-
employment’ or ‘dependent self-
employment’ and includes charac-
teristics of both dependent employ-
ment, such as primarily personal
work, continuity over time, single
client, tasks subject to direction,
and of self-employment proper,
such as pay related to results and no
social security10.
Lifelong learning is considered as
an essential response to technolog-
ical and structural changes in the
economy. Re-skilling is often
required to facilitate reintegration
into the labour market in the face
of a job loss, while on-going educa-
tion and training is essential to pre-
vent skills obsolescence and to
increase the continuing employabil-
ity of individuals. Therefore this
chapter will look at education and
training as an integral part of
labour market transitions and not
just as a one-off period that takes
place before entry in the labour
market. 
Job advancement is a multi-dimen-
sional concept that could include
upward wage and occupational
mobility, increased productivity,
improved skills, better quality in
work and life-work balance. Since
some of these aspects have been
analysed in other Commission
reports11 this chapter will focus on
upward wage mobility, which can
be taken as a proxy for several
other dimensions of the job ladder.
In particular, special attention will
be paid to the lower end of the
wage distribution and to the condi-
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6 Particular attention is drawn to social protection systems that need to be adapted to support mobility in the labour market and facil-
itate transitions between different statuses, such as work, training, career breaks or self-employment (job-to-job insurance).  
7 Page 2 in Schmid G. and Schömann K. (eds), 2003, The concept of Transitional Labour Markets and Some Policy Conclusions: the State
of the Art, tlm.net working paper.
8 OECD (2002), Upgrading the skills of the low-qualified: a new local policy agenda, LEED programme and OECD 2001 and 2003
Employment Outlook, Paris. 
9 For a comprehensive analysis of these issues, see G. Schmid and B. Gazier, 2000, The Dynamics of Full Employment: Social Integration
through Transitional Labour Markets, Edward Elgar.  
10 For a thorough presentation of these issues see Perulli A., 2003, Economically dependent/ quasi subordinate (parasubordinate)
employment: legal, social and economic aspects, A study for the European Commission. See also: Schmid G., 2000, Towards a theory
of transitional labour markets, in Schmid and Gazier (2000) op. cit.   
11 In particular, see the Employment in Europe reports 2002 and 2003 and European Commission (2003) Improving quality in work: a
review of recent progress COM(2003) 728 final.
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tions that may help workers to exit
from a low-pay status. 
Section one of this chapter looks at
employment retention and the
diversity of contractual arrange-
ments. Section two concentrates on
the incidence of low pay and career
advancement. Section three will use
econometric models to assess the
key determinants of labour market
transitions, highlighting the role of
education and training and of pub-
lic employment services to facilitate
job search and labour market
attachment. Finally, the annex
reports on the key findings in the
academic literature concerning the
effectiveness of temporary con-
tracts to secure long-term employa-
bility and their possible role as step-
ping-stones towards more stable
and permanent forms of contract.     
The main data source for this chap-
ter, except where otherwise speci-
fied, is the European Community
Household Panel survey for the
years 1994 to 2001. The ECHP is the
only comparable longitudinal data
source at the European level and for
this reason it is used in this chapter
on labour market dynamics.
Therefore, figures reported in this
chapter may slightly differ from
those presented elsewhere in this
report12, due to different survey
design and definitions used. In par-
ticular, it should be noted that in
this chapter employment is defined
as “working 15 hours per week or
more” due to the survey design and
data robustness. All other defini-
tions are specified where relevant.
The analysis in this chapter will be
restricted to the EU15 since the
ECHP is not available for the new
Member States.
4. Employment
retention and
diversity of
contractual
arrangements
By looking at the European
Community Household Panel
(ECHP) survey for the period from
the mid-nineties to 2001 (the last
year of the survey), two facts are
immediately evident (see table 45)13.
The first one is the decrease by
approximately four percentage
points in the percentage of the
working age population that is not
employed. This decrease is reflected
in the corresponding increase in the
percentage of employed individu-
als, while the percentages of those
who are self-employed and in edu-
cation or training remain roughly
constant during the same period. 
The second fact is that working as
an employee with a permanent con-
tract remains by far the most impor-
tant form of employment and it
continues to increase. However,
temporary employment has
increased twice as fast as perma-
nent employment, by almost 15% in
the period under consideration
against a 7.3% growth for perma-
nent employment. This means that
if we look at employees only, the
proportion of those with a perma-
nent contract is decreasing.  
12 For figures on fixed-term employment for the EU25 based on the Labour Force Survey, see chart 21 chapter 1. 
13 This classification is based on self-defined main activity status. The first two categories include those working with an employer in
paid employment of 15 hours or more per week. Temporary work includes employees with fixed-term or short-term contracts, casu-
al work with no contract and some other working arrangements. Self-employment includes both self-employed workers and unpaid
workers in a family enterprise, in both cases only those working 15 hours or more per week. The “not employed” category includes
the unemployed, retired, inactive and those working less than 15 hours per week. Those in education and training include also those
working with an employer in paid apprenticeship and special schemes related to employment of 15 hours of more per week. In all
cases, the 15 hours or more per week restriction has been used because of the classification used in the ECHP that distinguishes the
contract type only for those in this group. 
14 The classification by contract type is not available in the ECHP for 1994.
Table 45 - Main activity status by year14 – EU total – (row percentages)
1995 1997 1999 2001
Permanent work 42.3 42.7 44.4 45.4
Temporary work 6 6.2 6.1 6.9
Self-employment 9.3 9.1 8.9 9.1
Not employed 32.7 32.1 30.9 29
Education/training 9.8 10 9.7 9.7
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: data for SE not available.
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Chart 81 - Developments i  average growth in p rmanent and fixed-term 
employment in the EU15 in the two periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003
Further insights on growth trends
in temporary and permanent
employment can be gained if we
consider the two periods 1997-
2000 and 2000-200315 separately.
The late 1990s represent a period
of strong employment growth in
the EU-15, as opposed to the early
years of the following decade,
when employment growth has
been sluggish. Chart 81 looks at
the average annual growth in per-
manent and fixed-term employ-
ment for the two periods.
Fluctuations in fixed-term employ-
ment over the two periods are
much more marked than for per-
manent employment. In particular,
the former follows a clear pro-
cyclical trend, with relatively
strong growth of almost 6% over
the 1997-2000 period and a 1%
contraction in the following one.
On the other hand, permanent
employment grows in both peri-
ods, albeit at a slower pace in
2000-2003.   
The average picture for the EU as a
whole hides wide variations
between countries. In particular,
the percentage of the working age
population who are neither work-
ing nor in education or training
varies from 14.4% in Denmark to
35.6% in Italy. It is also interesting
to note that countries with the
highest percentage of the working
age population in paid employ-
ment, including Denmark, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands and the
UK have some of the lowest pro-
portions of employees with tempo-
rary contracts, while the opposite is
true for countries with low employ-
ment rates including Spain, Greece,
Italy and Portugal (table 46 and
chart 82). 
The percentage of working age
individuals who are self employed 
is the highest in the southern 
countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy
and Spain) and lowest in the
Netherlands, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, and France. Finally, the pro-
portion of those who are in educa-
tion or training ranges from over
12% in Spain and Denmark to 
less than 3% in the UK and
Luxembourg. 
The main activity status of the
working age population in Europe
also differs markedly according to
personal characteristics, such as
gender, age and the highest level of
education attained (table 47).
Women are twice more likely than
men to be non-employed. The
probability of being self-employed
is also much lower, standing at
5.3% as opposed to 12.9% for men,
while the proportion of those in
education or training is similar for
the two groups. Finally, the proba-
bility of having a temporary con-
tract is about two percentage
points higher for female employees
Chapter 4 Employment in Europe 2004
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15 Data for 2001 is not available. 
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Note: data for SE not available.
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Table 46 - Main activity status by country - 2001 (row percentages)
Chart 82 - Percentage of the working age population in paid employment vs. 
percentage of employees in temporary jobs – 2001
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: data for SE not available.
Permanent Temporary Self-employed Not-employed Educ./training
DE 45.9 7.8 6.4 28.5 11.4
DK 62.2 5.4 5.2 14.4 12.8
NL 55.8 6.7 4.5 25.0 8.0
BE 48.8 5.6 7.8 26.2 11.6
LU 61.3 3.8 5.2 27.9 1.9
FR 50.3 5.7 5.6 27.3 11.1
UK 58.5 3.3 8.1 27.3 2.9
IE 44.9 6.4 8.5 29.7 10.5
IT 35.3 5.0 13.9 35.6 10.2
GR 27.9 8.2 21.4 32.8 9.7
ES 29.6 14.4 11.4 31.7 13.0
PT 43.6 9.7 15.7 22.2 8.8
AT 53.4 4.0 9.5 24.8 8.4
FI 51.4 8.4 8.6 21.0 10.6
Total 45.4 6.9 9.1 29.0 9.7
rather than for male ones (14.5%
vs. 12.1% respectively).
More than half of those aged 16-
24 are in education or training
and this percentage drops drasti-
cally in the late 20s reaching less
than 1% for those aged over 35.
Conversely, the proportion of
those that are neither working
nor in education or training
increases with age, from 16% for
those in the age group 16-24 to
around 63% for those aged 55-64.
Self-employment is most prevalent
among workers aged 35-54 and
only 1.6% of those aged 16-24
undertakes this activity. Young
entrants in the labour market are
more likely than any other age
group to have a temporary con-
tract with roughly one in three
employees aged 16-24 having this
type of contract. The importance
of temporary employment decrea-
ses with age, with approximately
16% of those aged 25-34 having
this type of contract against
around 9% of those over 35.
The main activity status of the
working age population also corre-
lates with the level of qualification.
For example, those with a medium
level of qualifications are more
likely to be in education or train-
ing than those with high or low
qualifications. The fact of not
being in employment is inversely
correlated with the level of qualifi-
cation, its probability being more
than twice as high for the low
qualified as opposed to the highly
qualified. Furthermore, the inci-
dence of temporary employment
among employees is inversely cor-
related with the level of qualifica-
tions, ranging from 11% to 15%,
approximately.
In conclusion, in the period 1995-
2001 temporary employment
increased twice as fast as perma-
nent employment and tends to
show a pro-cyclical behaviour, sug-
gesting that it might be used, at
least partially, as a buffer to deal
with changes in demand that are
perceived as temporary16. The inci-
dence is higher for women and for
young people for whom it may be
used as a probationary period to
select workers with the necessary
skills or for the young people them-
selves to experiment with different
types of jobs. Finally, temporary
employment is more prevalent
among low-qualified workers, pos-
sibly pointing to their relative dis-
advantage in the labour market in
finding more stable forms of
employment17. 
4.1. Labour market dynamics:
employment transitions
An important issue relating to tem-
porary employment is whether it
leads to more employment, in the
form of either permanent or fixed-
term contracts, or to some other
status, in particular unemployment
or inactivity. More generally, it is
useful to analyse transitions over
time between the various possible
economic statuses to assess the
capacity of individuals to remain in
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Table 47 - Main activity status by personal characteristics – EU total - 2001 - (row percentages)
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: high qualifications correspond to recognised third level education (ISCED 5-7), medium level qualifications correspond to second
stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3) and low level qualifications to less than the second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2). 
16 For a different interpretation based on the screening function of temporary contracts, see Varejão J. and P. Portugal, 2003, Why do
firms use fixed-term contracts?, mimeo. 
17 This is particularly worrisome as evidence shows that workers on temporary contracts tend to receive less on-the-job training than
those on permanent contracts (see Employment in Europe 2003, p. 127; Storrie D., 2002, Temporary agency work in the European
Union, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working conditions; Wallette M., 2004, Temporary jobs and on-the-
job training in Sweden – is there a trade-off?, mimeo). In particular Wallette finds that although the incidence of on-the-job training
for temporary jobholders is lower than for corresponding open-ended jobholders, conditioned on that a worker receives on-the-job-
training, it is not automatically the case that the amount of training is lower for all jobholders This points to the importance of the
distinction within temporary jobs between probationary jobs on the one hand – normally used to screen workers and generally with
intensive training – and project temporary jobs and on-call jobs on the other hand. 
Permanent Temporary Self-employed Not-employed
Education  or
training
Temporary/ 
all employees
Male 52.3 7.2 12.9 18.4 9.3 12.1
Female 38.7 6.6 5.3 39.3 10.1 14.5
16-24 21.0 10.2 1.6 16.0 51.2 32.6
25-34 54.5 10.5 7.5 20.7 6.9 16.1
35-54 57.6 5.7 12.4 23.6 0.7 9.0
55-64 25.0 2.7 9.0 63.2 0.2 9.7
Highly qualified 59.2 7.6 9.4 16.4 7.5 11.3
Medium qualified 46.7 6.9 8.4 25.2 12.9 12.9
Low qualified 37.3 6.5 9.5 38.5 8.3 14.8
the labour market or to undertake
periods of education or training,
possibly to enhance their future
employability.
Table 48 shows one-year transitions
between the five economic statuses
in consideration for the two periods
1995 to 1996 and 2000 to 2001. It is
interesting to point out that when
comparing the mid-1990s to the
beginning of 2000, the transition
probabilities are rather similar.
Therefore, in the analysis that fol-
lows, data will be pooled for all
years to increase reliability. A possi-
ble interesting difference is a slight
increase in the probability of tem-
porary and self-employed workers
to remain employed and of those in
education or training to move into
paid employment. 
Looking in more detail at the tran-
sitions between 2000 and 2001, it
can be seen that over a one-year
period there is a high degree of
persistence for people on a perma-
nent contract (as it might be
expected), for the self-employed
and for those that are not
employed or in education or train-
ing: around 91%, 88% and 85% of
individuals in these three groups
respectively are still in the same
group one year later. Around 46%
of workers on a temporary contract
are still in that status one year later,
with 30% of them managing to
obtain a more stable form of
employment but around 17% of
them leaving work: the probability
of loosing the job is therefore more
than three times higher for those
with a temporary contract than for
those on a permanent one.
Approximately 72% of those in
education or training are still in
that category a year later, while
16% of them have started paid
employment of 15 hours or more.
Transition probabilities between
different economic activity statuses
differ according to the personal
characteristics of the individuals
(see table 49). Looking at the gen-
der dimension, a first point to note
is that working women are more
likely to move out of employment
than their male counterparts. This
applies to those on permanent con-
tract (6.4% of whom leave their job
as opposed to 4.3% for men), on
temporary contracts (20.8% as
opposed to 16%) and in self-
employment (13.1% vs. 4.9%). On
the other hand, the probability for
men on temporary contracts to
move to a more stable job is around
two percentage points higher than
for women. This suggests that for
men a temporary job is more likely
to be a first step towards stable
employment, while for women it is
more likely to represent a period of
work in a rather more intermittent
career path. 
Considering the different age
groups, it should be noted that
the lowest degree of persistence
in permanent jobs is for those
aged 16-24 or 55-64. In the former
case this is probably due the fact
that young workers need to
experiment more before they find
the “right” job for them, and in
the latter case due to older work-
ers exiting the labour market
(16.2%) probably indefinitely. The
same applies to those in tempo-
rary employment, the difference
with prime age workers explained
mainly by a greater proportion of
young workers moving to further
education or training (10.8% of
them) and for older workers leav-
ing the labour market (29.5% of
them). Persistence in education or
training is highest for the
youngest age group with an
increasing percentage moving to a
job or non-employment as age
increases. Education and training
increases the likelihood of obtain-
ing a job, compared to the same
likelihood for those that were ini-
tially not employed or in educa-
tion or training - and this for all
age groups except for those aged
16-24. Finally, the proportion of
those moving from education 
or training to non-employment
increases with age.       
The analysis of transitions by levels
of qualification highlights once
more the importance of education
for labour market outcomes. The
likelihood of temporary workers to
move to more stable employment
increases with the level of qualifica-
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Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: data for SE not available.
Table 48 - Transitions by economic activity status – 1995/96 and 2000/01 – EU total (row percentages)
Permanent Temporary Self-employed Not employed
Education/ 
training
1996
1995
Permanent 90.6 2.6 1.1 5.1 0.6
Temporary 28.5 44.3 3.1 19.8 4.4
Self employed 3.5 2.0 85.3 8.8 0.4
Not employed 5.9 4.6 2.2 85.1 2.2
Educ./ training 7.5 5.4 1.1 14.4 71.7
2001
2000
Permanent 90.6 3.2 0.9 4.8 0.5
Temporary 30.5 45.8 2.8 17.1 3.9
Self employed 3.8 1.9 87.7 6.2 0.3
Not employed 6.6 4.5 2.0 84.6 2.3
Educ./ training 8.4 7.6 0.9 11.3 71.8
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Table 49 - 1-year transitions by main economic status and by personal characteristics – EU total (row percentages)
Permanent 
employment
Temporary 
employment
Self employment Not employed Education/ training
t
t + 1
Total
Permanent 90.4 2.9 1.0 5.2 0.6
Temporary 31.4 43.8 2.6 18.2 4.1
Self employed 4.0 1.9 86.3 7.4 0.4
Not employed 6.1 4.7 2.2 84.8 2.1
Educ./training 7.7 7.0 0.9 12.6 71.8
Male
Permanent 91.1 2.8 1.3 4.3 0.6
Temporary 32.2 44.5 3.2 16 4.1
Self employed 4.2 2.0 88.6 4.9 0.3
Not employed 8.6 7.2 3.4 77.5 3.3
Educ./training 8.2 7.3 1.2 12.9 70.4
Female
Permanent 89.5 3.0 0.6 6.4 0.6
Temporary 30.3 43.1 1.8 20.8 4.0
Self employed 3.6 1.8 81 13.1 0.6
Not employed 5.0 3.7 1.6 88.1 1.6
Educ./training 7.2 6.7 0.7 12.2 73.2
16-24
Permanent 82.9 6.6 0.8 6.5 3.3
Temporary 30.4 39.9 1.4 17.4 10.8
Self employed 8.8 7.1 69.4 10.7 4.1
Not employed 14.1 14.2 2.3 56.4 13.1
Educ./training 5.6 6.1 0.6 11.3 76.4
25-34
Permanent 90.4 3.6 1.3 4.0 0.7
Temporary 32.5 45.3 2.7 16.8 2.8
Self employed 6.6 3.0 83.6 6.1 0.7
Not employed 11.0 8.5 3.1 74.5 2.8
Educ./training 14.1 11.6 2.5 15.6 56.2
35-54
Permanent 93.0 2.2 0.9 3.7 0.3
Temporary 31.9 45.6 2.8 18.3 1.4
Self employed 3.5 1.5 89.0 5.8 0.1
Not employed 6.4 4.2 2.8 85.7 0.8
Educ./training 28.0 8.9 3.5 26.4 33.2
55-64
Permanent 80.5 2.4 0.8 16.2 0.1
Temporary 24.4 40.1 5.6 29.5 0.3
Self employed 1.7 1.0 83.6 13.8 0.0
Not employed 1.0 0.7 0.9 97.2 0.1
Educ./training 22.6 4.2 1.1 45.1 26.9
Low qualified
Permanent 88.8 3.2 1.1 6.4 0.6
Temporary 27.2 45.7 2.8 21.0 3.3
Self employed 3.2 2.0 86.0 8.5 0.3
Not employed 4.1 4.0 1.8 88.8 1.3
Educ./training 7.2 6.1 0.6 12.4 73.8
Medium qualified
Permanent 90.5 3.0 0.8 5.0 0.7
Temporary 35.3 39.8 2.3 17.4 5.3
Self employed 4.2 1.6 87.8 5.9 0.5
Not employed 7.1 5.0 2.2 82.7 3.0
Educ./training 8.0 7.4 1.2 11.5 71.9
High qualified
Permanent 92.4 2.3 1.1 4.0 0.3
Temporary 34.5 46.3 2.8 13.2 3.3
Self employed 5.2 2.0 85.6 6.8 0.4
Not employed 11.9 6.6 3.9 74.7 2.9
Educ./training 11.5 10.4 2.0 14.9 61.1
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tions, from 27.2% for the low-qual-
ified to 34.5% for the high-quali-
fied. Also, regardless of the type of
contract, the probability that work-
ers loose or leave their job decreases
with the level of qualifications of
the individual. 
As might be expected, transitions
become more frequent as we
extend the time horizon to a multi-
year period (Table 50). In particu-
lar, the probability of remaining in
temporary employment is reduced
with time, but in a non-linear way.
This probability, which is around
44% after one year, drops by
around 11 percentage points after
one more year, then by 10 points
to 22% in the following two years
and then only by a further 6 points
in the following two years, bring-
ing the likelihood of having a tem-
porary job after six years down to
around 16% in the EU as a whole. 
This non-linear decrease in the
probability of remaining in a tem-
porary job is mirrored by a non-
linear increase in the probability
of moving to permanent employ-
ment. The likelihood of obtaining
a permanent job increases by 10
points between t+1 and t+2, from
around 31% to 41%, and then by
a further 10 points after two more
years and finally by 4 percentage
points in the last two years, to
55%. These trends seem to sug-
gest that there is a considerable
percentage of temporary workers
that manage to obtain a more sta-
ble form of employment relatively
early on. At the same time, after
six years a high proportion of tem-
porary workers (around 37%) are
still in precarious employment, or
bouncing in and out of employ-
ment, with their chances of mov-
ing to stable employment reduced
over time.own p.
Another interesting point that
emerges when looking at multi-
year transitions is the high persist-
ence in a non-employment status.
Almost 70% of individuals that are
neither working nor in education
or training at any one point in
time are in the same position six
years later, following a long peri-
od of inactivity or of transitions in
and out of the labour market.   
Differences between countries are
presented in chart 83 that ranks
Member States according to their
degree of mobility between eco-
nomic statuses as summarized by
the MT index18. Austria presents an
average degree of mobility for the
EU15 with the UK, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Finland, the
Netherlands, Germany and Ireland
characterised by high mobility,
while Belgium, France, Portugal,
Greece, Italy and Spain showing
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. Pooled data 1995-2001
Notes: data for SE not available.
18 The mobility index MT measures the difference between the observed transition matrix P and the limiting matrix of the Markov
process which has all the n rows equal to the invariant distribution: this represents a situation of equal outcomes in which the tran-
sition probabilities to move to a certain class is the same independent of the class of origin. Consequently, to be compared across
countries, they require similar limiting distributions. In particular,  
MT= (n - trace(P))/(n - 1)
In case of perfect mobility the trace is equal to 1 and MT is equal to 1 while in case of perfect immobility the trace is equal to n and
MT tends to zero. Alternative mobility indices, MD and ML, are based on the determinant and the second largest eigenvalue with the
former leading to similar results, while the latter present a few differences, with Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria at the bottom of
this classification before France and Belgium. 
Table 50 - Multi-year transitions by main economic activity – EU total (row percentages)
Permanent Temporary Self employed Not employed
Education/ 
training
t + 2
t
Permanent 86.5 3.3 1.5 8.0 0.7
Temporary 41.4 32.4 3.3 19.5 3.5
Self employed 6.3 2.4 81.2 9.8 0.4
Not employed 9.0 5.5 2.8 80.4 2.2
Educ./ training 14.5 10.5 1.5 16.4 57.0
t + 4 
t
Permanent 80.9 3.6 2.4 12.5 0.7
Temporary 51.0 22.3 4.7 19.7 2.3
Self employed 9.8 3.0 73.3 13.6 0.3
Not employed 14.5 6.0 3.8 73.8 1.8
Educ./ training 28.9 14.0 3.1 17.0 37.0
t + 6
t
Permanent 76.7 4.0 3.1 15.8 0.5
Temporary 55.0 16.4 6.4 20.7 1.5
Self employed 12.5 2.9 68.3 15.8 0.5
Not employed 18.7 6.1 4.8 69.0 1.3
Educ./ training 41.6 13.4 4.8 16.1 24.1
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the least mobility. If we compare
the most mobile country, the UK,
with the least mobile, Belgium, we
find an almost 70% difference in
the MT mobility indices.
A simple cross-tabulation between
the MT index and the employment
rate (see chart 84) shows a marked
degree of correlation between
labour market mobility and
employment performance. In par-
ticular, highly mobile countries tend
to have above-average employ-
ment rates19 while countries with
little mobility all have below-aver-
age employment rates, with
Portugal as the only exception.  
5. The incidence of
low pay and career
advancement
From the perspective of the indi-
vidual, the best safeguard against
social exclusion is a job, which
implies that high employment
rates are a key objective for the
European economies. However, to
foster individual living standards
and social inclusion from a life-
cycle perspective, it is essential
that employment guarantees fair
remuneration and that individuals
have the opportunity to move up
the job ladder in line with their
productivity. Although the job
ladder may refer to several
dimensions of job quality, includ-
ing occupational status, access 
to training and better working
arrangements, this chapter will
concentrate on wages as an 
illustrative element of career
advancement. 
Here low pay is defined as earning
less than two-thirds of the median
hourly gross wage (for more details
see note 20). Any definition of low
pay is necessarily arbitrary.
However, the main focus of the
analysis here is on low-pay trends,
the relative incidence of low pay by
geographic, personal and socio-
economic characteristics and the
transitions in and out of low pay,
and not so much in its absolute
level per se. Therefore, the main
results presented in the following
section are, broadly speaking,
robust to small variations in the
choice of a low-pay threshold. 
As table 51 shows, low pay concerns
roughly 15% of EU workers in paid
employment of 15 hours or more
per week. When observing three-
year moving averages, it emerges
that there has been little variation in
the incidence of low pay between
1995 and 2000, with a decrease from
15.6% in 1995 to 14.9% in 1998, ris-
ing again but only marginally in
1999 and 2000 to 15.1%. 
Once again, EU averages hide wide
variations between different
Member States, with the highest
incidence of low pay in the UK and
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19 With the only possible exclusion of Ireland and Luxembourg, whose labour market mobility is actually the lowest after France, Belgium
and Austria when measured by the ML index – see previous footnote.  
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Chart 84 - employment rates vs. MT mobility index by country 1995-2001
Chart 83 - MT mobility index by country – 1-year pooled transitions 
1995-2001
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. Note: data for SE not available. 
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003 for the mobility index (pooled data 1995-2001)
and Labour Force Survey for the employment rates (average of the annual employment
rates by country for the period 1995-2001).   
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Ireland (19.4% and 18.7% respec-
tively in 2000), and lowest in
Denmark and Italy (8.6% and 9.7%
respectively).  In general it is not
possible to identify a strong trend
for each individual country, except
for a rather marked decline in Spain
(from 18.9% in 1995 to 15.6% in
2000), in Portugal (from 14.4% to
10.9%) and to a lesser extent in
Austria (from 13.9% in 1996 to
11.2% in 2000). On the other hand,
the Netherlands experienced an
appreciable increase in the inci-
dence of low pay, which rose from
13.3% in 1995 to 16.6% in 2000,
while in Germany there has been a
rather strong increase in the two
last years of the survey, from 13.9%
in 1998 to 15.7% in 2000. 
Chart 85 below looks at the inci-
dence of low pay by personal charac-
teristics. The first striking feature is
that low-pay is twice as high for
female employees than for male
ones. The difference is particularly
high for the UK, the Netherlands and
Austria (where it corresponds to 14.4,
12.7 and 12.3 points respectively) and
low in Italy, Finland and Denmark
(2.8, 3.2 and 4.6 points respectively).
The incidence of low pay is also cor-
related with the highest qualifica-
tion obtained, ranging from 8.3%
for those with high qualifications to
15.0% for those with medium level
qualifications and 20.9% for those
with a low level of qualifications.
The difference between the high
and the low qualified is largest in
Denmark, Ireland and Greece (21.5,
20.6 and 18.9 points respectively)
and smallest in the Netherlands,
Finland and France (7.2, 9.4 and
10.1 respectively).
Although in the computation of
low-pay figures we are excluding
individuals working with an
employer in paid apprenticeships or
under special training schemes, the
low pay incidence is particularly
high (39.9 %) for young employees
aged 16-24. Those aged 25-34 and
55-64 have a similar degree of low
pay incidence at approximately
15%, roughly 5 points higher than
for employees aged 35-54.    
The incidence of low pay differs not
only in relation to the personal
characteristics of the individual
employees but also to labour mar-
ket conditions. Chart 86 measures
the low-pay incidence in relation to
contractual arrangements, type of
occupation and sector of the econ-
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: 3 year moving averages. Data for SE and LU is not available.
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Incidence of low pay by personal characteristics - 2001 - EU total
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: high qualifications correspond to recognised third level education (ISCED 5-7),
medium level qualifications correspond to second stage of secondary level education
(ISCED 3) and low level qualifications to less than the second stage of secondary education 
(ISCED 0-2).
Table 51 - The incidence of low-pay20 by country and year (percentages)
COUNTRY 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
DE 14.3 13.9 13.8 13.9 15.0 15.7
DK 9.0 8.6 8.9 8.6 8.8 8.6
NL 13.3 14.4 15.4 15.6 15.8 16.6
BE 13.4 12.9 13.2 12.9 12.4 12.2
FR 15.8 15.5 15.4 15.5 16.2 15.6
UK 20.9 20.6 20.0 19.4 19.4 19.4
IE 21.8 21.7 21.6 21.2 20.2 18.7
IT 10.4 10.1 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.7
GR 16.1 15.4 15.7 15.5 15.8 16.0
ES 18.9 18.5 17.8 16.9 16.0 15.6
PT 14.4 13.6 12.9 12.7 11.8 10.9
AT : 13.9 12.4 12.2 11.5 11.2
FI : : 11.3 11.4 11.0 10.8
Total 15.6 15.3 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.1
20 The low-pay threshold is defined as two-thirds of the median hourly gross salary and it is country-specific. The low-pay incidence is com-
puted for paid employees working more than 15 hours per week, excluding those in paid apprenticeship and in training under special
schemes related to employment. Only those working 15 or more hours per week have been considered because of data reliability.  
Chart 85 - Incidence of low pay by personal characteristics – 2001 – EU  
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omy. In 2001, employees in tempo-
rary contracts were almost three
times as likely as their counterparts
in permanent contracts to be low-
paid. At the same time the inci-
dence of low-pay among employ-
ees in supervisory roles was only
around 4% as opposed to just over
18% for those in non-supervisory
roles. In relation to sectoral differ-
ences, agriculture is characterised
by the highest incidence of low-pay
at 37%, followed by the service sec-
tor at 16% and industry at 11%.
However, within the service sector
there are remarkable differences
with 40% and 26% of low-paid
employees in hotels/ restaurants
and trade respectively against
around 10.9% in financial interme-
diation and real estate and 12.8%
in public administration, education
and health.   
5.1. Labour market dynamics: pay
transitions
The extent of low pay at any one
point in time is a cause for concern
as it measures the proportion of
workers lagging behind in the
wage distribution with negative
consequences for their relative liv-
ing standards and social inclusion. It
is also important for the economy
as a whole inasmuch as it signals
the corresponding extent of low
productivity or low quality jobs. The
issue, however, becomes even more
crucial in a dynamic context, in the
case of workers that are trapped in
low paid jobs and do not have the
prospect of a career that evolves
over time.
Table 52 shows pay transitions for
workers in paid employment of 15
or more hours per week in 1995-96
and 2000-01. In the five-year period,
1995-2000, there is very little varia-
tion in the transition rates21, the
only small difference being a slight
improvement in the likelihood of
moving out of low pay. Focusing on
the lower part of the table, it can
be seen that approximately half of
those that were low paid in 2000
are still in the same situation one
year after, while 31% of them have
seen their pay increase above the
low-pay threshold. However, 17.5%
of them end up without employ-
ment: this probability is almost
three times greater than that for
medium paid workers and four
times that of high paid ones.
Roughly 80% of both medium and
high-paid workers remain in the
same wage bracket one year later.    
Table 53 reports on difference in
transition rates by personal charac-
teristics. Not only is the incidence of
low pay higher among female,
young and low-skilled workers, but
their chances of improving their sit-
uation are also more limited.
Female workers are less likely than
their male counterparts to move up
the wage ladder: 54.5% of female
low-paid workers are still low-paid
a year after (as opposed to 45.9%
of males) and only approximately
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Incidence of low pay by type of contract, occupation and economic sector - 2001 - EU
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
21 Therefore, in the following tables we will concentrate on pooled data for the whole period 1994-2001 to increase data reliability. 
Table 52 - 1-year pay transitions – EU (row percentages)
No pay Low pay Medium pay High pay
1996
1995
No pay 88.8 4.7 5.6 0.9
Low pay 17.6 52.4 28.2 1.7
Medium pay 7.2 5.4 79.3 8.1
High pay 4 0.3 14.7 81
2001
2000
No pay 87.7 5.1 6.4 0.9
Low pay 17.5 51.1 30 1.4
Medium pay 6 5.7 79.7 8.7
High pay 4.5 0.6 14.3 80.6
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. 
Notes: low pay is defined as less than 2/3, medium pay between 2/3 and 4/3 and high pay
as over 4/3 of median hourly gross wages. Data for LU and SE is not available.  No pay
here is defined using the ILO employment definition as opposed to the self-defined main
activity status used in the previous section. It also includes those working less than 15
hours, those in paid apprenticeship and under special training schemes. 
Chart 86 - Incidence of low pay by type of contract, occupation and 
economic sector – 2001 – EU
26% of them manage to exit low
pay towards a higher wage bracket
(the corresponding figure for men
is just below 38%). At the same
time, the probability for female
low-paid workers to leave employ-
ment one year after is three per-
centage points higher than for
men. 
Low-paid employees aged 16-24
have roughly the same probability
as those aged 35-54 to exit low pay
by increasing their relative salary
(around 30%), but they are also
more likely to leave employment
(the probability being around 22%
against 15% for those aged 35-54).
The highest probability of moving
up the wage ladder is associated
with low paid employees aged 25-
34, since they are at the beginning
of their career and at the same time
have more experience and qualifi-
cations than younger workers. The
most disadvantaged group with
fewer improvement prospects are
low-paid older workers, 56.2% of
whom are still low paid a year later,
while 26.7% of them leave the
labour market. While it may be
expected that older workers are
more likely to leave the labour mar-
ket, within the 55-64 age bracket
the exit probability of low-paid
employees is 12 percentage points
higher than for high paid employ-
ees in the same age bracket.
Finally, transitions out of low pay
and into higher pay increases with
the level of qualification obtained
and the probability of low-paid
employees leaving the labour mar-
ket is about four percentage points
lower for the highly qualified than
for those with a medium or low
level of qualifications. Furthermore,
upper wage mobility increases with
the level of qualifications not only
for those starting on low pay, but
also for those on medium pay.         
Although persistence in low pay
decreases with time, the increasing
probability of exiting low pay is
reflected not only in an increase in
the percentage of those moving up
the wage ladder (from 30.7% after
one year to 44% after seven years)
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No pay Low pay Medium pay High pay
t + 1 
Total
t
No pay 88.2 4.9 6.0 0.9
Low pay 18.2 51.1 29.5 1.2
Medium pay 6.9 5.4 79.3 8.4
High pay 4.4 0.4 14.5 80.6
Male
t
No pay 84.1 5.6 8.9 1.4
Low pay 16.5 45.9 35.9 1.7
Medium pay 6.4 4.6 79.3 9.7
High pay 4.1 0.4 13.8 81.8
Female
t
No pay 90.4 4.6 4.4 0.6
Low pay 19.4 54.5 25.3 0.8
Medium pay 7.5 6.5 79.2 6.8
High pay 5.0 0.6 16.2 78.2
16-24
t
No pay 84.0 8.1 7.4 0.5
Low pay 22.2 47.4 29.8 0.6
Medium pay 11.3 11.4 73.6 3.7
High pay 9.7 3.6 34.0 52.7
25-34
t
No pay 79.1 7.3 11.9 1.7
Low pay 16.3 46.6 35.6 1.5
Medium pay 6.2 5.2 80.3 8.3
High pay 3.2 0.6 19.3 76.8
35-54
t
No pay 88.4 4.3 6.0 1.4
Low pay 15.1 55.6 27.9 1.3
Medium pay 4.9 4.6 80.9 9.6
High pay 2.9 0.3 13.5 83.3
55-64
t
No pay 98.2 0.8 0.7 0.2
Low pay 26.7 56.2 16.0 1.1
Medium pay 17.0 5.2 71.3 6.5
High pay 14.7 0.3 10.6 74.4
Low qualified
t
No pay 90.9 4.5 4.3 0.3
Low pay 18.6 52.7 28.1 0.6
Medium pay 7.8 6.8 80.1 5.4
High pay 6.1 1.1 22.3 70.6
Medium qualified
t
No pay 86.7 5.0 7.4 0.8
Low pay 18.6 50.1 30.2 1.0
Medium pay 6.3 4.7 81.4 7.6
High pay 4.2 0.4 19.3 76.1
Highly qualified
t
No pay 80.3 5.7 10.1 3.9
Low pay 14.3 49.0 33.3 3.4
Medium pay 6.0 4.2 73.5 16.2
High pay 4.0 0.3 9.4 86.3
Table 53 - 1-year pay transitions by personal characteristics - EU (row percentages)
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. Pooled data 1994 -2001
Notes: data for SE and LU not available.
but also in the likelihood of leaving
employment, from 18.2% after one
year to 29.8 after seven years.   
The probability of exiting low pay
increases with time, as is shown in
table 54, but at a decreasing rate.
This is evident in charts 87a, 87b
and 87c that show the probability
of moving up the wage ladder and
out of low pay for those that stay
in employment by country. In gen-
eral, countries with the lowest inci-
dence of low pay (Denmark, Italy,
Finland, Portugal and Austria), also
present the highest probabilities of
exiting low pay. Their probabilities
curves are rather steep especially in
the first four intervals; in all of
them after six years employees that
were low paid at the beginning of
the period have more than a 70%
chance of being in a higher paid
job.
Even within this group of countries,
of course, there are several differ-
ences. For example, Denmark and
Finland present a rather flat curve,
with exiting probabilities of around
50% to start with and very little
improvement in the probability
after four years. On the other hand
Austria has the lowest one-year
exiting probability of just over 35%,
but then it increases markedly
reaching almost 80% after six years.
Particularly high exiting probabili-
ties towards the end of the seven
year period are also characteristic
of the Netherlands and Ireland in
the high incidence group, while
Spain, Belgium and France in the
middle incidence group tend to
have rather high initial probabili-
ties, but a less steep improvement
in the longer term. 
Finally, Germany and the UK show
the lowest exiting probabilities
both in the short and in the longer
term. In Germany, low paid employ-
ees have just 30% chances of mov-
ing to a better-paid job after one
year, and this probability does not
reach 50% even after seven years. 
To conclude, the low-pay incidence
at any one point in time is only one
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Table 54 - Multi-year transitions by pay level – EU (row percentages)
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. Pooled data 1994 -2001. 
Notes: data for SE and LU not available.
Table 55 - 1-year labour market transitions by country (percentages)
Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. Pooled data 1995 -2001 (1994-2001 pooled data
for low pay to higher paid transitions). Data for SE is not available. 
No pay Low pay Medium pay High pay
t+1
t No pay 88.2 4.9 6.0 0.9
Low pay 18.2 51.1 29.5 1.2
Medium pay 6.9 5.4 79.3 8.4
High pay 4.4 0.4 14.5 80.6
t+3
t No pay 78.2 7.4 12.4 2.1
Low pay 23.3 36.9 37.8 2.0
Medium pay 11.8 5.3 71.1 11.8
High pay 9.8 0.6 15.5 74.1
t+5
t No pay 70.1 8.8 17.7 3.4
Low pay 26.9 29.9 39.7 3.4
Medium pay 15.3 5.1 65.7 13.9
High pay 14.6 0.7 15.3 69.4
t+7
t No pay 62.4 9.1 22.7 5.8
Low pay 29.8 26.2 39.2 4.8
Medium pay 17.4 5.2 61.3 16.1
High pay 17.0 0.9 17.0 65.1
Move into
employment
Stay in
Employment
Temporary to
permanent
Low pay to
higher pay
DE 13.9 91.5 37.2 25.4
DK 21.1 92.6 36.3 36.2
NL 15.5 93.7 44.9 29.4
BE 9.6 95.4 41.7 39.4
LU 8.6 95.1 57.9 .
FR 14.1 92.4 20.7 34.5
UK 18.4 92.3 44.5 28.0
IE 15.5 92.4 38.0 30.9
IT 9.2 92.9 30.6 34.2
GR 11.2 92.4 28.0 33.7
ES 14.0 89.8 23.5 35.8
PT 15.7 94.0 29.4 39.5
AT 13.5 93.5 50.6 31.6
FI 20.2 92.2 28.5 39.4
EU total 13.0 92.3 31.4 30.7
of the aspects that should be taken
into account. Another is the proba-
bility of exiting low pay, both in the
short and in the long term. So for
example, in countries like Ireland
and the Netherlands that are char-
acterised by a relatively high inci-
dence of low pay, it is also relatively
easier to move up the job ladder,
while this is not the case in the UK.
And although Germany is charac-
terised by an average incidence of
low-pay, it is relatively rather hard
for employees in that situation to
move to a higher pay bracket. 
Mobility out of low pay should be
seen together with the other
aspects of job retention and
advancement to have a more com-
plete assessment of national labour
markets. The mobility index pre-
sented in chart 83 is a measure of
the overall dynamicity of the labour
market, but it does not disentangle
the different dimensions related to
the openness of the labour market,
to employment security in terms of
remaining in employment and
moving to a job with a permanent
contract, and to labour market
advancement for those in low pay.
Table 55 summarizes 1-year transi-
tion by country23, focusing on the
probabilities to enter employment,
to remain in employment, to move
from temporary to permanent
employment and to exit low-pay by
moving over the low-pay threshold. 
Denmark, Finland, the UK, Portugal,
Ireland and the Netherlands have
rather open labour markets, with
the highest percentages of working
age individuals entering employ-
ment in any one year. However,
these countries differ in terms of
mobility within employment: the
Netherlands, the UK and Ireland
present a relatively high probability
of moving from temporary to per-
manent employment, but the UK
presents little upward wage mobili-
ty, while the reverse is true for
Portugal and Finland, countries
with relatively lower probabilities
of moving from temporary to per-
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22 The categorisation into high, intermediate and low incidence of low pay has been introduced for purely illustrative purposes and to
facilitate the presentation of the results since the cut-off points are rather arbitrary and should only be seen in relative terms. 
23 Similar results, in particular the points emphasised in the text, are also true if we consider two-year transitions.
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Chart 87 -  Comparing exit probabilities low-pay to higher-pay by 
country and intervals – pooled data 1994-2001
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Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003. Notes: data for SE and LU not available.
a - Countries with high incidence of low pay (16% or more)
22
b - Countries with average incidence of low pay (between 12% and 16%)
c - Countries with low incidence of low pay (less than 12%)
manent employment, but the two
highest probabilities of moving out
of low pay.  
Countries with the highest degree of
in-year employment retention, such
as Belgium and Luxembourg, also
present the most closed labour mar-
kets in terms of working age individ-
uals moving into employment. These
countries are also characterised by a
good degree of in-work mobility in
terms of movement to more stable
employment and, in the case of
Belgium, upward wage mobility. 
The remaining countries present
different sets of issues in relation to
short-term access to the labour
market, employment retention and
advancement. In particular, France
is characterised by relatively low
transitions from temporary to per-
manent employment. Germany has
relatively low employment reten-
tion and mobility out of low pay.
Italy and Greece have a relatively
closed labour market with difficult
access to employment and more
limited opportunities to move from
temporary to permanent employ-
ment. Spain has low employment
retention and access to stable con-
tracts. Finally, Austria is charac-
terised by transition probabilities
which are close to the EU15 aver-
age, apart from a relatively high 1-
year probability to move from tem-
porary to permanent employment.
6. Determinants of
labour market
transitions
The following section will look in
more detail at the relative effect of
several factors on the probability of
the employment and pay transi-
tions described in the previous sec-
tions. For this purpose several dis-
crete-choice econometric models
have been estimated for the work-
ing age population in the EU15.
The specification of the models
below is based on four main theo-
retical arguments. The first one is a
human capital accumulation argu-
ment. According to this, labour
market experience, over and above
educational attainment, helps in
improving the workers’ human cap-
ital (because of learning-by-doing,
on-the-job training, and the accu-
mulation of social capital) and this
in turn may facilitate the search for
a better job or an increase in the
pay level24. Secondly, labour market
institutions (employment protec-
tion legislation, public employment
programmes, the legal contractual
framework as well as publicly pro-
vided training schemes) have a
strong impact on wage progres-
sions and job status transitions,
especially for the so-called “out-
siders”25. Thirdly, job-search theory
is useful to explain the interaction
between the macroeconomic envi-
ronment and individual labour mar-
ket advancements26. Finally, the
costs associated with labour market
transitions, both in-work and out-
of-work, may differ in relation to
specific characteristics of either the
employee or the employer, as
analysed in transaction costs theo-
ries of the labour market. 
The variables that have been
included in the econometric models
relate to specific social, economic
and demographic characteristics of
the individuals, to the type of jobs
they are holding and to the macro-
economic framework. The variables
in the first group are: gender, age
group, highest level of education
attained, whether the individual
has children less than 15 years old,
whether the individual is married or
not, whether the job he/she is hold-
ing is their first one or not, whether
he/she attended a training or voca-
tional course since January in the
year of the survey, whether s/he
registered to a public employment
service for work, whether s/he was
in receipt of unemployment bene-
fits prior to employment and
tenure in employment. In the sec-
ond group, the variables considered
are: whether of not the individual
undertook on-the-job training,
whether s/he was in casual employ-
ment (without contract), the type
of occupation, the sector of the
economy (agriculture, industry and
services; public and private), and
the size of the firm (0-19, 20-99 and
100 or over employees). The unem-
ployment rate27 was also included as
a measure of the tightness of the
labour market.
At the risk of oversimplifying the
analysis, the first group of variables
can be interpreted as the expres-
sion of supply-side conditions, and
the second group as structural/
demand factors. Within these two
groups, it is also useful to identify a
set of variables that represent key
labour market policies. The first
variable is skills level that in the
models has been differentiated into
three different categories: highest
level of education attained, voca-
tional or training courses, and on-
the-job training. The second vari-
able is whether the individual is in
receipt of unemployment benefits.
In particular, receiving unemploy-
ment benefits may have a contrast-
ing effect on labour market out-
comes: on the one hand they can
create labour supply disincentives,
but on the other hand they can
facilitate the job-search process and
lead to a better match between
individuals and jobs. The third vari-
able shows whether the individuals
have been using Public Em-
ployment Services in their job
search. Finally, the unemployment
rate is at least partly influenced by
the macroeconomic management
of policy makers.   
All models include country dum-
mies, to control for different em-
ployment regimes, in particular
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24 Mincer J. and Ofek H., 1982, Interrupted work careers: depreciation and restoration of human capital, The Journal of Human
Resources n. 17, 3-24.
25 Bertola G., Blau F. D. and Kahn L. M., 2003, Labor market institutions and demographic employment patterns, mimeo.
26 Mortensen D.T. and Pissarides C.A., 1994, Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment, Review of Economic
Studies, vol.61, 397-415.
27 The unemployment rate used is the annual unemployment rate for each country from the Labour Force Survey.  
 
employment protection legislation,
and year dummies, to control for
the business cycle, and are estimat-
ed for individuals aged between 16
and 64 at the time of the interview. 
The models presented below can
be divided into different groups.
The first models consider the
determinants of transitions from
non-employment into work (Table
56). Then, in-work transitions are
considered, namely from tempo-
rary to permanent jobs (Table 57)
and from low pay to higher pay
(Table 58). These binary choice
models are then extended to con-
sider all possible labour market
transition simultaneously from
temporary employment and from
a status of non-employment
(Table 59 and 60). 
The first specification in table 56
shows the effect of the variables
listed on the probability of moving
from a situation of non-working to
working. The odds ratio quantifies
the change in that probability
when the individual has the charac-
teristics represented by the vari-
able, where 1 means no change in
the probability, less than 1 a reduc-
tion in that probability, and values
over 1, an increase28. Thus male indi-
viduals of working age have a 68%
greater chance than female coun-
terparts to move into work after
one year. This effect is highly signif-
icant from a statistical point of
view, and is indicated in the table
with three asterisks. 
Compared to those aged 35-54,
younger individuals have a greater
probability of moving into work,
with an increase of 44% and 32%
respectively for those aged 16-24
and 25-34. On the contrary, older
workers aged 55-64 are consider-
ably less likely to find employment
– the estimated reduction in the
probability being around 62%. The
level of qualification attained also
has a strong and statistically signifi-
cant impact on the likelihood of
finding work, with a reduction of
14% and an increase of 36% for
those with a low and high level of
education respectively. Having chil-
dren or marital status do not seem
to have a significant impact on the
likelihood of finding work. 
Considering the effect of the three
policy related variables - receipt of
unemployment benefits, atten-
dance at a training course in the
year prior to the survey or regis-
tration with the public employ-
ment services for work - all have a
significant impact on moving into
work, increasing this likelihood by
30%, 34% and 9% respectively. In
particular, having attended a
training or vocational course in
the year prior to the survey has
almost as strong an effect on the
short-term probability of moving
into work as higher educational
qualifications29. Finally, as expected,
the overall national unemployment
rate has a significant adverse effect
on the probability of finding a job
thus reflecting a demand-side
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28 Marginal effects are computed for continuous variables such as the unemployment rate and length of tenure. In this case any devia-
tion from 0 must be interpreted as a negative/positive percentage effect.
Table 56 - Logit models for transitions from "Non-working" to "Working" – EU – pooled data 1994-2001
Notes: Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003, 1994-2001. SE missing for all the years because some variables missing. Individuals
between 16 and 64 years. Also controlled for time and country dummies. Reference category: female, between 35 and 54, medium edu-
cation, not married, no children 0-15, no unemployment benefit, no training, no public employment office. 1995, Germany. (*), (**), (***):
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. odds ratio tell how the odd of observing Y=1 changes  when X changes from 0 to 1 (1 if no
change). odds ratio - fe panel is for the conditional fixed-effects logit model. +For unemployment rate marginal effects computed at the
average sample value. Standard errors computed with the Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimates (not for panel estimates).
Transition from "Non-Working" to "Working" - Europe - logit models
1-year transitions 3-year transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
odds ratio odds ratio-fe panel odds ratio odds ratio-fe panel
male 1.68 *** 2.02 ***
age 16-24 1.44 *** 1.20 1.59 *** 0.64 *
age 25-34 1.32 *** 1.17 1.47 *** 0.86
age 55-64 0.38 *** 1.33 0.20 *** 0.36 ***
low education 0.86 *** 1.01 0.78 *** 1.04
high education 1.36 *** 1.47 *** 1.30 *** 1.10
have children 0-15 1.00 0.86 ** 1.09 *** 0.69 ***
married 0.97 0.82 0.91 *** 1.38
unemployment benefit 1.30 *** 0.82 *** 1.26 *** 0.96
training last year 1.34 *** 1.21 *** 1.54 *** 1.09
public employment office 1.09 *** 1.29 *** 1.01 1.14
unemployment rate -0.01+ *** -0.02+ *** -0.02+ *** -0.01+
n. of observations: 41568 14305 25503 5301
n. of groups: 5118 1941
Pseudo R2: 0.053 0.074
macroeconomic constraint to
employment opportunities. 
The variables included in the model
may have an impact on the final
outcome through other unobserv-
able characteristics that are associ-
ated with that variable. For exam-
ple more able or motivated individ-
uals may “self-select” themselves
into higher level education courses
so that higher employment proba-
bilities may actually be determined,
at least partially, by the unobserv-
able motivation or ability rather
than education per se. Model 2 uses
a panel estimation technique that
controls to some extent for this
unobservable heterogeneity
among individuals30.
Looking at model 2 in table 56, it
should be noted that the effect of
low educational qualifications
become insignificant, while that of
higher education is increased, possi-
bly showing that differences in
unobservable characteristics such as
motivation or ability are important
in the case of low qualified individ-
uals, but not in the case of higher
qualifications. The effect of receiv-
ing an unemployment benefit
becomes negative (compared to
the positive impact in model 1),
producing a reduction of roughly
18% in the probability of moving
into employment. This may suggest
that the effect of the unemploy-
ment benefit depends mainly on
the fact that the people claiming
them could be more motivated to
find a job, possibly due to the lack
of other non-wage income, the
unemployment benefit acting as a
job-search subsidy. But once we, at
least partially, control for these
differences in motivation and
other personal characteristics, the
effect of the unemployment bene-
fit is to reduce the chance of find-
ing a job due to the financial dis-
incentive it causes. The effect of a
training course is reduced, show-
ing that the fact that the individ-
ual does some training also cap-
tures other personal unobservable
characteristics linked to the indi-
vidual which facilitate his or her
entry into work. On the contrary,
the role of public employment
services is enhanced once we
account for time-invariant person-
al characteristics. In this case, one
possible explanation could be that
only the most disadvantaged indi-
viduals use public employment
services as a way of entering the
labour market, and given their
pool of customers, PES actually
tend to perform rather well.  
Similar results are also found
when analysing the same models
for three year transitions. The
main difference concerns the
effect of being registered at a
public employment office that
becomes insignificant – this is
probably due to the fact that the
individual is not necessarily active-
ly looking for a job through the
public employment services, or is
even still registered after three
years.  
Table 57 analyses transitions from
temporary to permanent employ-
ment. Being male and in the
younger age bracket have a limited
but highly significant effect on
moving to a more stable employ-
ment. Education also has an influ-
ence on the likelihood of getting a
permanent contract, with a signifi-
cant (and negative) effect for low-
qualifications in the first model and
a significant (and positive) effect
for higher-qualifications in the
fixed-effects model, compared to
medium-level qualifications. If the
temporary job held is the individ-
ual’s first, this reduces the likeli-
hood of getting a permanent con-
tract by approximately 37% when
we account for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Tenure has a significant
impact on transitions to a perma-
nent contract, particularly marked
in the second model. 
Being in temporary employment of
a specifically casual nature with no
contract further reduces the odds
of getting stable employment, even
if this reduction is rather limited.
The model estimates simultaneously
the effects of vocational and train-
ing courses on the one hand and
on-the-job training on the other:
while the former does not seem to
have a significant impact on the
likelihood of moving from tempo-
rary to permanent employment,
the latter increases it by around
30%. This could be explained in
two possible ways. Employers may
give more value to specific work-
related training done within the
firm, rather than general vocational
courses, when they decide whether
to offer a permanent position: in
other words, they see on-the-job
training as either more effective in
increasing the employees’ human
capital or as a better way of screen-
ing employees. Alternatively, on-
the-job training is particularly
intensive in temporary jobs of a
probationary nature that are most
likely to lead to a permanent posi-
tion, hence the correlation
between this type of training and a
move to a permanent post. 
Concerning occupational status31,
manual and managerial ones, as
opposed to intermediate occupa-
tions, appear to limit the chances of
moving to a permanent post, even
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29 It is perhaps important to express a note of caution on the results presented here. Household surveys such as the ECHP contain only
limited information on the variables used in the model and their estimated effects represent only broad averages across a very het-
erogeneous group of, for example, educational qualifications or training courses. Therefore, before drawing strong policy conclusions
on, say, the effectiveness of training courses it is important to consider all relevant differences between their type, their length, their
quality etc. as clearly not all training courses would have the same impact on the probability of finding employment.  
30 To control for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity fixed-effects logit models have been used. Essentially the idea behind them
is that the effect of certain variables may be driven by other unobservable factors. By exploiting the longitudinal characteristics of the
survey, fixed-effect techniques estimate the marginal effect of the various variables dropping out the time-invariant unobservable
heterogeneity between individuals, once it is assumed, continuing with the example in the text, that personal ability or motivation
do not change over time.
if their effect disappears in the
fixed-effect model, while firm size
does not seem to have a significant
effect.  In relation to economic sec-
tor, the public sector offers signifi-
cantly fewer chances of moving to
permanent employment, and the
same applies to a certain extent to
agriculture, while there is no signif-
icant difference between industry
and services – the reference category.
Finally, the unemployment rate
adversely affects the probability of
obtaining a permanent contract in
all models.  
The same models have been esti-
mated for 3-year transitions
between temporary and perma-
nent employment and the results
are presented in columns (3) and
(4). The results are similar to those
for the one-year transitions, with a
few differences. In particular, the
effect of being an older worker
becomes highly significant and it
reduces the probability of moving
onto a permanent contract in a
three year horizon by 23%. In addi-
tion, firm size becomes significant
when working in a small firm with
0 to 20 employees reduces the
chances of obtaining a permanent
contract by around 16% compared
to those in a medium-size firm. The
effect is reversed for larger firms
with a 13% increase. 
Table 58 looks at the determinants
of transitions up the wage ladder. If
we focus on 3-year transitions in
column (3), the odds of moving out
of low-pay are greatly increased for
males (+91%) and for those in the
16-24 and 25-34 age brackets
(+73% and +59% respectively),
while they are significantly reduced
for individuals aged 55-64 (-29%).
The effect of education is highly sig-
nificant, both for the low-qualified,
for whom the chances of exiting
low-pay are 19% lower, and for the
highly qualified, for whom they are
27% higher. Tenure does not
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31 Managerial occupations include legislators, senior officials, managers and professionals, intermediate occupations include technicians,
associate professionals, clerks, service workers, shop and market sales workers, skilled agricultural and fishery workers, and manual
occupations include craft and trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations. 
Notes: Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003, 1995-2001. UK, SE, LU and FR missing for all the years because some variables missing.
Individuals between 16 and 64 years. Also controlled for time and country dummies. Reference category: female, between 35 and 54,
medium education, not married, no on-the-job training, no training, fixed-term contract, already worked, intermediate occupation, pri-
vate sector, services, firm size 20-99, 1995, Germany. (*), (**), (***): significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. odds ratio tell how the
odd of observing Y=1 changes  when X changes from 0 to 1 (1 if no change). odds ratio - fe panel is for the conditional fixed-effects logit
model. +For tenure (measured in years) and unemployment rate marginal effects computed at the average sample value.  Standard errors
computed with the Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimates (not for panel estimates).
Table 57 - Logit models for 1-year and 3-year transitions from temporary to permanent jobs – 
EU - pooled data 1994-2001
Transition from TC to PC in Europe - logit model
1-year transitions - pooled 3-year transitions - pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
odds ratio odds ratio - fe panel odds ratio odds ratio - fe panel
male 1.10 *** 1.11 ***
age 16-24 1.17 *** 0.99 1.26 *** 0.77
age 25-34 1.18 *** 1.20 1.18 *** 0.76
age 55-64 0.88 0.94 0.77 ** 0.29 **
low education 0.84 *** 0.88 0.74 *** 0.94
high education 1.06 2.07 *** 1.08 2.51 ***
have children 0-15 1.01 1.16 1.05 1.27
married 1.11 *** 0.98 1.05 0.78
first job 1.00 0.63 *** 1.00 0.56 **
tenure 0.01+ *** 0.03+ *** 0.01+ *** -0.01+
casual contract 0.93 *** 0.92 0.77 *** 0.91
training last year 1.08 * 0.96 1.08 1.01
on-the-job training 1.34 *** 1.31 *** 1.44 *** 1.08
manual occupation 0.86 *** 1.16 0.72 *** 0.75
managerial occupation 0.78 *** 0.85 0.74 *** 0.86
public 0.55 *** 0.71 *** 0.56 *** 1.31
agriculture 0.48 *** 1.26 0.37 *** 1.15
industry 0.97 1.02 1.05 1.71 **
Firm size 0-19 0.98 1.26 *** 0.84 *** 1.19
Firm size 100+ 1.06 1.11 1.13 ** 1.07
unemployment rate -0.02+ *** -0.02+ *** -0.03+ *** -0.01+
n. of observations: 19319 6845 10540 2009
n. of groups: 2577 775
Pseudo R2: 0.052 0.07
strongly affect the chances of exiting
low-pay, once we control for the fact
that the individuals holds his/her first
job which reduces the odds by an
estimated 26%. With regard to con-
tractual arrangements, the likeli-
hood of moving out of low pay is
reduced by holding casual employ-
ment with no contract, while the
fixed-term nature of a contract
increases the odds by 15%.
Training or vocational courses have
a strong and significant effect
(+20% likely to exit low-pay after
three years), while on-the-job train-
ing has a more limited and less sta-
tistically significant role. However,
the relative importance of on-the-
job training and vocational courses
is reversed once we consider shorter,
1-year transitions. Indeed, on-the-
job training has a far more impor-
tant role in increasing the probabil-
ity of increasing the wage over the
low-pay threshold in the short
term, with a highly significant coef-
ficient corresponding to an 18%
increase in probability. Once con-
trolling for on-the-job training, the
effect of training courses on the
short-term probability of not being
low paid any longer becomes
insignificant.
Employees in manual occupations
have a reduced probability of mov-
ing out of low pay, while the con-
verse is true for those in managerial
posts (the respective odds ratio
being 0.80 and 1.77). With respect
to the economic sector, the odds of
moving up the wage ladder are
greater in industry (1.17) and lower
in agriculture (0.45), once we com-
pare them with those in the services
sector. Working in the public sector
or in large-size firms also improves
the chances of low-paid employees.
Results for 1-year transitions are
similar with the only interesting dif-
ference being in terms of the
effects of training mentioned
above.
So far, we have been looking at
binary choice models, with transi-
tions between two specific statuses
only. We will now look at the
determinants of moves from, in
turns, temporary employment and
non-employment to all other pos-
sible economic statuses in a multi-
nomial-logit framework where
competing transitions are estimated
simultanously. For presentational
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Notes: Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003, 1995-2001. UK, SE, LU and FR missing for all the years in (1) and (2) because some vari-
ables missing. Individuals between 16 and 64 years. Also controlled for time and country dummies. Reference category: female, between
35 and 54, medium education, not married, no on-the-job training, no training, worked already, intermediate occupation, private sector,
services, firm size 20-99, 1995, Germany. (*), (**), (***): significant at 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. odds ratio tell how the odd of
observing Y=1 changes  when X changes from 0 to 1 (1 if no change). odds ratio - fe panel is for the conditional fixed-effects logit model.
+For tenure (measured in years) and unemployment rate marginal effects computed at the average sample value. Standard errors com-
puted with the Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimates (not for panel estimates). 
Table 58 - Logit models for 1-year and 3-year transitions from low-pay to higher-pay – 
EU - pooled data 1994-2001
Transition from "Low-pay" to "Higher-pay" - Europe - logit models
1-year transitions 3-year transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
odds ratio odds ratio - fe panel odds ratio odds ratio - fe panel
male 1.63 *** 1.91 ***
age 16-24 1.30 *** 0.85 1.73 *** 1.34
age 25-34 1.32 *** 0.87 1.59 *** 1.28
age 55-64 0.77 *** 0.20 *** 0.71 *** 0.76
low education 0.81 *** 0.93 0.81 *** 0.79
high education 1.21 *** 1.65 * 1.27 *** 0.42
have children 0-15 1.02 1.17 0.96 1.01
married 1.14 *** 0.90 1.13 *** 1.28
first job 0.77 0.62 ** 0.74 *** 1.86 **
tenure 0.00+ 0.08+ *** 0.00+ * 0.00+
fixed-term contract 1.00 0.72 ** 1.15 *** 1.33
casual contract 0.80 *** 0.70 ** 0.78 *** 1.19 *
training last year 1.03 0.88 1.20 *** 0.82
on-the-job training 1.18 *** 1.08 1.12 * 1.03
manual occupation 0.90 *** 1.11 0.80 *** 1.12
managerial occupation 1.43 *** 1.47 1.77 *** 0.80
public 1.19 *** 0.82 1.25 *** 0.91 *
agriculture 0.52 *** 1.14 0.45 *** 2.01
industry 1.11 0.99 1.17 *** 1.43
Firm size 0-19 0.70 0.85 0.69 *** 1.22
Firm size 100+ 1.24 1.50 ** 1.22 *** 1.27
unemployment rate -0.02+ *** -0.03+ *** 0.00+ 0.00+
n. of observations: 16470 5606 8979 1861
n. of groups: 2056 689
Pseudo R2: 0.048 0.075
purposes, specific attention will be
drawn on the main policy vari-
ables of interest. 
Table 59 considers transitions out
of temporary employment. Low
educational attainment signifi-
cantly reduces the probability of
moving to a permanent post, self-
employment or training and edu-
cation, while a high level of edu-
cational qualifications reduces the
chances of moving out of employ-
ment or back into education or
training. For those employees
whose temporary job is also the
first one they have, the likelihood
of leaving employment or moving
into education or training are sig-
nificantly higher (+15% and +84%
respectively), while the converse is
true for tenure.
If the temporary post is also of a
casual nature, the employee has a
much higher probability of moving
into either self-employment or out
of employment altogether.  On-the-
job training reduces the chances of
moving either into non-employ-
ment or education or training,
whilst increasing those of obtaining
a permanent contract. Finally, a
higher unemployment rate reduces
the odds of moving either into per-
manent employment or education
and training. 
The role of skills in employment
transitions is also supported by the
results presented in table 60, show-
ing the determinants of moves out
of non-employment. Low educa-
tional attainment reduces the odds
of transition into all alternative
states, including permanent and
temporary employment, self-
employment and education or train-
ing, while the reverse is true for both
higher educational attainment and
training or vocational courses.  As
shown in table 56, individuals receiv-
ing unemployment benefits are
more likely to move into employ-
ment, with no particular difference
with respect to the contractual
arrangement. Concerning the role
of public employment services, they
do facilitate entry into employment
as well as education or training, but
the likelihood is much higher for
temporary rather than permanent
employment (+47% vs. +12%).
Finally, higher unemployment rates
reduce the odds of finding a job,
especially a permanent one.   
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Table 59 -  Multinomial logit models for 1-year transitions from temporary employment – EU - pooled data 1994-2001
Notes: Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003, 1995-2001. UK, SE, LU and FR missing for all the years because some variables missing.
Individuals between 16 and 64 years. Also controlled for time and country dummies. Reference category: female, between 35 and 54,
medium education, not married, no on-the-job training, no training, worked already, intermediate occupation, private sector, services,
firm size 20-99, 1995, Germany. (*), (**), (***): significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. odds ratio tell how the odd of observing Y=1
changes  when X changes from 0 to 1 (1 if no change). +For tenure (measured in years) and unemployment rate marginal effects comput-
ed at the average sample value. Standard errors computed with the Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimates. TC: temporary con-
tract; PC: permanent contract; SE: self-employed; NW: not-working. TR: training and education. In the “Hausman” test the HO means that
the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives hypothesis holds.
Transition from TC to every other state in 1 year (pooled) - Europe
multinomial logit model (base category TC)
TC-PC TC-SE TC-NW TC-TR
odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio
male 1.10 *** 2.30 *** 0.60 *** 0.87 **
age 16-24 1.16 *** 0.62 *** 0.94 5.77 ***
age 25-34 1.17 *** 1.12 0.97 1.59 ***
age 55-64 0.84 ** 0.98 2.02 *** 0.51
low education 0.84 *** 0.75 *** 1.05 0.78 ***
high education 1.06 0.96 0.69 *** 0.62 ***
have children 0-15 1.01 1.15 * 1.02 1.13 *
married 1.09 *** 1.23 *** 1.12 *** 0.55 ***
first job 1.01 1.20 * 1.15 *** 1.84 ***
tenure 0.01+ *** 0.00+ -0.03+ *** -0.04+ ***
casual contract 0.94 ** 2.29 *** 1.18 *** 0.98
training last year 1.09 ** 0.77 * 1.13 ** 0.87
on-the-job training 1.35 *** 0.99 0.71 *** 0.84 **
manual occupation 0.85 *** 0.77 *** 1.18 *** 0.77 ***
managerial occupation 0.77 *** 1.49 *** 0.59 *** 0.88
public 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 1.02 0.81 ***
agriculture 0.48 *** 1.16 0.95 0.52 ***
industry 0.97 0.96 0.80 *** 0.78 ***
Firm size 0-19 0.98 2.01 *** 1.14 *** 1.10
Firm size 100+ 1.06 1.19 0.84 *** 0.99
unemployment rate -0.02+ *** 0.00+ 0.00+ -0.02+ ***
n. of observations: 24837
Pseudo R2: 0.084
Hausman test for IIA: Accepted
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Notes: Source: ECHP UDB version December 2003, 1994-2001. SE missing for all the years because some variables missing. Individuals
between 16 and 64 years. Also controlled for time and country dummies. Reference category: female, between 35 and 54, medium edu-
cation, not married, no children 0-15, no unemployment benefit, no training, no public employment office. 1995, Germany. (*), (**), (***):
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. odds ratio tell how the odd of observing Y=1 changes  when X changes from 0 to 1 (1 if no
change). +For unemployment rate marginal effects at the average sample value. Standard errors computed with the Huber/White/sand-
wich robust variance estimates. NW: not-working; TC: temporary contract; PC: permanent contract; TR: education or training. In the
“Hausman” test the HO means that the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives hypothesis holds.
Table 60 - Multinomial logit models for 1-year transitions from "not-working" – EU - pooled data 1994-2001
Box 3 - Duration dependence in the exits from temporary jobs: a European overview
This section32 presents some results from the estimation of a duration model (see the annex for a description)
for the transition out of temporary jobs in the European Labour market. This type of model allows controlling
for all the standard determinants, as well as for duration dependence, which is the pure effect of time spent in
temporary employment on the probability of moving to another state.
This empirical analysis is based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1995-1999. Since
it is very likely that different career prospects arise according to the skills and behaviour of the individuals, the
probability of leaving temporary jobs is estimated on an annual basis and for two different destination states,
permanent contracts and non-employment. The analysis is performed separately for men and women.
In doing this, a discrete-time setting is assumed, thus specifying the hazard function (which is the probability
of leaving a specific state conditional to the time spent time on it) as a multinomial-logit and allowing for unob-
servable heterogeneity, assumed to follow a discrete distribution with two points of support (non-parametric).
This last feature is particularly useful since it offers the opportunity of controlling for spurious or “true” state
dependence in the hazard rate and, in addition, it does not imply the IIA (Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives) assumption that is implicit in the multinomial-logit model (such an approach is referred to in the
statistics literature as a competing risks model). Moreover, a completely flexible baseline hazard function is used
(which is the pure effect of time on the exit probability) by allowing the hazard to vary freely on each interval
of one year (using a set of time dummies instead of a predetermined function).
The sample consists of individuals starting a temporary job during their participation in the 1994-1999 waves
of the ECHP. The model has then been estimated first on the whole set of EU member countries, excluding
Sweden, Germany and Luxembourg for which there is no data on temporary employment.
32 The findings in this section are based on A. D’Addio and M. Rosholm, 2004, Exits from temporary jobs in Europe: a competing risks
analysis, a study for the European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs. 
Transition from NW to every other state in 1 year (pooled) – Europe
multinomial logit model (base category NW)
NW-PC NW-TC NW-SE NW-TR
odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio
male 2.07 *** 1.67 *** 3.97 *** 1.29 ***
age 16-24 1.85 *** 1.74 *** 0.72 *** 4.91 ***
age 25-34 1.48 *** 1.29 *** 1.04 1.64 ***
age 55-64 0.27 *** 0.35 *** 0.3 *** 0.29 ***
low education 0.67 *** 0.85 *** 0.67 *** 0.57 ***
high education 1.39 *** 1.49 *** 1.46 *** 1.53 ***
have children 0-15 0.98 1.01 0.90 0.96
married 0.92 * 0.93 * 1.15 * 0.43 ***
unemployment benefit 1.51 *** 1.58 *** 1.03 0.95
training last year 1.58 *** 1.33 *** 1.56 *** 1.41 ***
pub. employment office 1.12 ** 1.47 *** 0.70 *** 1.26 ***
unemployment rate -0.02+ *** -0.01+ *** 0.00+ 0.00+
n. of observations: 38520
Pseudo R2: 0.094
Hausman test for IIA: Accepted
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Some of the results point to very important features of the European labour market. Indeed, it appears that
the passage through a flexible work arrangement at the EU level is a different experience for men and women.
The hazard rate, measuring the conditional probability of exiting temporary jobs, reported in the charts below
shows that women with longer temporary contracts are more likely to get a permanent job, while for men,
after a duration of three years, there is a clear negative path: transition rates into non-employment increases
after that moment. At the same time, while for men longer temporary jobs are in general associated with high-
er job insecurity, the contrary is true for women33. 
Previous labour market status is important in determining the probability of job instability (and therefore of
exclusion) implying that past unemployment has a severe penalty on subsequent job tenure. Furthermore, for
those individuals entering a temporary job after a period of unemployment, a fixed-term contract is more likely
to be a synonymous of a dead-end job instead of a stepping-stone. The same is true for older workers, irrespec-
tive of their gender, and to some extent for less educated people. Some occupational categories are likely to
be more affected than others. It is generally the case for manual occupations and low-skilled individuals. At the
same time women with young children and older workers are more exposed to the risk of unemployment after
the experience of a temporary job.
TC to PC TC to NW
Men Women Men Women
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Unemployment before -0.42 ** -0.56 ** 0.95 ** 0.67 **
Receiving training 0.17 0.04 0.18 -0.02
Secondary Education 0.22 ** 0.11 -0.23 0.19
Higher Education -0.04 -0.14 -0.87 ** -0.08
Age 55-64 -0.54 -1.96 ** 0.81 ** 0.47
Having children 0-12 0.08 0.14 -0.16 0.33 **
Duration dependence:
1 year tenure dummy -5.76 ** -12.25 ** -6.77 ** -14.04 **
2 years tenure dummy -5.93 ** -11.98 ** -6.33 ** -13.38 **
3 years tenure dummy -4.64 ** -11.45 ** -5.43 ** -12.94 **
4 years tenure dummy -5.33 ** -11.44 ** -5.94 ** -12.15 **
Table 61 - A competing-risks model with flexible duration dependence - EU
Notes: (**) and (*) mean respectively significant at 1% and 5%. Also control for occupational level, other age dummies, unemployment
rate, marital status, sector, experience, health, working hours, public or private sector, firm size, country dummies, non-parametric unob-
servable heterogeneity (two factors loading function).
33 This pattern is not easily deducted by looking at the parameters attached to the tenure dummies because duration dependence
is influenced by both sets of parameters – into permanent contracts and non-employment – through the denominator of the
multinomial specification. 
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7. Summary and
conclusions
Diversity in terms of contractual
arrangements is an increasing fea-
ture of European labour markets,
with firms increasingly using tem-
porary employment, either to meet
uncertainty and cyclical fluctuations
in demand or to screen employees.
Even if temporary employment
remains the smallest component of
the active labour force, it is the one
that has been growing most rapidly
in recent years. This development
calls for a close scrutiny of the tem-
porary form of contractual arrange-
ments to ascertain whether the
greater flexibility they offer is also
matched by an adequate degree of
security. However, static measures,
such as the incidence at any one
point in time of precarious employ-
ment, are not an adequate measure
of security, since what is most
important is continuous employ-
ment rather than a job for life. For
this reason, this chapter has looked
at the dynamics over time. 
Apart from the main activity status
and contractual arrangements, this
chapter has analysed pay levels and
dynamics as an illustrative element
of in-work upward mobility. Low
pay is relevant as a measure of both
employees’ welfare and social cohe-
sion. Although the incidence of low
pay does not seem to have
increased in the EU in the second
half of the Nineties, it still remains
at roughly 15% and it has notice-
ably increased in the Netherlands
and in Germany between 1998 and
2000.  
Labour markets are characterised
by a high degree of mobility,
roughly one third of those in tem-
porary employment finding a more
stable job after only one year.
However, it is also true that even
after six years, the longest time
horizon allowed by data available,
around 16% of those that were in
precarious contractual arrange-
ments are still in the same situation
and, more worryingly, 20% of them
have moved out of employment,
more than for any other category
of workers.
Similar conclusions emerge from
the analysis of pay levels, where
persistence is in any case higher
than for temporary employment.
44% of the low-paid manage to
increase their pay above the low-
pay threshold, but only after an
average of seven years. In contrast,
30% of the low-paid are no longer
working after seven years, a proba-
bility of moving out of employment
almost 13 percentage points higher
than for those that were initially
highly paid.    
Furthermore, this average picture
hides important differences. In par-
ticular, it has been shown that cer-
tain categories of individuals,
including women, the low-skilled,
older – and to a certain extent
younger – workers, not only have a
weaker position in the labour mar-
ket at any one point in time, both
in terms of precarious contractual
arrangements and low pay, but
they also have fewer chances to
improve their position in the labour
market relative to the other groups. 
In the econometric analysis presented,
this chapter identified four sets of
factors that influence labour mar-
ket transitions and in particular the
probability of an individual to move
into work and once in work from a
precarious to a stable job and from
low pay to higher pay. These factors
are: the overall macroeconomic
labour market performance, here
captured by the unemployment
rate; individual characteristics, such
as gender, age, marital status, skills;
labour market policies (training,
public employment services and
unemployment benefits); and
demand/structural factors, such as
sector, occupation, public vs. private
sector, firm size. 
All these factors have a strong
impact on the upward mobility of
individuals in the labour market,
calling for a comprehensive set of
policies. These include effective
active labour market policies to
reintegrate individuals in the
labour market and support upward
mobility, and a proper implementa-
tion of income support policies,
including unemployment benefits,
to financially support job-seekers
without creating disincentives to
work. Sound macroeconomic poli-
cies are also needed, given the neg-
ative impact of high unemploy-
ment rates on the opportunities to
enter, remain and progress in the
labour market. Evidence shows that
public employment services can
play an important role in (re)inte-
grating individuals in the labour
market, even if they seem to facili-
tate entry into temporary rather
than permanent employment (see
table 60). 
Besides policy-related variables,
demand/structural features of the
economy also have a strong impact
on the ability of individuals to
progress in the labour market, with
large firms and those in the indus-
trial sector offering more opportu-
nity for career advancement than
those in the (growing) service sec-
tor. 
It is essential that labour market
policies take into account the gen-
der dimension since female employ-
ment is characterised by the highest
incidence of precarious contractual
arrangements and low pay. This is
further exacerbated by the fact that
women are also at a disadvantage
in terms of moving out of low pay
and precarious employment, sug-
gesting that they suffer relatively
more from intermittent labour mar-
ket trajectories.  
While younger workers have the
highest incidence of both tempo-
rary employment and low pay, they
also have a relatively higher proba-
bility of moving up in the labour
market. This shows that, in most
cases, the weaker position of
younger workers is due to the fact
that they are starting their working
life. However, there is a risk that,
for young people, long spells of
unemployment or highly intermit-
tent, low skilled work experience
may have a long-term negative
impact on the individuals’ employa-
 
bility or career opportunities. Older
workers, by contrast, have a better
position at any one point in time in
terms of low pay and precarious
contractual arrangements than
younger workers, but in a dynamic
context they have the greatest diffi-
culty to remain or progress in the
labour market. 
Skills, as a vast literature has
proved, are a key factor to
improve labour market outcomes
and the long-term employability
of individuals. However, the term
“skills” is too broad to represent
any real guidance for the design
of specific policies and there are
several key issues that need to be
considered when looking at edu-
cation and training, including the
role of general education vs. train-
ing, vocational courses vs. on-the-
job training, type, length and
quality of education or training,
who finances it, etc. 
This chapter has explored this issue
to a certain extent by differentiat-
ing between educational qualifica-
tions, training or vocational courses
and on-the-job training. The most
interesting results are that educa-
tional qualifications, and to a lesser
extent training courses, are particu-
larly important to move into
employment. Concerning in-work
transitions, on-the-job training is
strongly correlated with the likeli-
hood of moving from temporary to
permanent employment34, with
training courses having little effect
in this respect. Finally, in relation to
moving out of low pay, on-the-job
training has a stronger effect on 1-
year transitions than training cours-
es, while training courses have a
more important role for longer-
term transitions, hinting that train-
ing courses, possibly if they lead to
some sort of recognised qualifica-
tion, serve as good ‘signals’ for
prospective employers.   
National labour markets are charac-
terised by different degrees of
mobility with respect to the main
economic activity of their working
age population, namely temporary
employment, permanent employ-
ment, self-employment, and educa-
tion or training. Countries with the
highest mobility include the UK,
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands
and Germany, those with the low-
est mobility are: Belgium, France,
Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain,
while the position of Luxembourg,
Ireland and Austria varies according
to the index used. Furthermore, it
appears that mobility is correlated
with labour market performance,
where countries with the highest
overall mobility also tend to have
the highest employment rates, with
the converse being true for coun-
tries with more limited mobility. 
Four crucial dimensions of mobility
have been identified and analysed
separately. These are related to the
labour markets’ openness or easi-
ness to access employment, to the
degree of employment security in
terms of remaining in employment
and moving to a job with a perma-
nent contract, and to the likelihood
of labour market advancement for
those in low pay. 
Considering either one or two year
labour market transitions, the prob-
ability of moving into employment
is particularly low in Luxembourg,
Italy, Belgium and Greece while
that of moving out of employment
is relatively higher in Spain, and
Germany. Spain, together with
France and Greece, is also charac-
terised by one of the lowest proba-
bility of moving from temporary to
permanent employment. Finally,
Germany and the UK present the
fewest opportunities for those in
low pay to move above the low pay
threshold.  
At the same time, short-term transi-
tions into employment are relatively
easier in Denmark, Finland and the
UK, while the probability to move
from temporary to permanent
employment is particularly high in
Luxembourg, Austria, the
Netherlands and the UK. Countries
where it is easier to move out of
low pay and into higher paid
employment are Portugal, Finland
and Belgium. 
The transition rates into employ-
ment and, once in employment, the
opportunities to remain and
progress in the labour market, vary
considerably between individuals
according to specific characteristics,
between occupations and sectors of
the economy and between coun-
tries, in certain instances with high
persistence rates in precarious and
low pay employment even after
several years. Concerns have been
expressed35 that this may lead to the
emergence of a two-tier labour
market, with “insiders” benefiting
from a high level of employment
protection and career opportunities
and “outsiders” recruited under
competing forms of contract. This
calls for a comprehensive set of
policies to promote flexibility com-
bined with security in the labour
market.
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34 As it is generally the case, these models show correlations rather than causality. So, in this instance, on-the-job training may, for a
number of reasons, facilitate the move to a permanent contract; at the same time, temporary contracts may be of a probationary
nature with an implicit goal of a move to a permanent contract and, in view of this, temporary employees receive in their initial period
more training. 
35 See for example the report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, where it is emphasised that long-sequences of consec-
utive fixed-term contracts are considered an abuse.  
8. Annex to chapter 4:
Are temporary
contracts stepping-
stones? 
Some findings36
The recent growth of temporary
employment observed in many
European countries has raised con-
cerns that temporary jobs may be
crowding out more stable forms of
employment and thus creating an
additional source of insecurity for
workers. In this sense, it is feared
that temporary jobs may amplify
the dualism in the labour market
between workers who are
employed on a permanent basis and
workers who are not, especially if
workers experiencing temporary
employment, particularly early in
their careers,  continue in a precar-
ious condition for a long time
before moving to a permanent
contract.
The main question therefore is the
following one: to what extent does
a temporary job increase the prob-
ability of finding a permanent job?
Existing theory suggests different
answers to this question. On the
one hand, as has been well
explained in the economic litera-
ture on career interruptions start-
ing with Mincer and Ofek (1982)37,
job interruptions might imply
human capital depreciation and
consequently productivity to fall.
Moreover, temporary jobs usually
do not provide as much as - or as
good as - on-the-job training as per-
manent ones do. On the other
hand, there might be a positive
effect represented by the increase
in workers’ human capital through
the accumulation of general skills.
In addition temporary employment
is a way of connecting the worker
to a network that could help him or
her find a permanent job.
At the same time, there may also be
a “signalling” argument. Tempo-
rary work experiences can be seen
by a potential employer as a signal
of unconditioned willingness to
work, but when they are too long
and too many, they can be inter-
preted as a signal for low skills.
Lastly, there is a concern that some
employers may be using tempo-
rary employment as a short-term
buffer to deal only with tempo-
rary changes in demand. As a con-
sequence, they will always be
reluctant to move temporary
workers to a permanent position,
regardless of their human capital.
This behaviour could be exacer-
bated when occurring in a labour
market with an excess supply of
labour, or in one that is already
regulated by stringent security
provisions for permanent jobs.
This section summarises some
recent studies on this issue, which
try to analyse transition patterns
out of temporary employment
using micro data. These studies
can be classified into two main
groups, according to the different
questions they want to address
and consequently to the different
econometric techniques used. On
the one hand, following a pro-
gramme evaluation approach,
many authors have tried to assess
whether temporary employment,
as opposed to unemployment,
help workers to get a permanent
job. On the other hand, increasing
attention has been paid to the
analysis of duration patterns in
temporary employment, i.e. the
effect time spent in a temporary
contract has on the probability of
exiting towards a stable occupa-
tion. 
8.1. A “programme evaluation”
approach
Concerning the first approach,
there have so far been only a few
studies looking at the causal effect,
rather than simple correlation, of
temporary employment on the
probability of getting a stable job.
Two very recent papers have con-
tributed to this debate by providing
new evidence on European labour
markets: the first is a paper by
Hagen (2004)38 which applies to
Germany, and the second is a paper
by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini
(2004)39, which applies to Italy.
Both papers attempt to investigate
the employment effects of a tem-
porary job experience on an unem-
ployed individual using matching
methods, which have been devel-
oped in the evaluation of active
labour market programmes (see
Heckman, Lalonde and Smith40,
1999 for a survey). Entry into differ-
ent types of contract (namely, tem-
porary or permanent) might in prin-
ciple be driven not only by observ-
able characteristics, such as qualifi-
cations, experience, socio-demo-
graphic factors or the state of the
economy, but also by unobservable
ones, such as individual propensity
for risk, ability, etc. In other words,
there might be a “self-selection” of
individuals into different types of
jobs according to their unobserv-
able preferences, attitudes or char-
acteristics. Matching methods allow
for at least partial control of this
problem.
In particular, matching estimators
are based on the “potential out-
come” approach to causality (see
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36 Most of the papers mentioned in this section have been presented at an academic workshop organised by DG Employment and Social
Affairs in Brussels on 12/13 February 2004 with the title Temporary employment in Europe: determinants, trends, perspectives.  
37 Mincer J. and H. Ofek , 1982, Interrupted work careers: depreciation and restoration of human capital, in The Journal of Human
Resources n. 17, 3-24 
38 Hagen T., 2003, Do fixed-term contracts increase the long-term employment opportunities of the unemployed?, ZEW Discussion Paper
n. 03-49. 
39 Ichino A., F. Mealli and T. Nannicini, 2004, Temporary Work Agencies in Italy: A Springboard to Permanent Employment?, mimeo.
40 Heckman J. J., R. J. Lalonde and J. A. Smith, 1999, The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs, in Ashenfelter
A. and D. Card eds., Handbook of Labour Economics, vol. 3A, chapter 31, 1865-2097.
Roy, 1951 and Rubin, 197441).
According to this method, two
groups of individuals are identified,
both groups having similar observ-
able characteristics (the degree of
similarity is here synthesised with
the propensity score, which is com-
puted as the probability of belong-
ing to a “similar” group) and then
assuming that their unobservable
characteristics (the so-called unob-
servable heterogeneity) are also
similar. One group then receives a
certain “treatment” (e.g. partici-
pates in a specific labour market
programme) while the other does
not. The outcomes for the two
groups are then compared, where
the outcome for the “non-treated”
group can be interpreted as the
potential outcome for the first
group, should they have not under-
taken the treatment. In the present
context, for example, the outcome
(e.g. labour market status) of indi-
viduals who have had a temporary
job after unemployment is com-
pared with the outcome of similar
individuals that were also initially
unemployed, but who did not have
a subsequent experience as tempo-
rary workers. 
In Hagen (2003), the central issue is
whether or not temporary work
really increases the long-term
employment prospects of unem-
ployed people entering into tempo-
rary work in terms of future perma-
nent employment relationships. In
particular, this paper investigates
the effects of the transition from
unemployment to fixed-term jobs
on an individual’s future employ-
ment opportunities in the West
German labour market, by using
the GSOEP dataset for the period
1991-2001.
The empirical findings of the paper
can be summarised as follows.
Entering into temporary jobs
increases the future employment
probability (between +4% and
+17% for an exit to another tempo-
rary contract, and between +3%
and +16% for an exit to a perma-
nent contract) but this effect varies
according to different time hori-
zons, with a higher probability
observed at the beginning for a
renewal into a fixed-term job and
later for a renewal into a perma-
nent job. These findings are com-
patible with the hypothesis that
temporary employment may be a
stepping-stone towards a perma-
nent contract.
The paper by Ichino, Mealli and
Nannicini (2004) is similar in scope
and techniques, even if it refers to a
different country (Italy) and to a
different typology of fixed-term
contracts (Temporary Working
Agencies - TWAs). As for the previ-
ous paper, the general aim of the
paper is to understand whether,
and to what extent, TWA work-
placements represent a spring-
board toward a permanent job, or
a “trap” in endless precariousness.
In this case both samples of treated
and control subjects are composed
of residents in nine provinces of
Tuscany and Sicily, aged between 18
and 40, and the control sample is
composed of other atypical workers
(proper fixed-term contracts, train-
ing contracts, etc.) and unemployed
individuals. A particular feature of
the paper is that it exploits, in the
estimation of the initial propensity
score, a potentially exogenous char-
acteristic (the geographical distance
of the worker from the agency)
which may ensure a better control
for any source of endogeneity. 
Key results are as follows: for tem-
porary workers, the probability of
finding a permanent job 18 months
after the TWA work placement
doubles with respect to the coun-
terfactual case of no placement
(from 14% to 28%). Other tempo-
rary contracts produce the same
individual effect, but if TWA
employment had completely
crowded out other types of non-
permanent employment, the
aggregate effect would have been
zero. The effect of the treatment
on the individual probability of
finding any kind of job is greater in
absolute terms, but lower in rela-
tive terms (from 48.5% to 68.5%).
Moreover, while 51% of TWA work-
ers had been informed by employ-
ers interviewed in the survey that
they may be hired on a permanent
basis at the end of the mission, only
32% of them were effectively hired
by the firms. This suggests that
screening and flexibility are com-
plementary motivations for firms to
hire TWA workers. The study con-
cludes, much like the other study,
that TWA employment seems not
to be, at least in Italy, a “trap” of
endless precariousness, but an
effective springboard towards per-
manent employment. However, a
similar springboard is offered by
other types of non-permanent
labour contracts and it is not equally
effective everywhere.
Summing up, according to these
two studies, temporary employ-
ment seems not to be a “trap” of
endless precariousness, but it is an
effective springboard towards per-
manent employment. However,
these results should be interpreted
with caution since the samples for
the analyses were quite small
(between 349 and 239 treated in
Hagen, and between 305 and 162
in Ichino et al.). Moreover, match-
ing estimators, as opposed to
instrumental variable or Heckman-
type estimators can only reduce the
bias but they cannot account for
any source of endogeneity which
might affect the probability of find-
ing a job. 
8.2. A duration analysis approach
“Duration analysis” represents the
second strand of literature that
looked at transition patterns into
temporary employment. While pro-
gramme evaluation tells us whether
a temporary contract, as opposed to
any other counterfactual situation,
helps in getting a permanent job,
duration techniques help identify
the effect of time spent in temporary
employment. However, in duration
analysis there is usually no counter-
factual: since the sample is composed
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41 Rubin D.B., 1974, Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomised and non-randomised studies, in Journal of Educational
Psychology n.66, 688-701.
only by people holding a temporary
contract in time t, any attempt to
compare temporary employment as
opposed to unemployment is com-
pletely disregarded here.
Despite the increasing number of
studies analysing duration patterns
in temporary employment, the
most representative, at least for the
European labour market are two
recent studies: Booth, Francesconi
and Frank (2002)42 and Guell and
Petrongolo (2003)43 (but see also
box 3).
Using a UK dataset (waves 1 to 7 of
the BHPS), Booth et al. (2002) speci-
fy a model that relates the exit
process to a number of individual-
and job-specific characteristics. The
estimation is carried out separately
for two different types of tempo-
rary jobs: fixed-term contracts and
seasonal-casual contracts. 
Concerning the first type of tempo-
rary contracts, the results of the
paper show that the transition from
fixed-term to permanent work dif-
fers for men and women. For men,
only age, part-time employment
status, and a few occupational
groups (craft, sales and machine
operatives) appear to be good pre-
dictors for this exit. The evidence
for women is rather different. The
strong positive effect of any educa-
tional qualification on this exit rate
is likely to be spurious, as it disap-
pears (except for higher and univer-
sity degrees) once unobserved het-
erogeneity is controlled for. The
negative effect of being employed
in a part-time job may also not be
genuine for the same reason.
However, women employed in any
organisation of the public sector
have a much lower exit rate than
those employed in the private sec-
tor, even after controlling for edu-
cation and occupation. A higher
number of previous layoffs increases
the exit rate into permanency. This
may capture vintage effects, as sug-
gested by the lower risk of exit for
the youngest cohort of workers.
Regardless of a worker’s gender,
both part-time work and living in
an area with adverse labour market
conditions reduce the chance of
exiting seasonal-casual work and
finding permanent employment.
The paper also documents some
striking gender differences. For
men, a strong occupational gradi-
ent is found, with workers in mana-
gerial, technical and craft occupa-
tions having a higher risk of leaving
seasonal and casual work than
workers in semi-skilled and
unskilled occupations. However, for
women the occupational gradient
is clearly less pronounced with
other factors playing a major role.
In particular, those employed in the
local government sector and non-
profit organisations are significantly
less likely to gain permanency than
those employed in the private sec-
tor, and so are workers in the
youngest age group compared to
those in the 35-44 age group.
Interestingly, women (but not men)
who work in union-covered organi-
sations have a higher chance of
leaving their seasonal-casual jobs.
A more detailed analysis of dura-
tion patterns in temporary employ-
ment comes instead from the paper
by Guell and Petrongolo (2003). In
particular, they estimate a duration
model of temporary employment
using the panel version of the
Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA),
starting in 1987. Moreover, the
advantage of using the EPA data is
that the length of the period cov-
ered by the survey is extremely long
(from 1987 to 2002), which allows
for an assessment in the conversion
pattern of fixed-term contracts
introduced in 1984, as well as an
analysis of the effects of the later
reforms.
Concerning the timing of perma-
nent promotions, they find both
early and late spikes in the renewal
rates of temporary contracts,
around durations of one and three
years, respectively. The later spike is
relatively more important for men
and for the less skilled. If anything,
the screening use of fixed-term con-
tracts seems to apply more to
women than to men, most likely so
as to assess the women’s job attach-
ment of women, and to the skilled
rather than the less-skilled, who can
more easily be replaced by new
temporary workers at the legal
duration limit of their contracts.
These results seem to suggest that
there are alternative reasons why
firms opt for temporary workers,
other than simply for covering jobs
whose underlying nature is tempo-
rary. On the one hand, a fixed-term
contract can in fact be used as a
screening device when it is not
known whether the skills of the
applicant best suit the vacant post or
when the productivity of a worker is
not initially observable. In this case
the temporary contract may be
renewed into a permanent one as
soon as the uncertainty is resolved,
especially if firms perceive a real
trade-off between using the two
types of contract. In fact, while tem-
porary contracts are cheaper in sev-
eral respects, they may discourage
worker motivation, retention, and
specific human capital investment if
the worker can credibly threaten to
leave the employer. On the other
hand, for workers who cannot cred-
ibly threaten their employers, and
for jobs which do not require spe-
cific human capital, fixed-term con-
tracts may simply be used as a
cheaper alternative to permanent
positions up to their legal duration
limit of three years. Low conversion
rates, mostly concentrated around
the legal limit, would be in line
with this second explanation, while
earlier spikes in renewal would be
more consistent with the screening
explanation for the use of tempo-
rary employment.
To sum up, it seems that the results
of both papers suggest an increas-
ing trend in the probability of exit-
ing temporary contracts towards a
permanent position. However,
there is a consistent heterogeneity
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42 Booth A., Francesconi M. and Frank J., 2002, Temporary jobs: stepping stones or dead ends?, in The Economic Journal, vol. 112,
June,189-213.
43 Guell M. and B. Petrangolo, 2003, How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain, IZA
Discussion Paper n.782
around these results, since the tim-
ing of this pattern can change dras-
tically depending on institutional
settings, gender and educational
attainments of the workers under
consideration.
However, it is important to note
that the search for a permanent job
may simply require one spell of
temporary employment, but it can
also entail a sequence of temporary
jobs, sometimes inevitably stag-
gered with unemployment or peri-
ods of inactivity. In this case, look-
ing at a single transition it might
not be possible to capture the more
complex dynamics arising when
repeated spells occur over time: for
example, young workers may need
more than one temporary job in
order to acquire the right expertise
and be promoted to a permanent
job. 
This concept has been recently
developed in a paper by Gagliar-
ducci (2003)44, who applies duration
techniques to an Italian prospective
panel, the ILFI survey (1997 inter-
view). In particular, he uses a multi-
ple-spell specification that allows
controlling for lagged duration
dependence, as well as for state
and duration dependence. The
main results are as follows: as in the
studies outlined above, the proba-
bility of moving from a temporary
job to a permanent one increases
with the duration of the contract,
but not linearly. Moreover, repeat-
ed temporary jobs and in particular
unemployment interruptions redu-
ce it. This suggests that it is not
exactly temporary employment per
se but job interruptions that harm
employment prospects.
Chapter 4 Employment in Europe 2004
186
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1. Introduction
With 7% of the world’s population,
the European Union accounts for
over one third of global trade in
goods and services1 and a third of
the world’s GDP. The EU is a major
global player and Europeans are
among the primary beneficiaries of
opening up to trade; chapter 2 of
this report recalls some of the main
benefits of openness (defined as
increased international competi-
tion in product markets)2; however
its effects on employment are
ambiguous3 because it increases
exposure to international shocks, its
undesirable distributional effects
continue to be felt and require fur-
ther attention. Trade is certainly the
area in which the European Union
has abolished barriers most effec-
tively and from there encouraged
further integration in a broader
sense. 
The nineties have witnessed a
strong intensification of the inte-
gration of EU countries into the
global economy; the first part of
this chapter will illustrate such a
trend. However important issues
remain on the agenda, such as
identifying the winners and losers
from trade liberalisation and glob-
alisation; the labour market effects,
the immigration issue and the links
between trade, employment and
wages4 continue to be hot topics
among economists, policy makers
and the public at large. The fears
voiced in the media and public
opinion echoed this lack of com-
pleteness in the sharing of the ben-
efits of globalisation. Extending the
benefits of globalisation to all is
clearly the policy aim at European
level, which was underlined in a
recent communication by the
European Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalisation5 (box 4).
In the context of ‘globalisation’,
increased integration among EU-
economies implies not only liberali-
sation of trade among its Member
States, but also further cohesion
among Member States and better
employment conditions through-
out the EU. Therefore the present
chapter will focus on ‘globalisation’
and some of its manifestations that
may have an impact on labour mar-
kets, namely the dynamics of fur-
ther integration and offshoring.
Having illustrated the phenome-
non of ‘globalisation’ through an
analysis of the nature of changes in
international trade in the 1990s,
this chapter looks at the enlarge-
ment process as a move towards
further integration at the EU level,
continuing the process of lowering
barriers and deepening the links
between countries – from the
Single Market project leading to
the present form of the European
Union, which goes far beyond a
mere free-trade area. We show that
the EU25 increases product diversity,
to the benefit of all since it increas-
es specialisation and therefore
trade and growth. From there we
assume that further integration can
be viewed as a ‘model’ of global
integration. Throughout the chap-
ter, the labour market issues and
implications of such moves will be
underlined. With a view to safe-
guarding both a dynamic economic
environment and a supportive
labour market, we should empha-
sise that the EU has established
standards and regulations in the
field of employment and social poli-
cies that contain compensating
mechanisms at European level to
help those most affected, thus
counterbalancing some of the
potential negative distributional
effects resulting from further eco-
nomic and monetary integration. 
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1 Imports and exports of goods and services by the EU amount to approximately 6,000 bn constant US $ out of 18,000 bn constant US $
worldwide (Source: World Bank, WDI latest available year, in constant US $ - basis 1995); this is valid if intra-EU trade is included
(approx. 35%), it represents one fifth of world foreign trade (20%) otherwise (Eurostat). This trend has shrunk by 3 % from 1993 to
2003 (using Eurostat data, Ameco database, measuring the share of EU-trade relative to foreign trade).
2 International competition in product markets affects the wage and price formation mechanisms, limiting price inflation in the econ-
omy and reducing the pressure for rent-seeking. Chapter 2 uses the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP as a proxy for
'openness'.
3 In a macro-economic perspective such as the one adopted in chapter 2 of this report, openness leads to positive effects on employ-
ment when openness reduces rent seeking behaviour, while effects of openness can be negative when it increases the demanded
for protective intervention (demand for insurance against unemployment and income risk, and/or increases the bargained wage. 
4 The link between trade, employment and wages is an empirical issue – these variables are endogenous. Indeed despite many
attempts to disentangle the effects of trade (per se) on the labour market variables, no robust evidence on this topic can be found
in the economic literature. 
5 http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/may/tradoc_117580
The chapter goes on to highlight
sectoral patterns and more specifi-
cally points to the sectors and
workers that are potentially
adversely affected by the negative
effects of globalisation. The chap-
ter then also attempts to shed light
on the definition of outsourcing
and offshoring, the nature and
scale of such a phenomenon, since
this is precisely the type of ‘negative
effect’ that worries workers
throughout the EU. In employment
terms, the chapter finally explores
the skill-content of employment
creation throughout the EU and by
sector in order to tentatively track
the potential tensions or ‘pres-
sures’ that globalisation generates
at sectoral level. Data on the extent
of job creation are presented by
sector and by skills in order to assess
the nature and magnitude of
changes that workers are faced
with in the EU, as well as the oppor-
tunities offered by the European
labour market. 
Overall, the aim of this chapter is to
offer a balanced view of the debate
over the distributional effects of
‘globalisation’, specifically in an age
of offshoring. This will be achieved
by  taking stock of the whole liter-
ature on trade and growth and
acknowledging its unambiguously
positive effects through specialisa-
tion on growth, while focusing on
the potential strengths of the
European labour market and the
issues that still need to be
addressed. 
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Box 4 - Key messages of the communication on the social dimension of globalisation
In May 2004, the European Commission published a communication on how it intends to contribute to max-
imising the benefits and minimising the costs of globalisation.   It highlights the need to strengthen policy
coherence at all levels in order to promote mutually reinforcing economic, employment, social and environ-
mental policies. The Communication is partly in response to the publication in February 2004 of the findings of
the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation. 
In its Communication, the Commission states that it wants to ensure that the EU makes an active contribution
to harnessing globalisation to serve social as well as economic goals both in the EU and elsewhere. It notes the
efforts made so far in the EU to ensure that economic and social progress go hand in hand, but states that more
can be done and calls for a move from debate to action. The Communication briefly describes the current range
of actions undertaken in the framework of the EU regarding the social dimension of globalisation and makes
proposals for certain changes.
The Communication states that the EU has a key role to play at the international level and that enhancing dia-
logue with its bilateral partners on the social dimension of sustainable development policy is a means of secur-
ing progress. It says that the EU will also seek to promote social development through its agreements with other
regions and countries, its development and external cooperation, its trade policy including its unilateral pref-
erential market access scheme (its Generalised System of Preferences) and indicates that a forthcoming revision
of this scheme will seek to ensure a continued commitment to fostering the implementation of core labour
standards.
The Commission believes that further efforts are required to encourage greater corporate social responsibility
(CSR); the Communication states that efforts should also be made to ensure that CSR initiatives respond trans-
parently to the concerns of consumers and social partners.
Finally, the document highlights the role of international institutions as being central to progress in achieving
the goal of decent work for all. It states that there should be increased coherence between the different sys-
tems of ‘global governance’  and that developing countries should participate more effectively in key rule-mak-
ing bodies, such as the World Trade Organisation. There should also be a greater involvement of social partners
and broader civil society in these bodies.  The EU commission will continue to improve dialogue with its stake-
holders on the follow-up of the social dimension of globalisation. 
The Communication is intended as a first contribution to the debate which was started by the publication of
the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation’s report and in particular to the discussion on
its  follow-up to be held at the ILO and elsewhere.. The Commission believes that some of World Commission’s
proposals should also be discussed at other fora which have responsibility for financial, economic and trade
issues.
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2004/06/inbrief/eu0406201n.html
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2004/may/socialglobal_en.html
Globalisation and Labour Markets: a European perspective Chapter 5
189
The issue is the following: there are
perceived effects of globalisation,
some are negative and there are
grounds for concern; on the other
hand, globalisation also brings about
large overall benefits. Public concerns
over increased insecurity, job reloca-
tions, and the negative impact on the
low-skilled are to be taken seriously
by decision makers. Therefore policy
advice is needed to find a way of
spreading those benefits more even-
ly, as well as to bridge the gap
between perceptions and reality. 
2. Defining the issue
2.1. What is ‘globalisation’?
Although the term ‘globalisation’ is
widely used, very few actually per-
ceive this process as it is usually
defined, namely the trend of ongo-
ing international integration.
Globalisation is not only about
trade and FDI; indeed it encompass-
es much broader mechanisms such
as the intensification of links
between countries (trade, FDI,
exchange through ICT means, trans-
portation, opening up to other
countries and deepening the links
with them
6
); there is a qualitative
difference between ‘trade liberali-
sation’ and ‘globalisation’ which
stems from the deepening, intensifi-
cation and broadening of the
process. Economists tend to agree
on the significant gains from trade
liberalisation and on the distribu-
tional consequences (winners and
losers in standard trade theory);
however there is a lack of systematic
empirical evidence on the groups
affected by the negative distribu-
tional aspects of ‘globalisation’ in
the broad sense
7
. 
From a European perspective, glob-
alisation means simultaneously fur-
ther integration of the world econ-
omy and within-Europe integration
(further enlargement) – this is an
ongoing challenge. Globalisation
can be understood to have an
‘intra-EU’ (East-West or ‘within’-EU)
dimension reflecting the recent
enlargement as well as a truly 
global/worldwide perspective
8
. 
For a variety of reasons, greater
integration of the world economy
leads companies to internationalise
their production processes, which in
addition to the vertical division of
the production process – has a sig-
nificant impact on the international
division of labour. At European
level, further integration, through
increased specialisation, intra-EU
trade intensification, investment
and growth, should ultimately lead
to an increase in wealth and highly
paid and highly qualified jobs due
to constant innovation and the con-
sequent upgrading of European
products. 
2.2. Global labour flows?
Globalisation has mainly been driven
by the free movement of goods,
services, capital flows, investment
and technological change. Labour
flows on the other hand have never
been a driving force (Ghose, 2003);
the realm of globalisation now
extends beyond this definition if we
understand it as further integration;
labour flows are ‘formally absent’
from the globalisation process
although it should theoretically
improve the long-term outcomes9.
This does not mean that labour
market developments have had no
effect on the process itself. Even
though international trade models
usually assume full employment
and fully flexible labour market
adjustment mechanisms (through
wages), trade economists have
questioned these assumptions.
Indeed a country’s labour market
situation (including labour costs,
the skill composition of labour and
tax-benefit systems) affects its com-
petitive position, its attractiveness
to FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)
and acts as a ‘push-’ or ‘pull-factor’
thus triggering migration flows10.
The very fact that one does not talk
about ‘global labour markets’ is
telling. For, in reality, there is no
such thing as a ‘global labour mar-
ket’. Nevertheless migration, be it
legal or illegal, has increasingly
become an area of interest
11
. In
Europe, where wages are rather
‘sticky’, the major short-term focus
is the impact of migration on
employment (if the wage variable is
‘sticky’, meaning that wages are not
flexible downwards, then employ-
ment bears all the brunt of adjust-
ment in case of economic shocks
affecting labour market outcomes).
2.3. Causes for concern
‘Because the growth of North-South
manufactured trade constitutes the
core of globalisation, its primary
effects are on employment and
wages in manufacturing industries’
(Ghose 2003).  This statement12 and
the bulk of the empirical literature
6 UNCTAD has recently published a very comprehensive report on various indicators of development and globalisation 'Development
and Globalization: Facts and Figures' (2004), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//gdscsir20041_en.pdf.
7 some economists also disagree, especially when examining the case of Least Developed Countries locked in the export of non-fuel
primary goods with deteriorating terms of trade. 
8 ILO, Ghose (2003) presents detailed conclusions about globalisation and labour markets in a North-South perspective.
9 See the literature on optimal currency areas, especially applied to the European case.
10 Labour flows are usually hindered by country borders and language barriers; in the US and Brazil – two Federal States – those barri-
ers have largely been removed and there are substantial flows of labour between regions. 
11 Commission Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (2003). Migration is increasingly likely and necessary in
the context of an ageing labour force.
12 Changes in the manufacturing sector are often studied in greater detail because data on wages and employment are both available
on a relatively comparable basis throughout countries.
fail to acknowledge that globalisa-
tion now extends to all other activ-
ities and sectors, (trade in goods
13
,
services, financial services, and
movement of capital) therefore all
sectors should potentially expect to
be part of this global trend and
should all be prepared to manage
changes in the international divi-
sion of labour.  
It is worth noting here that globali-
sation has brought significant ben-
efits to many through the creation
of higher quality and higher earn-
ing jobs; however these benefits
are not shared equally14. While
trade openness brings ‘gains from
trade’ according to traditional
trade literature, it also brings ‘pains
from trade’
15
. If this aspect of glob-
alisation is taken in isolation, then
‘globalisation’ scares workers16.
Workers can potentially be severely
hit by ‘economic adjustment’ and
this aspect is especially relevant at
times when public debate focuses
on relocation of firms, resulting in
fear of job losses at local/regional
level. In the past, the manufactur-
ing sector has been particularly
hard hit by this trend which has
mostly affected the unskilled. Now
it is extending to the high-skilled,
white-collar workers too.
Replacement of such activities is less
obvious than the replacement of
manufacturing by service jobs, but
does develop. The qualitative
aspects that are witnessed in recent
years point to the broader nature
of ‘globalisation’ when compared
to pure international trade. 
Assuming that in the long-term the
‘compensation mechanism’ is sus-
tainable, the analytical presump-
tion is then that ‘those most affect-
ed’ can be compensated in one way
or another, for instance through a
variety of policy instruments with-
out exhausting the gains from
trade. Such a policy debate is espe-
cially relevant within the EU, as the
‘compensation mechanism’ which is
built in our regional integration
model rests upon the welfare state
(social protection systems) that
allows for national transfers to
occur and redistribution mecha-
nisms at pan-European level to bal-
ance out regional disparities. One
of the underlying questions is
whether this combination of a
Single Market and the ‘European
Social Model’ is sufficient in an
enlarged Europe and also whether
such a setting can be reproduced
elsewhere. 
Such a debate on globalisation and
jobs is entirely relevant in EU policy
terms, since the distribution effects
will be monitored in the context of
enlargement. The EU Social Model
and its capacity to manage the neg-
ative consequences of globalisation
on labour are a core aspect of
future policy developments, with a
view to safeguarding social cohe-
sion by alleviating the pressure on
those sectors and workers exposed
to competitive forces. The examples
of Greece, Portugal, Spain and
Ireland are successes in terms of real
convergence mostly resulting from
the combination of economic inte-
gration and structural funds
17
.
2.4. Perceptions
The gap between the views shared
by economists (who most frequent-
ly focus on trade per se) and those
expressed by workers and the per-
ception of globalisation by the pub-
lic at large is ‘the ferment of politi-
cal backlash’18 which creates doubts
and uncertainties about the long-
term prospects for further integra-
tion worldwide. 
For many, globalisation is perceived
as ‘increased change’ (accelerated
change) and therefore increased
insecurity. ‘Individuals that perceive
globalisation contributing to their
own economic insecurity are much
more likely to develop policy atti-
tudes hostile towards economic
integration’
19
. Increases in perceived
economic insecurity stem from fast
reallocation of FDI and the activity
of MNCs (multinational corpora-
tions) in general
20
. The uncertainty
about the winners and losers from
trade integration and further liber-
alisation, the difficulty in identify-
ing who is moving from one sector
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13 The fact that agriculture is still a highly regulated sector should also be of concern while discussing potential gains from lowering
barriers in this sector. However, this specific issue is not tackled in this chapter.
14 The report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, A fair globalisation: creating opportunities for all,
February 2004, ILO, notes that the benefits are not shared equally across countries and groups, and concludes that without an
effective system of global governance, globalisation will continue to generate unbalanced outcomes.
15 Sapir (2000), Who is afraid of globalisation? The challenge of domestic adjustment in Europe and America, CEPR Discussion Paper
n°2595.
16 Since the protests in Seattle 1999, anti-globalisation movements have fuelled concerns about the perceived consequences of trade
with emerging markets. A number of concerns were prominent among the issues raised: first, whether cheap labour in China, India
or Brazil would wholly displace highly paid workers in 'industrialised countries'; second, whether MNCs (multinational corporations)
would simply close down in the industrialised countries and set up factories in countries where they can employ children. Both con-
cerns are linked to the perceived effects of trade on labour market outcomes (employment and wages). Child labour is one of the
core labour standards agreed upon at the ILO. This chapter will therefore not dwell on the issue and its purpose is to concentrate on
the issue of competition with providers of 'cheaper labour'.
17 Third Cohesion Report. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm
18 Verdier (2004), Socially responsible trade integration: a political economy perspective, paper presented at the ABCDE meeting organ-
ised in May 2004 by the World Bank in Brussels. 
19 Scheve K., Slaughter M.J.  (2002), Economic insecurity and the globalisation of production, http://ssrn.com/abstract=386625
20 Scheve K., Slaughter M.J. (2002), Economic insecurity and the globalisation of production, op. cit., 'Insecurity' is measured as 'less sat-
isfaction' from a given job, as the authors have coded a survey by inserting values from 1 to 7 according to job satisfaction and then
used as the dependent variable for econometric estimations. See also Scheve and Slaughter (2001), www.iie.com, on the US case.
21 There is a time inconsistency problem (once trade gains accrue to a country/government, they are less likely to be redistributed to
compensate the losers). There are also information constraints that hinder the compensation process.
to the other and the relative posi-
tion of workers in the income distri-
bution are precisely what remains
unclear in the current debate.
Furthermore, economic literature is
also unclear about the impact of
trade on the capacity and willing-
ness to redistribute its gains
21
through appropriate adjustment
policies (such as employment and
social policies). However, the ‘nega-
tive’ perception of globalisation is
not shared unanimously; gathering
feedback throughout the EU yields
the following comments22: for
instance, 56% of the people sur-
veyed in the EU15 see globalisation
as an opportunity for national
economies, while 39% perceive it as
a threat. 
What seems clear, in light of the
theoretical, empirical literature and
case studies, is that trade integra-
tion should not be pursued on its
own. The explicit choice of the EU’s
founders was to reconcile economic
gains with political feasibility. The
same type of approach could also be
applied to reconcile expectations of
globalisation’s benefits – which are
high
23
, with perceptions of its nega-
tive effects – that need to be care-
fully understood and addressed
with appropriate, timely and well-
tailored policies. Globalisation could
be made more encompassing than
previously if the benefits of interna-
tional trade and deeper integration
were more evenly shared while
simultaneously taking into account
the compensation mechanisms and
labour market concerns.
Starting with the changing nature
of international trade, the chapter
assesses the EU’s position as a
‘major global player’ in the global
division of production. This fact has
consequences on the demand for
and supply of labour.  
3. The changing
nature of
international trade
EU integration in global trade
In the past four decades, interna-
tional trade in goods and services
has increased tremendously and
some developing countries have
increased their participation in
worldwide trade, notably China,
India and Brazil, who make up for a
large part of the increase in the fig-
ures for ‘developing countries’ as
broadly reported in table 62.
Indeed the share of exports and
imports of the grouping named
‘other Asia(n)’ countries in the
United Nations’ classification, which
includes China and India, has risen
from 7.9% in 1980, 12.9% in 1990
to 19.7% in 200024.
International trade has, no doubt,
brought about large gains in terms
of long-term growth of the world
economy (table 63). This assertion is
based on the body of empirical lit-
erature on trade and growth: more
open countries grow faster and
attain higher levels of income than
countries that hinder international
trade
26
. The impact of economic
openness usually feeds through to
income per capita or the growth
rate of GDP. All studies find that
countries with more open trade
policies have tended to grow faster.
As shown in chapter 2 of this
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22 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/FL151bGlobalisationREPORT.pdf, Eurobarometer (2003). 
23  Verdier (2004), see graph on pros and against trade (Annex): only in the Netherlands do the 'pro-trade' outstrip the 'against'.
24 UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2003.
25 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan008092.pdf
26 Dollar, D.  (1992), Outward-oriented developing economies really do grow more rapidly: evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85 Economic
Development and Cultural Change, pp. 523-544; Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1995) Economic reform and the process of global integra-
tion, Brookings papers on economic activity, 1, pp. 1-118; Harrisson A. (1996) Openness and growth: a time-series, cross-country analy-
sis for developing countries, Journal of Developing Economics, 48, pp. 419-447; Edwards S. (1998) Openness, productivity, and growth:
What do we really know?, Economic Journal, 108 (March), pp. 383-398. 
Source: UNCTAD 
Source: UNCTAD 
Note: in the above table, country groupings are the ones used by the United Nations25;
i.e. the EU15 is a subset of ‘developed countries and NMS are a subset of CEEs. ‘Developed
economies’ encompasses the EU15, Canada, the US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand;’
CEEs’  include Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, former Macedonia and Yugoslavia;
‘Developing economies’ include Africa, Asia and the Pacific (excluding Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, and the Asian parts of the CIS) and Latin America and the Caribbean.
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Developing countries 24.7 19.2 29.4 24.1 32
CEEs 10.6 10.1 8.0 5.0 4.2
Developed countries 64.7 70.7 62.6 70.8 63.8
Table 62 - Merchandise trade (shares in % by country group)
Region 1980-85 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
World 0.6 1.9 0.5 1.7
Developing countries 0.3 2.4 3.3 2.3
CEEs 2.1 0.6 -7.1 2.1
Developed countries 1.9 3.0 1.1 2.2
Europe 1.4 2.8 0.9 2.3
Table 63 - GDP growth per capita (average annual growth 
rates of real GDP per capita in %)
 
report, in a macro-economic set-
ting, the long-term impact of
‘openness’ on the employment rate
is unambiguously positive: an
increase in the degree of openness
by 10% is associated with an
increase of 1% to 3% in the
employment rate27. 
We shall first review some trade
indicators for the EU and then dis-
cuss other components that need to
be discussed when focussing on
‘globalisation’ in a broad sense. 
3.1. The enlarged EU in the world
economy 
In 2003, the EU is US’s main trading
partner (ranking n°1 in US’s imports
and n°2 in USA’s exports; conversely,
the US ranks n°39 in the EU’s
imports and n°30 in EU’s exports)28.
Bilateral trade in services between
the EU and the US represents 35%
of world flows.  The EU’s share of
world trade in goods (18.9%) and
services (25.2%) surpasses that of the
US in services (20.3%), whereas the
US represents 21.3% of the world’s
trade in goods, and both surpass
Japan to a large extent (goods: 7.7%
and services: 7.3%).
3.1.1. Characteristics of EU trade
All sectors of the economy are sub-
ject to an increased competitive pres-
sure and moreover this process is not
new: the gradual opening up to
trade has witnessed this increase in
competitive pressure for decades
29
.
The enlargement process puts pres-
sure on the NMS (New Member
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27 Although price stickiness leads to a negative response of the employment rate in the short-term (indeed there is a trade-off between
adjustment through wages and adjustment through employment).
28 All data used in this paragraph comes from Eurostat, Comext database.
Trade (% of GDP) 
China
India
Japan
Switzerland
US
EU15
1991
35.52
18.05
18.28
68.59
20.64
76.43
2001
49.24
29.08
20.26
86.60
26.20+
90.97*
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)  
China
India
Japan
Switzerland
US
EU15
1991
19.43
8.73
9.95
34.98
10.15
38.08
2001
25.83
13.65
10.44
45.47
11.24+
46.87**
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
China
India
Japan
Switzerland
US
EU15
1991
16.09
9.32
8.34
33.61
10.49
38.34
2001
23.41
15.43
9.81
41.13
14.95+
44.10
Foreign direct investment. net inflows (% of GDP) 
China
India
Japan
Switzerland
US
EU15
1991
1.16
0.03
0.04
1.38
0.39
1.67
2001
3.82
0.71
0.15
3.49
1.30
6.71
Foreign direct investment. net inflows (% of gross capital formation) 
China
India
Japan
Switzerland
US
EU15
1991
3.33
0.13
0.11
5.43
2.42
7.62
2001
10.07
3.17
0.59
16.17
15.13+
65.83+
Source: WDI. World Bank.
Notes: * excluding Luxembourg; ** using 2000 data for Greece and Luxembourg; + in 2000 due to missing data. Figures for the EU15
include intra-EU trade and are not strictly comparable.
Table 64 - Broad trade indicators
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States) to proceed quickly with
restructuring and reforms. Further
integration in the global economy
is putting the whole EU25 under
intense competitive pressure, forc-
ing Europe to change rapidly. 
A closer look at the composition of
EU trade with the rest of the world
shows that a large majority of the
trade is carried out within the EU.
Yet one should also underline the
fact that the EU15 is a major player
in world trade relations (table 64).
Trade in goods clearly represents a
growing share of GDP for the small-
er countries, such as Switzerland,
Belgium, countries of Eastern
Europe (chart 88), while the picture
is slightly different for the US, China
and India in the 1990s.
One typically notes the divide
between large countries and small-
er countries in the chart below,
with smaller countries necessarily
being more open than large ones
and also witnessing the relative
importance of intra-European trade
in the 1990s.
Overall the EU’s trade increased so
considerably in the 1990s that it is
today (data for 2002) a frontrunner
with regard to its volume of trade
(20% of world trade) and FDI
(22.5% of inflows and 32.5% of
outflows). The liberalisation of cap-
ital markets at the beginning of the
1990s (and the end of the 1980s,
depending on the country) has
obviously played a prominent role
in deepening integration and this is
a new feature of European integra-
tion in the 1990s. It still seems that
most of the trade is concentrated
among industrialised countries
(‘North-north’ type of trade, intra-
industry trade, i.e. trade in similar
products). 
As regards the impact of different
types of trade and factor mobility
on wages, incentives for inter- ver-
sus intra-industry trade include
higher product diversity, and effi-
ciency gains through competition.
Intra-industry trade does not affect
the supply of and demand for fac-
tors, because of similar factor
endowments or due to an increase
in the variety of goods traded, thus
explaining mainly trade among
economies that are similar in terms
of their stage of development;
meanwhile, inter-industry reflects
the predictions of standard trade
model (box 5). Skill upgrading in
the countries of the EU’s main trad-
ing partners will benefit the Union,
as it will be trading similar products
(intra-industry trade) and this
should not affect the supply and
demand for factors, and ultimately
will not affect factor prices.
Adjustment costs in that case are
considered to be much smaller than
those deriving from inter-industry
specialisation. As shown in chart 89,
intra-industry trade characterises
Source: WDI database, World Bank. Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services meas-
ured as a share of gross domestic product. Data from the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files.
29 E.g. in the 1960s the automobile industry feared the development of a new competitor, Japan. 
Chart 88 - Trade (% GDP)
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Box 5 - The two outcome variables - Employment and Wages
Standard trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson theorems) would predict that further integration
of the world economy leads to further inter-industry specialisation and for industrialised countries this means
in relative terms:
- wages: a decrease in wage of the unskilled where less in demand or endowed (if wages are flexible)
- employment: a decrease in employment of the unskilled (if wages are not flexible), by net destruction of jobs
or skill mismatch.
Intra-industry trade: simultaneous imports and exports within the same industries (trade in similar products)
should not lead to major changes in factor prices and adjustment costs are smaller. 
Assessing the impact of trade integration on wages and employment for various sets of ‘industrialised’ coun-
tries (looking at trade between ‘labour-abundant’ and ‘capital-abundant’ countries), it seems that trade inte-
gration matters, but has relatively varied effects depending on the time-period under scrutiny. Overall in the
1980s, negative effects on employment and wages dominate. In the 1990s, however, there were positive labour
market outcomes. The effect on employment variables seems more prominent than the effect on wages.
Adding data on low-skill and high-skilled industries, the negative effect also vanishes in the latter period. The
standard trade Heckscher-Ohlin framework is not backed by sufficient evidence to address the issue in a com-
prehensive way; indeed after trade has been liberalised, labour market changes are essentially caused by tech-
nological change and productivity changes, which makes the issue more complex.
In the European case*, during the period from 1980 to 1989, a negative effect of trade on employment was
observed (inter-industry trade dominates, trade in different products). Then intra-industry trade (trade in simi-
lar products) takes over: the years from 1990 to 1996 witnessed a positive effect on employment; trade in sim-
ilar products, vertical integration of firms and fragmentation of production process,  out sourcing thus trigger-
ing savings and reinvestment of profits in the home country led to  positive outcomes on labour market vari-
ables. Overall, employment effects were larger than the effect on wages.
* Source: Landesmann M., Stehrer R., Leitner S. (2002), Trade liberalisation and labour markets: perspective from OECD
economies, Employment paper 2002/41, ILO.
Source: data from Djablik M. (2004), UN. Data is missing for LU, CY and MT; data starts in 1992 for EE, SI,
LT, LV and 1993 for CZ. 
Note: Intra-industry trade is measured as of % of manufactured products traded with the EU15.
Chart 89 - Intra-industry trade
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European countries, and this should
be a very positive element of
European specialisation.
Hereafter a more specific review of
trade in manufacturing goods,
services, foreign direct investment,
international production patterns –
stress the specific features of the
1990s and the changing environ-
ment of trade relations.
3.2. Manufacturing
The loss of manufacturing jobs has
attracted attention in the EU but
is strikingly higher in the US. After
the recession in early 2000, the US
manufacturing jobs decreased by
7.8%, much more than after the
1990-1991 recession, when they
declined by 2.2%. However the
decline in manufacturing jobs is
not new. During the past fifty
years (between 1950 and 2000),
employment shares declined in
manufacturing and increased in
the services sector both in the EU
and in the US, although there are
slight country specificities: indus-
trial employment shares (in % of
total employment) declined from
33.3% to 21.6% in the US, from
46.5% to 22.8% in the UK, and
from 39% to 27% (somewhat
higher percentage) in France and
Germany (see chapter 3 for more
details on this point).
It is often thought that the very
nature of manufacturing goods
somehow leads to the relocation of
production sites to areas closer to
potential demand and/or where
demand is increasing and in large
numbers (regarding China and
India – the market access argument
and the demographic arguments
are mutually supportive here) and
because demand is largely satisfied
in the EU, US and other ‘developed
economies’ (satiation point). As a
result - many contend - that prod-
uct upgrading, innovation, replace-
ment activities and the expansion
of leisure activities could be the
way out.  The trade balance of the
EU with China, for instance, bears
out the first part of this claim (chart
90), however the market access
argument fares less well. This could
be due, inter alia, to remaining
high trade barriers with China. Con-
sequently, the search for a level-
playing field in the context of trade
relations needs to be accelerated.
As China has joined the World
Trade Organisation, its impact
should be felt rapidly.
It is indeed the structure of manu-
facturing trade that has changed
substantially in the past couple of
decades. Notably the share of elec-
tronics doubled to reach almost one
fourth of the share of world trade
in manufactured goods. Moreover,
developing countries are now net
exporters of manufacturing goods
(especially visible for China; table
-60000000 -50000000 -40000000 -30000000 -20000000 -10000000 0 10000000
ALL PRODUCTS
PRIMARY PRODUCTS
Agricultural products
Mining products
Non-ferrous metals
Energy
Petroleum and petroleum products
Non-agricultural raw materials
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
Machinery
Office/telecom.equipment
Power/non-electrical mach.
Electrical machinery and apparatus
Transport equipment
Automotive products
Chemicals
Medical pharmaceutical products
Plastics
Other manufactured products
Textiles and clothing
Iron and steel
Paper and articles of papers
Non-metal.mineral manuf.
Other products
Chart 90 - EU 25 trade balance with China in 2002 (mio €)
Source: Eurostat. 
Region 1980 1990 2001
Developing countries 13.7 14.4 23.7
CEEs 19.3 8.9 2.7
Developed countries 67.0 76.7 73.6
Western Europe 32.1 34.0 26.2
China 3.9 2.6 7.2
North America 22.1 23.3 30.1
Table 65 - Distribution of world manufacturing 
value-added, at current prices (in %)
Source: UNCTAD
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65), while developed economies have
become net importers of such goods. 
To many, the negative impact of
globalisation on labour markets is
net job destruction, with job
destruction outweighing job cre-
ation, especially in the manufactur-
ing sector.  Indeed, relocation in this
sector has led to heavily localised
job losses, concentrated on specific
types of workers. This conclusion
could easily be reached if the charts
above were considered in isolation
(which illustrates the large trade
deficit of the EU with China and the
changing ‘location’ of the distribu-
tion of value-added for the manu-
facturing sector). 
Behind this conclusion lies the fol-
lowing reasoning about trade liber-
alisation (strictly speaking): low
labour-cost countries exist, labour-
intensive jobs should go to emerg-
ing economies; we then import
labour-intensive goods. Through
this substitution effect, unskilled
labour is presumably ‘destroyed’ in
the home economies. Since the
high-value-added products that we
export to the emerging economies
are not very labour-intensive, the
balance between jobs that are cre-
ated and jobs destructed is obvious-
ly negative. This reasoning is based
on the assumption that an eco-
nomy hosts a fixed amount of jobs
and that whichever job is offshored
is a job destroyed and a lost
employment spell30. In fact, this is
not the way the labour market
works; indeed jobs spells are con-
stantly being created or destroyed
and it is not a fixed amount. 
In addition, not all of the jobs des-
troyed are offshored, since job
destruction is also partly due to
‘restructuring’, brought about by
increases in productivity for
instance31. 
One other underlying assumption
behind fears of massive job losses is
that trade surpluses are ‘good’
while trade deficits are ‘bad’, which
unveils a few remaining misunder-
standings of the mechanisms of
international economics as well as
an over simplistic view of world
trade. For instance, catching-up
economies usually display a current
account deficit, given that they
need to attract foreign capital and
to import investment goods in
order to engage on an upward
investment path. 
As a corollary to increased trade,
countries producing different types
of goods have come across
increased specialisation of produc-
tion. However harmful this process
may seem to the lower-skilled
workers in import-competing sec-
tors, this process has overall led to
more growth through the additional
demand created by the opportunity
offered by trade, to greater prod-
uct diversity (utility gains) and to
increased competitiveness (efficien-
cy gains).
3.3. Services
Increased diversity also plays its part
in the changing aspects of services
which are provided. Increased
demand, driven by increases in
income, then outsourcing opportu-
nities (e.g. services to industry) and
increasing trade in services (in the
international framework for liber-
alising services) are factors that
modify the nature of our ‘service
sector’. This sectoral classification
encompasses more and more
diverse activities. As for the impact
of trade on services, some services
remain non-tradable and therefore
difficult to relocate, while others
can be relocated more easily, both
phenomena coexist. 
Service sector jobs are mostly ‘non-
outsourceable’ and therefore job
creation could gain from focusing
on those jobs that require geo-
graphical proximity. Owing to the
ageing population, job creation will
be increasingly needed in health-
care and personal services
32
- such
jobs can hardly be delocated.
Boosting job creation in high quality
high paying jobs could become a
paramount objective of more
advanced economies, as wages
implicitly contain information
about worker ‘quality’.
Again, when illustrating trade in
services, a very diverse picture
emerges from the chart 91 (%
change in trade in goods and serv-
ices 1997-2002). The EU15 still
exports goods as well as services
and no clear-cut differentiation
can be achieved. Actually services
can differ in their very nature.
Most services trade relates to
tourism (30%), transport (25%),
business services (12%) and finan-
cial services (6%). Trade intensity
of OECD countries is 2 to 7 times
higher in goods than in services33.
This is also due to the non-trad-
able nature of services (a hair-
dresser is less likely to export serv-
ices than an insurance company).
In addition, the influence of geog-
raphy/location and market size may
differ for trade in goods and trade
in services. 
30 The illusion that the output of an economy and, hence the total amount of work available are fixed, is called the 'lump of labour fal-
lacy'. In the past, the most commonly asked question was whether all agricultural jobs would be lost, now it is becoming whether all
manufacturing and service jobs will also be destroyed.  These questions are based on the assumption that the stock of jobs in the
economy is fixed. However, reporting on job destruction (the media is usually less prompt at reporting success stories and job cre-
ation) only feeds into anti-free-trade arguments, and fails to take into account the positive aspects of such dynamics on job creation.
Indeed the worldwide number of jobs is not a fixed amount and the labour market consists of jobs being constantly destroyed and
created.
31 This 'restructuring' trend is beginning to appear in China, incidentally, a note by the Conference board (www.conference-
board.org/utilities/pressDetails.cfm?press_ID=2432) underlines the fact that 'China is losing more manufacturing jobs than the US,
adding service jobs at a rapid pace'. Indeed between 1995 and 2002, China lost 15 million manufacturing jobs, compared with 2 mil-
lion in the US.
32 Such jobs have so far been created more in the public sector. However, incentives are gradually being set across the EU in order to
foster job creation of such services by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs).
33 This is also partly due to the fact that trade in services has not yet been completely liberalised.
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Moreover imported services cannot
substitute services of the same type
of factor. The whole supply chain
could be affected if tasks are imper-
fectly performed in the host coun-
try. Services (traded) are imperfect
substitutes; specific inputs and local
knowledge of markets in both
countries are needed (e.g. airports,
telecom exchange, computers,
tourism, banking, insurance). Such
inputs (including labour) from two
countries need to interact to
engage in trade in services.
Consequently increased trade in
services may lead to a certain
amount of job creation. 
This does not negate the fact that
where services can be easily stan-
dardised, risk of outsourcing and
possibly relocation may also prevail. 
An empirical study for the US has
searched evidence of outsourcing
in services, by examining the rela-
tionship between imports of servic-
es by the US and the international
sourcing of services production
activities using a number of differ-
ent panel data estimators for vari-
ous categories of services
34
. Using
indirect measures of trade in servic-
es, the author shows that interna-
tional in- and outsourcing is taking
place, and that trade substitutes
for investment in local services.
However investment in non-service
sectors is simultaneously found to
stimulate imports of services indi-
cating complementarity at the
aggregate level. Finally there is a
positive effect on the volume of
trade (imports of services increase
from US outward investment in
services), which is consistent with
international insourcing resulting
in the return flow of imports into
the US.  
Overall, the employment composi-
tion of services is diverse: services
require both highly skilled labour
and labour with lower levels of
skills. On the other hand, a growing
number of services, such as child-
care and personal services, lifelong
learning services, cultural services,
social integration services are being
created; such a need for ‘new’ serv-
ices is brought about by new
demand and societal changes. 
(See Chapter 3 of this report which
provides a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the services sector).
34 Van Welsum (2004), In search of outsourcing – evidence from US imports of services, draft, Birkbeck College. 
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Chart 91 - Trade in goods and services (1997-2002)
Source: Eurostat. Note: BLEU stands for Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.
3.4. Foreign Direct Investment
Only in the early 1990s did financial
market liberalisation actually start
to occur; in the EU the Single
Market project drove this process
forward. From then on, its effects
were widely felt and the increase in
FDI bears witness to this develop-
ment. Additional data shows that in
the first half of the 1990s, the eco-
nomic slowdown also translated
into relatively low rates of cross-
border investment flows; however,
after 1995 FDI picked up again. 
Table 66 not only shows the magni-
tude of FDI stocks accumulated in
each of the EU countries with
respect to other ‘global players’,
but it also underlines the fact that
the magnitude of the stocks of FDI
driven by European countries is
considerable. FDI is itself a strong
driver for trade creation and hence
the EU can indeed be attributed a
place in the front seats of the glob-
alisation process.
3.5. Internationalisation of
production
The internationalisation of produc-
tion plays an increasing role in the
global system. One way of ‘evaluat-
ing’ the impact of such a feature is
to acknowledge the activity of for-
eign affiliates of MNCs (multi-
national corporations; table 67) and
to assess their role in the global
economy. While the headquarters
of those MNCs are mostly located in
the EU or North America, employ-
ment of foreign affiliates has
grown in the past few years.
Then at EU level, although not
much data is available, this growing
importance of foreign affiliates
becomes apparent, notably
through its increased impact on
investment and labour productivity.
On average, the number of people
employed per enterprise in foreign-
controlled enterprises is much larg-
er than in nationally controlled
enterprises and labour productivity
(value-added divided by number of
employees) is higher in foreign-con-
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Source: UNCTAD, DITE database. 
Notes: * 2001 data.
Table 66 - FDI stocks as %GDP
1990 2000 2002
Austria Inward 6.1 16.1 20.6
Outward 2.6 13.2 19.5
Belgium and Lux Inward 27.8 79.1 81.8*
Outward 19.4 72.8 72.9*
China Inward 7.0 32.3 36.2
Outward 0.7 2.4 2.9
Cyprus Inward 20.5 44.2 47.7
Outward 0.2 6.0 7.2
Czech Republic Inward 3.9 42.1 54.8
Outward n.a. 1.4 2.1
Denmark Inward 6.9 42.0 41.7
Outward 5.5 41.6 43.4
Estonia Inward n.a. 51.5 65.9
Outward n.a. 5.0 10.5
Finland Inward 3.8 20.2 27.0
Outward 8.2 43.4 52.8
France Inward 7.1 19.9 28.2
Outward 9.1 34.1 45.8
Germany Inward 7.1 25.2 22.7
Outward 8.8 25.9 29.0
Greece Inward 6.7 11.2 9.0
Outward 3.5 5.2 5.3
Hungary Inward 1.7 42.5 38.2
Outward 0.6 4.4 7.3
India Inward 0.5 4.1 5.1
Outward 0.1 0.3 0.5
Ireland Inward 72.3 124.4 129.1
Outward 24.5 29.3 29.9
Italy Inward 5.3 10.5 10.6
Outward 5.2 16.8 16.4
Japan Inward 0.3 1.1 1.5
Outward 6.6 5.8 8.3
Latvia Inward n.a. 29.1 32.4
Outward n.a. 3.4 0.8
Lithuania Inward n.a. 20.9 31.4
Outward n.a. 0.3 0.5
Malta Inward 20.1 83.4 73.8
Outward n.a. 5.7 5.4
Netherlands Inward 23.3 66.7 74.9
Outward 36.3 83.3 84.7
Poland Inward 0.2 21.7 23.9
Outward 0.3 0.7 0.7
Portugal Inward 14.8 26.9 36.0
Outward 1.3 16.2 26.2
Slovakia Inward 0.5 23.6 43.2
Outward n.a. 1.9 1.7
Slovenia Inward 3.5 15.5 23.1
Outward 1.2 4.4 4.8
Spain Inward 12.8 25.8 33.2
Outward 3.0 29.4 33.0
Sweden Inward 5.3 41.0 46.0
Outward 21.3 53.8 60.5
UK Inward 20.6 30.5 40.8
Outward 23.2 63.1 66.1
USA Inward 6.9 12.4 12.9
Outward 7.5 13.2 14.4
trolled enterprises (chart 92) in both
manufacturing and services35. 
3.6. A short run vs. long run story?
However the above-mentioned
characteristics of ‘globalisation’ in
the 1990s, namely increasing FDI
and the activity of MNCs, seem to
increase the feeling of insecurity of
the economic environment. Eco-
nomic insecurity increases with the
globalisation of production
36
.
Particularly at risk are groups of
workers, who are more vulnerable
to change, such as the less skilled,
the less adaptable, those threat-
ened by early retirement, and those
out of the labour force and/or for
whom it is harder to find jobs
again. Globalisation can indeed cre-
ate massive short-term disruptions,
which are widely reported in the
press, such as localised and sudden37
plant closures. 
Short-term effects seem to be fairly
heavily concentrated in a few sec-
tors – at first sight, textiles and
clothing, steel, occasionally the
automobile industry – and have
spread more recently to electron-
ics and digitizable services. Short-
term effects are also strongly
localised. Long-term effects can be
sector-specific as comparative
advantage shifts towards new
industries and activities. However,
it is usually difficult to pinpoint
the long-term effects, which are
more dispersed, such as a general
(across the board) upgrading due
to rising income levels and grow-
ing demands for more diversity
and increased quality of goods
(many European countries have a
comparative advantage in fine
clothing, food, drink, tourism,
etc.). Indeed the benefits from
integration fall on workers as well
as on consumers, the set of work
opportunities changes, and the
consumption set is enlarged.
Increased opportunities in terms
of jobs and increased opportuni-
ties in terms of consumption bun-
dles (varieties) are benefits which
are difficult to perceive, and these
benefits are rarely attributed to
their source.
An open economy leads to costs
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Source: UNCTAD
Indicator 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
Sales 16 10.1 10.9
Gross product 17.3 6.7 7.9
Exports 13.5 7.6 9.6
Employment 5.5 2.9 14.2
Table 67 - Average annual growth rate (in %) in foreign affiliates
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foreign-controlled enterprises nationally-controlled enterprises
Source: Eurostat, NACE C-F. Data for other countries are not available.
Source: Eurostat, NACE G-I, K. (data refer to 2000; the unit is in million €, the
apparent labour productivity reported here is the average value-added per
enterprise in units divided by the number of employed persons per enterprise
in million €;  data for ES is not available)
35 However these differences in labour productivity may also be due to the much larger size of foreign-controlled enterprises, due to the
scale effects.  Data from Eurostat, Statistics in Focus 21/2004, Characteristics of foreign-owned enterprises, by Michaela Schneider.
36 Scheve, K. F. and Slaughter, M. J. (2002), Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production. Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
Working Paper No. 03-09. http://ssrn.com/abstract=386625
37 Only recently, ST Microelectronics announced its decision to leave its French location in Rennes and move to Asia, leaving behind work-
ers that need to find jobs elsewhere or to relocate. Elsewhere, British newspaper the Financial Times reports: 'Companies such as General
Electric or IBM gain many jobs – again, higher-paying headquarters and research jobs – in the US by adding jobs in other countries. Those
jobs outside the US meanwhile both secure market access for goods produced by US companies and increase global demand for these
goods by reducing production costs.' (24/03/2004).
Chart 92 - Labour productivity in manufacturing
Labour productivity in services
 
being concentrated on certain cate-
gories of workers / sectors, while
the benefits of trade liberalisation
are dispersed but are very signifi-
cant in the long term. Again refer-
ring to chapter 2 of this report, the
degree of openness does not per-
manently modify the cost competi-
tiveness but raises the employment
rate. This suggests that the advan-
tages of economic integration are
related not only to increases in
price competition (that moderate
price and wage inflation) but also
to the diffusion of innovation and
knowledge (productivity gains are
transferred in the long term into
higher real wages). ‘Adjustment
costs’ which arise in the short to
medium term, include ‘job losses’ or
‘worker dislocation’ at local, region-
al, national level, depending on the
perspective and size of the conse-
quent ‘adjustment’ which is needed.
In theory and in practice, such costs
are transitory and so far have been
found empirically to be small com-
pared with total changes in eco-
nomic activity38. Although aggre-
gate costs of adjustment may be
relatively small in theory, and at
best quite difficult to measure, no
one would deny that the individual
costs of dislocation or unemploy-
ment are relatively high. There is a
stark contrast and imbalance
between aggregate effects and
individual effects. 
There are concerns and reserva-
tions about the interpretation of
studies on the impacts of globali-
sation on labour markets. The cen-
tral issue is to sort out the long-
term aggregate employment
effect (looking at aggregate out-
come variables) from the short- to
medium-term effects which occur
mostly at sectoral / regional / local
level. Short- and medium-term
challenges with regard to employ-
ment and wage developments are
to be carefully assessed in order to
take account of key facts and
arguments. 
In the long-term, economic theory
and empirical studies predict that
trade openness increases growth
(see chapter 2), but empirical
attempts to test this hypothesis
hinge upon methodological issues,
notably the endogeneity bias, as
trade policy is endogenous to eco-
nomic performance and the issue
of omitted variables, notably well-
functioning institutions that could
also be strong drivers of economic
growth
39
. Nevertheless trade and
growth are intrinsically related
through the driving mechanism of
specialisation, especially for smaller
countries
40
. 
However, overlaps between struc-
tural change (a combination of
changing demand patterns and
technological change) and trade
liberalisation (or further globalisa-
tion) seem not to have been taken
into account. Both trends are con-
comitant, and the consequences
of each phenomenon overlaps
with the other, creating confusion
and misunderstanding; since
employment and wages are
endogenous, it is quite difficult to
assess which job losses are caused
by ‘restructuring’ and which are
caused by ‘globalisation’ per se. 
Policy makers should therefore 
be concerned about short-term
adjustment costs, for the very rea-
son that it takes time to reap the
benefits of international trade41;
however the medium- to long-
term gains from trade are solid
grounds on which the longer-term
policy perspective should build. This
longer term perspective is reflected
in the European Construction (the
principles of a market economy and
free competition are deeply
enshrined in the articles of the
founding Treaties
42
) and in the mul-
tilateral trading system. 
In this section, we have illustrated
the fact that the nature of interna-
tional exchange has been tremen-
dously altered in the 1990s, gradu-
ally shifting away from mere trade
in goods and moving towards
much more complex links between
the economies. There is much more
to ‘globalisation’ than just trade
opening and that the long-term
perspective must be adopted while
discussing such an issue. 
4. Regional
integration and
labour markets
Regional integration as a regulat-
ing device responding to pressure
from globalisation.
It is clear, when examining broad
trade indicators, that the world has
become more global in the 1990s
compared to the 1980s for instance
(chart 93). At individual country
level, dependency on trade has
increased and at European level
both trade in goods and services -
and FDI flows - have increased sub-
stantially. The magnitude and
nature of intra-European trade will
be illustrated in the next section. 
As a starting point, chart 93 illus-
trates the changes that occurred in
Europe in the Nineties compared to
the Eighties. The opening up of
Eastern and Central Europe in the
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38 Klein, Schuh, Triest, 2003, Job creation, job destruction and international competition, the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
39 See Theo Eicher. The OLS estimator used in earlier studies is biased in such cases, therefore the relationship between openness and
growth often vanishes once all the appropriate control variables are integrated into the modelling strategy. Attempts have been
made to develop methodologies to test the growth-trade nexus avoiding the endogeneity problem, among them, A. K. Fosu (1996),
Primary exports and economic growth in developing countries, the World Economy, vol. 19, n°4, pp. 465-475. However the aim of this
chapter is not in any way to cover the whole debate of trade and growth. See also http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10244.pdf, Fooling
ourselves: evaluating the globalisation and growth debate, Hallak J.C.,  Levinsohn J. (2004). 
40 On the questioning of economists regarding the sources of growth and prosperity: Easterly W. ((2002), The Elusive Quest for Growth,
MIT Press, 332 p.
41 Davidson C., Matusz D.  (2002), Globalisation, Employment and Income, Analysing the Adjustment Process, in Trade, Investment,
Migration and Labour Market Adjustment. D. Greenaway, R. Upward, and K. Wakelin eds., Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 66-92.
42 Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992.
 
Nineties subsequent to the Europe
Agreements is obviously an impor-
tant part of the story but overall it
seems that Europe has especially
intensified its role as a major trad-
ing partner. 
The EU is undeniably a driving force
for globalisation and such a promi-
nent role naturally confers upon it a
responsibility to contribute to ‘bet-
ter governance’ of globalisation. All
the more since the EU is a unique
experiment, in the sense that some
competencies have been trans-
ferred to the ‘supra-national’ level.
As global phenomena lie by nature
beyond the realm of strictly nation-
al policies, it seems that the EU has
the lead in terms of the mecha-
nisms of governance it creates. 
4.1. Regional integration, 
a mini-globalisation’
European integration could be
thought of as a laboratory experi-
ment, a ‘mini-globalisation’ given
that it displays all the features of
this complex process. For 50 years,
European policy makers have liber-
alised the internal market and
freed the movement of factors
within the EU, but this has not trans-
lated into more labour mobility. The
access to EU labour markets is still
not guaranteed in all EU15 for
workers coming from the NMS,
although this would be a logical
move towards a more efficient and
equitable economic integration
process. 
An additional phase of the EU’s
enlargement was completed on 
1 May 2004, this very recent devel-
opment will be taken as an exam-
ple of the ‘integration’ process in
the following paragraphs, in order
to illustrate what ‘further integra-
tion’ entails. (In this section, and for
the sake of the example, we con-
sciously distinguish between EU15
and NMS). However de facto, trade
liberalisation (in industrial goods)
with the NMS had already occurred
to a large extent since the opening
up of these countries in 1990. The
overall macroeconomic impact is
likely to be positive, but small in the
short term. Some 75 million poten-
tial consumers have been added to
the EU15’s internal demand in one
go, representing a positive poten-
tial demand shock at the macroeco-
nomic level and benefiting all 
EU exporters (table 68). Moreover
demand for ‘more sophisticated’
goods is expected to grow as pur-
chasing power in the NMS increases
in the coming years.  Nonetheless
the share of NMS in EU trade is
small (chart 94) so the overall effect
of their integration will not be
huge43. There are also likely to be
winners and losers from this inte-
gration process in specific regions
or sectors. One of the policy chal-
lenges of enlargement is to find
ways of compensating those who
will lose out without burdening
others too heavily.  
An enlarged internal market should
boost economic growth in the NMS
and this effect will eventually be
transmitted EU-wide44. This should
be good news for businesses, as
larger markets and lower costs usu-
ally offset potential competitive
threats; indeed, in many NMS, local
industry is partly owned or operated
by Western businesses (through for-
eign direct investment, mergers and
acquisitions, joint ventures, etc.).
During the run-up to the EU’s
enlargement on 1 May 2004, the
impact of enlargement on Eur-
opean labour markets was meas-
ured. On the whole for the 10 new
countries ‘a noticeable impact of
their integration on the prices and
goods, and hence on wages and
employment, is limited to only a
few sectors in a few regions.’
45
However, the potential growth in
trade with the EU is large. Indeed
the EU15 currently runs a trade sur-
plus with the NMS, which is likely to
raise employment and wages of
employees in the exporting sec-
tors46. Imports from the NMS remain
low because of the lower quality of
products, not yet fully tailored to
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43 The impact of Eastern enlargement on Employment and labour markets in the EU Member States, (2001), by the European
Integration Consortium  (CEPR,  DIW, FIEF, IAS, IGIER)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm
44 This transmission effect works through the traditional demand channel.
45 The impact of Eastern enlargement on Employment and labour markets in the EU Member States,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm
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Western European demand.
Nevertheless the NMS are expected
to progressively catch up with their
trade growth potential. 
Last but not least, as illustrated by
chart 95, integration is a move
which matters enormously from the
NMS’s perspective. Indeed, if they
represent only a small share of
trade compared to the EU15, for
the NMS, the EU25 is paramount
and the ‘internal market’ is the first
import and export market for their
goods.
4.2. Changing specialisation
patterns
Two very different outcomes could
emerge in the enlarged EU: either
the NMS develop those sectors that
are progressively being abandoned
by the EU15, or the NMS move
quickly to a ‘modern’ economic
structure and those activities are
further shared with developing or
emerging economies (provided
product markets are opened
accordingly).
In this respect European integration
can be thought of as a ‘mini-global-
isation’. Thus if the macroeconomic
situation improves steadily and liv-
ing standards (and wages) catch up
with the former EU15, then what is
perceived as a negative conse-
quence of globalisation namely ‘the
competitive threat’ should diminish
over time. At the same time, since
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46 Even though so far in the NMS an increase in export growth has not necessarily improved the employment situation, e.g. the Polish
case, this may happen in the short-term. In the long-term though, one would expect increased trade to increase employment
growth.
Source : Eurostat, Ameco. *EU-15 = 100. Data is mostly for the year 2002 since there were missing observations for 2003.
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Chart 94 - Share of the NMS’ trade in the EU15’s total trade (%)
Total 
population in 
2004 (Mio)
GDP in 2002 
(bn euros)
Real GDP 
per capita 
(PPS)*
Annual growth
of GDP 
(2003/2002)
% Gross Value 
Added in 
Agriculture
% Gross Value
Added in
Industry
% Gross Value
Added in
Services
EU-25 455 9,613 91 0.5 2.1 27.2 70.7
EU-15 381 9,169 100 0.4 2 27 71
CZ 10.2 78 62 3.4 3.2 37.3 59.5
EE 1.3 7 40 4.6 5.4 29.3 65.3
CY 0.7 11 77 2.2 4.1 20.3 75.6
HU 2.3 9 35 7.3 4.7 24.7 70.6
LV 3.4 15 39 8.8 7.1 30.5 62.4
LT 10.1 69 53 2.9 3.7 30.7 65.6
MT 0.4 4 69 1.9 2.8 28.1 69.1
PL 38.2 202 41 3.9 3.1 30 66.9
SK 2 23 69 2.3 3 35.2 61.8
SI 5.4 26 47 4.2 4.4 31.1 64.5
Table 68 - Comparative indicators 
 
the NMS only represent 5% of the
EU total aggregate GDP, the posi-
tive effect is likely to be small at the
aggregate EU level and will largely
go unnoticed
47
. However for indi-
vidual NMS this positive effect of
integration are potentially very
large.
The EU15 are expected to lose part
of their ‘traditional activities’,
although it is unlikely that they will
disappear completely since every
segment of production has to be
taken into account while assessing
the capacity of goods to export and
compete internationally. Such a
process is part of the ‘natural’
upgrading of the production
process, as know-how is accumulated
and the segment becomes more
competitive. Some of these activi-
ties could move to the NMS and
would increase the number of higher
skilled jobs there, thus triggering a
progressive upgrading of their pro-
duction or some of them could
even move to countries that are not
part of the EU. Restructuring in the
EU15 and the NMS is an ongoing
process and in a broad sense – activ-
ities have already ‘shifted’ towards
a modern industrialised structure;
in a way, economies are in perpetual
‘transition’. However, the share of
services in gross value-added
remains somewhat lower in the
NMS than that in the EU15. This
automatically increases the ‘dissimi-
larity’ or the ‘diversity’ between
economic structures of NMS with
respect to the EU15 (table 69).
Growing disparities also show in
the field of labour markets, as doc-
umented in the chapter on candi-
date countries in Employment in
Europe 2002. 
There are clear imbalances
between the shares of employment
and value-added across sectors,
notably in agriculture for Poland,
Latvia, Lithuania, and to some
extent in Slovenia pointing to
expected improvements in terms of
productivity. In essence, the magni-
tude of changes that were
achieved in agriculture between
1990 and 2002 is large, in terms of
the contribution to value-added,
but - as illustrated in the last col-
umn of  table 69 - this did not nec-
essarily translate into comparable
changes in terms of employment.
Even in industry, if we take the
EU15 as a benchmark, value-added
in industry is higher than the share
of employment in industry; this is
not necessarily the case for the NMS,
e.g. the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. According to this reading
of the table, Hungary and Slovakia
for instance seems to come closer to
EU15 structures. The Czech Republic
for instance clearly has a potential to
restructure further. However, these
observations disregard the variabili-
ty in employment rates. In addition,
the magnitude of the difference in
the contribution of industry to total
value-added (5 to 10 percentage
points higher in NMS than in the
EU15) suggests that further restruc-
turing is foreseeable. One could also
argue that some countries within
the EU25 will retain more features
of an ‘industrialised economic struc-
ture’ while others will display pre-
dominantly the distinctive features
of ‘service-led economies’. 
In employment terms, figures for
employment as a percentage of the
working age population clearly indi-
cate that the full potential labour
supply is not participating actively in
economic activity. This observation is
also valid for the EU15. Differences
seem to follow suit in the composi-
tion of the workforce itself.
The pie charts (chart 96) point to the
fact that the skill structure in NMS is
more polarised than in the existing
MS and that ‘non-manual’ groups
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http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm
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seem to be underrepresented.
Indeed the share of non-manual
workers amounts to 64% of the total
employed in the EU15 while to only
48% in the NMS. Together with the
fact that the unskilled have suffered
most from the loss of employment,
this suggests that there is room for
structural upgrading, notably for the
high-skilled and mid-skilled, com-
pared to other MS.
Table 70 relates products to their
technological content as classified by
the OECD: low technological content
(LT), medium-low technological con-
tent (MLT), medium high technolog-
ical content (MHT), or high techno-
logical content (HT).
From table 70, and bearing in mind
that overall the EU15 had a trade
surplus with the NMS, it seems that
the products which make up this
surplus are processed and require
on average higher technology con-
tent than the products imported
from the NMS
48
. 
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48 This confirms previous arguments on intra-industry trade within the EU (see section 2.1). 
Source: Eurostat, QLFD, annual average, 5/8/2004
Note: latest data for CY 2000.
Source: Eurostat for the data and ranking, and OECD’s main industrial indicators.
Table 70 - Main exports from the NMS to the EU15 and from the EU15 to the NMS
Main exports from the NMS to the EU15 Main exports from the EU15 to the NMS
1 furniture, bedding, lamps etc LT computers, machinery, turbo-jets, nucl.reactors…. HT
2 wood and articles of wood LT plastics and articles thereof MLT
3 men's apparel articles etc MLT pharmaceutical products HT
4 energy MLT motor cars, vehicles, except railway, prts MHT
5 women's apparel articles etc MLT paper & paperboard etc LT
6 rubber and articles thereof MLT miscellaneous chemical products MHT
7 textile art; needlecraft sets; worn text art LT tanning & dye ext etc; dye, paint, putty etc; inks MLT
8 aluminum and articles thereof MLT optic, photo, medic instrments etc HT
9 railway or tramway stock etc; traffic signal equipment MLT essential oils etc; perfumery, cosmetic etc preps HT
10 organic chemicals MHT impregnated etc text fabrics; tex art for industry LT
11 fertilizers MLT raw hides and skins (no furskins) and leather LT
12 footwear, gaiters etc. and parts thereof LT manmade staple fibers, incl yarns & woven fabrics LT
13 telecom, tv and sound equip HT aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof HT
14 meat and edible meat offal LT cotton, including yarn and woven fabric thereof LT
15 articles of iron or steel MLT miscellaneous articles of base metal MLT
Gross Value-Added (% GDP) agriculture industry services
EU-15 2.5 27.8 69.8
CZ 5.6 37.0 57.4
EE 5.8 33.4 60.9
CY 4.4 20.1 75.5
LV 7.5 32.3 58.5
LT 8.9 34.8 56.3
HU 5.4 34.8 59.6
PL 2.0 36.9 57.6
SI 3.3 39.4 57.3
SK 5.4 31.6 63.0
Table 69 - Structure of employment and value-added 
Employment 
(% of total employment)
Employment 
(% of population aged 15-64)
agriculture industry services agriculture industry services
EU15 4.1 25.0 70.9 2.6 15.9 45.0
CZ 4.8 39.7 55.5 3.1 25.8 36.1
EE 6.9 31.2 61.9 4.2 18.9 37.4
CY 9.1 20.7 70.2 6.0 13.6 46.1
LV 15.1 24.4 60.5 8.7 14.0 34.8
LT 17.6 27.4 54.9 10.4 16.2 32.4
HU 6.2 34.1 59.7 3.5 19.2 33.6
PL 19.3 28.6 52.0 10.6 15.7 28.6
SI 11.2 37.5 51.4 7.0 23.6 32.3
SK 5.0 34.5 60.5 2.8 19.6 34.3
Source: Eurostat , data for 2002.
Research results show that the
most advanced of the NMS
already display shares of intra-
industry trade comparable to
those of Italy, Spain or Sweden49
(chart 89). European integration
was accompanied by sharp
increases in intra-industry trade. A
thorough study of intra-European
trade flows suggests that intra-
industry trade in qualities (differ-
ent quality segments) has
increased and that a qualitative
division of labour has emerged in
the EU, with some countries spe-
cialising in up-market products,
and others on the low- and medi-
um- quality products. This analysis
is confirmed by an analysis of mar-
ket shares
50
, which shows that the
EU-integration move has already
gone hand in hand with increased
trade in similar products but dif-
ferent quality segments. This is
good news for labour market out-
comes as stressed in this chapter’s
previous section, as well as for
guaranteeing that industrial activ-
ities will not disappear from the
European landscape. Indeed this
type of analysis shows that, condi-
tional on the EU’s capacity to bene-
fit from growth in third countries
and on continuous upgrading, both
industrial and service activities can
be maintained within the EU.
In the 1990s, countries that have
experienced evident increases in
intra-industry trade with the EU15
are the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Estonia and to some extent
Slovenia and Lithuania, thus
enhancing the EU’s long-term
growth potential. However one
should note that inter-industry
trade remains a characteristic of
trade with some other NMS51,
which indeed could hurt the
unskilled. At the same time, the
share of trade with other transition
and developing countries is signifi-
cantly lower. Hence it seems that
trade in similar goods is increasing
with the NMS while trade in differ-
ent types of goods is still predomi-
nant in trade with other transition
and developing countries
52
. 
In a report on the location of
European industry53, specialisation
indices show the growing diver-
gence in the EU’s production struc-
tures. This trend will continue with
further enlargement of the Union.
The report shows that 20% of this
increased specialisation is due to the
amplification of initial cross-country
differences in production structures,
while 80% is due to what the
authors call ‘differential change’,
meaning that countries move in and
out of an industry (which could also
be a definition of ‘restructuring’). 
In the aforementioned report on
the impact of EU enlargement on
labour markets, the authors com-
pare the revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) of the EU15 rela-
tive to the NMS of Central and
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49 Fidrmuc, Djablik (2003), Intraindustry trade between the EU and CEECs, OENB. The authors use the Grubel-Lloyd index of intraindus-
try trade (Grubel, Lloyd, 1971) which represents the share of the absoplute value of intraindustry trade in trade turnover. An index
value of 0 shows that there is exclusive inter-industry trade (i.e. complete specialisation on different products for each country), while
an index of 1 indicates complete intraindustry trade (i.e. countries exclusively trade similar products). They show for instance that
intraindustry trade can be taken into consideration while assessing convergence between catching up economies and more developed
countries. They also hint towards the specialisation of NMS in lower quality segments of products.
50 Fontagné L. (1997), Trade patterns inside the Single Market, CEPII working paper.
51 The impact of Eastern European Enlargement on the Labour markets of the EU Member States (2001) Report for the European
Commission's DG Employment and Social Affairs, by the European Integration Consortium (CEPR, DIW, FIEF, IAS, IGIER).
52 This analysis is confirmed by a very recent study by the CEPII-CIREM, which was commissioned by DG Trade of the European
Commission. The report, by Fontagné L. et alii (July 2004), European industry's place in the international division of labour: situation
and prospects, rests upon an analysis of market shares and sectors.
53 Mindelfart-Knarvik et ali, The Location of European Industry (2000), report prepared for the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs,
European Commission.
Source: Vienna Institute for International Studies (WIIW) data.
Chart 96 - Distribution of employment by skill (2003)
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Eastern Europe. The RCA is computed
as the share of a given sector in
national exports over the share of
that sector in world exports. 
For the NMS, analysis of RCAs con-
firms that the NMS have high and
increasing comparative advantage
in shipbuilding, basic metal industry
(iron and steel) and to a lesser
extent in textiles, clothing and
footwear (the last section of this
chapter shows similar findings in
terms of employment trends)
54
with
respect to the EU15. The EU15’s
RCA markedly stems from high R&D
intensive industries (pharmaceuti-
cals, computers), industries with a
high degree of product differentia-
tion and scale- and capital-intensive
industries (chemicals, rubber and
plastic, motor vehicles), although
this RCA is on a slowly declining
trend. 
The pivotal question is which sec-
tors stand to benefit or lose. Trade
was initially characterised by
marked but declining differences in
inter-industry specialisation (lead-
ing to trade in different types of
goods). Now, a strong increase in
intra-industry trade within same
product categories is taking place
and more intra-industry trade is, in
theory, neutral to relative factor
prices55. However, empirically, the
factor content of traded goods can
differ considerably even within the
same commodity groups or indus-
tries. For NMS, declining differences
in inter-industry specialisation go
hand-in-hand with a vertical spe-
cialisation in different quality and
price segments of specific markets.
These differences in product quality
correspond to differences in the
factor content of trade so they
should have the same impact as
inter-industry trade.
56
Ultimately
this should put pressure on certain
groups of workers (among the
unskilled).
However, the main limitation of the
factor content analysis of trade
(import and exports) is that it does
not take into account the pressure
towards further specialisation
which derives from international
trade and notably does not account
for the change in prices (i.e. the
framework of analysis is static).
Analysis carried out for France57
shows that in 1978-1990 the bal-
ance for employment is negative,
whilst 1990-1997 the balance turns
positive (and benefits both the
skilled and the unskilled). Over a
20-year period, trade liberalisation
seems to have been labour neutral. 
Given the patterns of specialisation
displayed by the EU it seems that
increased diversity of production
structures could mitigate the
impact of globalised trade flows.
This is precisely the result that one
would derive from trade theory.
Differences in factor endowments
(types of labour by skills for
instance) may trigger the specialisa-
tion of EU15 and NMS in different
price and quality segments, leading
to increases in real income of all
factors in the EU and NMS, given
that so far we know little about the
substitutability of goods produced
on both sides, but – from the above
- it is likely that they are weak sub-
stitutes. In the course of ‘catching
up’, upgrading of products should
occur and intra-industry trade
develop thus limiting further the
extent of the impact on wages and
employment. In some cases, EU
enlargement could even slow down
the tendency for activities to be
relocated outside the EU in the
medium term. With an increase in
the diversity of production struc-
tures and product variety/segments,
trade in low-skilled goods tends to
be diverted from outside to within
the EU boundaries (this was sup-
ported by the aforementioned
report on EU enlargement), and
therefore within-EU relocations
become ‘internal mobility of pro-
duction units’. 
So far, it seems that overall gains
from trade integration were
reaped by the EU15. Public opinion
shows some concern about the
pace of integration with the NMS,
namely wider differences in pro-
duction structures should trigger
further and maybe more rapid
changes in the production and
employment structures. Will this
lead to larger adjustment costs
than during past episodes of EU
integration? This remains an open
question.
4.3. The role of Foreign Direct
Investment 
FDI flows between EU Member
States (intra-EU FDI) rose by 13% in
2002 whereas extra-EU FDI con-
tracted (minus 49% in 2002 com-
pared to 2001). In the late 1990s
and beginning of 2000 intra-EU FDI
stocks increased tremendously
58
.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
plays a double role in the NMS,
increasing the investment rate and
thus growth of GDP and ultimately
employment quite visibly, as well as
triggering the transfer of know-
how, skills and technology; the
more so as FDI in the NMS of
Central Europe do not seem to have
substituted for exports and thus
should not harm employment
59
. The
differentiated overview of FDI has
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54 Conversely the EU15 has a RCA in food and agriculture, the RCA in agriculture is slightly artificial since it relies heavily on the high
level of policy intervention. Source: The impact of Eastern enlargement on Employment and labour markets in the EU Member States,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm
55 as demonstrated in textbooks by Helpman and Krugman.
56 – confirming standard trade predictions between labour-intensive and human-capital intensive sectors.
57 Guimbert S., Lévy-Bruhl F. (2002), La situation de l'emploi en France face aux échanges internationaux, Economie et Prévision, n°152-
153, pp. 189-206.
58 Statistics in focus, EU15 FDI in 2002, March 2004.
59 Di Mauro F. (2000), Economic integration between the EU and the CEECs: a sectoral study', CEPS a,d ULB,
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2000/Papers/diMauro.pdf, gives a comprehensive account of the redirection of trade and FDI in the 1990s
for the NMS.
implications for the labour market,
such as labour demand pressures
for certain categories of skills,
notably relatively high skilled work-
ers. The scope for increasing FDI in
higher-skill activities is still large. So
far, FDI has had a direct employ-
ment effect in the NMS as the affil-
iates of MNCs (multinational corpo-
rations) create jobs or continue to
employ workers of previous compa-
nies in the host country (or have
directly contributed to the privati-
sation process), which has an unam-
biguously positive employment
effect in the host country and acts
as a catalyst for growth.
Since FDI was mostly seen as a cata-
lyst for restructuring in the NMS,
with investors flowing into the NMS
already in the early 1990s, the
effect of FDI inflows into the NMS
could potentially act as a signal
indicating the rate at which the
States are restructuring. However
the effects of FDI are most felt in
border regions such as the
Bratislava/Vienna region (Eastern
Austria altogether) or the
Finnish/Estonian border, where
potential gains to be reaped from
integration are particularly high60.
Again NMS remain too small to
affect factor rewards and EU-wide
factor prices. Crowding-out of
investments within the EU15 is neg-
ligible. Market-seeking investments
complement rather than substitute
for trade, as FDI raises the added
value of parent companies in their
home countries. FDI reinforces the
specialisation pattern across the
EU25 and hence the specialisation
in human-capital-intensive or labour-
intensive activities. Consequently, FDI
increases trade in intermediate
goods and services (through vertical
integration) and within industries
and firms – however, such effects
are concentrated in a few sectors at
present (electrical and other
machinery, measuring instruments,
rubber and plastic products, and
other transport equipment). 
FDI increases the capital endow-
ment of NMS and also expected
growth through technology trans-
fers, transfers of know-how,
knowledge and human capital.
FDI affects the change in relative
wages in NMS rather than in the
EU15.
Several studies on MNCs and affil-
iates of foreign companies show
that relative wages (in line with
productivity levels) and skill levels
are higher relative to workers’
wages in ‘local’ companies. Wages
are indeed 20 to 30% above aver-
age, which suggests that FDI may
increase wages for skilled labour
relative to unskilled labour in the
NMS and thereby reduce the
incentives for migration by skilled
workers out of the NMS. MNCs,
which are usually large compa-
nies, are especially more produc-
tive in manufacturing industries
in the EU
61
. The investment that
MNCs are able to leverage per
person employed, as they are fre-
quently able to raise capital more
easily, feeds positively into the
host countries.
Although FDI illustrates the growing
interdependence between Western
European economies and the NMS,
the presence of FDI remains uneven
across Central and Eastern Europe
(chart 97). Hence it is assumed that
the role it performs in the upgrading
process will also be uneven, unless
investment patterns change and also
move up the ‘quality ladder’.
Manufacturing industry has been an
important target of FDI (attracting
nearly half of total FDI), but further
disaggregation shows that FDI is
attracted in the medium/high-tech
branches
62
, therefore helping certain
branches to upgrade the productivi-
ty and quality, and ultimately their
export performance. 
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60 Vienna Institute for International Studies (WIIW) report for DG Employment and Social Affairs and conference presentations,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm
61 Statistics in Focus 21/2004, Characteristics of foreign-owned enterprises, by Michaela Schneider. 
62 See WIIW Structural Report 2003 on Central and Eastern Europe, October 2003.
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Source: Eurostat.
Note 1: the scale of this graph has been modified in order to be meaningful, however
it should be noted that for BLEU (Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union) the actual figure
for 2002 is 51.4. 
Note 2: FDI intensity is a structural indicator and it is measured as the average value of
inflows and outflows of FDI over GDP times 100.
Chart 97 - FDI intensity
The increased diffusion of techno-
logical change (notably ICT; table
71), which is the main internal driv-
er to growth, increases sectoral
reallocations and, as such, can be
viewed as a channel through
which globalisation has an impact
on the economy.
NMS will move more rapidly to a
‘modern production’ pattern (i.e.
services-driven), which will proba-
bly follow increased demand (i.e.
potential changes in consumer
behaviour as illustrated in table 71)
but there is still a large market
potential.  NMS within the EU25 are
moving fast towards service-led
post-industrial economies. Some
are already there, while for others,
more time is needed (PL, LT) and
wages should slowly increase
alongside.
Overall, economies that are catch-
ing-up should experience large
increases in FDI thus triggering an
upgrading of their products and
labour force. This is what happened
in the NMS in the 1990s with no
major labour market impact on
Western European labour markets
and this is what could happen now
with China and India as well, albeit
to a lesser extent in view of chart
98, in which FDI as a percentage of
gross fixed capital formation can be
interpreted as the ‘degree of open-
ness’ of a country63.
Changes of employment by skill cat-
egory (chart 99) are consistent with
this picture of catching-up econo-
mies and qualitative upgrading.
Indeed, the NMS differ most from
the largest EU15 with respect to the
reduction in low-skilled manual
labour and the increase in the low-
skilled non-manual labour over the
period 1997 to 2003
64
. 
Some regions are catching up in
terms of industrial upgrading; they
are successful in attracting FDI,
while other regions are locked in
low-skill areas, with low shares of
well-educated people. 
Differentiation across countries and
regions constitutes a real challenge
and will have implications on cohe-
sion of the EU25.
Given the modest share of exports
from foreign MNCs based in the
NMS, table 72 suggests that most
MNCs enter the NMS in order to
gain market access (not necessarily
seeking lower labour costs) and
supply internal demand (not
intended for the processing of
intermediate inputs to be directly
re-exported). In the opposite case, a
larger proportion of exports would
be observed. Comparing table 72 to
Eurostat data on employment in
foreign-owned enterprises for EU
countries65, a rough conclusion
would be that Slovenia is closely in
line with Western Europe in terms
of the activity of the MNCs that
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Chart 98 - FDI (% of capital formation)
Number of 
cars per 
100 inhabitants
Number of
mobile 
phones per 
100 inhabitants
Number of 
personal compu-
ters per 100 
inhabitants
Number of inter-
net users per 100 
inhabitants
EU25 46 74 31 33
EU15 49 78 34 36
CZ 34 84 18 26
EE 30 65 21 33
CY 37 58 27 9
HU 25 39 17 13
LV 33 47 11 14
LT 24 68 11 16
MT 50 70 26 21
PL 27 36 11 23
SK 44 77 30 38
SI 24 54 18 16
Table 71 - Indicators of technological change
Source: Eurostat, Newcronos, April 2004.
63 Here one should note nevertheless, that FDI inflows in 'less developed economies' can have a negative impact, namely they might
substitute foreign for national capital and also increase the dependence of the economy on foreign capital (risk of reversal of capital
flows is present especially in less stable economic and political environments). 
64 In this chart we look at the change in the structure of skills in the EU15 and in the NMS, whereas the pie-charts displayed earlier-on
in this chapter display the distribution of skills in 2003 only. The comparative change enables to show which kinds of skills are actu-
ally 'catching-up' or in demand in the NMS in particular. 
65 Eurostat, Statistics in focus, op. cit.
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have invested there whereas in the
three other NMS there is still scope
for foreign involvement, which
should progressively occur as pro-
duction structures evolve. In terms
of employment, the situation is
diverse. Even though data are avail-
able only for four countries, it
seems that employment in foreign
affiliates represents quite a variable
share of employment in the NMS,
thus FDI has a differential impact
depending on the percentage of
workers involved.
In terms of the structure of trade of
foreign affiliates based in the NMS,
in Hungary in 2000, 67.1% of the
trade of affiliates of foreign MNCs
were directed towards the EU and
14.6% towards other NMS. For
Hungary and the Czech Republic
66
data strongly suggest  that FDI from
foreign companies is concentrated
in specific industries such as motor
vehicles, electronic equipment (for
the industrial sectors) and telecoms
and distributive trade in the tertiary
sector. Data on several dimensions
of FDI was gathered by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) for several
of the NMS, the concentration of
affiliates of MNCs can be found in
the manufacturing and tertiary sec-
tors essentially and a striking aspect
is that exports of affiliates of for-
eign MNCs are heavily concentrated
in manufacturing (83.2% in 1999
for the Czech Republic, 85.4% in
2000 for Slovenia and 91.9% in
2000 for Poland)67.
Economies that are catching-up
need to and should experience large
increases in FDI that trigger the
upgrading of their production and
labour force. This process took place
in the NMS in the 1990s, for
instance, and such changes were
found not to have a major impact on
Western European labour markets.
4.4. Too small to matter?
Since the early 1990s the ‘Europe
Agreements’ have provided the
institutional framework for bilateral
trade relations between the EU and
countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Already 70% of NMS’s
exports are directed to the EU15 and
growth remains strong compared to
the EU15. Similarly the EU’s trade
with the NMS grew steadily in the
last decade, already reaping the
major part of the benefits from
trade liberalisation. Altogether the
EU has a high trade surplus with the
NMS. The NMS are catching up,
therefore they need capital inflows
and import investment goods, which
shows up as a current account
deficit, but this should not be a
source of concern as long as the
catch-up is under way. 
The trade implications of EU
enlargement at a very aggregate
level seem to point to little differ-
ences in trade terms between the
former EU15 and the EU25 (table
73, chart 100).
In the aforementioned report
68
, the
authors adopt an 'intra-EU' per-
spective and assess the impact of EU
enlargement on trade in goods and
services within the Union. Accord-
ing to the report, enlargement has
provided the NMS with a huge
stimulus for economic reform. 
66 UNCTAD data, country profiles on www.unctad.org.
67 Further details on the profits, value-added and structure of trade of foreign MNCs in the NMS as well as in the EU15 can be found on
the above-mentioned UNCTAD website
68 The impact of Eastern enlargement on Employment and labour markets in the EU Member States, 
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm.
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Chart 99 - Comparative change in the structure of skills (1997-2003)
Affiliates 
of foreign MNCs 
Employment 
in foreign affiliates 
as % of total 
CZ Employment 1999 469,800 10%
HU Employment 2000 606,749 15.85%
PL Employment 2000 648,323 4%
SI Employment 2000 46,775 5%
Table 72 - Employment in foreign affiliates (selected NMS)
Source: Unctad, DITE and Eurostat QLFD data.
In theory, for integration to matter,
size is critical: taking into account
trade in goods and services, the
integration of NMS has no impact
on wages and employment of the
EU15 if other countries outside the
EU15 remain marginal suppliers in
the respective markets (since the
‘trade diversion’ impact –conse-
quent to integration - is too small). 
Empirical findings confirm the fact
that NMS are too small to have an
impact on wages, labour mobility
employment and unemployment
risks EU-wide. However, effects are
felt more strongly in some sectors
(as mentioned earlier in the chap-
ter), because trade has increased
most in these sectors and NMS are
becoming larger players in these
specific markets or even market
segments. There is a clear trend
towards specialisation of EU15 in
capital and human-capital intensive
goods, whereas the NMS still tend
towards labour-intensive produc-
tion processes.
Conversely, in physical-capital inten-
sive and human-capital intensive
industries, large export surpluses
from the EU15 bear witness to the
difference in specialisation and
largely ‘compensate’ for competi-
tive threats in more specific sectors.
Trade creation outweighs the nega-
tive effects of trade diversion in a
longer term perspective. The vast
majority of FDI is driven by market
access. Crucial to MNCs in the 1990s
was to gain first-mover advantage;
this relates to the timing of off-
shoring, and means that it is essen-
tial to enter a market first, before
the competitors flow in. Once the
market has been entered though,
‘clustering forces’ can continue to
attract enterprises who wish to
benefit from spillover effects. 
The successive waves of enlarge-
ment have widened the scope of
intra-European trade and, as such,
have triggered structural change. 
From the early 1980s onwards the
industrial structures of the EU
economies have become more
diverse. Standard and new trade
theories alike have predicted this
move as a consequence of further
economic integration. It is a long-
lasting process (similar to overall
structural change). Strong drivers
for specialisation are inherent to
economies. Specialisation led grad-
ually to product diversification.
Studying the concentration or dis-
persion of activities reveals no clear
pattern, because inter- and intra-
industry trade coexist. Increasing
diversity of the economic structure
and integration of the EU should
become an advantage since it may
well cushion the effects of adverse
asymmetric shocks by spreading the
risks across the area. In addition,
increased demand in the EU25,
brought about by the gradual inte-
gration of countries of East and
Central Europe and the subsequent
enlargement of the EU, together
with continuous product upgrading
and diversification (across different
quality segments), should lead to
increased long-term trade and
growth opportunities. 
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Sources: Ameco, IMF, Comext, March 2004. Latest data available is 2003.
Table 73 - Trade implications of EU enlargement
EU 15 EU 25
GDP – billion Euros 9,275 9,712
GDP - % of world GDP 26.9% 28.7%
GDP per capita 24,100 21,100
Total trade/GDP (degree of international
trade openness)
28.6% 26.9%
0
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1995 2001
Source: Ameco, 2004.
Chart 100 - Share of imports and exports of goods in world trade (%)
(1995 and 2001)
5. Delocalisation,
relocation and
outsourcing
So far, the pace of economic inte-
gration has been rather gradual
and changes were accompanied by
supporting policies to compensate
for adjustment costs. The following
section explores the above-men-
tioned concern: if ‘change’ occurs
rapidly, will it be associated with
large and sudden adjustment costs
in the labour market? It attempts to
shed light on the definition of out-
sourcing and offshoring, the nature
and scale of such a phenomenon,
since this is precisely the type of
‘sudden negative effect’ that wor-
ries workers and enterprises
throughout the EU.
There are two distinct dimensions
to the issues of delocalisation, relo-
cation and outsourcing: the first
concerns all possible ‘delocalisa-
tions’ from the former EU15 to the
NMS – essentially an ‘intra-EU’
issue; the second issue concerns off-
shoring to countries outside the EU.
Both issues raise the same fears
among European public opinion.
The subject of “offshore outsourc-
ing” has produced a highly contro-
versial debate in industrialised
countries and especially in the US.
Although a stable picture of the
extent and impact of outsourcing is
difficult to obtain, some evidence
can be instrumental in feeding this
debate. 
Specific concern arose against the
background of country-specific and
also very diverse cases, such as, for
instance, the offshoring of call cen-
tres from Scotland to India, the
impact of the removal of trade bar-
riers on the textile industry in
Portugal, the offshoring of R&D
functions (boxes 6,7,8). These three
examples relate to different stories,
one of which is a pure ‘offshoring’
story, the other a consequence of
the removal of barriers to trade
(pure trade story) and the latter a
case of offshoring of highly-skilled
white-collar / research jobs.
In other cases, specific technological
‘niches’ attract enterprises in
regions such as Northern Italy for
instance, or the South-east of
France. In such cases, companies
relocate in order to make use of
certain skills (e.g. the Silicon Valley;
call centres in Scotland before mov-
ing to Asia). This functional concen-
tration leads firms to locate to the
same area to share the same type of
labour, but this does not always
coincide with sectoral concentra-
tion. In a way, this resembles a
labour market pooling argument69,
whereby labour market considera-
tions play an important role in the
location decision of firms - interest-
ed not only in the cost of labour,
but rather in the concentration of
certain types of skills. Empirical
analysis identifies underlying forces
that determine industrial location
as a combination of factor costs and
geographical considerations70. For
example, the location of R&D inten-
sive industries has become increas-
ingly responsive to countries’ R&D
endowments of researchers (these
industries move to research abun-
dant locations); non-manual
labour-intensive industries remains
sensitive to the proportion of coun-
tries’ labour force with secondary
and higher education; central loca-
tions are increasingly attracting
industries higher up the value-
added chain; industries with
increasing returns to scale locate in
central regions; services are more
dispersed than manufacturing (the
general shift into services, including
the catch-up of poorer countries
where the service sector is initially
smaller – both reinforce this trend
towards a higher dispersion of serv-
ices). 
The supply of skilled labour or
researchers is an increasingly impor-
tant factor in attracting some
industries to move to a particular
country well endowed with these
types of workers. On the other
hand, labour-intensive industries
tend to locate where the supply of
skills necessary is abundant and
therefore relatively cheaper.
Increased dissimilarity comes as a
result, but the rate of structural
change is sufficiently slow to pro-
duce no large adjustment costs in
the short run and overall gains in
the long run.
5.1. ‘Offshoring, the global cousin
of outsourcing’
Outsourcing pertains to the broad-
er ‘FDI’ category. Out of three types
of FDI (market-seeking; resource-
asset-seeking and efficiency-seek-
ing
71
) outsourcing can be thought
of as one of the external drivers to 
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Box 6 - Call centres in Scotland
Some categories of workers can clearly be identified as losers from out-
sourcing strategies. Research carried out by Philip Taylor, University of
Stirling for Unifi, focused on the heavy concentration of call centres in
Scotland. Some 48% of the jobs created in the UK during the three-year
duration of this study on the ICT sector were created in the call centre
services. Taylor shows that insecurity for such routine processes (call cen-
tre jobs, some financial services, IT helpdesk jobs, back office jobs) has
risen with globalisation, because of low labour cost in English-speaking
India. However he concludes that it is not a foregone conclusion that all
jobs will leave; some companies have chosen to remain and in such
cases, ethical agendas and corporate social responsibility have played
their part. (among other articles on this topic: ‘An assembly line in the head’,
Industrial Relations Journal 30:2 (1999))
69 Robert-Nicoud F. (2003), CEPR Discussion Paper 3875.
70 main results : see Midelfart-Knarvik, Overmann, Redding, Venables (2000). 
71 N. Campos, CEPR, see several working papers on the issue of FDI, http://ideas.repec.org/e/pca133.html.
 
the further international division of
labour. FDI has employment effects
and knowledge spillover effects
(through trade in goods) and
depending on the country, sector,
types of workers, one effect may
dominate the other. In the presence
of spillovers and externalities
(knowledge spillovers, technology
etc.), FDI can be seen as a driver of
technological transfer.
‘We live in an age of outsourcing’72.
Indeed, outsourcing is more than
just ‘global production sharing’, it
implies stronger relationships
between the contractor and the
sub-contractor. Offshoring is the
global cousin of outsourcing
73
,
which is a feature of labour market
and industrial flexibility. 
How a company arrives at the point
where it chooses to offshore is illus-
trated in diagram 1.
A cost-benefit analysis of outsourc-
ing and offshoring points to many
additional ‘turnover’ costs that are
factored in before the outsourcing
decision is made74. 
The costs, for example, of co-ordi-
nation, customisation (adapt prod-
ucts to local demand or to demand
for the re-exported goods), mana-
gerial uphold, transportation costs,
and the costs related to the labour
force (hiring, firing, recruiting, pro-
viding extra or specific training,
maintaining workforce and legal
security) need to be carefully
assessed before outsourcing is
decided. Differences in costs affect
the pattern of trade according to
the old trade theory; however
turnover costs have a non-negligi-
ble impact on equilibrium out-
comes. At this point the efficiency
wage theory and search theory pro-
vide frameworks that can help
think about outsourcing in a
labour-market perspective. Search
frictions and additional costs could
for instance explain why some com-
panies choose not to outsource. 
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72 Grossman G., Helpman E. (2002), Outsourcing Versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium, CEPR Discussion Paper 3647, and Grossman G.,
Helpman E. (2002), Outsourcing in a Global Economy, NBER Working Paper 8728.
73 Glenn Hubbard, Financial Times, 24/03/2004.
74 Antras and Helpman (2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10082 use a theoretical model to show that the most productive firms will
'outsource' in the 'South', whilst the least productive ones will offshore in the South. However it would be an empirical question to
determine which way the causality runs. 
Diagram 1
Firm's choice
Produce in-house: 
vertical 
integration
Sub-contract: 
outsourcing
Outsource abroad: 
offshoring
Outsource 
'domestically': nationally
or within the EU
Box 7 - The IT and 
telecoms sector 
is outsourcing R&D to India 
More companies are relying heavily on India to serve
their R&D needs. The R&D outsourcing market in
India is estimated to grow from 1.3 billion dollars to
about 9 billion dollars by year 2010 (estimates by
Frost and Sullivan). Mostly R&D on computing archi-
tecture, encryption and network security, human
computer interface, programming language and
software engineering are being offshored. In tele-
coms, both service providers and manufacturers are
projected to carry out further R&D abroad in business
support systems, video servers and wireless as grow-
ing opportunities. (cf Nortel, that makes switches
and other equipment that power most networks
both in the service provider and user side and even
though the company does not have an R&D centre of
its own in India, it works with partners Infosys,
Sasken and TCS, providing engineers).
http://www.enterblog.com/200404290800.html)
Box 8 - Textile industry
in Portugal
The sector most affected by restructuring in Portugal
has been textiles and clothing. Job losses, often hit-
ting women and poorer regions have prompted
much criticism and debate (especially late 2002).
According to a study for EIRO (the European
Industrial Relations Observatory online) both
enlargement and globalisation are great challenges
to the Portuguese textile and clothing industry. There
is a large structural component in the sense that this
follows from a long-term declining trend of the tex-
tile industry; however, the study shows that the
Portuguese compete with the Germans and the
Danes, rather than with lower-cost countries. Clearly,
in the case of Portugal, within-EU competition tells
the trade story of lowering barriers in a greater inter-
nal market, thus triggering need for further upgrad-
ing of skills and qualifications of the Portuguese
industry to be able to face such a competition.
(www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int)
On the benefits side, cost-saving
considerations mix with market
access considerations and vertical
integration considerations, such
that it is likely that outsourcing
benefits firms when they can con-
centrate on innovation tasks or task
delivering high value-added prod-
ucts. 
Overall, in choosing between a
domestic and a foreign supplier of
parts, a final-good producer trades
off the benefits of lower variable
costs (if the firm outsources to low-
wage countries) against the bene-
fits of lower fixed costs per unit in
the home country. 
The extent of outsourcing itself
varies across sectors, industries, and
establishments; it depends on the
extent to which firms export goods,
use intermediate inputs, are affected
by changes in exchange rates and
would like to escape fluctuations,
and by barriers to trade (including
non-technical barriers to trade); it
also varies according to the extent
to which products compete with
imports, i.e. according to their
degree of substitutability.
In short, the debate sets innovation
against relocation: competition
increases innovation (in a defensive
way) so where it is difficult to inno-
vate (often the case in the least pro-
ductive companies), firms choose to
relocate parts of their activity to
low-cost countries (which may also
be the only way out if the company
intends to remain in a similar mar-
ket segment
75
). 
It should be borne in mind that the
‘pure strategies’ described in table
74 can be combined: for example
Corami, a French textile industry
used both outsourcing / relocation
of its large series of standardised
goods (it produces swim-suits) to
Tunisia, and concentrated on the
production of high-quality differen-
tiated products (produced in smaller
series) in France – where it could
guarantee more responsiveness to
changes in demand.
Therefore, depending on the type
of strategy chosen by firms and on
the various differentiated impacts
that such strategies have on
employees, vertical strategies, those
most often used in ‘capital-abun-
dant’ to labour-abundant’ delocali-
sations, have the largest negative
impact on home country labour
markets, especially on unskilled
labour. Policies aimed at securing
jobs in the home economy should
target their response following a
careful analysis of the initial situa-
tion and of the direct and indirect
effects of international trade. 
5.2. Outsourcing and vertical
integration
Outsourcing, which implies a sub-
contracting party or the relocation
of activities in a broader sense, is
actually part of the fragmentation
of the production process and conse-
quently part of a greater debate on
the location of activities. For
instance for an EU company, this
implies either choosing to outsource
within its own home country, within
the EU15, within the EU25 or outside
the EU25.
The fragmentation of production
processes and growth of MNCs
affects factor prices76. The purpose of
‘disintegrating vertically’ is to
achieve the lowest cost across coun-
tries in the production of intermedi-
ate and final goods. Evidence shows
that cost is not the only factor to be
taken into consideration, especially
when transport costs and other bar-
riers to trade are still high.
Moreover, if ‘outsourcing’ is viewed
strictly as a contractual way of sub-
contracting activity
77
, then the
extent of international outsourcing
strongly depends on: the ‘thickness’
of the domestic and foreign market
for input suppliers (the number/vari-
ety of suppliers on the market seg-
ment); the relative cost of searching
in each market; the relative cost of
customising inputs, and the nature
of the contracting environment in
each country. Therefore, a broad set
of factors pertaining to the economic
and social environment are consid-
ered when taking an outsourcing
decision.
The economic theory behind out-
sourcing lies in answering a very
simple question about whether to
‘make it in-house’ or to ‘buy it’78.
This is a fundamental question in
industrial organisation and ‘out-
sourcing’. Furthermore ‘offshoring’
(which implies more extensive
transportation costs), is more preva-
lent in some industries than others
(e.g. ‘parts’ in the car industry, call
centres, business services
79
). But
even in a given industry the mode
of organisation can vary from one
region or country to another.
Vertical integration forces man-
agers to spend time on both pro-
duction and innovation activities80
thus creating an overload.
Outsourcing of some production
activities helps alleviate tasks, and if
the value of innovation is high,
then it encourages outsourcing.
The production of standardised
products or services is usually ‘out-
sourceable’ while the production of
specific parts is kept in-house. For
instance, French telecommunica-
tions equipment company Alcatel is
now seen as a ‘fab-less’ company
(meaning that the whole produc-
tion has been outsourced) and
made this strategic choice not to
produce its products but rather to
concentrate on the design and
R&D. However, this ‘traditional’
view of the nature of outsourced
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75 Therefore many concerns are voiced in the press and in the public at large referring to companies that are 'forced' to relocate.
76 Venables (1999).
77 As defined by Grossman, Helpman (2002), Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 117-1, pp. 85-120.
78 Grossman, Helpman, (2002) op.cit.
79 Outsourcing seems to be on the rise in recent years, Abraham and Taylor (1996) document a rise of outsourcing of business services,
etc. Outsourcing requires large cost advantages (reason for locating in low-cost countries), and depends on the degree of competi-
tion on the market (who bears the costs of co-ordination).
80 Acemoglu (2002), NBER WP 9191.
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Strategy Impact Long-term effects
Extending market access to other
countries in the case of non-trad-
able services (energy, transport,
banks, trade, food industry,
tourism), i.e. relocate to markets
where large demand is located
(horizontal strategy)
Negligible impact on labour mar-
ket (no substitution effect)
e.g. Carrefour in China
Positive.
Through increased demand for
goods and services provided by an
investor. Thus also positive effects
on employment in both the home
and host economies. 
Semi-processed and re-exportable
goods, such as cars and motor vehi-
cles,  steel, chemicals, etc. (horizon-
tal strategy)
Indirect effect (non-job-creation)
because activities are not being
created in the home country.
Possible substitution effects. 
e.g. Renault producing its new
5'000 car in Slovakia.
Possibly positive depending on the
way in which savings are re-invested
at home. Potential job creation in
the host economy, with positive
effects on overall demand.  
Relocate in order to reduce labour
costs, goods that are 'highly' re-
exportable, standardised, labour-
intensive production processes
(textiles, software components,
automobile parts, electronic servic-
es) – cheap labour argument, (ver-
tical strategy)
Substantial impact on local labour
markets in the short run. Complete
substitution by the host economy's
labour force.
e.g. Nike
Negative on the low-skilled.
Always at risk of further delocalisa-
tion / relocation to where labour is
cheapest. 
Relocate in order to benefit from
highly skilled or specialised cate-
gories of labour (scientific skills,
researchers, specific technical skills,
etc.)  – labour pooling argument,
(vertical strategy)
Quite a substantial impact on local
labour markets and on the
demand for certain types of skills.
e.g. 'Silicon Valley'
Upgrading of the labour force as
well as of the quality of products /
research or services produced lead-
ing ultimately to higher productiv-
ity and growth. 
In response to this fragmentation of the production process ('relocation' strategies chosen by firms), other
firms choose to 'innovate'. Such radically different strategies may lead to varied labour market outcomes,
as follows: 
Innovation: opening up to compet-
itive forces drives innovation to
anticipate losses in competitive-
ness, leads to skill-biased techno-
logical change. 
Capital/labour substitution to
reduce costs (reduce number of
unskilled workers). Increases
demand for skilled labour. 
e.g. Alcatel
Overall positive.
Difficult to disentangle pure
'exogenous' innovation from inno-
vation triggered by competitive
pressure.
Product differentiation: Avoid
competitive pressure by creating
monopoly power on a specific mar-
ket segment. Either increase prod-
uct quality/technology content, or
improve the image / presentation. 
Highly qualified labour force in
demand, with specific technical
skills or design abilities. 
Unskilled labour usually looses
from this process.
e.g. Corami 
Positive. The production of non-
standardised products at home
secures a certain number of jobs. 
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goods or services is somewhat chal-
lenged by evidence: nowadays,
even the most knowledge-led seg-
ments of the production process are
being outsourced.
If the inputs can either be produced
domestically or abroad, differences
in factor endowments across coun-
tries lead to movements in capital
and to changes in the demand for
skilled labour, resulting in goods
that used to be produced domesti-
cally being outsourced
81
. In both
theoretical cases, firms are perfectly
competitive. Hence vertical disinte-
gration is a function of trade costs
or differences in factor endow-
ments. Even with zero trade costs
and equal factor endowments, ver-
tical disintegration can be a result
of technological characteristics82. If
the opportunity of firms to out-
source part of their production
process is taken into account, it
shows that different types of firms
(vertically integrated or more disin-
tegrated) can coexist, depending
on their cost structure and the
stage of development of their tech-
nological/production processes. In
the development stages, firms are
likely to be vertically integrated,
but then as learning by doing
improves, standardisation of vari-
ous stages of the production
process leads to outsourcing possi-
bilities
83
. 
5.2.1. Outcome for employment
and wages
Alongside employment, the impact
on wages is the variable of concern
in the debate on globalisation and
labour markets. Wage differentia-
tion according to skills (production
vs. non-production workers) has
increased over the last thirty years
especially in the US. The only expla-
nation that comes from economists
is that demand for skilled workers
has expanded leading to an
increase in their relative employ-
ment and wages. Increased compe-
tition from low-wage countries is
considered a minor explanatory fac-
tor for this in comparison to the
influence of technological change84.
There are three reasons for this: the
magnitude of trade, changes in
import prices, and employment
changes within and between indus-
tries. The decline in the relative
wages of ‘less-skilled’ workers has
occurred to a much lesser extent in
the EU
85
. Economists consider that
in the US, wages are the ‘adjust-
ment variable’ as shocks occur and
require labour market adjustment,
while on the contrary in the EU,
employment plays this role. In theo-
ry, ‘global production sharing’ and
international trade in inputs are a
potential explanation for the
increase in the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers, as
well as skill-biased technical
change, having much the same
impact on changes in labour
demand 86: both of these will shift
demand away from low-skilled
activities, while raising relative
demand and wages of the higher
skilled. There is disagreement
among economists as to the extent
of the impact of international trade
on employment and wages, but a
majority would agree that interna-
tional trade and increased competi-
tion in product markets has a rela-
tively small impact on the labour
market.
For NMS relocation, concerns of
labour-intensive production from
the EU15 to the low-wage NMS are
not borne out by the analysis: FDI is
concentrated in the non-tradable
sectors (public utilities, communica-
tion, financial intermediation, and
other services). Only one fifth of FDI
is allocated to industries where low
labour-costs are key and the share
of unskilled labour is high (clothing,
footwear, electrical machinery, rub-
ber and plastic products)
87
, suggest-
ing that the market access argu-
ment is much more potent than the
low-cost factor. Empirical applica-
tion of the fragmentation theory to
the Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary at NACE-2 (DA-DN) level
suggests that outsourcing bridges
the skilled-to-unskilled wage gap in
manufacturing (analysis is usually
limited to manufacturing because
of data limitations). So the frag-
mentation of production processes
may in some cases reduce the
skilled-to-unskilled wage gap88.
Hungary is an example of the
responsiveness of an economy to
global specialisation trends. This
country needed to shift to human-
capital-intensive production swiftly
since it faced high competition
from lower-labour-cost neighbour-
ing countries (Slovakia: other cost-
related advantages) and Asia. As a
result the structure of Hungarian
exports has rapidly turned towards
more skilled-intensive exports. 
Fragmentation of the production
process and international outsourc-
ing89 may affect factor rewards and
factor productivity even in coun-
tries with large home markets (such
as the US). If a country or region is
specialised in the production of
skill-intensive goods then there
should be no effect of outsourcing
on wages of the skilled, which
should only benefit from higher
real income. The wages of the
unskilled though could decrease
nationally; this is the standard result
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82 Ciliberto, Panzar (2003).
83 This is an implication of the simple argument of the products' life cycle developed by Vernon.
84 Feenstra op. cit., Freeman, R. B. and Katz L.F (1995), ed. Differences and Changes in Wage Structures. 462 p.,  and Wood, 
http://www.albany.edu/~ms339/CapitalIntensity.pdf for the literature on technological change.
85 In fact evidence shows that the increase in wage differentiation was comparable to the US in the UK, more modest in France, the
Netherlands and Nordic countries, while inequality tends to decrease in Germany (Borjas, 2000, Labor Economics).
86 Feenstra R.C., Hanson G.H. (2001), Global production sharing and rising inequality: a survey of trade and wages, NBER work
ing paper 8372.
87 Above quoted report on The impact of EU enlargement on the labour markets.
88 WIIW (working papers by Egger and Stehrer)
89 Feenstra, Hanson (2001) and (2002).
 
which one would expect.
Determining empirically the actual
impact of outsourcing and off-
shoring on wages calls for the use of
more precise databases: using plant-
level data rather than industry-level
data is helpful in analysing such a
phenomenon but unfortunately, this
data is not available EU-wide. More
efforts should definitely be given to
gather and analyse plant-level data
that would contain the most appro-
priate information to analyse the
phenomenon. Analysts would then
be able to link trade and employ-
ment dimensions
90
. 
The outsourcing and relocation
phenomena are diverse in nature.
From the above, it seems that such
strategic choices could be viewed as
a threat to local labour markets if
they are only driven by low-wage
motivations (leading to strong dis-
ruption in the short-term), or as an
opportunity if a broader set of con-
siderations are taken into account.
In the latter case, thanks to feed-
back effects (increased exports,
increased efficiency and cost sav-
ings in the home country, and rein-
vestment of savings in a productive
way) increased outside opportuni-
ties should improve the economic
situation of home economies
(increased trade, increased growth,
employment creation and upgrad-
ing of production processes).
Lately the press has reported cases
of firms having repatriated activi-
ties which they had previously cho-
sen to outsource (Dell, in the com-
puter industry, Lehmann Brothers,
in the  financial sector91) because of
the difficulty in managing and con-
trolling the sub-contracters and
ultimately due to consumer com-
plaints about the quality of service
which was provided. Indeed, a
broader set of factors pertaining
both to the economic and social
environment ought to be part of
the debate on this phenomenon,
suggesting that the decision to off-
shore requires careful assessment of
all related costs (e.g. search costs,
co-ordination costs, extra manage-
rial costs) and all risks associated
with offshore locations (e.g. intel-
lectual property rights, reputation,
exchange rate risks)
92
.
5.3. Empirical evidence
The difficulty for analysts is that
nowadays there is much more to
international trade than just trade
in final goods
93
(this explains the use
of a diverse set of data, indicators
or different methodologies, box 9).
Along the same lines, there is much
more to globalisation than just
international trade. Globalisation
has induced the development of
global production patterns and
hence the relative importance of
trade in intermediate goods has
increased; this goes hand in hand
with the diffusion of new technolo-
gies, which –inter alia- allows firms
to produce around the clock (mak-
ing use of the time difference).
Ghose (2003) characterises the cur-
rent global production pattern as
the ‘combined effect of shifting
comparative advantage, growth of
outsourcing and diffusion of skill-
biased technological trade’. 
The European Monitoring Centre
on Change (EMCC)
94
uses the fol-
lowing definitions of outsourcing
and relocation (within a broader set
of types of restructuring
95
):
• outsourcing: a type of restructur-
ing where the activity is subcon-
tracted to another company which
may or may not be located within
the EU. Such a definition matches
the contractual approach used by
Grossman / Helpman (2002). 
• relocation: where the activity is
relocated to another country of the
EU or beyond its borders. 
The difference lies mainly in the
type of legal arrangement that
then links the headquarters to its
other production units. Both cases
imply job losses in the ‘home’ coun-
try, but also potential job creation
in the home as well as in the host
country (through savings and feed-
back effects – box  9). 
Out of 1472 case studies posted by
the European Restructuring Monitor
(as of 30/04/2004 – table 75), out-
sourcing and relocation cases togeth-
er represent 7.38% of all restructur-
ing cases, which corresponds to
7.30% of the total planned job reduc-
tions. Among the ‘outsourcing’ cases
(13 cases from 2002 to 2004 collected
by the European Restructuring
Monitor), some three companies out-
sourced within the EU15, one within
the EU25 and the remainder (five
companies) outside the EU (mainly in
India).
Although the EMCC’s approach
only captures one side of the phe-
nomenon (due to its data collection
method it only considers job
destruction, i.e. plants’ outsourcing
and layoffs announced in the
press
96
), it is somewhat informative.
Chapter 5 Employment in Europe 2004
216
90 See Jansen, Turrini (2002), Job creation, job destruction and the international division of labour, CEPR DP 3202 for the Italian 
case, and Redding (2004) for the UK.
91 Drezner, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.
92 CESifo Forum, Volume 5, number 2, Summer 2004, special focus on outsourcing and offshoring.
93 Although it is true that trade in final goods was not the only type of trade, obviously trade in raw materials has historically 
played a major role. 
94 In particular the European Restructuring Monitor, Dublin Foundation, www.eurofound.ie.
95 e.g. EMCC: 'restructuring' also encompasses 'outsourcing' and 'relocation' (vertical disintegration) which could also be viewed as consequences
of 'globalisation' (free movement of capital, establishment, and investment). Increased competition can indeed stem from competitors in the
home country (or region – within EU) as well as competitors  abroad; at the same time, restructuring occurs because of increased competition
but also due to innovation, changes in consumer demand, increases in productivity, etc.
96 The EMCC – the European Restructuring Monitor - gathers data through the press, which means that ERM correspondents have to rely on the
accuracy of newspaper articles. Then newspapers report on restructuring announcements and then do not follow up on actual measures that
are taken. Finally, ERPM document a proportionately high number of 'smaller' cases in the small economies, since these are picked up in the
national papers but would not get coverage in the newspapers monitored in the large economies. Furthermore, newspapers rarely report on
job creation aspects. 
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98 Faini R., Falzoni A.M., Galeotti M., Helg R., Turrini A. (2001), Importing Jobs And Exporting Firms? On The Wage And 
Employment Implications Of Italy's Trade And Foreign Direct Investment Flows, 
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99 Bazen S., Cardebat J.M. (2001), The impact of trade on the relative wages and employment of low-skilled workers in France, Applied
Economics (2001), 33, pp. 801-810.
100 Aussilloux V., Cheval M.-L. (2002), Les investissements directs français à l'étranger et l'emploi en France, Economie et Prévision, n°152-
153, pp. 171-188.
101 BCG (2004), Capturing Global Advantage. 
Box 9 - Individual country cases 
Comparing the effect of FDI on employment in the US and Sweden97 - some economists have tried to include the
effect of globalisation on different types of labour (white/blue - skilled/unskilled). The small part of the Swedish-
owned production that takes place abroad – in developing countries – involves more employment in the parent com-
pany in Sweden (notably more white-collar employment), even though the effect on Swedish employment becomes
weaker over time. In the case of Sweden – the authors find no evidence of substitution – on the contrary, more sales
by foreign affiliates increase employment in the parent company. According to these researchers, ‘there is no evi-
dence that production abroad by Swedish firms involves the allocation of labour-intensive operations to affiliates’.
With regard to the US case, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) use trade in intermediate goods (imports of) as a proxy for
delocalisations (imports of intermediate goods presumably being substituted to national production). This constitutes
the upper bound for such an approximation. Under this assumption, their main finding is that outsourcing can
account for 31-51% of the increase in the relative demand for skilled labour that occurred in US manufacturing indus-
tries during the 1980s.
For the UK, it seems that localised effects, notably in Scotland (work of Philip Taylor on call centres), have been 
highly disruptive on the local/regional labour force, while at a broader level, across the UK (Redding 2004) evidence
shows that the industrial structure has an important impact on the final outcome for wages. Using establishment
data (Girma, Görg 2004) suggests that higher wages at home are positively related to outsourcing, which could mean
that the savings motive is important. It also shows that foreign establishments outsource more and that there is a
positive relation to labour productivity. 
The case of Ireland in the recent years is fairly self-explanatory as to the consequences of high FDI inflows. 
For Italy, an empirical study by Faini, Falzoni, Galeotti, Helg and Turrini98, finds that international trade did not contribute
to Italy’s labour market problems. A possible explanation put forward by the authors is that given Italy’s pattern of spe-
cialisation, international integration as reflected in falling import prices may have boosted the labour demand.
In the case of France, Cardebat99 shows that delocalisations played an important role in the years from 1985 to 1992,
leading to especially destructive consequences on unskilled labour and wage inequalities. Cardebat’s empirical results
– estimating labour demand for unskilled labour – show that a 10% fall in the price of intermediate goods would
lead to a reduction in unskilled labour employment of -5.5% to -12.5%, notwithstanding methodological limitations.
However, these results encompass both the effects of broader restructuring (inter-sectoral specialisation) and the
effects of delocalisation, without managing to disentangle them. And in this case, only the negative effects are meas-
ured, again, potential job creation is not evaluated. 
Using factor content analysis, Guimbert and Lévy-Bruhl (op.cit.) show that overall, trade has had a neutral effect on
labour. They decompose results into two periods: 1978-1990 the balance of labour content has been negative (minus
40,000 jobs per year) while 1990-1997 is has been found to turn positive, even for the textile industry, for both skilled
and unskilled labour. 
Aussilloux and Cheval100 show that FDI have a positive effect on employment in parent companies (located in France)
and boost exports. On the whole, through this feedback effect, FDI has a positive impact on employment.
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has recently published results concerning France: globalisation is rather job-cre-
ating. Large French companies going global contribute to create jobs in France. Only 6% of manufactured goods con-
sumed in France are processed in low-cost countries. BCG actually surveyed large companies and compared net job
creation to their activity. (www.bcg.com). In a recent publication, the BCG conducts sectoral analysis for which evi-
dence is mixed and shows overall that some companies choose to move their R&D activities to low-cost countries, that
large multinationals are driving this trend, that evidence is mixed according to the segments that the companies
choose to delocalise, that industries with short time-to-market are stipulating local production101. 
From the above, we derive that analysis would obviously benefit greatly from a comprehensive gathering of
European-wide micro-data (establishment / plant-level data), which contain most valuable information about firms
and employees. 
In particular, it helps to identify
sectors that are under restructuring
pressure. However, since the
EMCC’s restructuring monitor only
launched its activities in 2002, there
is still some way to go before
‘trends’ can be identified. Two
years’ data gathering is too short a
period to find conclusive evidence
about restructuring trends. 
Overall – even though the evidence
gathered by the EMCC tells only
part of the outsourcing story – this
descriptive work indicates that the
actual number of job losses due to
‘pure’ outsourcing is very small. 
Reports from leading consultancies
and the media based on case stud-
ies have created controversy and an
emotional debate about ‘offshore
outsourcing’, especially in the con-
text of the US presidential election
campaign 2004. For instance, man-
agement consultancy McKinsey102
forecasts for the US, Europe and
Japan - 600,000 job losses a year,
70% in the US; IT researchers
Forrester, predict 3.3 million US
service job losses over the next 15
years; and IT industry analysts
Gartner estimate 1 out of 10 jobs in
the US IT industry will be lost. On
the other hand, Global Insight
103
–
finds IT outsourcing from the US
results in net US job growth: over
90,000 net new jobs were created
in 2003 and the number is 
projected to grow. The impact on
job creation varies by sector, but the
construction, transportation, edu-
cation and health, wholesale trade,
and financial services sectors are
expected to benefit. However
McKinsey (Global Institute) insists
that overall, for every dollar invest-
ed by the US abroad, 1.13 dollars
value-added is created in the US and
value added is created abroad as well
as jobs. This feeds back into increased
demand in the US economy.
As mentioned in all reports, labour
arbitrage (the cost-saving argu-
ment) is far from the only factor in
the offshoring decision (cf for
instance Canada, Ireland, Singapore
are host to many offshoring compa-
nies and are not ‘low-wage’ coun-
tries). Among other factors driving
relocation, companies cite greater
productivity, improved service,
superior technical skills, market
access and ‘other reasons’, such as
compensation costs, quality of
human resources, geopolitical risks,
and diversification of investment
risks104. The US and UK are poten-
tially most affected, because of the
English-speaking skills in destina-
tion countries. Human resource fac-
tors such as optimising a pool of
global labour supply, working
around the clock (by making use of
the time difference) and making
use of a broader range of skills and
educational base are key.
The IT sector is the main focus of
the above-mentioned reports. For a
specific sub-sector which is often
nailed as a large ‘outsourcer’,
namely the NACE 2D-72 ‘computer
and related services’, which
includes hardware consultancy,
software consultancy and supply,
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101 The EMCC – the European Restructuring Monitor - gathers data through the press, which means that ERM correspondents have to rely on
the accuracy of newspaper articles. Then newspapers report on restructuring announcements and do not follow up on actual measures that
are taken. Finally, ERPM documents a proportionately high number of 'smaller' cases in the small economies, since these are picked up in
the national papers but would not get coverage in the newspapers monitored in the large economies. Furthermore, newspapers rarely
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102 in Offshoring a win-win game, www.mckinsey.com.
103 Methodological note (on Global Insight): study of employment concentration by industry and forecasted industrial growth. 
104 Gradev G. (ed.) (2001), CEE countries in the EU companies' strategies of industrial restructuring and relocation, ETUI, Brussels, pp.
12-13.
105 Source: Eurostat, the European Union Labour Force Survey, data and own calculations.
106   see Blomstrom, Fors, Lipsey (op.cit.) 
Table 75 - Planned job reductions by type of restructuring
Type of restructuring
# Planned job 
reductions
% Planned job
reductions
# Cases % Cases
Internal restructuring 550099 76.25% 833 65.44%
Bankruptcy / Closure 95933 13.3% 278 21.84%
Relocation 34937 4.84% 82 6.44%
Merger / Acquisition 21884 3.03% 47 3.69%
Outsourcing 17735 2.46% 13 0.94%
Other 820 0.11% 21 1.65%
Source: EMCC, 30/04/2004.
data processing, database activities,
maintenance and repair of office,
accounting and computer machin-
ery, other computer-related
services, the net job creation figures
have been over 31,000 jobs created
between 2002 and 2003 both in the
EU-15 (76%) and in the NMS (24%
of the jobs created); between 1995
and 2002 this sub-sector created on
average 175,000 jobs a year EU-
wide105. 
The IT sector, and more specifically
the lower-end of the IT sector (so
far), seems to be more amenable to
offshoring because such jobs can
offer relatively small productivity
differential but a high wage differ-
ential, making them interesting to
offshore. 
5.3.1. Comparison between the EU
and the US
In US firms, larger foreign produc-
tion is associated with smaller par-
ent-company employment, reduc-
ing labour intensity in the parent
company, especially if the produc-
tion is located in developing coun-
tries
106
. This reflects a strategy on
the part of investing firms of allo-
cating labour-intensive production
tasks to affiliates located in low-
wage countries. At a later stage,
elements are re-imported and used
in the production of the final good.
On the other hand, in Sweden,
firms employ more labour at home
when they produce abroad, in par-
ticular when associated with pro-
duction in developing countries.
Thus there is little allocation of
labour-intensive production to low-
wage countries by the Swedish
firms and the labour effect which is
observed reflects the need for hir-
ing managers and supervisors (par-
ent company supervision is
required). This suggests a difference
in investment strategies. It seems
that in the US, the strategy is to
take advantage of factor price dif-
ferences, whilst in Sweden the
strategy is rather to gain access to
markets by substituting trade.  
Outsourcing to English-speaking
countries has naturally tended to
affect the US and the British Isles
more than the EU as a whole. For
the IT sector, which is at the source
of the controversy on outsourcing
and job losses among white-collar
workers, it is difficult to obtain a
clear picture in the US. Indeed two-
thirds of IT jobs pertain to non-IT
sectors107. Moreover, it seems that in
IT sectors in the strictest sense,
lower skilled jobs have been
destroyed, while high-skilled jobs
have been created (e.g. computer
software engineers). In addition,
the average wage for those higher-
skilled IT workers was much higher.
Last but not least, the US runs a
trade surplus in the following sec-
tors: financial services, business,
professional and technical services,
and computer, data, database and
information services. 
Ninety percent of current US jobs
cannot be offshored because they
require geographical proximity. The
tasks that are offshored are also
easy to standardise, manage and
monitor. For the US, Forrester pre-
dicts a job loss of 3.3 million across
15 years, i.e. 220,000 jobs a year,
while it should actually create 22
million new jobs between now and
2010. Thus outsourcing should
affect less than 0.2 percent of
employed Americans (Drezner,
Foreign Affairs, May-June 2004).
Restructuring in a broad sense is tak-
ing place in the US but overall, at
least 16 million jobs are created or
destroyed annually, representing
14% of total US employment
108
.
Manufacturing in the US is also a
source of concern because job
destructions have not been made up
by job creations in good times, so
adjustment policies need to be
designed accordingly and tailored to
the specific needs of these workers. 
In BLS News109 of June 10, 2004,
extended mass layoffs associated
with domestic and overseas reloca-
tions, for the first quarter 2004
appear in table 76 for the US.
Layoffs associated with overseas
relocation represent 2.5% of the
non-farm workers separated from
their jobs for at least 31 days.
National relocation represents
4.2% of this total number of lay-
offs.
5.4. Upper and lower bounds
Currently we have very little evi-
dence or data on the complex phe-
nomenon of outsourcing. Here we
need to acknowledge the huge dif-
ficulties in measuring the extent of
outsourcing.
From a statistical perspective, it is
almost impossible to disentangle
the effects of outsourcing per se on
net job losses at the aggregate
level, since there are feedback
effects that one cannot measure in
the short-term. The raw number of
dismissals tells only part of the
story. Statistical shortcomings
unfortunately hinder a finer meas-
urement of the effects of outsourc-
ing on labour and the demand for
skills; white-collar as well as blue
collars face the same insecurity
linked to increased competitive
pressures and more precise classifi-
cations by skills would probably
help us show that within the high-
skilled, the low-end of the high-
skilled category also faces risk of
layoffs, as much as the broader
‘low-skilled’ category. 
The scale of outsourcing could 
be measured according to two
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107 Catherine Mann, 2004, IIE, Global sourcing and High-tech jobs.
108 Can manufacturing survive in advanced countries?, R. H. McGuckin, the Conference Board – Executive Action, March 2004.
109 Bureau of Labor Statistics, USA, publication based on a brand new survey, the Mass Layoffs Survey; so far results are available for
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approaches, two types of evidence
at the aggregate level: the lowest
estimate (or lower bound) can be
measured by counting the number
of outsourcing cases reported in the
press (as collected by the EMCC, i.e.
2.5% of planned job destructions);
the upper estimate (or upper
bound) can be measured by evalu-
ating trade in intermediate inputs –
which encompasses inter alia off-
shoring (see box 9, Feenstra and
Hanson, 1996). 
Concerns have been raised over the
fact that trade in intermediate
goods represents over a half of
Chinese exports
110
, namely US$97.2
billion in 1998. This kind of trade
has grown substantially, typically in
the case of China. From 1988 to
1998, 62.1% of total exports by
China to the EU15 were actually re-
exports. In the US case, processing
imports from the EU accounts for
approximately 20% of their total
processing trade. In US manufactur-
ing, imported inputs have increased
from 6.5% (1972) to 11.6% (1990)
of total intermediate purchases.
Yet the most accurate measure of
the specific process of offshoring
(international outsourcing) would
be to link individual data on wages
and employment to enterprise-level
data on sub-contracting of activities
(and the national vs. international
nature of this sub-contracting rela-
tionship). An attempt using data on
Germany (the German Socio-
Economic Panel) and industry level
data (broader aggregation than
enterprise-level data) on interna-
tional outsourcing from input-out-
put tables from the German Federal
Statistical Office111 explores the rela-
tionship between offshoring and
wages. The researchers find that
offshoring has had a marked
impact on wages, notably reducing
the real wage for workers in the
lowest skill categories by up to 1.8%
while it increased the real wage of
high-skilled workers by up to 3.3%.
However the use of enterprise-level
data, linking it to employee data
directly would greatly improve the
accuracy of the analysis, focusing
precisely on wages and employment
variables. If such data were gathered
across the EU25, such analysis would
be possible.
5.4.1. The policy issue 
Although the evidence gathered so
far does not point to a dramatic
increase in net job destruction, it is
nevertheless probably true that
outsourcing increases job turnover,
which in turn increases the feeling
of job insecurity. This in itself is a
major policy issue. The challenge is
not to assess the extent of workers
concerned in Europe; rather it is to
assess the differentiated impact on
the components of the labour mar-
ket and the ability of our labour
markets to adapt to this changing
situation. It boils down to whether
or not we have created the appro-
priate framework to deal with such
cases, and whether or not this
framework is complete enough
(should question the interactions
between employment, social pro-
tection, tax policies, and competi-
tion policies). The substitution or
complementarities between over-
seas and home jobs has been ques-
tioned. In the US in particular, it
shows that they are complements,
although there are distributional
effects (creating more high-paying
jobs in the US, but fewer low-skilled
jobs at home)112. 
Policy concerns should be raised in
cases of job destruction. Strong evi-
dence of net job destruction is diffi-
cult to assess, because factors
behind outsourcing, its causes and
the strategy behind it vary (see the
above section on the types of out-
sourcing strategies). It seems clear
that vertical integration strategies
lead to more substitution between
domestic and foreign labour, calling
for strong adjustment policies
(assisting dislocated workers, etc.),
while horizontal strategies lead to
complementarities, calling for poli-
cies geared towards mobility and
adaptability of the workforce.
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110 Feenstra, Hanson (2001), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8088.pdf
111 Geishecker I., Görg H. (2004), International outsourcing and wages: winners and losers, DIW Berlin,
http://www.diw.de/deutsch/dasinstitut/abteilungen/ldm/archiv/ar2004/soep2004/doksoep2004/paper2004_geisheckergoerg.pdf
112 Hanson and Slaughter (1999), NBER Working Paper 7074.
Table 76 - Layoff cases in the US
Action Layoff events Separations
Total private non-farm
sector
1204 239361
Total excluding seasonal
and vacation events
869 182456
Total with movement of
work
119 16021
Overseas relocations 34 4633
Within company 21 2976
Different company 13 1657
Domestic relocations 79 9985
Within company 65 8191
Different company 14 1794
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics,USA.
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A realistic self-appraisal and action
are needed to address the factors
that policy can influence in the
home economy, such as for instance
education and training, R&D (pro-
motion of ICT, innovation), entre-
preneurship, modern work organi-
sation. Outsourcing implies dis-
placement of workers in some
cases, but the net effect on jobs at
home is not certain; the challenge is
to help displaced workers in their
transition to other productive activ-
ities. However, blocking all out-
sourcing moves would not consti-
tute a realistic solution. Hindering
relocation would be counterpro-
ductive and would inhibit change
(which is a strong driver of the EU
economic model). Opportunities for
growth offered by globalisation
should also drive economic dyna-
mism.
6. Reconciling
economic insecurity
with the
globalisation of
production  
In this section we explore the skill-
content of employment creation
throughout the EU and by sector in
order to tentatively track the
potential tensions or ‘pressures’
that globalisation generates on cer-
tain sectors and groups of workers.
Finally, data on the extent of job
creation and job destruction are
presented by sector and by skills in
order to assess the nature and
magnitude of changes that work-
ers are faced with in the EU, as well
as the opportunities offered by the
European labour market if consid-
ered in its entirety. 
In open markets, greater competi-
tion spurs the reallocation of labour
and capital to more efficient uses in
the economy. Increasing job reallo-
cations and job turnover may or
may not result in an increased feel-
ing of insecurity
113
. The fact that
trade actually increases the pace of
simultaneous job creation and
destruction is a fundamental source
of concern to workers especially for
the low-skilled often bear the brunt
of ‘short-run adjustment’. Cushio-
ning the negative consequences of
this tendency for workers makes
sense. However halting the compet-
itive and opening up process could
overall be counterproductive.
6.1. Importance of job reallocation
…to generate productivity gains
and increase job opportunities at
times of changing production pat-
terns.
For any size of total employment
change induced by changes in inter-
national factors - the changes in
individual jobs at individual estab-
lishments are much greater114. Many
more jobs are destroyed and also
created than is apparent from the
net employment changes. Turnover
of jobs entails costs for firms as well
as for workers and society as a
whole (e.g. unemployment bene-
fits, even if temporary), and bene-
fits of better allocation of
resources. The economics profes-
sion cannot as of yet give a compre-
hensive quantification and evalua-
tion of costs and benefits. 
International trade leads to job cre-
ation, through innovation and effi-
ciency gains but it also requires
labour market adjustment, and
temporary dislocation. Job realloca-
tion (job destruction and job cre-
ation) is an essential part of a
dynamic economy. In the manufac-
turing sector in the US, the turnover
is 1 in 5 jobs a year (this may explain
the feeling of ‘economic insecurity’,
however it cannot be caused by
higher international exposure com-
pared to other economies, since the
US is a relatively ‘closed’ economy).
If the feeling of insecurity is 
an inevitable consequence of in-
creased economic dynamism, then
there is room for policy interven-
tion, in order to mitigate risks. 
The OECD has computed the rate of
job destruction, job creation and
job reallocation for a set of coun-
tries, and found that for all the
countries, net employment growth
was always much smaller than job
creation or destruction, and job
reallocation is ten to thirty times
higher than net employment
growth. 
However, at this point strong
methodological issues have to be
raised:
• calculating net job loss and the
net effect on employment is a
delicate operation, given the
backward and forward linkages
and short-term / long-term
dimension of the issue of trade
and employment. 
• disentangling the reasons for ‘job
dislocation’ is not a straightfor-
ward task. 
• changes in industry or manufac-
turing total net employment are
much smaller than the underlying
increases and decreases in
employment occurring simultane-
ously at the level of individual
establishment, i.e. a sector creates
and destroys far more jobs per
day in the national economy than
job cuts announced through the
press. Gross job flows (creation
and destruction) at establishment
level have to be taken into
account which has not yet been
done in any meaningful way. Job
flows are far larger in magnitude
than net employment changes. 
113 Scheve K., Slaughter M.J. (2002), Economic insecurity and the globalisation of production, Working Paper 03-09, Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=386625, define economic insecurity as 'worker insecurity' which may be related
to riskier employment/wage outcomes. The authors argue that FDI may be a key factor contributing to this increased risk by mak-
ing labour demand more elastic. They present evidence from panel data collected in Great Britain (1991-99) that FDI activity in
industries in which the individuals work is positively correlated with individual perceptions of economic insecurity in terms of
employment and wages. This study focuses on the individual level, based on the assumption that workers are risk-averse and they
are concerned about the volatility of their earnings and the volatility of the risk of unemployment. This feeling of economic inse-
curity may contribute to the backlash against globalisation (described in the introduction to this chapter).
114 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1998), Job creation and job destruction, MIT press, 288 p.
• the need to go beyond the econ-
omy-wide and even sector-wide
analysis : a focus on detailed
industries and establishment data
is needed. Greater emphasis
should be placed on the potential
insights of gathering plant-level
data throughout the EU25, there-
by providing information on
employer and employee behav-
iour simultaneously. More accu-
rate measures of turnover should
be defined by industry, such as
measures of job creation and
destruction due to plant closure,
contracting or expanding estab-
lishments, and plant openings. 
In the next sub-section, attempts at
illustrating the importance of net
job creation are carried out for the
EU25 with the very partial data that
we have. 
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Net job creation for the EU-25 by skills (2002 to 2003)
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Chart 101 - Net job creation for the EU-25 and the NMS by skills (2002 to 2003)
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Source: Eurostat, the European Union Labour Force Survey, and own calculations. 2002-2003 data was chosen for the quality of infor-
mation available. Indeed, the number of 'no answer' increases as a longer time span is chosen.
Net job creation for the NMS by skills (2002 to 2003)
 
6.2. Overall job creation in 
the EU25
While analysing job creation
dynamics
115
, it appears that both the
EU15 and the NMS have created a
number of jobs in the past year,
even though the economy was not
performing its best. However, it also
appears that the EU has lost com-
paratively more low-skilled jobs,
which seems to confirm previous
intuition about the groups of work-
ers that are most affected.  
Figures for net job creation (net
employment growth) from 1993 to
2003 reveal that, on average, 500
jobs were created daily in each of
the 15 Member States. Job realloca-
tion altogether represents 10 to 30
times this amount, including the
intra-sectoral shifts116. This repre-
sents 5,000 to 15,000 job realloca-
tions a day for each country in the
EU15. Hereafter net job creation
from 2002 to 2003 is taken as an
example as it is the most recent
data, this exercise can be repeated
for previous years (Chart 101). 
Taking the EU25 as a whole and all
sectors (chart 14), there was a net
job creation between 2002 and
2003 (positive or negative change
in the difference between the num-
ber of employed in 2003 and those
employed in 2002)
117
. However, job
creation is clearly more significant
in the case of highly skilled workers.
In both the EU25 and the EU15,
workers in agriculture, fishing, min-
ing and manufacturing, and ener-
gy, loose out. Compared to the
EU15, more jobs were lost in the
NMS in the areas of transport, stor-
age and communication and other
services. Job creation in the EU15 is
also more high-skill-intensive than
in the NMS, notably in the primary
sectors, which contrasts sharply
with the NMS. 
At a more detailed level (2-digit
NACE and 1-digit ISCED), the non-
tradable service sector stands out
as the sector that creates most of
the jobs in the NMS. Job creation
is also highest in the recreational,
cultural and sporting activities,
hotels and restaurants and real
estate business.
Analysis of the structure of net job
creation between 2002 and 2003
reveals the following two types of
sectors:
(i) the traditional sector in which
the NMS have a comparative
advantage : mining, textiles manu-
facturing, leather products, mineral
products and basic metals. 
(ii) the sectors that are in need of
strong job creation – ‘recently cre-
ated activities’ which are driven by
strong internal demand : recre-
ational activities, radio, TV equip-
ment, motor vehicles, hotels and
restaurants, real estate, support-
ing transport activities and travel
agencies. 
Comparing the ‘job creating’ sec-
tors in the NMS with the actual
structure of exports of these coun-
tries clearly shows that NMS are
specialising further in these specific
sectors (Chart 102). 
The EU clearly creates jobs and job
creation by skills is unevenly distrib-
uted across countries as shown on
chart 102 (for a longer time period).
However it seems that for the EU15
at least, high-skill jobs are the back-
bone of job creation. 
Job turnover has increased in the
recent years; this observation is also
valid at international level, for both
industrialised and developing coun-
tries (Ghose 2003, ILO). If no net
employment growth emerges,
these constant shifts are surely
highly disruptive and lower-skilled
workers are bound to suffer from
this outcome. Thus to be able to
accommodate changes, job cre-
ation and net employment growth
are crucial elements. 
Notwithstanding the potential inse-
curity that increased job turnover
could generate, to summarise the
above points, the rate of job reallo-
cation (which is far higher on aver-
age than the rate of net job cre-
ation) seems to be a crucial asset for
the dynamism of EU economies. 
Such a job creating potential (also
highlighted in chapter 3 of this
report) could be turned into an
opportunity and could be considered
as a driver of economic renewal, pro-
vided that appropriate and timely
support is given to displaced work-
ers. This needs to be done in order
to reduce the time workers spend
unemployed and to increase their
skills. Consequently the matching
efficiency needs to be improved, in
order to properly match vacancies
and unemployment spells. There-
fore not surprisingly it has become
a policy priority.
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115 at 2-digit NACE level (classification by activity) and measured against the number of employed persons as reported in the LFS
data from Eurostat.
116 Authors calculations, based on the argument developed by Pierre Cahuc, 
http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/DEAEns/Ch09ffHCE.pdf
117 by ISCED skill category, referring to the skills of the individuals employed.
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Net job creation by country and by skills (2002 to 2003)
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Chart 102 - Net job creation by country and by skills118
Net job creation by country and by skills (1998 to 2003)
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Source: Eurostat, the European Union Labour Force Survey and own calculations. The information on skills is less adequate
in this case – from 1998 to 2003 – with a higher share of 'no answer'. 
1998 to 2003
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118 In charts 101 and 102, the scale of the Y-axis was artificially standardised between -1 and 1 reflecting relative percentage
changes. In order to reflect the actual magnitude of changes (in terms of the number of people affected), the countries are sort-
ed according to the total absolute number of changes, therefore the largest countries are to the right of the charts. 
7. Concluding
remarks 
7.1. Main findings
In the 1990s, economies have
become more and more integrated.
Trade and FDI have increased sub-
stantially, and Europe seems to
have become more and more inte-
grated, with smaller countries dis-
playing more ‘openness’ than the
larger European economies.
Moreover, integration is a complex
set of links that goes far beyond
mere trade in goods. Therefore in
this chapter we have looked at
enlargement and the dynamics of
further integration as a ‘mini-glob-
alisation’. Indeed regional integra-
tion can be thought of as one
example of ‘globalisation’, as in a
laboratory experiment. 
We noted that patterns of speciali-
sation and trade have been chang-
ing with further integration, that
FDI plays an increasing role and
that overall the upgrading of prod-
ucts towards high quality segments
is a trend across industry and the
service sector. The dynamic or long-
term gains from regional integra-
tion at the EU level stem from all
the factors examined in section 3
leading to specialisation, enhanced
trade links, increased diversity and
increased efficiency within the EU,
together with the upgrading of
products and skills. Such gains
translate into long-term growth
prospects. Seizing the opportunities
brought about by globalisation
requires that all actors bear in mind
the long-term gains, even though
long-term gains are dispersed com-
pared to much concentrated and
localised short-term costs. 
While deepening economic integra-
tion may have an impact in specific
regions or sectors that are more
exposed to import penetration, evi-
dence also shows that this goes
both ways, in the sense it creates
new opportunities for all; this is
particularly obvious in bordering
regions. Yet there may be a bias
towards higher skills and the distri-
butional effects can be magnified
due to the lack of labour mobility
across sectors, regions and coun-
tries. Overall, experience gained
through previous periods of deep-
ening economic integration preced-
ing and accompanying enlarge-
ment of the Community shows that
the expected negative impact on
employment and wages did not
occur. The impact on employment
and wages is limited to certain sec-
tors; neither did it create substan-
tial inflows of migrants
119
. 
Although the assumption is that
wage differentiation should
increase the more a country
becomes integrated in the global
game, due to increasing rewards to
productivity gains in technology-
driven sectors, the evidence is
mixed (see chapter 3 of this report).
It seems that increasing productivity,
the continuous upgrading of Euro-
pean products and the increased
quality of European labour are the
way forward, this explains the
growing need for strong invest-
ment in human capital, lifelong
learning and adaptability of the
workers and enterprises. This holds
true, independently of the sector
under consideration, be it industry
or services (this relates to the find-
ings of chapter 3). 
In the European case, integration
takes place in a broader context of
solidarity and cohesion, which does
not apply globally. The EU institu-
tional framework represents a fur-
ther step to such ‘integration’,
which is lacking at global level –
namely global governance. In addi-
tion, European integration has
occurred gradually, whereas in
recent years, further integration of
economies globally has witnessed
fairly abrupt changes and sudden
shocks, such as the relatively
localised and concentrated impact
of offshoring on some workers and
sub-sectors. 
The bulk of the work on globalisa-
tion and its impact on the labour
market has so far focussed on man-
ufacturing, partly also because of
data limitations. This will probably
change in the coming years,
because of the importance of ICT
and related services – telecoms and
technological improvements that
accelerate the pace of ‘change’ in
general and restructuring in partic-
ular; and related topics that have
emerged recently, such as outsourc-
ing, the growing importance of
trade relations with countries such
as China, India, and Brazil. 
Attention should be paid to analyse
carefully the specific strategies of
firms when they opt for outsourc-
ing. Consequences of vertical or
horizontal strategies differ and
should be accounted for in the
design of policies targeted at man-
aging change, in particular with a
view to mitigate the strongly
localised or regional effects of mass
layoffs due to certain types of out-
sourcing or offshoring (irrespective
of the type of skills and of the
nature of the sector). Indeed the
geographical concentration of lay-
offs is most disruptive in such cases,
calling for strong and timely policy
action targeted towards the dis-
placed workers.
One of the main challenges to
come to grips with such a topic is
methodological. Pure trade data
are not adequate to understand
changes in the division of labour
among countries, the international
fragmentation of production and
the activities of affiliates of MNCs.
There is a need to gather the fol-
lowing data European-wide: at the
macroeconomic level, data on job
vacancies (through the job vacancy
survey of Eurostat) should prove
most useful once all countries pro-
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119 See The impact of Eastern enlargement on Employment and labour markets in the EU Member States,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/impact_en.htm
vide it, especially in relation to
unemployment data, to understand
the dynamics of matching; at the
microeconomic level, linked em-
ployer-employee data are needed to
analyse job creation and destruc-
tion thoroughly as well as more
specific trends such as offshoring
for instance, possibly combining
such data with data from customs
registers. Further attempts at link-
ing datasets containing informa-
tion on both employment and
trade variables at individual level
should be encouraged. 
Finally analysing the dynamics of
job creation throughout the EU in
recent years (1998-2003) shows that
overall, net job creation occurs
across a variety of sectors and
notably for the high skilled. Such
diversity should be seen as a poten-
tial and as an opportunity, driving
economic renewal, provided that
mobility is improved and efficient
matching is guaranteed. 
7.2. Policy perspective
Globalisation has positive and neg-
ative effects, but altogether this
process brings about overall gains
for European workers and con-
sumers. Yet the distribution of gains
is uneven; the labour market is cen-
tral to whether these benefits of
globalisation are effectively accessi-
ble to all. Dynamic economies nec-
essarily create jobs and such
dynamism creates enhanced oppor-
tunities for workers; however this
requires adaptability of all actors,
with appropriate policies helping
them in ‘anticipating, triggering
and absorbing change’120, thereby
embracing globalisation from a
pro-active perspective.
Growing inter-linkages and inter-
dependence will characterise the
global economy. Variables linking
economies such as trade agree-
ments, as well as exchange rate
policies, have spillover effects and
may feed into the labour markets
through the export channel.
‘Integration’ of emerging countries
into the world economy, ‘the glob-
al game’, their growth and catch-up
is intrinsically linked to opening up. 
While in analytical terms, one dis-
cusses how to ‘compensate’ losers,
in policy terms, one generally thinks
about this issue as ‘finding ways of
helping those negatively affected’
by structural change. The EU has
built-in mechanisms that could help
mitigate the negative effects of
change; these are generalised
access to education and training,
social protection, social dialogue
and activation through appropriate
labour market policies, within a
broader solidarity and cohesion
perspective. This framework could
well serve as a solid basis to help
both workers and enterprises
increase their adaptability, in the
context of accelerated change.
Early-warning and prevention
mechanisms for workers, as well  as
policies that mitigate the costs for
displaced workers in the short- and
long-term, and strong and continu-
ous investment in human capital,
and efficient skill-matching mecha-
nisms should be enhanced to con-
vert the overall feeling of insecurity
into opportunities for the develop-
ment of more diverse career paths
at the individual level. Social pro-
tection systems also need to be
reinforced to cope with such
‘mobility-friendly’ economic envi-
ronments.
The question of how to compen-
sate the losers facing negative con-
sequences of global trends and
structural change (in a broader per-
spective) deserves to be tackled at
European level, all the more as the
EU is a global player and probably
one of the best placed to reap the
benefits from globalisation. For this
reason it should give timely and
appropriate responses to those who
need to rely on compensation
mechanisms. As a result, the gap
between perceptions of what glob-
alisation may be and reality would
tend to close up, making the differ-
ence between expectations that
emerged from globalisation and
reality smaller.
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120 Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok: Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Creating more employment in Europe, November
2003.
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